State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1033

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Judana Catherine Williams,
Respondent.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-18-2146

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant)

Melvin R. Welch, Welch Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this pretrial appeal by the state, appellant challenges the district court’s
suppression of respondent’s statements made to law enforcement. Appellant argues that
the district court err ed in determining that respondent was in custody when she was

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interrogated by a law -enforcement officer and in determining that respondent made an
equivocal request for counsel that needed t o be clarified before continuing the
interrogation. Appellant contends that the district court’s order will have a critical impact
on the outcome of the trial.
Based upon the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of the respondent, a
reasonable person would believe she was in custody associated with a formal arrest such
that she should have been provided a Miranda warning prior to her first statement. While
interrogating respondent a second time and following the Miranda warning, the detective
failed to stop the interrogation to ask narrow clarifying questions after respondent made an
equivocal request for counsel. For these reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 7, 2018, police arrived at the Faribault trailer home of respondent
Judana Catherine Williams’s boyfriend in response to her multiple 911 calls. A Faribault
police officer was the first to respond to the 911 calls and entered the trailer after hearing
respondent screaming. The officer recognized respondent’s boyfriend, M.B., lying on the
floor and covered in blood. Respondent, who was also covered in blood, was kneeling next
to M.B. and applying pressure to his wound. The officer asked respondent several times
what happened though the respondent did not answer. The officer then noticed and kicked
away a large kitchen knife that lay between respondent and M.B. Next, the officer placed
handcuffs on respo ndent while informing her that it was for officer safety. The officer
asked respondent if she stabbed M.B., and respondent replied that “he ran up on me, he ran
up on me.”

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Several officers arrived on the scene including Detective Alexander of the Faribault
Police Department who eventually interrogated respondent. Detective Alexander testified
during the omnibu s hearing that, “I approached [respondent] and ensured that she
understood that she was not under arrest and asked if she would be willing to go to a
different location to speak, which she agreed to do so, and at that point I removed her
handcuffs that she was in.” Detective Alexander drove himself to the police station , and
respondent rode in the back of a separate marked squad car driven by a uniformed police
officer.
A. First Interview
The first interview took place at approximately 9:43 a.m . Detective Alexander sat
across from respondent in one of the police station’s interrogat ion rooms. Detective
Alexander began the interview by stating:
And you’re still not under arrest. Ok? The reason we came
down here to the police station is to talk away from all the
commotion and the chaos alright? Um, so in talking with you
here alright and at any point you feel like you want to leave
you can just tell me and the door is right there. You can open
it up and walk out okay? Alright.

During the omnibus hearing, Det ective Alexander testified that he knew , before starting
the interview, that respondent had stabbed M.B. Detective Alexander did not read
respondent a Miranda warning at this time but continued asking respondent open-ended
questions. Respondent admitted that she used drugs with M.B. and that they began arguing.
Respondent said the following:
He was in my face (sigh). We both was yellin. He told me to
get out you stupid b---h. I said ah now you want me to leave I

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was on drugs. (Inaudible) no drugs. (Sighs). He kinda grabbed
me. I tried to shake back an he threw me to the closet an you
can see the closet is kinda broke the door. It broke. Right there
he threw me to the closet. (Crying). (Inaudible) I hate you an
he hit me. I fell to the bed, tried to kick em. (Crying). He
grabbed my leg an like pulled me off the bed. I tried to get up.
He hit me again. I ran to the front, kinda grabbed my pepper
spray. He ran up on me again, tried the pepper spray em. He
said now you (inaudible) gonna f --k you up. (Crying). He ran
towards me an right there on the si [sic] right there on the sink
I tried to I grabbed a knife and I tried to run to the back and
close the door but he f--king pushed the door open an an he ran
up on me I stabbed him . . . .

Detective Alexander then asked clarifying questions to learn how respondent was hold ing
the knife and to determine that the drug they used was cocaine. As Detective Alexander
was preparing to leave the room , respondent asked, “I’m under arrest for . . . for self -
defense?” Detective Alexander answered, “No, I need ta [sic] need to call and find out
how [M.B. is] doing.” Detective Alexander left the room around 9:53 a.m.
B. Second and Third Interviews
Detective Alexander returned to the room at approximately 10:01 a.m . This
exchange followed:
Detective: Alright. But I do want to remind you of your
rights before we continue to [talk] about what
happened ok? Um . . .
Respondent: Can I have a lawyer present? (Inaudible)
Detective: I’ll I’ll read it to you . . .
Respondent: (Inaudible) am I suspect? Well obviously cuz I
stabbed him right?
Detective: Well you were the only two there right?
Respondent: Right. Exactly. What . . .
Detective: So so I just want now that we know a jist of what
happened I just want to make sure that you
understand your rights before we keep ironing
out the details. So [respondent], you do have the

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right to remain silent. Anything you say can and
will be used against you in court. You have the
right to talk to a lawyer now and have a lawyer
present now or anytime during questioning. If
you cannot afford one, one will be appointed to
you without cost. Understand all that? Yes?
Respondent: Yes.
Detective: Kinda sounded like you did before I read it.
Yeah. Ok. You alright talking to me still about
what happened?
Respondent: Yeah, I don’t care.
Detective: Ok.
Respondent: Yeah. Do I need a lawyer (inaudible)?
Detective: It’s not up to me to decide that. I just have to tell
you all that (inaudible). So how l ong have you
been with [M.B.]?

Detective Alexander continued to ask questions for 25 minutes. During that time,
respondent gave more incriminating details about the fight and circumstances surrounding
that morning. Detective Alexander left the room for the second time at approximately
10:29 a.m. and returned for a third interview at approximately 10:43 a.m. After the
interrogations, officers informed respondent that M.B. died , and the offic ers brought
respondent to the hospital.
C. Charges and Court Proceedings
Respondent was arrested and charged with second -degree murder and second -
degree assault with a dangerous weapon. Respondent filed a motion to suppress the out -
of-court statements made b y respondent, and the district court issued an order granting
respondent’s motion in part and denying in part. The district court ruled that the state could
not use respondent’s statements during the three different interviews with Detective
Alexander in its case-in-chief. The district court reasoned that the statements made during

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the first interview were inadmissible because they were made during a custodial
interrogation without first providing a Miranda warning. All statements following
respondent’s equivocal requests for an attorney were suppressed because Detective
Alexander did not stop and clarify respondent’s statement regarding counsel.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s order suppressing respondent’s statements has a critical
impact on the outcome of the trial.

The state can appeal a pretri al order pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 28 .04, subd. 2.
However, the state is not entitled to review as a matter of right. State v. Sexter, 935 N.W.2d
157, 161 (Minn. App. 2019). In order to obtain review, “the state must demonstrate that,
unless the district court’s allegedly erroneous ruling is reversed, it will have a critical
impact on the outcome of the trial.” Id. (quotation omitted). Critical impact “is intended
to be a demanding standard, but with some flexibility.” State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d
677, 683 (Minn. 2009) (quotations omitted) . “The state can satisfy the critical -impact
standard if the challenged ruling either completely destroys the state’s case or significantly
reduces the likelihood of a prosecution.” Sexter, 935 N.W.2d at 161 (quotations omitted).
Appellate courts consider the critical impact of the evidence by examining it in light of all
the admissible evidence. Id. In doing this, we weigh its “inherent qualities . . . its relevance
and probative force, its chronological proximity to the alleged crime, its effect in filling
gaps in the evidence viewed as a whole, its quality as a perspective of events different from

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those otherwise available, its clar ity and amount of detail and its origin.” Id. (quoting In
re Welfare of L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn. 1999)).
Appellant argues that suppressing respondent’s statement significantly reduces the
likelihood of prosecution because there were no witnesses to the crime and respondent’s
statements show the required intent fo r both crimes. Respondent argues that suppressing
the statements does not significantly reduce the likelihood of prosecution because the state
has other strong circumstantial evidence.
Respondent correctly notes that appellant has significant evidence to support their
case absent the confessions. Police found respondent kneeling over the victim, covered in
blood and in close proximity to the knife. Further, the incident took place in a small trailer
home when respondent and M.B. were the only two people present. Finally, the district
court ruled that respondent’s 911 call and response to the officer’s onsite questioni ng is
admissible. This includes respondent’s response of “he ran up o n me, he ran up on me,”
to the question of whether she stabbed M.B. However, it is still likely that respondent’s
statements have a crit ical impact on the prosecution if the absence of the statements
significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.
“[G]enerally the suppression of a confession will have a critical impact on the
prosecution.” State v. Scott , 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998) (stating suppression of
defendant’s confession has critical impact despite the state having two eyew itnesses
because suppression reduces likelihood of successful prosecution); see also State v.
Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1990) (“Even if the state’s case is as strong as
the court of appeals says it is, that does not mean that the suppression of the confession

8
will not significantly reduce the likelihood of a successful prosecution.”); State v. Dressel,
765 N.W.2d 419, 424 (Minn. App. 2009) (holding that defendant’s statements had critical
impact on the state’s ability to prosecute because they provided additional clarity and detail
and filled gaps from his previous statements.). We conclude that respondent’s statements
have a critical impact regardless of the evidence separately obtained by the state . The
state’s appeal is properly taken from t he suppression ruling because the suppressed
statements have a critical impact on the case. We will next consider the merits.
II. The district court properly suppressed respondent’s statements from the first
interview because respondent was in custody and the state did not provide a
Miranda warning.

Appellant contends that Detective Alexander was not required to read respondent a
Miranda warning before the first interview because respondent was not in custody. Before
the suspect’s words are admissible, a Miranda warning must be given if a suspect is in
custody and subject to an interrogation. State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn.
2010). There is no dispute tha t the questioning by Detective Alexander constituted an
interrogation. Appellant solely challenges whether the district court properly ruled that
respondent was in custody for Miranda purposes during the first interview.
Determining whether a suspect is i n custody is a mixed question of law and fact.
State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 31 (Minn. 2016). Appellate courts “examine a district
court’s factual findings for clear error, but review independently the legal conclusion
regarding whether the interrogation was custodial.” Id.
“An interrogation is custodial if, based on all the surrounding circumstances, a
reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police

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custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491. No
one factor is conclusive in considering the circumstances under which the statements were
given. State v. Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Minn. 2011). Six factors have been identified to
consider whether a suspect is in custody:
(1) the polic e interviewing the suspect at the police station;
(2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a
crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect’s freedom of
movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly
incriminating statement; (5) the pres ence of multiple officers;
and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.

Id. (citing State v. Staats, 658 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted)). “The
mere fact that an interrogation occurs at the police station,” or the mere fact that a suspect
makes “a significantly incriminating statement does not automatically convert a
noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation.” Id.
Additional factors may combine to indicate that a suspect is not in custody. Those
are:
(1) questioning the s uspect in his or her home; (2) law
enforcement expressly informing the suspect that he or she is
not under arrest; (3) the suspect’s leaving the police station
without hindrance; (4) the brevity of the questioning; (5) the
suspect’s ability to leave at any time; (6) the existence of a
nonthreatening environment; and (7) the suspect’ s ability to
make phone calls.

Id. (citing Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491-92). These two sets of factors are jointly known
as the Staats factors. See Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 492.
Prior to determining that the respondent was in custody, the district court thoroughly
considered and weighed the circumstances with all the custodial factors. Two of the factors

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clearly weigh in support of the district court’s finding that respondent w as in custody :
respondent was questioned at the police station , and she made significant incriminating
statements. The district court also noted that “ [t]he police controlled [respondent’s]
environment from the time the first officer arrived at the trailer through [respondent] being
escorted to the interview room.” This fact is supported by the record. Respondent was still
in handcuffs when Det ective Alexander asked her if she wanted to go to the station t o
answer questions. She was then escorted in to the back of a marked squad car by a fully
uniformed police officer and transported to the police station. Once they arrived at the
police station, she was brought to the interview room where the doors were closed and she
was constantly monitored by one o r more police officers . Additionally, Det ective
Alexander believed that respondent stabbed M.B. before he started the first interview with
her.
The district court also carefully considered those factors which might suggest the
respondent was not in custody. Specifically, Detective Alexander told respondent she was
not under arrest and she was free to leave at any time.
In balancing all the Staats factors, the district court ruled that “the weight of the
evidence comes down in favor of the conclusion that the [respondent] was subject to
custodial interrogation during the [f]irst [i]nterview [q]uestioning .” Taken as a whole,
these facts show that respondent was in custody at the time of her first interview before
which she was not provided a Miranda warning. The district court did not err in
suppressing respondent’s first interview statements.

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III. The district court properly suppressed respondent’s statements made during
the second and third interviews.

The district court suppressed respondent’s statements fro m the second and third
interviews because Detective Alexander did not stop and clarify respondent’s equivocal
request for counsel during the second interview . “When a suspect asks for counsel,
questioning must cease ‘until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’”
State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484 -85, 101 S.Ct 1880 , 1885 (1981)). This reque st must be unequivocal. Id.
Minnesota also extends a decreased protection to equivocal requests for counsel. “[W]hen
a suspect indicates by an equivocal or ambiguous statement, which is subject to a
construction that the accused is requesting counsel, all further questioning must stop except
that narrow questions designed to ‘clarify’ the accused’s true desires respecting counsel
may continue.” State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn. 1988). Appellate courts
review the district court’s application of the “stop-and-clarify” rule de novo . State v.
Ortega, 798 N.W.2d 59, 70 (Minn. 2011).
The district court found, and the record supports, that respondent made an equivocal
request for an attorney when she asked whether she needed a lawyer after receiving her
Miranda warning. Appellant points to both of respondent’s references to an attorney and
argues Detective Alexander satisfied the Robinson “stop-and-clarify” rule for the first
request by read ing respondent her Miranda rights. T he second reference to an attorney

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was not an equivocal request for an attorney that might otherwise require the Robinson
“stop-and-clarify” rule.
Appellant correctly notes that an officer satisfies the “stop-and-clarify” requirement
by reading the suspect his or he r Miranda rights. Id. at 73. Detective Alexander read
respondent her Miranda rights directly after her first equivocal request for an attorney.
Therefore, Detective Alexander properly addressed respondent’s first request for an
attorney, and t he request would not have prevented the ad missibility of subsequent
statements if such statements had occurred. Instead, respondent’s second equivocal request
for an attorney immediately followed.
Respondent’s second mention of an attorney was as follows: “Yeah. Do I need a
lawyer (inaudible)?” In Ortega, the supreme court stated that the defendant’s statement
“Am I supposed to have a lawyer present?” was “ [a]t minimum . . . an equivocal request
for an attorney.” Id. at 75. These two statements are substantially the same . After
respondent asked the question, Detective Alexander answered, “It’s not up to me to decide
that. I just have to tell you all that (inaudible). So how long have you been with [M.B.]?”
Detective Alexander did not stop and clarify respondent’s equivocal request for counsel.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s suppression of the statements made after
respondent’s second equivocal request for counsel in the second and third interviews.
Affirmed.