State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0984

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Glenn Herman Thomas,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-587

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
After an expert witness told a jury his opinion about common sex-trafficking
practices, other witnesses testified that Glenn Thomas and a man who had just struck and
threatened to kill a 15- year-old girl forced her to engage in various sex acts, that Thomas
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and the other man used force during the rape, and that Thomas photographed the girl naked
after learning that the man would use the images to solicit her to practice prostitution. The
jury found Thomas guilty of five offenses, including first-degree criminal sexual conduct
for penetrating the girl while he was aided by an accomplice’s use of force or coercion and
aiding the solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution. Thomas appeals, arguing that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct
and aiding solicitation and, further, that the district court improperly admitted the expert
witness’s sex-trafficking testimony. We affirm because sufficient evidence supports the
jury’s verdict and the district court properly admitted the expert’s testimony.
FACTS
A sex-trafficking investigation led St. Paul police to suspect that Glenn Thoma s
sexually penetrated a 15- year-old girl while being aided by another man’s force or
coercion, and that Thomas photographed the girl naked knowing that the man would use
the images to induce the girl to practice prostitution. The state charged Thomas with aiding
the solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, using a minor in a pornographic work,
and three counts of criminal sexual conduct . See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, .322,
subd. 1(a)(1), .344, subd. 1(b)–(c), .342, subd. 1(f)(i), 617.246, subd. 2 (2016). The state
notified Thomas of its intent to offer expert testimony about common sex -trafficking
practices. Thomas asked the district court to preclude the evidence as irrelevant and as
risking jury confusion. The district court rejected the request, concluding that the state’s
expert could offer opinions relevant “to the charges at hand . . . and some of the definitions
that have been brought up or disclosed in discovery.” The case proceeded to a jury trial.
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Expert Testimony
St. Paul Police Commander Sean Lohse-Johnson opined about common terms used
in the sex-trafficking industry. He testified that sex traffickers often prey on vulnerable
girls, groom them by habituating them to nakedness and sex, and test them by having sex
with the girls or by directing them to have sex with others. The commander opined that sex
traffickers control victims by threatening violence or manipulati ng them emotionally. He
explained that traffickers use various means to arrange sexual encounters—including
online postings—and that patrons sometimes specify their preference for younger victims.
Victim’s Testimony and Statements
The girl involved in Thomas’s conduct, A.D. (“Victim”), testified as follows. She
told the jury that she was 15 years old in November 2017 when she and her 16- year-old
friend C.D. (“Friend”) ran away from a residential treatment facility. Victim said that she
and Friend rode a train from St. Paul to Minneapolis, where they encountered two men—
Trent Phipps and “S.A.” —got into their car, ingested cocaine and alcohol, and went to
Thomas’s apartment. Thomas was not home, but they returned to his apartment the next
day and met him and Michael Morgan. Morgan groped the girls sexually, telling them they
would be a family an d that Victim and Friend would become prostitutes. Morgan and
Phipps took the girls to a Walmart to purchase clothes , lingerie, and makeup. Victim
understood that one of the men would photograph her and Friend so their images could be
shown to prostitution patrons.
After they returned to Thomas’s apartment, Victim went into the bathroom to
change clothes. Morgan followed her into the bathroom and told her that she was his
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“bitch” and that if she ever tried to leave him, “he’d find [ her]” and hurt or kill her. He
demanded that she perform fellatio, grabbed her head, and forced it to his penis. He slapped
her head and also penetrated her vaginally with his penis.
Morgan led Victim, naked, out of the bathroom and into the living room. There, he
again forced Victim to engage in sex with him, this time in front of others. Thomas joined
in, performing cunnilingus on Victim . Morgan pulled Victim’s head toward himself ,
forcing her to perform oral sex. Thomas did the same, and the two men alternately
penetrated Victim orally and vaginally.
The next day, another man took Victim into the apartment bedroom and spoke with
her about “doing business,” which meant prostitution. Thomas entered the room angry and
began yelling about the door having been shut. Morgan later told Victim “the rules of the
business.” She understood that Phipps had arranged a sexual encounter for her but that the
potential patron wanted to see pictures of her. Morgan and Thomas posed Victim and took
nude or mostly nude photographs of her using Morgan’s cell phone. Thomas was “present
for some of the conversations about what was going [to] happen with the pictures.” Victim
eventually left the apartment in a car with Morgan and a man named Creed Lewis. Morgan
received a message from Phipps, and they began driving to a gas station to meet him.
Police stopped the car and questioned them at the gas station. Officers took Victim
to a hospital, where she was reunited with Friend. Victim recounted her story to police and
told a nurse practitioner that Morgan and Thomas began “fighting over [her]” during sex,
“slamming [her] into the couch.” She said that Morgan coerced her into performing oral
sex, threatening, “You better do it or I’ll kill you.”
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Friend’s Testimony
Friend told the jury that she heard Morgan discuss “selling” Victim and Friend to a
man and that Thomas was present. She said that she saw Thomas and Morgan
simultaneously sexually penetrating Victim. She was not in the apartment when Morgan
and Thomas photographed Victim, but she was with Phipps when he received nude photos
sent from Morgan’s phone. She understood that the men intended to show the pictures to a
potential prostitution patron.
Michael Morgan’s Testimony
Morgan testified as an accomplice. He told the jury that he and Thomas were
longtime friends from Chicago. Morgan was living at Thomas’s apartment in November
2017. Phipps and S.A. had come to visit. Morgan acknowledged under the prosecutor’s
questioning that he had pleaded guilty in a separate criminal case during a plea hearing in
which he admitted to the following: he had engaged in oral and vaginal sex with Victim;
Thomas was in the apartment at least once when Morgan had sex with Victim; Thomas
and Morgan photographed the Victim in various stages of nudity ; and Morgan sent the
photos to Phipps because Phipps had arranged a sexual encounter for Victim. On
cross-examination, Morgan said that he had been confused during his plea-hearing
admission and that Thomas was never there when Morgan photographed Victim.
Other Testimony
A St. Paul police officer said that officers encountered Lewis, Morgan, and Victim
at a gas station after noticing them in a car with a nonfunctioning headlight. They spoke
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separately with Victim, who recounted the story outlined above. Officers recovered
condoms and condom-use instructions from the car.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Thomas guilty on all five counts. The district court entered
convictions and sentenced Thomas to consecutive prison terms of 187 months for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct and 90 months for aiding the solicitation of a minor to
practice prostitution. Thomas appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Thomas contends that the evidence does not support his convictions arising from
his aiding Morgan’s solicitation of Victim to practice prostitution and his sexually
assaulting Victim with Morgan’s aid. He also contends that we should order a new trial
because the district court improperly admitted expert testimony. We addre ss each
contention in turn.
I
We first consider Thomas’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for aiding Morgan’s solicitation of Victim to practice prostitution because the
evidence proved neither that he intended to aid Morgan nor that Morgan did nothing after
receiving Thomas’s aid that he would not have done without it. We reject the argument.
We must decide whether the evidence supports Thomas’s conviction on the state’s
accomplice-liability theory. To find Thomas guilty on an accomplice-liability theory, the
jury had to find that Morgan intentionally solicited Victim to practice prostitution, that
Thomas knew that Morgan was committing or would commit a crime, and that Thomas
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intended his presence or actions to help Morgan commit the crime. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.05, subd. 1, .322, subd. 1(a)(1); State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn.
2015). Thomas questions the sufficiency of the evidence of his intent and the evidence that
his presence or actions aided in Morgan’s crime.
We are satisfied that the circumstantial evidence proved Thomas’s criminal intent.
An accomplice’s intent to aid the commission of a crime is a state-of -mind requirement
that is rarely proved by direct evidence. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d at 53. A jury may instead
infer an accomplice’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, like the defendant’s
close association with the principal actor, his presence during the crime, his lack of
objection to or surprise at the principal’s actions, or his flight with the principal. Id. Because
the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove intent, we must first determine the
circumstances proved and then consider whether those circumstances permit any
reasonable inference other than Thomas’s guilt. See Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643
(Minn. 2017).
The state proved the following circumstances relevant to Thomas’s intent to aid
Morgan’s crime. Thomas was present when Morgan discussed his plans to “sell” Victim
and Friend to a man. Thomas became angry and confrontational when another man
spoke with Victim behind a closed door. Thomas and Morgan posed Victim nude and
photographed her with Morgan’s phone after a potential patron inquired about her. Thomas
was present when Morgan discussed the solicitation purpose of the photographs.
Thomas concedes that these circumstances “might” support the jury’s finding, but
he argues that they also support the rational hypothesis that he was merely “passively
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present” in his apartment, not intending his actions to aid Morgan. He emphasizes that
Morgan, Phipps, and S.A. had primary roles in targeting, grooming, and soliciting the girls
to practice prostitution. His argument misses the mark because his guilt is that of an
accomplice, which assumes that someone else was the principal. That Morgan and possibly
others played primary roles in the scheme is a necessary component of Thomas’s crime.
Also unavailing is Thomas’s passive-presence theory. He contends that no direct
evidence established “that Morgan said anything to Thomas about prostitution or sex
trafficking” and that he was mere ly present when Morgan discussed the scheme with
others. Thomas insists that Victim’s testimony about her understanding sheds little light
on his understanding. The theory overlooks the fact that we do not review circumstantial
evidence based on isolated facts but as a whole. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 599
(Minn. 2013). And the evidence as a whole includes Thomas’s presence while Morgan
discussed the sex-trafficking arrangement, Thomas’s presence when Morgan discussed the
purpose of posing and photographing Victim nude, and Thomas’s active role in posing and
photographing Victim using Morgan’s phone. Thomas’s passive -presence theory is
implausible on the facts as a whole. The circumstantial evidence proved his intent.
We are likewise satisfied that the evidence proved that Thomas’s ac tions aided in
Morgan’s crime. Thomas relies on State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. 1981),
to contend that accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant encouraged the
principal “to take a course of action which he might not otherwise have taken.” Ulvinen is
distinguished on its facts. In Ulvinen, the defendant knew of her son’s plan to murder his
wife and was present in the home when he did it. Id. at 426. The supreme court reversed
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her aiding-and-abetting conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient because it
proved nothing more than her passive approval. Id. at 428. The supreme court focused on
her statements to her son that the wife’s death would be for the best, concluding that the
statements were not “active encouragement or instigation” and that no evidence proved
they influenced her son’s decision to murder. Id. Unlike in Ulvinen, the state’s case here
did not focus on advising, encouraging, or counseling a principal to commit a crime. Here
the state focused on Thomas’s active role in aiding the principal, and it proved the case
with evidence that he helped create images to solicit a potential patron.
We have carefully c onsidered the circumstances in their entirety . We have no
difficulty concluding that those circumstances establish Thomas’s guilt as an accomplice
and preclude any rational hypothesis inconsistent with guilt.
II
We next address Thomas’s argument that the evidence does not support his
conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. To find Thomas guilty of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(f)(i), the
jury had to find that he sexually penetrated Victim, that Morgan aided or abetted Thomas,
and that Morgan “use[d] force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit.” Thomas
focuses on the last element, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that
Morgan’s actions caused Victim to submit to Thomas’s penetration. We hold that the
evidence of Morgan’s force and coercion gave the jury ample grounds to find that the state
proved the element.
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Our decision depends in part on the meaning of “force” and “coercion.” Force
includes the “threatened infliction by the actor of bodily harm . . . against the complainant”
which causes her to reasonably believe the actor is capable of executing the threat, and
which causes the complainant to submit. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3 (2016). Coercion
involves an actor’s use of words or circumstances causing a complainant to fear bodily
harm, or an actor’s use of “confinement, or superior size or strength, against the
complainant that causes the complainant to submit to sexual penetration . . . against the
complainant’s will.” Id., subd. 14 (2016). A variety of circumstantial evidence implies that
Morgan employed force or coercion to cause Victim to submit to Thomas.
Again, we first consider the circumstances proved by the state. See Loving ,
891 N.W.2d at 643. The following circumstances proved are relevant here. Victim was
15 years old. Thomas and Morgan were both 36 years old. In the bathroom and immediately
before Thomas penetrated Victim, Morgan told her that she was “his bitch,” threatened to
hurt or kill her if she left him, slapped her head, forced her to perform oral sex, and
penetrated her vaginally. Morgan paraded Victim into the living room naked and continued
penetrating her orally and vaginally. Thomas joined in, performing oral sex on Victim.
Morgan and Thomas began “fighting over [her]” during the sexual episode, “slamming
[her] into the couch.” The two men alternated between penetrating Victim orally and
vaginally, each grabbing her head and pulling her hair to force her to perform oral sex. And
when she attempted to stop, Morgan threatened her, saying, “You better do it or I’ll kill
you.”
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These circumstances allow for no rational inference inconsistent with guilt. See id.
Morgan’s conduct constituted both force and coercion. See Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subds. 3,
14. Coercion need not precede criminal sexual conduct, but can occur while the conduct is
being accomplished. State v. Whitley , 682 N.W.2d 691, 695 (Minn. App. 2004). And
conduct that contributes to an “atmosphere of fear” indicates coercive influence. See State
v. Gamez, 494 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 1993).
The circumstances proved include all of these features and easily support the verdict.
Thomas acknowledges that Morgan “certainly used force or coercion to cause
[Victim] to submit to his own penetration of her” and even that Thomas’s action s
established that he forced Victim to engage in sex. But he contends that, because each
man’s actions enabled his own criminal sexual conduct, Morgan’s force or coercion could
not have separately caused Victim to submit to Thomas. But multiple causes may
contribute to the same effect. In other criminal contexts, we have analyzed causation by
considering whether a defendant’s actions were a substantial causal factor of a result. See,
e.g., State v. Dunagan, 521 N.W.2d 355, 356 (Minn. 1994) (applying the substantial-factor
test in a criminal-vehicular-operation case); State v. Sutherlin, 396 N.W.2d 238, 240–41
(Minn. 1986) (explaining that a premeditated act must be a substantial causal factor in the
death). Likewise, we do not read the statutes prohibiting criminal sexual conduct
accomplished by force or coercion as requiring proof that the rape victim submitted
because of a single forceful or coercive cause. Nor do we see any logic in the premise that
one man’s threats coercing a child to submit to sex acts with him cannot coerce a child to
submit to sex acts with additional men during a group encounter. The circumstantial
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evidence supports the verdict on the challenged element and precludes any rational
hypothesis inconsistent with guilt.
III
Finally, we consider Thomas’s argument that he is entitled to a new trial because
the district court improperly admitted expert testimony about the illegal sex- trafficking
industry. This argument also fails. We review the district court’s decision to admit expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn. 2016).
For the following reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by allowing the testimony.
Thomas argues that the district court should have preclude d Commander
Lohse-Johnson’s opinion testimony because it was irrelevant and unhelpful. Relevant
evidence is evidence “ having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. If specialized knowledge will assist the jury
to understand the evidence or to resolve a factual issue, a qualified witness “may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. The ultimate question
is whether the expert’s testimony will help the jury to resolve the factual questions
presented, and even if this is so, the district court should consider whether the testimony’s
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of either unfair prejudice or
misleading the jurors. State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn. 1995).
Thomas argues that evidence of his guilt for aiding the solicitation of a minor was
focused so narrowly on his conduct of photographing Victim that generalized
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sex-trafficking testimony was not helpful. The argument overlooks the fact that the state
also had to prove that Thomas intentionally aided Morgan in his solicitation crime as
applied to the allegation that Thomas was liable “for a crime committed by another.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1. The relevance and helpfulness of the expert testimony was therefore
not limited to the narrow issue of the photography. The commander’s testimony tended to
help resolve an essential fact question by providing relevant information about how
traffickers control their victims and find patrons. The testimony was therefore relevant and
helpful.
Thomas contends that the testimony was excessive and unnecessary because this
case “did not involve a sophisticated prostitution ring.” He relies on State v. DeShay, where
the supreme court observed that “[g]ang expert testimony in this noncomplex drug
conspiracy, to the extent relevant, was largely duplicative, giving little assistance to the
jury in evaluating the evidence.” 669 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn. 2003). But the DeShay court
cited numerous problems with admitting the expert testimony in that case: witnesses with
firsthand knowledge had already given testimony tending to prove gang membership; the
prosecutor told the jury the crimes hinged on witness credibility; there was a risk of
laundering inadmissible hearsay evidence; the testimony was “potentially prejudicial”; and
“as a practical matter, [extensive testimony about gang activities in general] places the
defendant in the position of defending allegedly criminal activities of others.” Id. at 886–
87. In contrast, here the expert testimony occurred first. The testimony did not potentially
introduce inadmissible hearsay . And Thomas’s conduct was appropriately linked to the
criminal activities of others because of the aiding-and-abetting liability theory. Whether
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the prostitution scheme was complex has little bearing on whether the expert testimony
was helpful in determining whether Thomas’s photographing Victim aided Morgan’s
crime. The commander’s testimony about how traffickers f ind patrons and how patrons
sometimes specified their preferences helped the jury in understanding how Victim’s
photographs would be used to solicit or induce prostitution. And in this case Friend’s
testimony corroborated the expert testimony about the purpose of Victim’s pictures:
[The patron] was an older, white man. He said that he wanted
to see her to do anal sex. And so they sent the pictures to the
guy so he could look at her because he . . . only wanted to see
black girls. And he said that she was okay.
We reject Thomas’s contention that the expert testimony was inadmissibly
cumulative on his theory that there was “ample” evidence establishing “that Morgan was
trying to get [Victim] to engage in prostitution activities.” Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403
allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed . . . by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Thomas does not demonstrate that th e expert’s testimony was
inappropriately cumulative, let alone that the alleged accumulation substantially
outweighed the testimony’s probative value.
Thomas also argues that the expert’s limited testi mony concerning sex-trafficking-
specific terminology and pricing strategies was irrelevant to Thomas’s crimes. But the
evidence was relevant to Morgan’s crime and therefore to Thomas’s aiding and abetting .
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence.
Affirmed.