In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: William Lee Erickson.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1038

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: William Lee Erickson.

Filed March 23, 2020
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-PR-17-686

William Lee Erickson, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Danielle Baan Hofman, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
On appeal fro m the district court’s order denying appellant’ s motion to withdraw
his stipulation to an indeterminate commitment as a sexually dangerous person and to
vacate his judgment of commitment, appellant argues that: (1) he should have been allowed
to withdraw his stipulation because he was not adequately informed by his attorney; (2) his

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attorney gave him ineff ective assistance of counsel; and (3 ) his stipulation did not satisfy
the requirements of a criminal plea agreement and, therefore, is defective. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, the s tate petitioned for the civil commit ment of appellant William Lee
Erickson as a sexually dangerous person and sexually psychopathic personality. The state
based its petition on Erickson’s history of harmful sexual conduct, as exhib ited by the
following events.
In 1995, Erickson sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old girl and was charged with
four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Erickson admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with the victim and pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Erickson was placed on probation for 10 years.
In 1996, Erickson violated probation after he was charged with felony
telecommunication fraud for making long distance calls t o sexual pay-per-call phone
numbers. Erickson placed some of the calls from jail.
In 2001, Erickson sexually assaulted a 16 -year-old coworker twice. The state
charged Erickson with fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct, and Erickson entered an
Alford1 plea to the offense. Erickson was place d on probation for two years. In 2002,
Erickson was convicted of failing to register as a predatory offender.

1 When a defendant enters an Alford plea, he maintains his innocence but admits that the
state possesses sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty at trial. See State v. Theis,
742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91
S. Ct. 160, 168 (1970)).

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In 2012, Erickson’s 12-year-old stepdaughter reported that Erickson had attempted
to have sex with her. Erickson’s wife obtained an order for protection (OFP) against him.
After violating the OFP on several occasions, Erickson was charged with violating the OFP
and pleaded guilty.
Erickson eventually pleaded guilty to fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct
regarding the sexual assault of his stepdaughter. He was placed on probation for five years.
Erickson’s probation agent filed a violation report after Erickson had unsupervised contact
with minors, was terminated from sex offender treatment, changed his residence without
permission, and failed to remain law abiding. Erickson’s wife a lso reported that she
sustained injuries from Erickson’s sexual behavior and that Erickson would continue to
engage in sexual behavior with her even after she begged him to stop.
The state also alleged that Erickson engaged in other criminal sexual beh avior and
harassment since 1995, which had not been charged.
Following the state’s petition, Erickson appeared for a commitment hearing. After
testifying at length, Eric kson conferred with his counsel and decided to stipulate to an
indeterminate commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The district court accepted the
stipulation and ordered Erickson to be civilly committed.
The following year, Erickson moved to withdraw his stipulation. He argued that his
stipulation was not made voluntaril y, knowingly, and intelligently, asserting that his
counsel was ineffective for several reasons , including that his counsel had been recently
charged for the possession and sale of drugs. The district court appointed special counsel
to represent Erickson in his motion to withdraw his stipulation.

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At the motion hearing, Erickson argued that his prior counsel’s admitted drug use
resulted in his ineffective representation of him. Following the hearing, the district court
denied Erickson’s motion to withdraw his stipulation, but reserved his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel with the instruction that Erickson was required to submit an amended
motion and affidavit in support of his claim. The district court ordered Erickson to provide
“at least some specifically-articulated extrinsic evidence” regarding how his counsel’s drug
use affected his representation of Erickson. Erickson filed an amended motion with the
district court but did not file an affidavit discussing the drug use. In its order, the district
court found that Erickson did not address the specific issues that the district court left open
for him to address and instead raised new issues that were “entirely counter to the record.”
The district court therefore denied Erickson’s motion.
Erickson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Erickson’s motion
to withdraw his stipulation to be civilly committed.

Erickson argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to withdraw his stipulation because he received ineffective assistance of counsel as his
attorney told him that he would be committed for only three to four years.
A civil commitment stipulation, as any other civil stipulation, cannot be withdrawn
by one party without the consent of the other party, “except by leave of the court for cause
shown.” In re Commitment of Rannow, 749 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App. 2008), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). A district court has wide discretion in vacating a stipulation,

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and this court will not reverse its decision “absent a showing that the court acted so
arbitrarily as to constitute an abuse of that discretion.” Anderson v. Anderson, 225 N.W.2d
837, 840 (Minn. 1975). “ A stipulation may be vacated when it was made improvidently
and in good conscience and equity should not stand. ” Rannow, 749 N.W.2d at 396.
“Stipulations are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561
N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). Thus, stipulations made under fraud or duress and “that
prejudice the defrauded or coerced party” are unenforceable. Toughill v. Toughill , 609
N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. App. 2000).
Erickson asserts that he would not have entered the stipulation but for counsel’s
promise that he would be committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) for
only three to four years, although the commitment stipulation wa s for an indeterminate
period of time. Therefore, h e argues that his civil -commitment stipulation is an
unenforceable contract based on fraud or duress.
The district court ruled that because Erickson testified before the district court that
he had not received any promises for entering the stipulation and had acknowledged that
no one knew the length of time his commitment would last and that it could last a long
time, Erickson did not allege facts sufficient to prove fraud or duress and thus vacate the
stipulation.
When a person has “a sound, rational basis for entering into [a] stipulation, and the
record lacks any evidence of fraud or duress that influenced [that person],” a district court
properly concludes that the person made the stip ulation knowingly and voluntarily.
Rannow, 749 N.W.2d at 399. In Rannow, this court determined that the district court was

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well within its discretion in refusing to vacate a civil-commitment stipulation because “the
record lack[ed] any evidence of fraud or duress.” Id.
In the present case, t he following exchange occurred between Erickson and his
counsel at the stipulation hearing:
Q: And prior to entering the stipulation did anybody threaten
you or make you any promises?
A: No.
Q: Do you understand that there is no way to predict how long
this commitment will be?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, because it’s indeterminate it could be short, but more
likely it could be a very long time; do you understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: And that the only way to get out of this process right now is
through a separate court proceeding where you prove that
you’re no longer dangerous to society?
A: Yes.

Erickson also testified that he had no questions about what he was agreeing to in the
stipulation and stated that he believed his counsel’s representation was sufficient.
Erickson also signed each page of the seven -page stipulation, which stated that
Erickson “fully understand[s] the nature of these proceedings and the contents of the
Petition” and “believe[s] that the Petitioner ha s enough evidence that, if it were presented
to a judge, would most likely result in [him] being indeterminately committed as a ‘sexually
dangerous person.’” The signed stipulation also states that Erickson “wish[es] to agree to
indeterminate judicial commitment as a ‘sexually dangerous person.’”
Based on Erickson’s testimony before the district court and his signed stipulation,
we hold that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Erickson knowingly and
voluntarily made the stipulation to be committed as a sexually dangerous person. Because

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Erickson has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant
his motion to vacate the stipulation, we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Erickson’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

Erickson argues that his counsel was ineffective because his counsel told him that,
if he stipulated to the commitment, his commitment would last only three to four years.
A person who is subject to civil -commitment proceedings has the right to be
represented by counsel. Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c (2018). A person who is
indeterminately committed as a sexually dangerous person may bring an ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claim under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. We analyze ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims in civil-commitment cases under the Strickland standard. In
re Civil Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Minn. App. 2019). And we review
these claims de novo. Id.
To succeed on an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim, Strickland requires a
defendant to show that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an object ive standard of
reasonableness”; and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2055 (1984).
We apply “a strong presumption that [an attorney ’s] performance falls within the
wide range of reasonably professional assistance.” Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 657 (quotation
omitted). “General assertions of error without evidentiary support are inadequate to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. If one of the Strickland prongs is

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determinative, this court need not address the other. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842
(Minn. 2003).
A. The district court did not err by finding that Erickson failed to show that his
counsel’s performance was unreasonable.

Erickson offers no evidence to support his claim that his counsel told him he would
be released from MSOP in three to four years. Rather, the record shows that Erickson
entered into the stipulation of his own free will and that no one thre atened or coerced him
to obtain the stipulation. He also testified that no one made any promises in order to induce
him to enter into the stipulation and that he understood that there wa s no way to predict
how long his commitment would last. Erickson stated that his attorney’s representation of
him was sufficient and that he had enough time to discuss the issues with his attorney.
Furthermore, Erickson signed the stipulation which reads:
My attorney has told me, and I understand that by stipulating
to this commitment, I shall not be discharged unless it appears
to the satisfaction of the Special Review Board, that I am
capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society,
that I am no longer dangerous to the public, and that I am no
longer in need of in-patient treatment and supervision . . . and
that I have the right to review of that determination by a three
judge panel . . . .

Through the stipulation, Erickson expressly acknowledged that he would be
discharged only when he is no longer a danger to the public—which is contrary to a belief
that he will be released in three to four years. This is consistent with his counsel’s affidavit
which states, “Because of the significant procedural difficulty in securing a release for
persons committed to MS OP, it has also been my practice to specifically inform every
client who stipulates to commitment that I have no idea when the y will actually be

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released.” Therefore, nothing in the record supports Erickson’s assertion that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objectively reasonable standard.
Erickson also argues that his counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable
because of his counsel’s drug use. In both his brief to this court and his submissions to the
district court, Erickson failed to state how his counsel’s drug use impacted his
representation. And when the district court gave Erickson another opportunity to submit
an amended motion about his counsel’s representation and drug use, Erickson failed to
discuss the drug use and, instead, raised other unrelated issues. Indeed, his only assertion
regarding drug use was that his attorney’s “ineffective counsel was likely caused by his
addiction to drugs and alcohol.” Erickson has not alleged any facts sufficient to show that
his representation fell below an objectively reasonable standard. See State v. Nissalke, 801
N.W.2d 82, 111 (Minn. 2011) (holding that Nissalke could not prove ineffective assistance
of counsel because he did “not articulate with any specificity how” counsel’s drug use
affected his representation). Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by finding that
Erickson failed to show that his counsel’s performance was unreasonable.
B. The district court did not err by finding that Erickson failed to show that, but for
counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have entered into the stipulation.

Although we need not address the second prong of Strickland, under the second
prong, “the defendant must show that counsel’s errors ‘actually’ had an adverse effect in
that but for the errors the result of the proceeding probably would have been different. ”
Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Minn. 1987).

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The district court concluded that Erick son failed to show that he would not have
entered into the stipulation but for his counsel’s ineffective assistance. Erickson does not
specifically address how his counsel’s alleged promise that he would be committed for
only three to four years would have changed the outcome as Erickson testified at the time
of the stipulation that he believed that there was enough evidence for a court to find that he
is a sexually dangerous person and therefore wished to agree to an indeterminate
commitment. Therefore, the district court did not err by finding that Erickson failed to
show that he would not have entered into the stipulation but for the alleged misconduct.
Because Erickson has not shown that his counsel’s perfo rmance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that he would not have stipulated to the
commitment but for his counsel’s alleged errors, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Erickson’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Erickson an
evidentiary hearing.

Erickson also argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing
before dismissing his ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim. “[A]n evidentiary hearing
is merely a procedural means by which a district court may determine whether a party is
entitled to relief.” In re Civil Commitment of Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40, 47 (Minn. App. 2013),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). “A petitioner is entit led to an evidentiary hearing
only if a factual dispute is shown by the petition.” Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d 917,
920 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1988).

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The district court considered whether to grant Erickson an evidentiary he aring.
Concluding that an evidentiary hearing would likely invite questions of his counsel’s drug
use, the district court stated, “The Cour t is not willing to go down this rabbit hole unless
and until it can be certain that such evidence would actually be necessary. That means
providing at least some specifically-articulated extrinsic evidence that [counsel] provided
ineffective representation to [Erickson] in particular.” The district court invited Erickson
to submit “an affidavit setting forth the evidence he has in his possession which he intends
to submit at [a] hearing.” Nevertheless, Erickson did not submit an affidavit setting forth
such evidence and did not raise any issues related to his counsel’s drug use in his amended
motion. Because of this, the district court denied Erickson’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel without an evidentiary hearing.
Because the district court gave Erickson another opportunity to provide a factual
basis for his claim, and Erickson failed to do so, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying his claim without an evidentiary hearing.
III. The plea agreement standard in criminal proceedings does not apply to a
civil-commitment stipulation.

In the alternative, Erickson argues that the plea agreement standard in criminal
proceedings applies to a civil-commitment stipulation.
We have previously addressed a similar argument in Rannow. In that case, Rannow
argued that his civil -commitment sti pulation should be treated as an Alford plea. 749
N.W.2d at 399 . But we rejected the argument because “commitment proceedings and
commitment laws are civil in nature.” Id. at 396; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.

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346, 361–70, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082–85 (1997) (discussing Kansas’s civil-commitment law
for sexually violent predators and holding that it does not constitute a criminal proceeding);
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 n.3, 87 S. Ct. 1209, 1212 n.3 (1967) (noting that a
former version of the Minnesota psychopathic personality commitment law is not criminal
in nature); In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 871 –72 (Minn. 1999) (following the holding
of Hendricks).
Because a civil commitment is clearly not criminal in nature, the district court di d
not err by failing to apply the criminal standard for accepting a plea agreement when
accepting the parties’ stipulation.
Affirmed.