State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1007

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Dwayne Leckner,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CR-18-790

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey S. Naglosky, Koochich ing County Attorney, Interna tional Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Ab igail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Christopher Dwayne Leckner challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion for a dispositional sentencing depart ure, arguing that he was deprived of his

2
constitutional right to an impartial fact-finder. Because the district court impermissibly
based its sentencing decision on information obtained during its independent investigation
of facts outside the record, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
While heavily intoxicated, Leckner stabbe d his girlfriend three times. The state
charged Leckner with one coun t of first-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.221,
subd. 1 (2018) and one count of second-degr ee assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 2 (2018). Leckner pleaded guilty to the first-degree assault charge in exchange for
the state’s dismissal of the second-degree assault charge and the state’s agreement to seek
a sentence of no more than 150 months. It was also understood that Leckner would argue
for a departure from the sentencing guidelines.
Before sentencing, a dispositional advi sor from the public defender’s office
prepared a report that was provided to the dist rict court. In the report, the advisor noted
that Leckner suffered from a long history of mental health and substance abuse issues. The
advisor discussed, at length, the availability of mental health and substance abuse treatment
in Minnesota prisons. She noted that although there is access to mental health treatment in
prisons, the access is “often lim ited to ‘severe’ and ‘serious ’ mental illness treatment,”
making access to mental health care “sporadic.” In her opinion, there was “no way to
ensure that Mr. Leckner would receive any tr eatment” if incarcerated because only those
assessed with a “significant mental illness” qualify for treatment a nd Leckner was not in
that category. The advisor recommended that the district court stay any prison sentence

3
and place Leckner on probation on the condition that he enter into long-term inpatient
treatment for mental health and substance abuse issues.
The district court held a sentencing hearing in March 2019. At the hearing, Leckner
sought a dispositional departur e consistent with the reco mmendation of the dispositional
advisor. Leckner testified in s upport of his request. His fath er, his sister, and his doctor
also testified. The state did not call any witnesses but did read a statement from the victim
into the record.
Leckner, who was 33 years old at the time of the hearing, tes tified that he has
suffered from mental health problems since he was young. He further testified that he has
spent most of his adult life in prison. He explained that he was first incarcerated from
2005 to 2012 and did not receive mental health treatment during that time. Instead, he was
in solitary confinemen t for two years where he suffere d from auditory hallucinations.
When he was released from pr ison, he was not placed on parole or probation. He
subsequently served another five years in prison from 2013 to 2018. During that period of
incarceration, Leckner spent 50 out of the 60 months in solitary confinement. He testified
that he did not receive any mental health treatment during that more recent term of
incarceration other than monthly visits by an outpatient therapist, which he did not find to
be helpful. Leckner agreed that he needed structured treatment and asserted that he would
succeed on probation if given th e opportunity for treatment. Leckner’s father and sister
agreed that Leckner needed treatment.
Leckner’s psychiatrist, who has treated Leckner since he was young, also testified.
The doctor explained that L eckner suffers from a borderlin e personality disorder and has

4
poorly regulated emotions that make it difficu lt for him to think thro ugh problems in the
moment. The doctor opined that solitary confinement—where Leckner spent the majority
of his prior prison sentences—could contribute to auditory hallucinations because people
with borderline personality di sorder have difficulty with abandonment. The doctor
confirmed that long-term, structured inpatient treatment for mental health and chemical
dependency would be better for Leckner’s rehabilitation than prison.
The state opposed Leckner’s request for a dispositional departure. The state argued
that confinement was necessary to protect the public. And the state asserted that there are
“excellent” treatment programs in prison but presented no evidence to support its assertion.
In response, Leckner’s attorney argued that a departure was warranted because
Leckner suffers from mental health and substa nce abuse issues that require long-term,
structured treatment for ment al health and chemical depe ndency. Leckner’s attorney
reiterated that Leckner was unlikely to receive treatment in prison, that he has not received
meaningful treatment in prison in the past , and that prison has only made his condition—
and offenses—worse. His attorney also emphasized that while mental health programs are
available in prison, most offenders will not receive such treatment unless they are assessed
as having a significant mental illness, and Lec kner had not received su ch an assessment.
And, Leckner himself stated that the Stillwat er prison, one of two prisons where Leckner
was likely to be sent, did not offer mental he alth treatment. Accord ing to Leckner, that
facility offered only chemical dependency treatment.
At the end of the hearing, the district court informed the parties that it was not going
to pronounce a sentence that day. Instead, th e district court judge stated that he would

5
“personally . . . go and speak with the department of corrections programming office,” and
invited counsel for both the state and Leckner to attend. The district court judge continued
the sentencing hearing, and subsequently visited the Stillwater correctional facility.
The district court reconvened the senten cing hearing approximately three weeks
later. The district court allowed Leckner an opportunity to speak. Leckner repeated his
arguments for a dispositional departure and informed the district court of eight
community-based hospitals that provided the treatment he sought. Leckner emphasized
the lack of programming available in prison and reiterated that his mental health problems
were not treated during his previous periods of incarceration.
The district court then addressed Leckner’s request for a dispositional departure.
The district court judge acknowledged that L eckner wanted to participate in long-term
mental health treatment and noted that Leck ner argued that prison would not afford him
that opportunity. But the judge disagreed w ith Leckner’s assertion that he would not
receive treatment if he were incarcerated. The district court judge stated: “One of the
reasons I continued this case wa s to go down and check out the prisons. And I went to
Stillwater.” The district court judge also noted that he had visited other correctional
facilities in the past. The judge concluded:
Whereas there is a contrast, a great contrast, between what
prison can offer and what the community can offer in terms of
meeting your folk’s [sic] needs . . . . And the contrast,
Mr. Leckner, after having been there is that you get more
services in prison than you could ever get in the public. I was
there, Mr. Leckner. I saw the services that you say you can’t
get. I walked through those facilities. I saw the places where
you can get support services, he alth help group, evaluations,

6
short-term/long-term treatmen t, long-term treatment for
mental health.

(Emphasis added.). The district court then denied Leckner’s mo tion for a dispositional
departure and sentenced Leck ner to 150 months’ imprisonm ent, which is within the
presumptive sentencing range.
Leckner appeals. 1
D E C I S I O N
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn.
July 20, 2010). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by its independent
investigation of facts outside the record and its reliance on those facts in its sentencing
decision.
In State v. Dorsey, the Minnesota Supreme Court established a bright-line rule that
“judges may not engage in independent investigations of facts in evidence.”
701 N.W.2d 238, 251 (Minn. 2005). In Dorsey, the district court que stioned the veracity
of a factual statement made by Dorsey’s key w itness, investigated the fact independently,
and revealed the results of the investigation in open court. Id. at 243-44. The supreme
court ruled that the district court deprived Do rsey of the right to an impartial judge and
fact-finder because: (1) the ju dge’s comments indicated th at she did not believe the
testimony of the witness based on facts not in evidence, and (2) th e judge independently

1 The state did not file a responde nt’s brief. We therefore deci de this case on the merits.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

7
investigated a fact not in the record. Id. at 250. The supreme court concluded that “when
a judge possesses extra-r ecord knowledge that is prejudicia l to a defendant in a criminal
trial, the judge may not disclose that knowledge. Rather, the judge must either disqualify
herself or set the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence adduced in deciding the
case.” Id. at 252.
Relying on Dorsey, Leckner argues that the di strict court’s independent
investigation of facts and reliance on those facts in its sentencing decision deprived him of
a fair sentencing hearing. Leckner notes th at defendants have a constitutional right to a
trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. Leckner
emphasizes that courts have long extended that right to court trials and that the Minnesota
Supreme Court has further extended that right to other hearings. Leckner contends that the
district court’s independent investigation of facts outside the record interfered with his right
to a fair sentencing hearing before an impartial fact-finder. We agree.
We recognize that the independent investigation at issue in this case occurred during
sentencing, not at trial like in Dorsey. But, in State v. Schlienz, that supreme court noted
that a judge must “maintain the inte grity of the adversary system at all stages of the
proceedings.” 774 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Minn. 2009) (empha sis added) (concluding that an
ex parte communication made prior to a plea-withdrawal hearing violated defendant’s right
to an impartial judge) (emphasis added). An d we are not aware of any authority creating
an exception for sentencing hearings. Accordingly, the rule in Dorsey against independent
investigation of facts applies here.

8
As in Dorsey, the district court’s conduct in this case of investigating and relying
on information outside the record to determin e the accuracy of evid ence in the record
deprived Leckner of his right to a fair hearing before an impartial judge. As Leckner points
out, the district court continued the sentencing hearing to visit the Stillwater prison, one of
two prisons where Leckner could have been incarcerated. And the district court did so to
discover information in respons e to Leckner’s evidence ab out the lack of treatment
opportunities in Minnesota prisons. Alth ough programming available in Minnesota
prisons often is relevant to se ntencing, that relevance does not authorize the district court
to continue a sentencing hear ing to conduct an independen t investigation by seeking and
obtaining information from the department of corrections staff to resolve a disputed issue
on a particular case. Such an act is in sharp contrast to the bright-line rule that “judges may
not engage in independent investig ations of facts in evidence.” Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d
at 251.
In reaching this conclusion, we are not suggesting that judge s should not visit
correctional facilities for general educational purposes outside of the context of a particular
case, as there are beneficial reasons to do so.2 And, we are confident that the district court
in this case was motivated by its desire to fu lly consider the options available to Leckner
to impose a fair sentence. But, the district court’s deliberate decision to continue the
sentencing hearing to inde pendently gather additional information and the court’s
subsequent reliance on that information, for the specific purpose of making a sentencing

2 We expressly recognize that such experiences are valuable and support the continuation
of those general educational opportunities.

9
decision, denied Leckner his right to an impartial decision maker. See Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d
at 252 (“[W]hen a judge possesses extra-record knowledge that is prejudicial to a defendant
in a criminal trial, the judge may not disclose that knowledge. Rather, the judge must either
disqualify herself or set the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence adduced in
deciding the case.”). Because the distri ct court’s impartiality may reasonably be
questioned, we reverse and remand for resentencing before a different district court judge
assigned by the chief judge.
Reversed and remanded.