In re the Matter of the Welfare of: C. A. R., Child.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1022

In re the Matter of the Welfare of:
C. A. R., Child.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-JV-19-123

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant C.A.R.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brett Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Melissa Hammell, Assistant County Attorney,
Preston, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A district court may exercise its broad di scretion to adjudicate a child as delinquent
in a felony-level delinquency case while continuing a stay of adjudication in a prior gross-
misdemeanor delinquency case and is not requi red to adjudicate only the least-severe
delinquency offense.
O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this appeal from an order adjudica ting appellant C.A.R. delinquent, C.A.R.
argues that the district court abused its disc retion when it adjudicated him delinquent in a

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felony-level delinquency case while continuing a stay of adjudication in C.A.R.’s prior
gross-misdemeanor case. Discerning no abuse of the district court’s discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 28, 2018, C.A.R. pleaded gu ilty to a gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree
controlled-substance-possession delinquency offense. At disposition, C.A.R. informed the
district court that he aspired to join the military and would therefore benefit from
adjudication being withheld. C.A.R. argued that he would be successful on probation. The
district court withheld adjudication and placed C.A.R. on probation for six months.
On October 11, 2018, approximately two weeks after the disposition of C.A.R.’s
gross-misdemeanor offense, C.A.R. sold five tablets of LSD to a confidential informant.
The state charged C.A.R. by delinquency petition with one count of felony fourth-degree
sale of a controlled substance. The state al so charged a separate count of felony third-
degree aiding and abetting the sale of a controlled substance from another incident.
As part of a plea agreement, C.A.R. plea ded guilty to an ame nded charge of fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance fro m the October 11 sale in exchange for
dismissal of the charge of third-degree ai ding and abetting the sale of a controlled
substance. The parties agreed that dis position would be left open for argument.
Disposition was consolidated with a probat ion-violation hearing concerning the earlier
gross-misdemeanor case, and C.A.R. waived his right to a predisposition report.
The state argued that the district court s hould adjudicate C.A.R. delinquent in the
felony case. It reasoned that, contrary to C.A.R.’s representation at the earlier disposition
hearing “that he wouldn’t be back [in court] again,” C.A.R. was caught selling LSD “two

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weeks later,” resulting in the new felony delin quency charge. The state contended that
C.A.R. failed to “follow[] the [c]ourt’s order despite being on the probationary conditions
that he not possess or engage in [the sale of drugs],” and that adjudication in the new case
was therefore appropriate.
Counsel for C.A.R. argued that adjudicatio n was not in C.A.R.’s best interests and
that adjudication on the new felony delinquency was not required to protect public safety.
Counsel reminded the district court that C.A.R. intended to join the military with the goal
of eventually becoming a surgical technician and asserted that, because a fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime “is a crime of vi olence under Minnesota law,” adjudicating
C.A.R. delinquent would also prohibit him fro m owning a firearm. Counsel for C.A.R.
urged the district court to withhold adjudication in both cases, or, alternatively, adjudicate
C.A.R. only in the earlier gross-misdemeanor case.
The district court continued to with hold adjudication in the earlier gross-
misdemeanor case but adjudicated C.A.R. delinquent on the new felony offense.
This appeal followed.
ISSUE
May a district court exercise its broad disc retion to adjudicate a child delinquent in
a felony delinquency case while continuing a stay of adjudication in an earlier and less-
severe gross-misdemeanor delinquency case?

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ANALYSIS
C.A.R. argues that the district court abus ed its discretion when it adjudicated C.A.R.
delinquent in the new felony case while continuing to withhold adjudication on the earlier
gross-misdemeanor offense.
A district court may make disposition in a juvenile-delinquency proceeding either
by adjudicating a juvenile delinquent or by continuing the case without adjudication. Minn.
R. Juv. Del. P. 15.05, subd. 1(A)-(B). A di strict court may continue without adjudication
“[w]hen it is in the best interests of the child to do so” and when it is not harmful to the
public. Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2018). In all other cases, the statute authorizes a
district court to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent. Id.
We review a district court’s decisi on concerning adjudication for abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of J.B.A., 581 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 31, 1998). District courts have “broad discretion in determining whether to
continue an adjudication in a delinquency proceeding.” In re Welfare of J.R.Z. , 648
N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20,
2002). “[W]e affirm dispositions that are not arbitrary.” In re Welfare of N.T.K. , 619
N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted). And although the district court
may not place a delinquent child out of home unless that is “the least drastic step necessary
to restore law-abiding conduct,” id., that least-drastic-step re quirement does not apply to
the question of whether to adjudicate delinquency, J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 245.
C.A.R. contends that the district cour t should have withheld adjudication in the
felony case and instead adjudicated him delinquent in the earlier gross-misdemeanor case

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because doing so is in his best interests. Specifically, C.A.R. notes that having a crime of
violence on his record will be detrimental to his future because he will likely be unable to
join the military or obtain employment as a surgical technician. He argues that the district
court should have taken the least-drastic step in making the disposition decision in his new
felony file.
In support of his argument, C. A.R. cites to our decision in J.R.Z. 648 N.W.2d at
245. But, in that case, we determined that the “appellant incorrectly argue[d] that a district
court’s decision to adjudicate must be the least drastic step necessary to restore law-abiding
conduct in the juvenile.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation and quotation omitted). We held
that the “[a]ppellant confus[ed] the standard for staying adjudication with the standard for
ordering a particular disposition.” Id. at 245-46.
C.A.R. does not challenge th e conditions of probation that the district court included
in the disposition. He argues only that, beca use those same conditi ons could have been
imposed by adjudicating the earlier gross-misdemeanor while withholding adjudication on
the new felony, the district court abused its discretion. This would seemingly establish a
rule of law that, where multiple adjudications are possible, a district court must adjudicate
only the least-onerous offense. But decision s such as this are entrusted to the broad
discretion of the district court. Id. at 244. We therefore decline to hold that adjudicating a
felony delinquency is an abuse of discre tion in a case where a gross-misdemeanor
delinquency is available to be adjudicated.
Instead, we employ the general and defe rential standard of review here. J.B.A., 581
N.W.2d at 38. The record su pports the district court’s adjudication of delinquency in the

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new felony file. Only two weeks after the dist rict court had withheld adjudication in the
gross-misdemeanor case, C.A.R. committed a new drug offense. The district court
properly considered the seriousness of the new offense and C.A.R.’s failure to comply with
the terms of the earlier con tinuance without adjudication in consideration of C.A.R.’s
expressed aspiration to join the military. The re cord supports the district court’s explicit
finding that appellant’s continuing and appa rently escalating delinquency “is a risk to
public safety.” That consideration is pr oper under Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7.
Therefore, the record supports the delinquency adjudication in the felony case.
Because the district court was not required to take the least-drastic step necessary
when deciding whether to adjudicate C.A.R. delinquent on the new felony drug offense,
and because the district court made the adjudication on careful consideration of the record,
the district court acted within its broad discretion.
D E C I S I O N
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it adjudicated C.A.R. delinquent
in a felony case while continui ng to withhold ad judication in C.A.R.’s earlier gross-
misdemeanor case.
Affirmed.