A19-0991

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0954
A19-0991

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
D. L. T. and J. A. P., Parents.

Filed December 23, 2019
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-JV-19-51

Jeremy Blackwelder, Holmstrom & Kvam, PLLP, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for appellant
D. L. T.)

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant J. A. P.)

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent
Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
The juvenile court terminated D.L.T. and J.A.P.’s parental rights to their two infant
daughters after it determined that the children suffered egregious harm from child abuse,
that the parents failed to comply with their parental duties, that both parents were palpably
unfit to parent the children, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. On
appeal, both parents challenge the juvenile court’s statutory -basis determinations, and
D.L.T. argues that social services failed to make reasonable reunification efforts. Because
clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination of egregious
harm, and because reasonable reunification efforts were not required, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
D.L.T. (mother) and J.A.P. (father) argue that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by ordering the termination of their parental rights to infant twins G.N.P. and I.R.P. The
decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary w ith the juvenile court. In re Welfare
of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). The juvenile court may order the
involuntary termination of parental rights only if: (1) at least one statutory ground for
termination exists; (2) termination is in the children’s best interests; and (3) reasonable
efforts toward reunification were either made or not required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subds. 1(b), 7, 8 (2018). Mother and father both challenge the juvenile court ’s
determination of the existence of stat utory grounds supporting termination. Mother also
argues that respondent Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services (the county) failed

3
to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Because neither parent challenges the
juvenile court’s best-interests determination, we do not address it.
I
Mother and father challenge the juvenile court’s determination that three statutory
bases supported termination of parental rights. “We review the determination of whether a
particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse
of discretion.” In re Welfare of K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019). We review a juvenile court’s factual findings
for clear error, considering whether they are supported by substantial evidence and whether
they address the appropriate statutory criteria. In re Welfare of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894,
897 (Minn. App. 2018). Because we conclude that the juvenile court properly determined
the existence of egregious harm, we decline to address its palpable-unfitness and parental-
duties determinations. See In re Welfare of P.R.L. , 622 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2001)
(noting that one statutory ground is sufficient).
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.3 01, subdivision 1(b)(6), permits the termination
of parental rights if the juvenile court finds:
that a child has experienc ed egregious harm in the
parent’s care which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that
indicates a lack of regard for the child’ s well-being, such that
a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best
interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care.
“‘Egregious harm’ means the infliction of bodily harm to a child or neglect of a child which
demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide minimally adequate parental care. ”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2018). Mother argues that: (A) there is insufficient

4
evidence to conclude that the children suffered egregious harm as a result of child abuse ;
and father argues that (B) there is insufficient evidence to conclude that he knew or should
have known of the egregious harm. Both arguments fail.
A. Clear and convincing e vidence supports the juvenile court ’s
determination that child abuse caused the children’s injuries.
G.N.P. suffered several rib fractures, facial bruising, and a subdural hematoma
(brain bleeding), while I.R.P. suffered several rib fractures. The juvenile court found that
these injuries were egregious harm resulting from child abuse . Mother argues that the
juvenile court erred by determining that abusive trauma caused the children’s injuries
because the county failed to investigate an alternative cause —osteogenesis
imperfecta (O.I.)—a genetic disorder commonly known as brittle bone disease. Her
argument fails.
First, clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court ’s finding that
G.N.P. and I.R.P. “do not suffer from the genetic disorder [O.I.].” Child-abuse pediatrician
Dr. Mark Hudson testified that the children exhibited no signs of the disorder ; there was
no family history of O.I ., the children lacked extra bones in their heads , and their bones
showed no decreased mineral density. Dr. Marcelo Vargas, a genetics-specialist physician,
also observed no O.I. symptoms; there was no indicated family history, the children did
not exhibit short fingers, short toes, or unusual birth marks, and his examination of G.N.P.’s
eyes revealed no blue-grey discoloration indicative of the disorder.
Mother contends that the county should have sought conclusive genetic testing, and
that it was unreasonable for the doctors to rely upon an absence of a family history of O.I.

5
where mother and father each came from “sever ely broken homes.” But the experts’
testimony concerning a lack of physical O.I. symptoms is clear and convincing enough to
support the juvenile court’s finding that O.I. did not cause the injuries. Mother’s O.I. theory
is also inconsistent with evidence showing that, after the children were removed from the
parents’ care, they suffered no further fractures.
Second, and most importantly, clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile
court’s conclusion that “[t]he injuries to the girls were inflicted child abuse.” Dr. Hudson
testified that the nature of the injuries and the children’s age -specific circumstances led
him to conclude the injuries were inflicted abuse: five-month-old children were not active
enough to accidentally self-inflict the injuries; G.N.P.’s bruising was consistent with being
struck, not falling; infant rib fracturing is “very specific for abusive injur y in infants” and
results most often from forceful squeezing; and the stages of healing in G.N.P.’s ribs
indicated abuse inflicted over a range of time. The juvenile court made findings consistent
with Dr. Hudson’s testimony, and the record contains clear and convincing evidence to
support the juvenile court’s conclusion that child abuse caused egregious harm.
B. Clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court ’s
determination that one or both parents abused the children , and that
they therefore knew or should have known of the egregious harm.
Unlike mother, father concedes that “[t]here is substantial evidence that the children
. . . were seriously abused by someone,” but argues that there “is no conclusion, and less
than satisfactory evidence, concerning who abused them.” We first clarify that, contrary to
father’s repeated insistence, the juvenile court did find “[t]he injuries to the girls were
inflicted child abuse by [father] or [mother] or both.” But we acknowledge that the juvenile

6
court did not find which parent (if not both mother and father) committed the child abuse.
As the juvenile court specifically acknowledged, “It is not possible to determine whether
it was [mother] or [father] who harmed [I.R.P] and [G.N.P], or both. Only [they] know this
information. . . . [Mother] and [ father] are capable of relating the information, but they
have not been forthright.”
Where a parent has not personally inflicted egregious harm upon a child, “a court
must find that the parent either knew or should have known that the child had experienced
egregious harm.” In re Welfare of T.P. , 747 N.W. 2d 356, 362 (Minn. 2008). We first
address whether clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
one or both parents abused the children, because it remains relevant to whether the parents
either knew or should have known about the egregious harm. The juvenile court knew that
both girls’ rib fractures were consistent with forceful squeezing and, in G.N.P.’s case, that
her brain bleed was likely caused by a strike rather than a fall. The juvenile court knew that
father characterize d G.N.P.’s bruising as a mere “sleep mark,” that father admitted to
having anger issues, and that parental-capacity evaluator Dr. Peter Marston believed father
had difficulty with self -control and self-regulation. The juvenile court also knew that the
healing of G.N.P.’s ribs indicated the injuries did not occur at once, but rather were spread
over time. Father and mother also testified that they delayed in taking G.N.P. to the doctor
despite her vomiting. And it noted that father gave “evasive” testimony, and failed to
unequivocally deny inflicting the children’s injuries. We recognize that the juvenile court
was in a superior position to assess father’s credibility. See In re Welfare of Children of

7
B.M., 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. App. 2014 ). The juvenile court’s finding that one or
both parents abused the children was not clearly erroneous.
Father implies that the lack of criminal charges against him or mother indicates that
neither he nor mother committed the child abuse. We are unpersuaded by th at argument.
Termination proceedings are separate from criminal prosecutions. The elements required
for an egregious-harm-based termination are different than those required for a successful
prosecution of assault, criminal sexual conduct, or malicious punis hment of a child, all of
which constitute child abuse. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 5 (2018).
Beyond concluding that one or both parents abused the children, the juvenile court
concluded that mother and father actually knew of the abuse. It found that father and mother
knew “whether it was [mother] or [father] who harmed” the children, that mother and father
were capable of relating the information, but that they were not “forthright.” The juvenile
court also found that mother and father were more int erested in protecting one another
rather than their children. It based its determination, in part, on Dr. Marston’s testimony
concerning the parents’ co -dependency issues. 1 The juvenile court was free to evaluate
mother and father’s testimony and to conclude that they were not being forthright, choosing
instead to conceal facts to protect one another.

1 Father challenges the admissibility of Dr. Marston’s parental -capacity evaluations and
testimony for the first time on appeal. Because he made no objection before the juvenile
court and failed to preserve the evidentiary issue in a motion for a new trial, we deem the
argument forfeited and decline to address it further. See In re Welfare of T.D., 731 N.W.2d
548, 553 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2007); In re Welfare of D.N.,
523 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994).

8
Father also questions whether he knew or should have known that the children
actually suffered egregious harm, in this instance focusing on whether he should have
known the degree of harm itself rather than how the harm was inflicted. Father questions
how apparent the injuries were, emphasizing that other medical professionals had not
identified rib fractures prior to Dr. Hudson’s examination, and that “one wo uld think that
the children would be exhibiting extreme [p]ain behavior.”
Father fails to consider the circumstances of G.N.P.’s bruising and subdural
hematoma. Trial testimony established, and the juvenile court found, that a day after father
discovered the “sleep mark” on G.N.P., she began crying more than usual (a sign seemingly
sufficient to satisfy father’s threshold for pain behavior) and began throwing up a large
amount. Father testified that G.N.P. “was just off,” describing the abnormal behavior.
Father told mother G.N.P. was fussy and “acting funny.” The mark on G.N.P.’s face was
concerning enough that a home -visiting nurse reported the mark to child -protection
services. G.N.P.’s soft spot grew hard. The parents did not take G.N .P. to the doctor until
several days later. We have held that the definition of egregious harm is broad enough to
encompass situations in which a parent knows or should have known of harm but “neglects
to obtain appropriate medical care.” In re Welfare of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 742 (Minn.
App. 2013) (addressing malnourishment and failure to seek medical care).
There is clear and convincin g evidence that, at a minimum, f ather knew or should
have known that G.N.P. had suffered harm of an egregious nature. Although the juvenile
court concluded that “the children” experienced egregious harm, it is sufficient to conclude
that the juvenile court’s findings were not clearly erroneous with respect to G.N.P., which

9
supports termination of parental rights regarding both children. See In re Welfare of A.L.F.,
579 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. App. 1998) (holding egregious harm to child in parent’s care
sufficient to support termination of rights to different child in parent’s care).
Father’s arguments do not lead us to reverse. Clear and convincing evidence
supports the juvenile court’s findings, and it did not abuse its discretion in determining the
existence of egregious harm as a statutory basis supporting termination.
II
Mother argues that the county failed to make “ reasonable efforts to finalize the
permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent ” as required by Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.301, subdivision 8(1). But the juvenile court may also find “that reasonable
efforts for reunification are not required a s provided under section 260.012.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8(2). Under Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(a)(1) (2018), the
juvenile court may relieve the social services agency of its duty to make reasonable
reunification efforts “upon a determination . . . that a petition has been filed stating a prima
facie case that . . . the parent has subjected a child to egregious harm . . . .” Here, the
juvenile court determined that the county stated a prima facie case of egregious harm under
section 260.012 and excused the county from making reasonable efforts toward
reunification. Because reasonable efforts were not required, the juvenile court did not err
in ordering the termination of parental rights.
Affirmed.