State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1043

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Steven Kalland,
Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-18-1255

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County Atto rney, John P. Fitzge rald, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from judgme nt of conviction for a fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime, appellant Anthony Kalland argues that he should be permitted

2
to withdraw his Alford plea1 because the district court did not expressly find appellant
guilty and because the anticip ated evidence identified in the plea colloquy did not
demonstrate a “strong probability” that appellant would be found guilty at trial. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of December 27, 2018, polic e responded to a residence in Litchfield.
A woman had called 911 and repor ted that appellant, her boyfri end, was in the residence
and threatening to shoot himself with a revolver. Police arrived, set up a perimeter around
the residence, and unsuccessfully attempted to communicate with appellant. Police
thereafter obtained a warrant to search the resi dence in order to retrieve the firearm.
Although police did not find the firearm, they did find methampheta mine paraphernalia,
which included smoking devices, snort tubes, and a scale—all of which were covered in
methamphetamine residue. Police did not find appellant in the residence.
On December 30, 2018, polic e received a tip that appe llant had returned to the
Litchfield residence. The owner of the resi dence informed police that the residence was
supposed to be locked and vacant. Police returned to and entered the residence—with the
permission of the owner—and found appellan t hiding under a pile of blankets. After
securing the residence and determining that appellant was the only occupant, police located
a firearm, a small amount of methampheta mine, a scale containing methamphetamine

1 An Alford plea permits a defendant to plead gu ilty while nonetheless maintaining his
innocence, in order to take ad vantage of a plea bargain beca use the defendant agrees that
there is sufficient evidence for a ju ry to find him guilty at trial. See North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970).

3
residue, and several small plastic bags. The state charged appellant with unlawful
possession of a firearm and misdemeanor domestic assault.
At an omnibus hearing on Ma rch 14, 2019, the district court received into evidence
25 exhibits offered by the state. The district court additionally heard from law enforcement
officers, who testified to their activities concerning appellant on December 30, 2018.2
On April 15, 2019, and af ter the complaint was amended to add a fifth-degree
controlled-substance-possession charge, the st ate and appellant entered into a plea
agreement. Appellant entered an Alford plea to the amended fifth-degree possession charge
as a gross misdemeanor, and the domestic-assa ult charge was dismissed. In the plea
petition, appellant acknowledged that he “had sufficient time to discuss [his] case with [his]
attorney,” and that appellant’s attorney was “fully informed as to the facts of this case” and
“fully advised” appellant. Appellant also af firmed that, “I understand that the judge may
accept my Alford guilty plea despite my claim of innocence, so long as I agree the state’s
evidence is sufficient for a jury to find me guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant
further acknowledged that, “I have reviewed th e evidence that the st ate will offer against
me if I have a trial,” and that “I believe that there is a subs tantial likelihood that I will be
found guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the offense to which I am pleading if the state’s
evidence is presented against me at trial.”

2 Although the omnibus record is significant to the plea-va lidity question, as discussed
below, there are no omnibus issues on appeal.

4
During the plea hearing, but before his co lloquy with the district court, appellant
had the following exchange with his counsel:
COUNSEL: . . . the Judge may accept a plea of guilty pursuant
to State versus Alford even if you claim to be innocent
provided that you agree that the evidence is sufficient for a jury
to convict you. Do you understand that?
APPELLANT: I do.
COUNSEL: And, do you believe that that’s possible that—or
likely that a jury would convict you if you did have a trial?
APPELLANT: Yes.

During his colloquy with th e district court, the district court asked appellant:
DISTRICT COURT: So, knowing this is an Alford plea and
you’re maintaining your innocence, if this were a jury trial and
we were at trial and there were a jury, if they were to hear
testimony from Detectives Danielson and Miller of the Meeker
County Sheriff’s Office and th ey were to testify that on
December 30, 2018, they arrest ed you at a residence off
County State Aid Highway 16 in Litchfield, which is Meeker
County, and that they had previously obtained a search warrant
for the residence and got a second search warrant after you had
been at the residence, um, and found methamphetamine bag—
baggies, a scale, and methamphetamine at the residence, and—
and [the methamphetamine] wasn’t there after they searched it
the first time, but it was there af ter they arrested you, do you
believe that it is substantially likely a jury could find you guilty
of the crime of fifth degree possession of a controlled
substance? And that’s if a jury were to hear the testimony of
the detectives.
APPELLANT: Yes, your honor.

The district court then accepted appellant ’s plea and sentenced him to 365 days in
jail concurrent with any other sentences.
This appeal followed.

5
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his Alford plea because the factual
basis supporting his guilty pl ea to gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance was inaccurate. Appellant did not present this argument to the district
court. Nonetheless, the supreme court has held that “by pleading guilty, a defendant does
not waive the argument that the factual basis of his gui lt was not established.” State v.
Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003). Moreover, appellant “is free to simply appeal
directly from a judgment of conviction and cont end that the record made at the time the
plea was entered is inadequate” to estab lish the requirements of a guilty plea. Brown v.
State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). We therefore consider appellant’s argument.
For a guilty plea to be va lid, it must be “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” State
v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994) (citation omitted). In explaining the validity
of a plea, the supreme court provided that:
The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a
defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than
he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to
trial. . . . The purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to
insure that the defendant is not pleading guilty because of
improper pressures. The purpose of the requirement that the
plea be intelligent is to insure that the defenda nt understands
the charges, understands the right s he is waiving by pleading
guilty, and understands the consequences of his plea.

State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “If a plea fails to meet any one of these
requirements, it is invalid.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). We apply

6
a de novo standard of review when dete rmining the validity of a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
As noted, appellant argues that his plea fa iled to meet the accuracy requirement. “A
guilty plea is inaccurate if it is not supported by a proper factual basis.” State v. Johnson,
867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). A proper
factual basis exists if there are “sufficient f acts on the record to support a conclusion that
defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Iverson,
664 N.W.2d at 349 (quotatio n omitted). A guilty plea ma y not be withdrawn “simply
because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record contains sufficient evidence
to support the conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A plea should not be accepted by
the district court “unless the record supports the conclusion that the defendant actually
committed an offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty.” Trott,
338 N.W.2d at 251-52.
An Alford plea is a plea under which the defe ndant acknowledges that the record
establishes his guilt and accepts as a fact that he reasonably believes the state has sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction, wh ile not expressly admitting guilt. Alford, 400 U.S. at
37, 91 S. Ct. at 167; see also State v. Goulette , 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977)
(recognizing Alford pleas in Minnesota). The factual basis concerning such a plea must be
carefully scrutinized by the district court “because of the inherent conflict in pleading guilty
while maintaining innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 648-49. The district court should

7
ordinarily determine whether an adequate factual basis has been established. Goulette, 258
N.W.2d at 761.
Appellant contends that plea withdrawal is appropriate here because the district
court did not state on the record that it found appellant guilty of gross-misdemeanor
fifth-degree possession of a controlled subs tance and did not separately find a “strong
probability” that a jury would convict appellant at trial. Appellant asserts that the record
is therefore insufficient to establish a factual basis for the offense.
Appellant cites no bi nding authority supporting the notion that an Alford plea is
invalid if the district court does not make an express finding of guilt, “and we are unaware
of any such authority.” Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 216. Moreov er, “there is no suggestion
in the rules of criminal procedure that a district court must make an express finding on the
record concerning the adequacy of the factual basis of every [ Alford] plea.” Id. The rule
provides that a “defendant must state the fa ctual basis for the plea.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
15.01 subd. 1(8). We have declined to “impose a requirement that, in every [Alford] guilty
plea, the district court must make an express finding on the record that there is a strong
probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the cr ime to which he is pleading
guilty.” Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 217. Instead, we may consider on appeal whether there
is a strong probability that a ppellant would be found guilty of gross misdemeanor fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance. Id. at 216.
The record as a whole reveal s a sufficient factual basis to support appellant’s plea.
Appellant acknowledged in the pea petition and in sworn plea testimony that a jury would

8
likely find him guilty of the o ffense and that there is ample evidence of his guilt. At the
omnibus hearing, evidence demonstrated that methamphetamine and paraphernalia were
recovered from the residence of which appellant was the only occupant. Omnibus exhibits
and the testimony of the responding police officers demonstrate that appellant would surely
have been found guilty of gross-misdemeanor fifth-degr ee possession of a controlled
substance had the case been tried.
Based on this record, we conclude that th e district court did not err when it accepted
appellant’s Alford plea. Appellant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.