State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0959

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Casey Belden Hoskins,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2020
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Rodenberg, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-17-1184

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County At torney, Angella M. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Paul F. Shoemaker, Shoemaker & Shoema ker, PLLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
When a district court imposes an interm ediate sanction of incarceration for a
probation violation, the defendant is entitled to the statutory good conduct allowance under
Minn. Stat. § 643.29 (2018) and shall not be pr ospectively deprived of that good conduct
allowance.

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O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Casey Hoskins appeals from a district court order upholding the
revocation of his work-release privileges, finding that appellant violated a condition of his
probation, and ordering interm ediate sanctions for the prob ation violation. Appellant
argues that (1) the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he violated a
condition of his probation; (2) the district court abused its discretion by sentencing
appellant to an additional year of incarcerat ion as an intermediate sanction; and (3) the
district court abused its discretion by denying appellant future allowance for good conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 643.29. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellant killed J.S.L. by ne gligently driving a truck wh ile he had a metabolite of
cocaine in his system. On November 29, 20 18, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of
criminal vehicular homicide under Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(6) (2016).
Consistent with a plea agreement, the dist rict court dispositionally departed from the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and stayed execution of a 48-month prison term. The
district court ordered that appellant serve one year in the Carver County Jail with work-
release privileges. Appellant was placed on supervised probation for ten years, with
conditions of probation that in cluded requiring that he co mplete a chemic al-dependency
assessment, follow the recommendations resulti ng from it, and “[f] ollow all rules of
probation.”

3
Appellant reported to jail on January 15, 2019. He was allowed to participate in the
Carver County Jail’s work-release program, and was self-employed at the time and worked
from an office in his home.
On April 15, 2019, appellant ’s work-release program supervisor, Corporal Johnson,
completed an incident report which detailed that, on April 13, 2019, appellant ran in a 15
kilometer (15K) road race—not a work-release-approved activity—while he was released
from jail to work. A ja il hearing board determined that appellant had violated two jail
rules: (1) giving false information to deten tion staff or a disciplinary hearing board and
(2) unexcused tardiness or ab sence from work release. Appellant served 17 days in
segregation for the two rule violations.
On April 25, 2019, Corpor al Johnson completed a second incident report. The
incident report explained that a Carver County detective listened to recordings of some of
appellant’s telephone calls from the jail, a nd determined from the conversations that
appellant was “going to unauthorized places out in the community while he was supposed
to be working.” Among ot her unauthorized activities, th e recorded conversations
suggested that appellant went to a jewelry store to pick up a ring while on work release. A
jail hearing board determined that appellant violated the terms of his work-release
privileges and deemed appellant’s “previously earned good conduct time” forfeited.
After the jail hearing board’s decision, appellant met with Commander Ashpole to
discuss the revocation of his work-release privileges. On May 2, 2019, Commander
Ashpole informed appellant that he was re instating appellant’s previously earned good
conduct time, but was revoking appellant’s work-release privileges because of appellant’s

4
noncompliance with jail rules. On May 6, 2019, appellant petitioned for district court
review of the jail hearing board’s decision.
On May 9, 2019, appellant’s probation supervisor, Ms. Engelen, filed a probation
violation report which alleged that appella nt violated the terms of his probation by
“fail[ing] to abide by work release conditions.” The repor t cites appellant’s unapproved
participation in the 15K race.
On June 5, 2019, Ms. Engelen filed an addendum to the violation report which
alleged an additional violation of probation—that appellant failed to complete a chemical-
dependency evaluation.
On June 6, 2019, a conso lidated hearing was held on ap pellant’s appeal of the jail
hearing board’s decision to revoke his work-release privileges and on the claimed
probation violations.
At the hearing, Deputy Di ckison testified that appellant admitted to running in the
15K race. Corporal Johnson testified about the rules of work release and about the
difficulties of supervising a self-employed person on work release.
1
Ms. Engelen also testified concerning th e allegations contained in her report and
addendum. Ms. Engelen testified that she me t with appellant for an intake meeting on

1 The record contains evidence that appellant ran the race using the alias “Barry Norman.”
After that duplicity was uncovered, appellant tried to tether his running in the race to work
activity because he had been a race “sponso r.” This claim was investigated and was
determined to be a lie. Appellant was not a sponsor of the race. Although these lies were
not a separate basis for any of the discipline the district court ultimately imposed, we think
it worth mentioning in the entire context of appellant’s belligerent and duplicitous approach
to probation conditions resulting from his conviction for killing J.S.L.

5
March 27, 2019. Appellant had, by then, been in jail for over two months. Ms. Engelen
testified that she and appellant “went over th e probation agreement line by line,” that she
“read him every condition,” and that appellant “was given the chance to ask . . . any
questions before signing [the probation agreement].” Ms . Engelen testified that she
discussed with appellant the expectation th at the court-ordered chemical-dependency
assessment be completed pursuant to the di strict court order “as soon as possible.”
Ms. Engelen testified that she believed that appellant “knew [the chemical-dependency
assessment] needed to happen as soon as possible because [she] wanted [appellant] to begin
treatment if treatment was ordered while in jail.” Appellant declined to do the assessment
while in the jail, because he thought jail staff “didn’t like him.” Ms. Engelen testified that,
to her knowledge, appellant had not made a ny effort to obtain a chemical-dependency
assessment as of the hearing date. He had not reported anything to her and had not provided
her with evidence of having st arted the evaluation process. Ms. Engelen agreed that the
condition of appellant’s probation that requi red him to obtain a chemical-dependency
assessment did not have a specific deadline for completion. She nevertheless reported the
failure to complete the condition imposed by the district court as a probation violation. She
did not believe appellant has the “willingness or ability to follow the requirements of
probation.” Based on her professional experience, Ms. Engelen opined that appellant had
“taken advantage [of] and abus ed” his work-release privileges, and she testified that she
did not believe that appellant was amenable to probation.
The district court affirmed the jail he aring board’s decision concerning work
release. It revoked appellant’s work-releas e privileges, and revo ked his good conduct

6
allowance both retroactively and prospectively.2 Concerning the probation violations, the
district court did not find th at appellant violated a spec ific condition of probation by
running in the 15K race. The district court reasoned that “there is no specific condition [of
appellant’s probation] that sa ys [appellant] must follow all terms and conditions of [his]
work release.” But the district court found that appellant’s failure to complete a chemical-
dependency assessment violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The district
court explained that appellant not only fa iled to complete the chemical-dependency
assessment between his sentencing on January 15 and his meeting with Ms. Engelen on
March 27, but that “then [Ms. Engelen] made it abundantly clear to [appellant] that [he]
needed to have that evaluation as soon as possible.” The district court found that appellant
understood “that as soon as possible does not mean at [his] own convenience.”
The district court did not execute appella nt’s stayed sentence for violating his
probation. Instead, it ordered an intermediate sanction as follows:
I’m reinstating you on all origin al terms and conditions. You
must complete the one year sentence that I have previously
ordered with no work release, and no good time. In addition, I
am sentencing you to an additional one year [consecutive to the
one-year jail sentence appellant was serving] in the Carver
County Jail. You are also not to avail yourself of work release.
I’m specifically ordering that you be denied work release, and
I’m specifically ordering that you get no good time for that
one-year sentence.

This appeal followed.

2 The district court received approximately 20 victim-impact statem ents, which it read
before issuing its ruling on th e record. The district court also explained why it could not
order some of the things that the victim-impact statements recommended.

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ISSUES
I. Does the record support the district court’s finding that the state proved by
clear and convincing evidence that appellant violated a condition of his probation?

II. Did the district court abuse its di scretion by sentencing appellant to an
additional year of incarceration as an intermediate sanction for his probation violation?

III. Did the district court err by revoking appellant’s future entitlement to a good
conduct allowance under Minn. Stat. § 643.29?

ANALYSIS
I. The record supports the district cour t’s finding that th e state proved that
appellant violated a condition of his probation.

Appellant challenges the district court’s finding that the state proved by clear and
convincing evidence that appellant violat ed a condition of his probation by not timely
completing a chemical-dependency assessment.
At a probation-revocation hearing, the st ate must prove a probation violation by
clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)b. “The clear and
convincing evidence sta ndard is met when the truth of th e fact to be proven is highly
probable.” Roby v. State , 808 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Minn. 2 011) (quotation omitted). The
district court has “broad discretion” in determining if there is sufficient evidence whether
a condition of probation has been violated. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn.
1980). When intermediate sanctions are imposed as a consequence for a probation
violation, the three-step Austin analysis for revoking probation does not apply. State v.
Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Min n. 2008). Intermediate sanc tions are entrusted to the
district court’s “broad discretion,” provided that the procedural safeguards of rule 27.04 of
the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure are observed. Id.

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“The imposition of sentences, includin g determining conditio ns of probation is
exclusively a judicial function that cannot be delegated to executive agencies.” State v.
Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Minn. 2004) (quota tion omitted). The district court at
sentencing must “[s]tate preci sely the terms of the sentence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 4(A). “[B]efore a probation violation can occur, the condition alleged to have been
violated must have been a condition actually imposed by the court.” Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d
at 80. A probationer must have a “fair wa rning” of which acts are prohibited by the
probation conditions. Id. It is best practice for a proba tioner to be given “a written copy
of the conditions of his probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251. Where there is a plea
agreement, it is also the best practice that the specific conditions in tended to be imposed
as part of the resulting sentence be clearly identified.
When a prior fair warning “is not containe d in a formal condition, the record must
be closely scrutinized to determine whether the defendant did, in fact, receive the requisite
warning.” Id. (quotation omitted). Oral instructions given to a probationer by his probation
officer may be a sufficient warning to a probationer of his conditions of probation. See id.
“The boilerplate instruction that appellant follow his probation offi cer’s orders may be
general but is necessary to give the probation officer some flexibility.” Id. Directions from
a probation officer are sufficient if “[a] re asonable probationer w ould have understood”
what was required of the probationer. Id. at 251-52.
At appellant’s sentencing, the district cour t told appellant that he was required to
complete a chemical-dependency assessment as a condition of his probation. The printed
sentencing order specified, as a condition of appellant’s probation, that he was required to

9
complete a chemical-depende ncy assessment and follow any resulting recommendations
and to follow “all rules of probation.” The setting within which these probation conditions
were imposed is significant. Appellant had successfully negotiated a downward
dispositional sentencing departure after his criminal conduct killed J.S.L. He was, as a
result, avoiding an executed prison sentence for having killed J.S.L. because of his decision
to combine driving and drugs. Trying to keep appellant drug-free was a critical component
of the negotiated plea agreement. We know this—and appellant knew it—because other
conditions of the negotiated plea and resulting probation included that appellant not use or
possess alcohol, not use or possess “non-pres cribed controlled substances,” submit to
testing for drugs or alcohol, and attend a victim-impact panel.3
At his March intake meeting with Ms. Enge len, appellant was to ld that he needed
to complete the chemical-dep endency assessment “as soon as possible.” Although no
specific date for completion of the assessment was identified in the sentencing order, any
reasonable probationer would have understood that “as soon as possible” does not mean
“at the probationer’s leisure.”
Here again, context is important. Appellant was not repo rted as being in violation
of this condition immediately after the March meeting with Ms. Engelen. Far from it.
Despite having been told in March that the chemical-dependency assessment needed to be
completed as soon as possible, appellant found the time to participate in a 15K race in April
and to shop for jewelry when he was supposed to be released to work. These problems

3 Appellant had violated the no-use-of-chemicals provision of his pretrial release by having
an alcohol concentration of 0.082 while he was at liberty before his guilty plea.

10
were brought to the district court’s attenti on in early May in connection with the work-
release violations, and still appellant did no t complete or even arrange for the required
evaluation. Finally, and on June 5, Ms. Engelen added failure to complete the assessment
as an additional claimed probation violation. And instead of volunteering to immediately
do the assessment, appellant argued to the distri ct court only that he had not violated any
“specific condition of the sentence.” The a ssessment was, as Ms. Engelen had told
appellant, available to be done in the jail. Appellant refused that option because, he said,
jail staff “didn’t like him.” (Jail staff does not do the assessment; an employee of Northstar
Regional Treatment Center is the assessor.) Appellant had ample time between his intake
meeting with Ms. Engelen at th e end of March and the proba tion violation hearing at the
beginning of June to complete a chemical-dependency assessment either at the jail or in
the community. It is evident from this record that he was refusing to do it.
The record supports the district court’s finding that appellant violated his probation
by failing to complete—or even start—the chemical-depe ndency evaluatio n within a
reasonable time after having been advised by his probation agent to complete it as soon as
possible.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by sentencing appellant to an
additional year of incarceration as an intermediate sanction for his probation
violation.

Appellant argues that, by ordering him to serve an additional year of incarceration
as an intermediate sanction for a technical pr obation violation, the district court acted
unreasonably.

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“Intermediate sanctions are imposed when the district court has determined that the
defendant has violated his probation but that revocation of the defendant’s probation and
execution of the underlying sentence is not appropriate, at least in part, because
rehabilitation is still possible.” Cottew, 746 N.W.2d at 637. “[B]ecause the district
court . . . agrees that revocation is not warranted,” findings as required by Austin are not
necessary. Id.; see Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250-51 (explaining the findings that a district
court must make before revoking probation). “[T]he term ‘intermediate sanctions’ includes
but is not limited to incarceration in a local jail or workhouse . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.135,
subd. 1(b) (2018). The distri ct court has broad discretion in deciding to impose an
intermediate sanction. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d at 638. A district court can impose additional
jail time as an intermediate sanction for a violation of a condition of probation. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.135, subd. 1(b).
“[T]he imposition of interm ediate sanctions for prob ation violations will be
reviewed to determine whether the dist rict court abused its discretion.” Cottew, 746
N.W.2d at 638. “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark,
927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Although the district court f ound what it described as a “flagrant” violation of a
condition of probation, it chose not to execute appellant’s prison sentence. The district
court reasoned that “send[ing] [appellant] to prison for not tim ely completing [his]
chemical dependency evaluation” was not a ppropriate. The district court instead

12
determined that imposition of an intermediate sanction was a more appropriate remedy for
appellant’s violation.
Minnesota statutes allow the district court, as a condition of prob ation, to “require
the defendant to serve up to one year incarceration in a county jail.” Minn. Stat. § 609.135,
subd. 4 (2018). There is no statutory limit on “the cumulative amount of local jail time a
district court may impose as a consequence of probation violations.” State v. Johnson, 743
N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. App. 2008). In the overall c ontext of appellant’s poor
performance on probation, the district court’s measured response in imposing an
intermediate sanction instead of revoking appe llant’s probation was within its discretion.
We see no abuse of that discretion by sentencing appellant to an additional year of jail time
for violating a condition of his probation.
III. The district court erred by prospect ively revoking appellant’s future good
conduct allowance.

Appellant argued in his briefing on appeal that the district court erred by revoking
both his previously earned good conduct allowance and any future good conduct allowance
that he would earn. At oral argument, appella nt withdrew his claim that the district court
erred by revoking appellant’s good conduct a llowance for his initial one-year period of
incarceration, because that time has alrea dy been served. Appellant maintains his
challenge to the district court’s prospective revocation of any good conduct allowance that
he would earn on the second one-year jail term—the intermediate sanction.
The district court has discretion in sentencing, including discretion to place a person
on probation, to revoke a person’s probation, or to impose intermediate sanctions. State v.

13
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014); Cottew, 746 N.W.2d at 636-38. We “reverse
sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08.
We therefore review the district court’s de cision to revoke appellant’s good conduct
allowance for an abuse of discretion. If a di strict court misapplies the law, it abuses its
discretion. State v. Babcock, 685 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 19, 2004).
Minnesota law provides for a “good co nduct allowance” to reduce a person’s
sentence.
Any person sentenced for a term to any county jail, . . . whether
the term is part of an execute d sentence or is imposed as a
condition of probation, shall, when sentenced to serve ten days
or more, diminish the term of the sentence one day for each
two days served . . . during wh ich the person has not violated
any rule or discipline of the place wherein the person is
incarcerated . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 643.29, subd. 1 (2018).

In response to a violation of a work-rele ase condition, a “correctional facility
administrator may require that the inmate spe nd the balance of the inmate’s sentence in
actual confinement.” Minn. Stat. § 631.425, subd. 7 (2018). “On appeal . . . , the [district]
court must review the facility administrator’s decision and, in its review, may (1) uphold
or reverse the decision; and (2 ) order additional sanctions for the work release violation,
including canceling any earned reduction in the [person]’s term and finding the [person] in
contempt of court.” Id. “Earned reduction” is not further defined by the statute.
Cancellation of an “earned reduction,” id. (emphasis added), uses the past tense and
therefore necessarily relates to a reduction al ready earned. “We must presume that [the]

14
legislature says in a statute what it means a nd means in a statute what it says there.”
Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Had
the legislature intended to gr ant the district court the optio n of prospectively denying the
good conduct allowance, it could and would have said so. It did not. We cannot add words
to a statute that the legislature omitted. Doran v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 720, 831 N.W.2d 1,
5 (Minn. App. 2013).
The district court, when imposing an inte rmediate sanction of incarceration, is not
authorized to prospectively deprive a defendant of the good conduct allowance under Minn.
Stat. § 631.425. The statute makes mandato ry a reduction in the duration of a person’s
sentence subject only to the remedies expressed in section 643.425. See Minn. Stat.
§ 643.29, subd. 1 (stating that a term of impr isonment “shall . . . diminish the term of the
sentence” except as provided by the statute). Prospective deprivation of the statutory good
conduct allowance is not permitted.
The district court was understandably co ncerned with appellant’s demonstrated
disdain for the conditions of his probatio n, but nevertheless misapplied the law by
prospectively denying appellant the future good conduct allowance as the law requires for
the intermediate sanction of one year in jail. Of course, if appellant continues to violate
rules, his good conduct allowance may be “taken away” under Minn. Stat. § 643.29,
subd. 2.
D E C I S I O N
The district court did not err in finding, on this extensive record, that appellant
violated a term of his probation. It did not abuse its discretion by or dering that appellant

15
serve one additional year of incarceration as an intermediate sanction for the probation
violation. But the district court erred by prospectively denying appellant the good conduct
allowance provided for under Mi nn. Stat. § 643.29, subd. 1. Appellant is entitled to the
good conduct allowance on th e second one-year incarceration period unless he commits
additional rule violations during that period of incarceration.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.