State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1009

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn William Lampi,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-18-1459

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael K. Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment, appellant , Shawn William Lampi, argues
that his conviction of threats of violence must be reversed because (1) the district court

2
erred by failing to appoint advisory counsel, (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support
his conviction, and (3) the district court erred by admitting Spreigl evidence.1 Because the
appointment of advisory counsel is discretionary, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not appointing advisory counsel. Because Lampi repeatedly threatened to
harm and kill an officer over an extended period of time , his statements constitute threats
of violence. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Spreigl
evidence of Lampi’s past conviction for threats of violence.2 We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Lampi with threats of violence, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), after he made several statements threatening to physically harm
a law enforcement officer. A second charged offense of disorderly conduct was dismissed
prior to trial. The case proceeded to a jury trial at which Lampi represented himself. The
following facts were established at trial.
In July 2018, Glencoe police officers and McLeod County sheriff deputies executed
an arrest warrant at Lampi’s residence pursuant to an alleged probation violation. After

1 State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965).

2 Lampi, in a pro se supplemental brief, challenged the grounds for the issuance of the
arrest warrant and asked this court to subpoena two witnesses for a future court proceeding.
Lampi contends that he did not violate the terms of his probation and therefore no arrest
warrant should have been issued. The proper forum to challenge the probation violation
would be at the probation -violation hearing. And because “[t]he function of the court of
appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them[,]” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988), our court has no authority to subpoena witnesses. Further,
we determine that the remaining issues raised in his brief are sufficiently addressed in this
opinion.

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law enforcement arrived, Lampi refused to leave his residence, shouted obscenities from a
window, and said that a search warrant was needed to enter his home . Lampi then
threatened to punch one officer in the face and “knock [him] out.” Lampi eventually left
the home voluntarily.
Law enforcement placed Lampi under arrest and transported him to the McLeod
County jail, where Lampi told the same officer that if he ever kicked his door again Lampi
would kick him and knock him out, and that he was lucky he did not “beat [the officer] to
death.” This officer testified that Lampi threatened “at least four or five times ” to punch
him in the face while the officer was outside of Lampi’s residence . The jury heard
testimony from the officers involved and viewed vid eo of the incident from the police
camera. The jury found Lampi guilty of threats of violence. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not prejudice Lampi by not appointing advisory
counsel.

A district court’s decision regarding the appointment of advisory counsel is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 163-64 (Minn.
App. 2012). A district “court may appoint advisory counsel to assist a defendant who
voluntarily and intelligently waives the right to counsel.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 2.
Appointment of advisory counsel under this rule “is permissive, not mandatory.” Dobbins
v. State, 845 N.W.2d 148, 155 (Minn. 2013). While the Minnesota Constitution provides
that defendants have a right to the assistance of defense counsel, see Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 6, the Minnesota Supreme Court has “decline[d] to read the Minnesota Constitution as

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guaranteeing advisory counsel for pro se defendants[,]” State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460,
466 (Minn. 2006).
Lampi argues that the judgment must be reversed because the district court failed to
consider the appointment of advisory counsel. Lampi asked the district court for assistance
in structuring his case at various times during his pretrial hearings. During one hearing, he
asked the district court to provide him with “legal representation in the form of just, like,
advice so that I can help set up my case regarding this entire matter.” At a subsequent
hearing, Lampi again indicated that he “would like legal assistance” but “would like to
speak for myself.” He also asked if it were possible to obtain legal aid through a nonprofit
organization such as the ACLU. The district court informed Lampi that such assistance
could be available but that he would need to exp lore those resources on his own because
the district court could not appoint such representation. The district court gave Lampi three
options for representation: (1) represent himself, (2) hire a lawyer, or (3) apply for a public
defender and, notably, told him there was no “hybrid or an in-between option.”
Though the record shows that the district court never considered the option of
advisory counsel , our supreme court concluded in Clark that t he failure to exercise
discretion to appoint advisory counsel is not subject to per se reversal. Id. at 467. As
background, Clark argued on appeal to the supreme court that the district court’s failure to
consider appointing advisory counsel warranted per se reversal. Id. The supreme court
concluded that failure to consider the appointment of advisory counsel was not an abuse of
discretion because, based on the trial record, the lack of advisory counsel did not ultimately
prejudice Clark such that a new trial was warranted . Id. at 468. “‘Standby counsel are

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present to steer a defendant through the basic procedure of the trial’ and ‘to relieve the
judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of [the] courtroom.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn. 1996)).
As in Clark, Lampi was not prejudiced by the failure of the district court to consider
appointing advisory counsel. After finding that Lampi intelligently and voluntarily waived
his right to counsel , the district court explained that Lampi would be held to the same
standard as an attorney and described the procedures to be followed at trial, including the
process for jury selection , filing witness lists, giving opening and closing statements,
reviewing jury instructions, objecting at trial, filing pretrial evidentiary motions, and
calling and questioning witnesses. The district court also cautioned Lampi about the
importance of following these procedures to maintain a clear court record and protect
Lampi’s rights on appeal. Moreover, the district court took further steps during the trial to
clarify the proper method of questioning witnesses on cross-examination and to clarify the
scope of issues and admissible evidence at trial. In sum, the record reflects that the district
court provided Lampi with ample assistance throughout all proceedings, and fulfilled the
district court’s general duty to treat him with respect. The record reflects that Lampi was
not prejudiced by the district court not appointing advisory counsel.
II. The evidence was sufficient to convict Lampi of threats of violence.

To obtain a guilty verdict, the state was required to prove that Lampi threatened an
officer with a crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize the officer , or in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing the officer. See Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. Although
the statute does not define “threat,” the supreme court has interpreted “threat” to mean “a

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declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawfu l act.” State
v. Schweppe , 237 N.W.2d 609, 613 ( Minn. 1975). Whether a statement is a threat,
therefore, “turns on whether the communication in its context would have a reasonable
tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Id.
(quotation omitted). A defendant’s “[i]ntent is a state of mind that is generally proved
using circumstantial evidence by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and
actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 136
(Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013).
We, therefore, must assess the circumstantial evidence produced at trial. “A
conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants particular scrutiny.” State v. Bolstad,
686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2004). And appellate courts apply a two-step analysis when
reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
598 (Minn. 2013) . First, we identify the circumstances proved , construing the evidence
“in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). Then, we
“determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” See State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727,
733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). The state’s evidence need not exclude all inferences
other than guilt, but it must “exclude all reasonable inferences other than guilt.” State v.
Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Minn. 2008) . We must view the circumstances proved as
a “complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of
the defendant as to exclude . . . any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al -
Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010).

7
The circumstances proved show: (1) six law enforcement officials arrived at
Lampi’s home to arrest him on a probation-violation warrant; (2) Lampi was hostile and
shouted obscenities at the officers; (3) Lampi, while at his house, repeatedly threatened to
punch one particular officer ; (4) Lampi threatened to kick, knock out, and kill the same
officer after Lampi was taken to the law enforcement center, several minutes after he was
initially arrested; and (5) the officer testified that the incident was alarming and that he
subsequently installed a security system in his home out of concern for his safety . These
circumstances suggest Lampi threatened the officer with a crime of violence with the
purpose of terrorizing the officer.
Lampi argues that the circumstances proved support a reasonable hypothesis
inconsistent with guilt, which is that he was expressing transitory anger. He contends that
the sta tute criminalizing threats of violence “is not meant to encompass verbal threats
expressing transitory anger without intent to terrorize.” State v. Dick , 638 N.W.2d 486,
492-93 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002).
However, the circumstances proved do not reflect an expression of transitory anger.
Lampi directed most of his anger at one particular officer, who testified that Lampi
threatened to punch him in the face at least four or five times , and threatened to kill him .
Lampi’s anger and threatening statements extended over a lengthy period of time, from the
moments after officers arrived outside of his home until after he was placed in a squad car
and taken to the law enforcement center. The encounter with Lampi also left the officer
alarmed and fearful of his safety so much so that he installed a security system in his home.
A “victim’s reaction to the threat is circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of

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intent.” Sykes v. State , 578 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn.
July 16, 1998). Lampi’s repeated threats directed at one officer over an extended period
of time are a reflection of sustained—not transitory—anger. In sum, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict , the circumstances show that Lampi
threatened to commit a crime of violence to terrorize the officers and support no reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Spreigl
evidence.

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) governs the admissibility of Spreigl evidence. Although
Spreigl evidence is not admissible to prove that a defendant acted in conformity with prior
bad acts, it is admissible for other purposes , such as proving knowledge or absence of
mistake. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). There is potential danger in admitting this evidence
because the jury may convict on account of these other crimes or misconduct and not
because of the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685
(Minn. 2006).
We review a district court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). The defendant “bears
the burden of showing an error occurred and any resulting prejudice.” Id. If we determine
“that the district court erroneously admitted Spreigl evidence, [we] must then determine
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” See id.

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The district court must follow a five -step process in determining whether Spreigl
evidence is admissible:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clarify what the evidence will be offered to
prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the evidence must
be relevant and material to the state ’s case; and (5) the
probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its
potential prejudice to the defendant.

Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685-86. The district court admitted Spreigl evidence of Lampi’s 2017
conviction for threats of violence on grounds that such evidence proved absence of mistake
or accident . A review of the record indicates that t he district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence of Lampi’s prior conviction. 3 The district court made a
clear record at trial that the state provided proper notice, that there was a clear indication
of what the evidence would be offered to prove, that there was clea r and convincing
evidence that Lampi was convicted of the prior incident, and that the charge was relevant
in that it demonstrated an absence of mistake or accident in that Lampi knew or had reason
to know that his statements would cause fear or terror in the officers. The district court
acknowledged the risk of prejudice in presenting evidence of the conviction to the jury but
concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudice. The district
court also mitigated the prejudice by reading cautionary instructions. See State v. Kennedy,

3 This evidence consisted of an officer’s testimony that he received a report of a bomb
threat at the Minnesota Department of Revenue in March 2016. After receiving the report,
the officer listened to the voicemail of appellant’s threat and then spoke with appellant on
the phone. The officer testified to appellant’s demeanor during the voicemail and phone
call, and to the existence of the charge. The state also introduced a certified copy of the
conviction into evidence.

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585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. App. 1998) (that court read cautionary instructions “lessened
the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.”)
The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Spreigl evidence of
Lampi’s past conviction.
Affirmed.