Bryant Duane Griffin, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1001

Bryant Duane Griffin, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 9, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-07-4595, 73-CR-07-4594

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney , Ole Tvedten, Assist ant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Bryant Duane Griffin filed a pe tition for postconviction relief, alleging
that his convictions for second-degree sale of controlled substances carried significant

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collateral consequences and that his plea ag reement was altered without his knowledge.
But the postconviction court denied his petition as untimely. Because Griffin’s petition is
time-barred and no exception excuses his late filing, we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2007, the state charged appellant Bryant Duane Griffin with two counts of
second-degree sale of contro lled substances. The charge s stemmed from Griffin selling
cocaine to a confidential informant on four separate occasions from December 2006 to
February 2007. About five months later, in October 2007, Griffin pleaded guilty to both
counts pursuant to a plea agreement. In accor dance with the plea agre ement, the district
court sentenced Griffin to 58 months in prison for each count, to be served concurrently.
Griffin did not appeal his convictions or sentences and did not file a petition for
postconviction relief.
Over four years later, after Griffin was released from state custody, he was involved
in an incident on a Metro Transit bus. Based on that incident, Griffin was charged in federal
court with being a felon in possession of a fir earm. A jury convicted Griffin, and he was
sentenced to 240 months in prison. Griffin’s sentence was imposed pursuant to the Armed
Career Criminal Act, which requires a fifteen-year mandato ry minimum sentence when,
among other things, an individual has three pr ior convictions of serious drug offenses.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). Under the Act, a serious drug offense is one that carries a
maximum prison sentence of ten years or more. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) (2012).

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During his appeal of his federal conviction, Griffin allegedly asked his attorney to
obtain information about his prior convictions, including the two stemming from his guilty
pleas in October 2007. According to Griffin, in a letter dated October 15, 2013, his attorney
informed him that those prior convictions carried maximum sentences of 25 years.
Several years later, on July 23, 2018, Griffin filed a petition for a writ of error coram
nobis.1 The district court construed Griffin’s petition as one seeking postconviction relief.
In his petition, Griffi n argued that he faced significant collateral conse quences from his
guilty pleas, primarily his enhanced sentence in federal court. Further, Griffin contended
that the terms of his plea agreement—specif ically, the maximum sentence each charge
carried—were changed without his knowledge, violating his right to due process. Griffin
maintained that he believed the maximum sentence for each charge was 36 months. And,
according to Griffin, he woul d not have accepted the plea agreement if he knew the
maximum sentence each charge carried. As a re sult, Griffin sought to withdraw his plea
or requested that the postconviction court vacate his convictions.
The postconviction court denied Griffin’s petition. In doing so, it concluded that
Griffin’s petition was time-barred, and no exce ption excused his untimely filing. Griffin
appeals.

1 “The writ of coram nobis is an old common-law writ, the purpose of which was to correct
a judgment for errors in fact in the same court in which it was rendered.” State v. Kubus,
68 N.W.2d 217, 218 (Minn. 1955). But “the postconviction statute contains an exclusivity
provision that provides a strong indication that [it] merely codified or replaced preexisting
remedies, including the common-law writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis.”
Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

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D E C I S I O N
We review the denial of a petition fo r postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Henderson v. State , 906 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn. 2018). In doing so, we
consider the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo and review factual findings
for clear error. Griffin v. State, 883 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 2016).
When an individual convicted of a crime claims that his or her constitutional rights
have been violated, he or she may file a petition for postconviction relief. Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2016). But the petition is subject to st atutorily outlined time
limits. Id., subd. 4 (2016). In cases wh ere no direct appeal is file d, as is the case here, a
postconviction petition must be filed no later th an two years after “the entry of judgment
of conviction or sentence.” Id., subd. 4(a)(1). Notwithstanding the two-year time limit, a
court may hear a postconviction petition filed outside the two-year window if one of five
exceptions applies. Id., subd. 4(b)(1)-(5). But even those exceptions are subject to an
additional time limit, and a pe tition “invoking an exception” must be “filed within two
years of the date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c).
Here, as the postconviction court conclude d, Griffin was sent enced on March 24,
2008. Because he never filed a direct appe al, that date began the two-year time frame
during which Griffin could file a timely postconviction petition. And two years elapsed on
March 24, 2010. Griffin did not file his petition until July 23, 2018, over eight years after
the two-year time frame ended. Accordingly, unless an exception applies, Griffin’s petition
is time-barred.

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The only exception potentially applicable to Griffin’s case is the exception where a
claim is not frivolous and is in the interest of justice. Id., subd. 4(b)(5). This exception is
only available “in rare and exceptional situations.” Hooper v. State, 888 N.W.2d 138, 142
(Minn. 2016). And petitions seek ing to invoke this exception “must be filed within two
years of the date the claim arises.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). “A claim arises under
an exception when the petitioner knew or shoul d have known that he had a claim.”
Nissalke v. State, 920 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). And we review
a postconviction court’s determination “of when a petitioner knew or should have known
about his or her claim” for clear error. Bolstad v. State, 878 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Minn. 2016).
Griffin’s postconviction argument is base d on his contention that he did not know
the maximum sentences his convictions carrie d and that his plea agreement was altered
without his knowledge. The postconviction court conclude d that, at the latest, Griffin’s
claim arose on October 15, 2013, when Griffin allegedly received a letter from his attorney
informing him about the maximum sentences for his 2007 convictions. Using this date,
Griffin could have timely invoked the interest-of-justice exception until October 15, 2015.
But Griffin did not file his petition until July 23, 2018, well outside the two-year time frame
after his claim arose. As a result, Griffi n’s petition cannot timely invoke an exception to
the two-year time limit applicable to postconviction petitions. And because no exception
excuses Griffin’s untimely filing, the postc onviction court correctly concluded that
Griffin’s claim is time-barred.
Affirmed.