In re the Marriage of: Ronald Lee Henrichs, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1014

In re the Marriage of: Ronald Lee Henrichs, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Charlene Lila Henrichs,
Appellant.

Filed October 12, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-FA-17-798

Mary L. Hahn, Hvistendahl, Moersch, Dorsey & Hahn, P.A., Northfield, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Lance R. Heisler, Lampe Law Group, L.L.P., Northfield, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Ronald Lee Henrichs and Charlene Lila Henrichs were married for approximately
28 years before their marriage was dissolved. The district court awarded Charlene
temporary spousal maintenance and evenly divided the parties’ marital property. On
appeal, Charlene raises ten issues. We conclude that the district court erred with respect to

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two of those issues. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
The parties were married in March 1990. They separated in October 2013 , and
Ronald petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in March 2017.
While the parties were married, they jointly owned and operated a small HVAC
business. Ronald performed services for customers at their locations; Charlene worked in
the office and served as bookkeeper. E ach party received wages from the business and
distributions of the business’s net income. In October 2017, the parties entered into a
written agreement that ended Charlene’s employment but provided her with income on a
temporary basis while this dissolution action was pending.
The district court conducted a trial on three days in July and August of 2018. The
parties and four other witnesses testified, and 85 exhibits were admitted into evidence. The
district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment, and decree in
December 2018. Charlene moved to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law
and for a new trial. In May 2019, t he district court denied Charlene’s motion for a new
trial but amended some findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In the amended decree, the district court found that Ronald’s after-tax income is
$4,403 per month and that his reasonable monthly living expenses are $5,046. The district
court found that Charlene could earn between $14.90 and $23.32 per hour and that her
reasonable monthly living expenses are $3,596. The district court awa rded Charlene

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temporary spousal maintenance of $1,500 per month for 36 months. The district court
assigned no value to the parties’ business and evenly divided their marital property.
Charlene appeals and raises ten issues, which we have reorganized according to
subject matter.
D E C I S I O N
I. Spousal Maintenance
Five of the ten issues raised by Charlene are concerned with the district court’s
award of temporary spousal maintenance.
Spousal maintenance is defined by statute to mean “an award . . . of payments from
the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2018). “The purpose of a maintenance award is to allow
the recipient and the obligor to have a standard of living that approximates the marital
standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the circumstances.” Melius v. Melius,
765 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). If a party requests spousal
maintenance, a district court engages in a two-step analysis.
First, the district court must consider whether the party seeking spousal maintenance
has demonstrated a “showing of need.” Curtis v. Curtis , 887 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn.
2016). Specifically, a district court must consider whether the spo use seeking spousal
maintenance either:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable
needs of the spouse considering the standard of living
established during the marriage, especially, but n ot limited to,
a period of training or education, or

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(b) is unable to provide adequate self -support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate
employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2018). A party demonstrates a need for spousal
maintenance if, considering the standard of living during the marriage, the party is unable
to provide for his or her reasonable expenses. Doherty v. Doherty , 388 N.W.2d 1, 2 -3
(Minn. App. 1986).
Second, if the party seeking spousal maintenance has “made a sufficient showing of
need, . . . a court [must] consider the amount and duration of a maintenance award.” Curtis,
887 N.W.2d at 252. The award “shall be in amounts and for periods of time, either
temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, . . . after considering all relevant factors.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 . When setting the amount and duration of spousal
maintenance, a district court must consider “all relevant factors,” including certain factors
that are specified by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a)-(h). But no single factor
is dispositive. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982).
In general, this court applies an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a district
court’s decisions concerning the amount and duration of an award of spousal maintenance.
Id. at 38.
A. Charlene’s Ability to Work
Charlene argues that the district court erred by finding that she is voluntarily
unemployed and is able to work full-time.

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Both parties presented evidence on this issue. Charlene testified that she worked at
the parties’ business from 1994 to 2017 for approximately 25 to 30 hours per week. She
answered telephones, typed invoices, handled accounts payable and accounts receivable,
and entered financial data into the business’s accounting system. She testified that she has
not searched for a new job since she stopped working at the parties’ business in October
2017. She testified that she suffers from certain medical issues, including fibromyalgia,
anxiety and depression, abnormal sleep patterns, and frequent panic attacks.
Charlene introduced the testimony of a certified rehabilitation counselor, Justin
King, who had examined Charlene to determine “what sort of work is appropriate for her
given her age, her education, her experience, [and] her medical impairments. ” King
testified that no employer could reasonably accommodate Charlene’s conditions and that
she “would not be a reliable employee to any employer in the competitive labor market.”
But Ronald introduced the testimony of a qualified rehabilitation specialist, Kathryn
Schrot, who also had evaluated Charlene. Schrot testified that Charlene said that she did
not have any medical restrictions, that her skills were current, and that she was “employable
in an administrative type of capacity, such as a bookkeeping clerk.” Schrot further testified
that Charlene could be expected to earn between $14.90 and $23.32 per hour.
The district court credited Schrot’s testimony and found it to be more persuasive
than King’s testimony. The district court noted that King’s testimony was “based entirely
on [Charlene’s] belief that she is disabled” but that Charlene had introduced “no medical
diagnoses that says that she is unable to work.”

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Charlene contends that the district court did not appreciate that she has been absent
from the competitive job market and that her skills are outdated. She also challenges the
district court’s reliance on Schrot’s testimony, noting that Schrot did not consult with
Charlene’s physicians and made conclusions about Charlene’s skills that were contradicted
by King’s testimony. Charlene also contends that the district court overlooked her
numerous health issues, which limit her ability to work.
The district court emphasized the absence of a determination by any of Charlene’s
physicians that she could not work. On appeal, Charlene does not contend that there is
such a determination in the record. Rather, Charlene relies primarily on King’s review of
her medical records. But the district court found King’s assessment to be less persuasive
than that of Schrot . Given the nature of the conflicting evidence, w e decline to second -
guess the district court’s determination that Schrot’s testimony was more persuasive than
King’s testimony because the district court is in a better position from which to resolve
conflicting evidence. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; La Point v. Family Orthodontics, P.A. ,
892 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Minn. 2017).
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that Charlene is voluntarily
unemployed and is able to work full-time.
B. Reduction of Charlene’s Expenses
Charlene argues that the district court erred in its findings of fact concerning some
of her living expenses. Before ruling on a request for spousal maintenance, a district court
must find the parties’ reasonable monthly expenses in light of the marital standard of living.

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Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 409-12 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 25, 2000).
Charlene’s primary challenge is to the district court’s finding that her housing
expenses and food expenses should be reduced by half because she shares an apartment
with her adult son. Charlene testified that she lives in a three-bedroom apartment with her
adult son, who contributes $400 to the monthly rent of $1,335 but contributes nothing to
the monthly food expenses of $500 . This court has stated that spousal maintenance must
be determined “ without con sidering the needs of the adult children.” Musielewicz v.
Musielewicz, 400 N. W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. App. 1987) , review denied (Minn. Mar. 25,
1987). But Charlene contends that it is unfair to require her to expect a greater contribution
from her adult son but to not requir e Ronald to expect a similar contribution from his
partner, with whom he shares a home.
Ronald testified that he lives with a woman and two of her children, that the woman
does not contribute anything toward his monthly housing expenses of approximately
$2,876, but that the woman pays for all of his groceries, which are a $400 item in his list
of reasonably monthly expenses. Ronald likely did not set his housing expenses with his
partner and her children in mind; he testified that, since the parties separated, he has lived
in the marital homestead and has continued paying the mortgage loan, property taxes, and
insurance premiums. The evidence is balanced in the sense that each party receives a $400
benefit from an ad ult who is sharing the party’s home—Charlene in the form of a $400
contribution to her rent payment and Ronald in the form of his partner’s assumption of all
of his food expenses of $400 . In the particular circumstances of this case, we cannot

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conclude th at the district court clearly erred in its findings concerning the parties’
respective housing and food expenses, even if we accept Charlene’s theory that Ronald’s
partner should be treated in the same manner as her adult son.
Charlene also challenges the district court’s finding that her reasonable monthly
expenses should not include a $542 contribution to a health-savings account. Charlene
testified that the annual deductible on her health-insurance policy is $6,500 and that, if she
were to incur out-of-pocket medical expenses in that amount, she would need to withdraw
an average of $542 per month from her health -savings account to pay those out-of-pocket
medical expenses. But she also testified that she is not actually making those contributions
and has not actually incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses of $6,500. Ronald testified
that he has a health-savings account but does not make any new contributions to it and that
he pays out-of-pocket for medical expenses that are not covered by his health insurance .
Given the evidence, t he district court did not clearly err by finding that Charlene’s
reasonable monthly expenses do not include contributions to her health-savings account.
C. Parties’ Standard of Living
Charlene argues that the district court erred by reasoning that the standard of living
that the parties enjoyed during the marriage should not be used to determine the amount of
spousal maintenance.
In considering the third statutory factor (the standard of living established during
the marriage), the district court stated that the parties “would pay themselves more income
in a given year than they actually made” and that they “would finance this by taking out
what has been described as a ‘never -ending loan.’” The district court reasoned that “any

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standard of living that they established would have been a false one and not actually based
on what they were making in the business.”
Charlene contends that “the standard of living reflected in the owners’ distributions
from the business income was not a false one, but rather was commensurate with what was
reasonably available to be paid.” But her own brief cites evidence that, in the years 2015,
2016, and 2017, the business made distributions that exceeded net income by an average
of approximately $7,000 per year. Charlene contends that the business improved its
financial position during that time period . But that time period was after the parties h ad
separated in October 2013. She cites no such evidence for the time period before the
parties’ separation. The district court’s reasoning is supported by the testimony of
Ronald’s expert forensic accountant as well as the testimony of the bookkeeping contractor
who replaced Charlene, who testified that Ronald and Charlene distributed more money to
themselves than was available, that the business continually used a line of credit to finance
the distributions, and that the business struggles to make payroll and pay vendors. In light
of this evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion by reasoning that the parties’
actual marital standard of living was exaggerated and could not be replicated after the
dissolution.
D. Ronald’s Ability to Pay
Charlene argues that the district court erred by finding that Ronald has a diminished
ability to pay spousal maintenance in the future because of his age and physical condition.
The district court found that Ronald “is not in good physical health due to t he
physical demands of his work” and that, because “[t]he Business income rests squarely on

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[his] ability to work,” his “declining physical health will directly impact the Business’
revenue, which in turn will reduce [his] individual income.” In making th at finding, the
district court credited Ronald’s testimony and also relied on his medical records and a
written report of a chiropractor. In considering the seventh statutory factor (Ronald’s
ability to meet his own needs while also meeting Charlene’s needs), the district court stated
that Ronald is in “the twilight of a career as a heating and air conditioning installer” and
that it “would be grossly unfair to award the permanent spousal maintenance that
[Charlene] is requesting” because such an award “would require [ Ronald] to continue
working despite his physical disabilities.”
Charlene contends that the district court’s reasoning is speculative and that the
record shows the business to be in good financial condition. But she does not confront the
evidence that Ronald’s physical condition will affect his income in the future. Instead, she
simply contends that any change of circumstances can be addressed in a request for a
modification of spousal maintenance. The district court did not make a clear ly erroneous
finding of fact in light of the evidence and did not abuse its discretion in considering the
seventh statutory factor.
E. Temporary Spousal Maintenance
Charlene argues that the dis trict court erred by awarding temporary spousal
maintenance instead of permanent spousal maintenance.
“Where there is some uncertainty as to the necessity of a permanent award, the court
shall order a permanent award leaving its order open for later modification.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 3. Accordingly, an award of permanent spousal maintenance is proper if

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“it is uncertain that the spouse seeking maintenance can ev er become self -supporting.”
Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198 (Minn. 1987). But if the only uncertainty is when
(not whether) a recipient o f spousal maintenance will become self -supporting, a district
court should award temporary spousal maintenance. Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666,
668-69 (Minn. App. 2009). “An award of temporary maintenance is based on the
assumption that the party recei ving the award not only should strive to obtain suitable
employment and become self-supporting but that he or she will attain that goal.” Nardini,
414 N.W.2d at 198. In light of this body of caselaw, an award of temporary spousal
maintenance implies that the recipient presently is not self -supporting but is expected to
become self-supporting and, thus, has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to increase
his or her earning capacity to become self-supporting. See Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d
705, 708-10 (Minn. 1997); Maiers, 775 N.W.2d at 668.
The district court determined that an award of temporary spousal maintenance for
36 months would allow Charlene to find suitable employment and become self-supporting
over a period of time . The district co urt stated that it limit ed maintenance to 36 months
because Charlene could have searched for employment in the prior 14 months but chose
not to do so . The district court also stated that it would be “grossly unfair ” to award
permanent spousal maintenance to Charlene because such an award would require Ronald
“to continue working despite his physical disabilities ” while she could “sit back and do
nothing.”
Charlene contends that permanent spousal maintenance is appropriate on the ground
that she is unable to maintain employment. But the district court found that Charlene is

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capable of working. We have concluded that that finding is not erroneous. See supra part
I.A. Charlene testified that she has not attempted to find employment since she stopped
working at the parties’ business in October 2017, which undermines her argument that she
is unable to find employment. Given the evidence and the district court’s findings, the only
uncertainty is when (not whether) Charlene will become self -supporting. See Maiers,
775 N.W.2d at 668-69. Thus, the district court did not err by awarding temporary spousal
maintenance.
II. Agreement for Temporary Relief
Charlene argues that the dis trict court erred in two ways with respect to the
agreement between the parties that provided C harlene with financial support during the
pendency of the dissolution action.
In October 2017, the parties and their counsel signed a written agreement in which
they agreed that the parties’ business would , on a temporary basis, pay for C harlene’s
health insurance and life insurance premiums, pay her $500 per month for certain living
expenses, pay her “$1,000 per month , representing compensation for her consulting
services with the business’s new bookkeeper,” and pay her $2,000 per month for her share
of the business’s expected profits.
At trial, Charlene sought to enforce the agreement because Ronald had not made all
payments described in the agreement. The district court ruled that Ronald is not obligated
to pay Charlene the $1,000 consulting fee because she had not performed any consulting
services. The district court also ruled that Ronald could deduct $5,246 from the amount

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due because Charlene had committed fraud by transferring that amount of money from the
business to herself without justification and without Ronald’s knowledge.
A. Consulting Fee
Charlene first challenges the district court’s finding that Ronald is not obligated to
pay her a monthly $1,000 consulting fee. She contends that the agreement required her to
merely be available for consultation but did not necessarily require her to perform
consulting services each month. The language of the agreement supports C harlene’s
contention. It provides in paragraph 4 that Charlene “shall cooperate in turning over the
business books and records, including passwords, but shall continue to maintain the status
quo for bookkeeping until the new bookkeeper is secured.” The bookkeeping contractor
who replaced Charlene testified that Charlene’s consulting services were limited to a two-
week period after the transition and that she had had no communication with Charlene
since then. But the new bookkeeper also testified that Charlene never refused to cooperate
with or assist her and, to her knowledge, is still available for any consultation that is needed.
In light of the plain language of the agreement, t he relevant question is whether
Charlene breached the obligations in paragraph 4 of the agreement . The district court did
not make any findings on that issue. Rather, the district court focused on the amount of
services Charlene performed. Thus, the district court erred by ruling that C harlene is not
entitled to $1,000 per month in consulting fees after October 15, 2017, without considering
whether Charlene breached the agreement. On remand, the district court should make
findings as to whether Charlene fulfilled or breached the obligations stated in paragraph 4.

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B. Reduction for Fraudulent Transfers
Charlene argues that the district court erred by reducing the amount owed to her by
the amount of money that she fraudulently transferred from the business to herself. The
evidence supports the district court’s ruling. Ronald’s expert forensic accountant testified
that Charlene wrote four checks to herself but recorded them on the business’s records as
payments to vendors. Thus, the district court did not err by adjusting the amount due to
Charlene under the agreement to account for the funds that Charlene wrongfully took from
the business.
III. Value of Marital Assets
Charlene argues that the district court erred with respect to its division of two marital
assets: the marital homestead and the parties’ business.
A. Homestead Valuation Date
Charlene argues that the district court erred by using the parties’ date of separation
as the valuation date for the homestead.
A district court “shall value marital assets for purposes of division between the
parties as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement confe rence . . . unless
the court makes specific findings that another date of valuation is fair and equitable. ”
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2018). A district court has broad discretion in dividing
property and in setting reasonable valuation dates. Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716,
720 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002).
The district court found that it was fair and equitable to set the property valuation
date for the homestead at the date of separation because Ronald remained in the homestead

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after that date and was solely responsible for all maintenance and expenses related to the
homestead thereafter. Meanwhile, Charlene moved into an apartment and paid rent with
marital assets. Charlene argues that the date of the pre -hearing conference should be the
valuation date of the homestead because the parties remained co-owners of the property up
to that date and because money generated by the parties’ jointly owned business was used
to pay the expenses of the homestead. The district court’s reasoning is logical inasmuch
as any increase in the value of the homestead after the separation would be attributable to
Ronald’s efforts and expenditures from that date forward.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the valuation
date of the homestead is the date of separation.
B. Value of Business

Charlene argues that the dis trict court erred by ignoring the value of used vehicles
when finding the value of the parties’ business.
The district court found that the value of the parties’ business is zero because its
assets could be sold for only pennies on the dollar. Indeed, Ronald testified that the
business’s tools, equipment, and inventory have de minimis value. But Ronald also
testified that the business own s a 2002 Ford F -250 pickup truck, a 2012 Ford van, and a
2008 Ford van, and he provided estimated prices at which each vehicle could be sold, which
add up to $18,000.
In light of R onald’s testimony, the district court erred by finding that the value of
the business is zero. The district court should have found that the value of the business is
no less than $18,000.

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IV. Evidence of Charlene’s Gambling
Charlene argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence concerning her
frequent visits to casinos. She contends that the evidence lacks relevance and is unfairly
prejudicial.
In cross-examining C harlene, Ronald’s attorney inquir ed about expenditures she
had made at a casino . Charlene’s attorney objected and argued that the evidence is
irrelevant because Charlene’s proposed budget did not include a line item for gambling.
Ronald’s attorney argued in response that the evidence is relevant because it contradict s
Charlene’s testimony that she is disabled and incapable of earning money. The district
court overruled the objection. In its dissolution order , the district court referred to
Charlene’s gambling in connection with her decision to not seek employment, noting that
she has “the time to make many trips to gambling casinos and sit at a slot machine and
gamble for hours at a time.”
A district court has broad discretion in ruling on objections to the relevance of
evidence. Johnson v. Washington C nty., 518 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 19 94). In this
situation, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Charlene’s frequent casino
excursions bore some relevance to her claim that she is incapable of sitting for long periods
of time, which would be required in many jobs. In any event, the evidence does not appear
to have been dispositive of any of the district court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Thus, the district court did not err by admitting evidence concerning Charlene’s
frequent visits to casinos.

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V. Judicial Bias

Charlene argues that “the record as a whole in this case reflects bias of the court
against her.” In support of the argument, she refers to many of the district court’s alleged
errors that are highlighted in her various arguments. But a dverse rulings alone, even
erroneous rulings, do not prove judicial bias. Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn.
App. 1986). Charlene has not identified any reason why the district court’s impartiality
should be questioned. Thus, C harlene is not entitled to appel late relief on the ground of
judicial bias.
In sum, the district court did not err with respect to most of the issues raised by
Charlene on appeal, but the district court erred in two ways. First, the district court erred
by ruling that C harlene is not e ntitled to $1,000 per month in consulting fees during the
pendency of the dissolution action without making a finding as to whether Charlene
fulfilled or breached the obligations stated in paragraph 4 of the October 2017 agreement.
On remand, the district court shall make findings on that factual issue and reconsider its
conclusion concerning the consulting fee. Second, the district court erred by finding that
the value of the parties’ business is zero. On remand, the district court shall find that the
value of the business is $18,000 and shall amend the decree accordingly with respect to the
division of the parties’ assets.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.