In re the Matter of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0971

In re the Matter of:

Tonia Lynn McRunnel and on behalf of minor children, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Adam Joseph McRunnel,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Norman County District Court
File No. 54-FA-19-118

Tonia Lynn McRunnel, Ada, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Adam Joseph McRunnel, Ada, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Segal, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s grant of an order for protection, appellant Adam
McRunnel argues that the district court abused its discretion when it issued an order for
protection against him. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Adam McRunnel (husband) a nd respondent Tonia McRunnel (wife)
married in 2010, and have one child together. On April 11, 2019, wife petitioned for an
order for protection (OFP) against husband. At the time, the parties were separated and
lived apart. In her petition, wife explained that husband sexually assaulted her on or about
April 10. Wife also describe d that the next day husband “hacked” into her internet
accounts, tracked her location, and called her 21 times in a 24-hour period. And wife
alleged that in March, husband threatened to commit suicide in front of her. Based on the
petition, the district court granted an emergency ex parte OFP to remain in effect until the
court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition.
On April 23, the district court held the evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from
wife and husband. Wife testified that on Ap ril 10, husband came to her residence late at
night to pick up the couple’s child, and he ha d nonconsensual intercourse with her. Wife
testified that she did not consent to the inte rcourse and told husband “that it hurt.” Wife
also testified about husband’s threat to commit suicide in March. Wife stated that husband
said he was going to “blow his brains out” with a firearm in front of her. Wife also testified
about husband’s repetitive calls. Wife st ated that during the phone calls husband
threatened to take their child.
Husband testified that on the night of the a lleged sexual assault, wife asked him to
spend the night and they engaged in consensual intercourse. Husband also testified that he
called wife repeatedly on April 11 because he had arranged to spend time with their child
but could not reach wife. Hu sband believed that the child was with wife and wife’s

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boyfriend. He further testified that he accesse d wife’s internet accounts in an attempt to
locate wife and their child and because he was concerned about the child being with wife’s
boyfriend.
After hearing the testimony, the district court granted the OFP. Concluding that
wife’s testimony regarding the sexual assault was credible, the district court found that
domestic abuse occurred when husband engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with
wife and that husband’s repetitive phone calls constituted harassment. Based on these
findings, the district court orde red husband not to have any co ntact with wife and to stay
at least 500 feet from her residence. The district court also granted wife temporary custody
of the couple’s child, and it provided husband with supervised parenting time on alternating
weekends under the supervisi on of husband’s mother. The district court found that
temporary custody and supervised parenting tim e were necessary to en sure the safety of
wife and the couple’s child. Finally, because the district court determined that husband
posed an imminent risk of causing substantia l bodily harm to others, the district court
required husband to transfer all firearms either to a third party or a law enforcement agency.
Husband appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Husband challenges the district court’s de cision to grant the OFP, arguing that the
record does not support the district court’ s finding that he committed domestic abuse.
Husband also argues that the district court abused its discretion by requiring supervised
parenting time. We address each argument in turn.

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I. The district court did not abuse its discre tion by granting an OFP in favor of
wife.

We review a district court’s decision to gr ant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.
Ekman v. Miller, 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Mi nn. App. 2012). The dist rict court abuses its
discretion if its factual findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law.
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2009). We view the record in
the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, and will reverse only if we are “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Braend ex rel. Minor
Children v. Braend, 721 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation omitted). But we
will not make credibility determinations or reconcile conflicting evidence. Aljubailah ex
rel. A. M. J. v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 2017).
The Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act provides that a district court may issue an OFP
upon a finding of domestic abuse. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4 (2018). Domestic abuse
includes, “if committed against a family or household member by a family or household
member,” “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” “criminal sexual conduct,” as well as
“the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bod ily injury, or assault.”
Id., subd. 2(a)(1)-(3) (2018). An OFP petitioner has the burde n of proving th at domestic
abuse did occur. Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App. 2015). Once a district
court determines that “domestic abuse” has been established, it may “examine all of the
relevant circumstances proven to determine whether to gran t or deny the petition for an
OFP.” Thompson ex rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018).

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Husband argues that there was insufficien t evidence to find that domestic abuse
occurred or was threatened with respect to wife. We disagree. Wife testified that husband
engaged in intercourse with her, that she did not consent, and that she told husband that it
hurt. Wife’s testimony is sufficient to esta blish that husband engaged in nonconsensual
sexual contact. And the nonconsensual sexual contact in this case meets the definition of
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451 (2018)—conduct that is
included in the definition of domestic abuse. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(3).
Although husband testified, and argues on a ppeal, that the conduc t was consensual, the
district court found wife’s testimony credible and husband’s testimony not credible. We
defer to the district court’ s credibility determinations. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99.
Wife’s testimony is sufficient to support the district court’s finding of domestic abuse.
Because the finding of domestic abuse is supported by the record, the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it is sued an OFP in favor of wife. See Gada v. Dedefo,
684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004) (noting that a district court abuses its discretion
when it issues an OFP that lacks evidentiary support).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering supervised parenting
time.

Husband also argues that the district cour t abused its discretion when it required
supervised parenting time. As part of an OFP, a court may “establish temporary parenting
time with regard to minor children of the parties on a basis which gives primary
consideration to the safety of the victim and the children.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 6(a)(4) (2018). A dist rict court’s parenting-time decision included in an OFP will

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not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Beardsley v. Garcia, 753 N.W.2d 735,
739 (Minn. 2008) (“The decision to award te mporary parenting time in an OFP is within
the discretion of the district court . . . .”).
Here, the district court found that husban d and wife could not co-parent, and that
husband’s admitted suicide threat made him unsuitable to have uns upervised parenting
time. Based on these findings, the district court determined that the safety of wife and the
couple’s child required supervised visitation.
Husband admits to the suicide threat, but he argues that an inability to co-parent is
an insufficient basis for requiring supervised parenting time. Husband’s argument fails to
fully consider the facts in the record and the reasons for the district court’s decision. The
record shows that husband thr eatened to commit suicide in th e presence of wife using a
firearm, threatened to take the couple’s ch ild in the past, and committed domestic abuse
against wife. Therefore, the district court’s finding that husband poses a risk to the safety
of wife and the child is supported by the record. Supervised parenting time is necessary to
protect wife from further harm and ensure the safety of the couple’s child.
Husband further argues that the couple’s child would be safer in his care than in
wife’s care because wife and her boyfriend “ingest illegal drugs” and wife has physically
abused her children from a prior relationship. But where an appellant’s version of the facts
might lead another trier of fact to make different findings, that does not render the district
court’s findings clearly erroneous where the district court’s findings are supported by the
record. Crosby v. Crosby , 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). As explained above, there is sufficient ev idence to support the

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district court’s finding that husband poses a risk to the safety of wife and the couple’s child.
Accordingly, while another court may have c oncluded differently, the district court here
did not abuse its discretion in ordering supervised parenting time.1
Affirmed.

1 Husband also argues that (1) the OFP is overly burdensome beca use it resulted in the
removal of his firearms, and (2) wife had the assistance of an attorney in drafting her
informal brief, which he asserts is unfair. Husband does not cite to authority and provides
no further argument to support these asserti ons. An assignment of error in a brief not
supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection. Braend ex rel. Minor Children v. Braend , 721 N.W.2d 924, 929 (Minn.
App. 2006); see also Schoepke v. Alexander Sm ith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133,
135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by
any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on
appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”). Because these issues were
not adequately briefed and no prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection, the
arguments are waived.