William Furlow, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0987

William Furlow,
Appellant,

vs.

Madonna Summit of Byron,
Respondent,

Jane Doe,
Defendant.

Filed January 27, 2020
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-18-8602

Peter C. Sandberg, Sandberg Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Edward Q. Cassidy, Ashley R. Thronson, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant William Furlow, patient’s duly-assigned representative , challenges the
district court’s rule 12.02(e) dismissal of his claims under the Minnesota Health Records
Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291-.298 (2018), against respondent Madonna Summit of Byron,
a health -care facility. Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that
(1) respondent’s employee’s social media post about patient was not the release of a “health
record” under Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2(1); and (2) there is no cause of action under
Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2 on a theory of vicarious liability, for unauthorized disclosure
of a health record. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 8.01. A district court may dismiss a complaint when the plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) . On appeal, we review de
novo whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Walsh v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014) . This court takes the facts alleged in the
complaint as true and draws inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Bodah v. Lakeville
Motor Express, Inc. , 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003) . This court reviews legal
questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d
293, 301 (Minn. 2014).

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On June 17, 2017, V.F. was a resid ent at Madonna Summit of Byron (Madonna).
Madonna is a senior living facility located in Byron, Minnesota and licensed under Minn.
Stat. §§ 144A.001-.756 (2018). Jane Doe, a nurse’s aide employed by Madonna, took a
photo of V.F. and posted it to Jane Doe’s personal social-media page. 1 The photograph
was taken in a mirror. V.F. is sitting in a chair in the background and Jane Doe is in the
foreground, her face covered by the phone. Jane Doe is wearing scrubs, but there is nothing
in the photog raph to identify anyone by name nor is there anything indicating that the
photograph was taken at Madonna. Jane Doe wrote the following caption on th e photo:
“This little sh-t just pulled the fire alarm and now I have to call 911!!! Woohoo.” William
Furlow is V.F.’s duly-assigned representative and brought this claim under the Minnesota
Health Records Act on V.F.’s behalf.
When applying statutory interpretation “[e]very law shall be construed, if possible,
to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.17(2) (2018) (establishing presumption that legislature intends entire statute to be
“effective and certain”).
We have stated that the goal of all statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature. The first step in statutory interpretation is to
determine whether the statute ’s language, on its face, is
ambiguous. In determining whether a statute is ambiguous, we
will construe the statute’s words and phrases according to their
plain and ordinary meaning. A statute is only ambiguous if its
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Multiple parts of a statute may be read together so as to
ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous. When we conclude

1 Jane Doe, the employee that posted the picture, is also listed as a party. She did not
participate in the district court case, and she is not participating on appeal.

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that a statute is unambiguous, our role is to enforce the
language of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of
the law. Alternatively, if we conclude that the language in a
statute is ambiguous, then we may consider the factors set forth
by the Legislature for interpreting a statute.

Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 -37 (Minn. 2013) (quotation s and citations
omitted).

The Minnesota Health Records Act provides that:
A person who does any of the following is liable to the patient
for compensatory damages caused by an unauthorized release
or an intentional, unauthorized access, plus costs and
reasonable attorney fees . . . negligently or intentionally
requests or releases a health record in violation of sections
144.291 to 144.297.

Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2(1).

The Minnesota Health Records Act defines a “health record” as
any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or
medium, that relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of a patient; the provision of health
care to a patient; or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to a patient.

Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c).

Furlow argues that the district court erred when it held that the photo and caption
did not constitute a “health record” and dismissed the claim. He argues that the social
media post is a health record because it relates to V.F.’s “present mental health or
condition.” Furlow argues that a viewer could infer V.F.’s mental -health status from the
content of the photo combined with the caption. He argues that the phrase “little sh-t” is a
“condescending, derogatory statement painting for the public . . . a picture of this patient’s
present mental health or condition as exultant to the playground mentality of a toddler.”

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Furlow argues that it i s not necessary to identify the patient by name for the photo to be
considered a “health record.” And that because those who view Jane Doe’s social-media
page may know where she works, they would be aware that V.F. is a patient receiving
medical care.
Although Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c) does not provide specific examples of
what a “health record” is, other sections of the Minnesota Health Records Act do. These
include “ copies of the patient ’s health record, including but not limited to laboratory
reports, x -rays, prescriptions, and other technical information used in assessing the
patient’s health conditions,” Minn. Stat. § 144.292, subd 5(1); and “the pertinent portion
of the record relatin g to a specific condition, or a summary of the record .” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.293, subd. 3. However, a “health record” is not limited to one of these forms and
can be “any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium.” Minn. Stat.
§ 144.291, subd. 2(c).
There is scant caselaw analyzing what constitutes a “health record” under the
Minnesota Health Records Act. This court has determined in an unpublished opinion that
a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension address verification form that contained a M innesota
Sex Offender Program committed patient’s full name, current address, date of birth, height,
weight, eye color, hair color, Minnesota drive r’s license number, Social Security number,
place of employment, employer ’s address, Federal Bureau of Invest igation number,
Minnesota prison offender identification number, and B ureau of Criminal Apprehension
number is not a health record under the statute. Rhoades v. Lourey, No. A18-1120, 2019
WL 1006804, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Mar. 4, 2019), review denied (Minn. May 28, 2019).

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The photograph here contains even less identifiable information than the document
at issue in Rhoades. Here, V.F. is seen sitting in a chair. While her hair and eye color are
visible, and one could infer her approximate age , there is nothing in the photograph to
identify any private medical information, condition, or past, present or future treatment.
Although Jane Doe is wearing scrubs, there is nothing to identify that she is working at a
nursing home or where she is working. The caption refers to V.F. as a “little sh-t” and that
she had pulled the fire alarm. Although Furlow argues that this goes directly to V.F.’s
mental capacity, i t does not expressly state anything about her past, present, or future
physical or mental health condition. We concluded in Rhodes that the definition of “health
record” does not cover a situation where a “person’s status as a patient could be inferred.”
Id. at *2 (declining to read into the statute that a health record exists where someone could
deduce that someone is a patient of a facility.) While a viewer of the post may infer that
V.F. was receiving care in a nursing home, there is nothing explicitly in the photograph or
caption that goes to the nature of the care or condition.
The photograph and accompanying caption are certainly not posted in the best taste,
but they do not fall under the definition of a “health record” in the Minnesota He alth
Records Act. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision.
Additionally, Furlow argues tha t Madonna is personally and vicariously liable for
the social media post, and Madonna argues that they are not a “person” under the statute
and there is no vicarious liability under the statute. Because we have determined that the

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photograph and accompanying caption posted here does not constitute a “health record ,”
we need not address these issues.
Affirmed.