A19-1067

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1064
A19-1067

In re the Guardianship of:
Jack Earl Kestner, Ward.

Filed March 23, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-GC-PR-17-371

Jevon C. Bindman, David F. Herr, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis , Minnesota (for appellant
Karen Huntington Earl)

Peter J. Kestner, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (attorney pro se)

Thomas W. Wexler, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent Guardian and Conservator Services
LLC)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant/cross-respondent Karen Hunt ington Earl (appellant) challenges the
district court’s award of gua rdianship and attorney fees to respondent/cross-appellant
Guardian and Conservator Services, LLC (respondent) in its January 24 order. Appellant
also challenges the district court’s award of a dditional fees in its Ju ly 10, 2019 order.

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Appellant argues that the district court erred because Minn. Stat. §§ 524.1-101 to .8-103
(2018) and the parties’ written agreements do not require that she pay respondent’s attorney
fees, a portion of the awarded attorney fees were unrelated to the ward’s benefit, the
attorney fees should not have been awarded at the hourly rate used by the district court,
and some of the guardianship fees were awarded outside the effective dates of the parties’
written agreement. Respondent challenges by notice of related appeal the district court’s
partial denial of claimed guardianship fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant and her ex-h usband, P.K., have a son, J. E.K., who has been diagnosed
with autism spectrum disorder. J.E.K. “has an extremely limited ability to communicate
his needs” and “needs full prompts and assist ance for all aspects of self-care and daily
living.” J.E.K. turned 18 years old in Febr uary 2018, and both parents agreed that a
guardian needed to be appointed for J.E.K.
The need for a guardianship arose in the context of a prolonged period of contention
between appellant and P.K. concerning their son, the details of which need not be set forth
in detail here. It is sufficient to note that, from the outset, this was anticipated to be a high-
conflict guardianship case. That shared prediction proved accurate.
Appellant and P.K. agreed in a written stipulation, approved by a subsequent district
court order, that appellant a nd respondent would serve as J.E.K.’s co-guardians.
Respondent, a limited liability company that provides professional guardianship services,
is owned by R.R. The stipulation recites that appellant “has elected to pay personally for
[respondent’s] services.” Appellant, P.K., and R.R. signed the stipulation. The district

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court approved and adopted th e stipulation by reference in its March 1, 2018 order
appointing co-guardians.
The district court’s March 1, 2018 orde r appointed appellant as “General Co-
Guardian” and respondent as “Limited Co-Guardian.” The district court ordered appellant
and respondent to share four of the seven po wers and duties enumerated in Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-313(c): (1) establishing J.E.K.’s place of abode, (2) giving or withholding consent
for J.E.K.’s medial and professional care, (3) exercising supervision authority over J.E.K.,
and (4) applying for government benefits or services on J.E.K.’s behalf. The order required
appellant and respondent to “exercise all shared powers jointly.” The district court ordered
that appellant would have the three remaining powers and duties: (1) providing for J.E.K.’s
care, comfort, and maintenanc e needs, (2) taking reasonable care of J.E.K.’s clothing,
furniture, vehicles, and other personal effects, and (3) approving or withholding approval
for any contract J.E.K. may make. Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c).
Appellant and respondent executed a serv ice agreement on Ma rch 5, 2018, that
outlined the scope of guardianship services th at respondent would provide. It also
identified respondent’s compensation and other terms. The se rvice agreement stated that
respondent would provide servi ces for the benefit of J.E.K. at $100 per hour charged in
six-minute increments, and that appellant would pay for “charges, materials and expenses
associated with any service provided, which includes but [is] not limited to: Guardianship
Duties, Guardianship Attorneys, etc.” The service agreem ent stated that it would “begin
on appointment letters [being] issued by the probate court es timated to be 2/26/2018 and
will remain in full force and effect until Co-guardian is discharged by the court.”

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In March 2018, respondent re t a i n e d a n a t t o r n e y a t a n h o u r l y r a t e o f $ 2 5 0 “ t o
represent it in the guardianship.”
I. First motion to compel and subsequent order

Respondent invoiced appellant for its services in February 2018, and appellant made
a $750 payment. But appellant refused to pa y subsequent invoices. On June 12, 2018,
respondent moved to compel payment of its gua rdianship fees, costs, and attorney fees.
Appellant opposed the motion. A hearing on these issues was scheduled for November 7
and 8, 2018.
Unrelated to the motion to compel, respondent, P.K., and J.E.K.’s attorney became
concerned about appellant’s abilit y to cooperate with respondent pursuant to the district
court’s order appointing co-guardians. On A ugust 10, 2018, the district court held an
attorneys-only telephone confer ence. The parties’ attorneys, J.E.K.’s attorney, and P.K.
(who is a practicing attorney and represented himself) appeared.
That day, the district court issued an order appointing respondent as temporary
substitute guardian with auth ority to perform all seven st atutory powers and duties and
ordered that appellant’s guardianship duties be “suspended for the duration of this Order.”
The district court found that appellant was not “performing her duties effectively” and that
the “protection of the welfare of the Ward requires immediate action.” The district court
also found that appellant “prevented [respondent] from performing its duties,” noting that

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“[i]t is clear to the Court th at the [appellant] and [respo ndent] are not able to work
cooperatively in the best interest of the Ward.”1
At the November 7 and 8 h earing on respondent’s motion to compel, respondent
requested fees in the amounts of $65,567 ( guardianship fees) and $31,738.85 (attorney
fees) incurred between March and October 20 18. Appellant, R.R., and respondent’s
attorney testified. The district court received 29 exhibits. Copies of respondent’s invoices
for guardianship services from the relevant period were received in evidence. The invoices
contained a list of services, itemized by serv ice date, brief description of services, time
spent, and amount charged. Eight invoices for the services of respondent’s attorney were
received in evidence. Each identified the services rendered, itemized by service date, brief
description, and hours spent on the invoiced task.
On January 24, 2019, the district court issued a written order (first fee order), which
contained 133 findings of fact and 20 conclusions of law, partially granting respondent’s
motion to compel. It ordered appellant to pay respondent $11,249 .64 for respondent’s
guardianship fees and $28,101.35 for attorney fees, for a total of $39,350.99.
Concerning guardianship fees, the distri ct court stated that it “questions many
billing entries” and “the total amount billed by [respondent].” The district court made
detailed findings about specific billing entries in each of the invoices. The district court
found that respondent charged one-tenth of an hour for each email regardless of the amount

1 Appellant also moved to reinstate custody a nd parenting time and, in an October 2018
order, the district court permitted appellant to have a minimum of three supervised visits
with J.E.K. per week.

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of time spent reviewing the em ail, did not provide an explanation fo r the time billed for
receiving and sending emails, and failed to provide copies of al l emails sent or received.
The district court noted that “[b]ased on the high conflict nature and parental involvement
in this case, it is cl ear that [respondent] spent . . . signi ficant time working on this case.”
The district court ultimately disallowed $54,317.36 of respondent’s requested guardianship
fees.
Concerning attorney fees, the district c ourt found that appellant did not dispute the
reasonableness of the attorney hourly rate or the number of hours billed and that “[o]verall,
the time billed by [respondent’s attorney] appears appropriate and necessary to represent
[respondent] in this matter.” The district court identified sp ecific billing entries that it
reduced and provided an explanation for each reduction. The district court disallowed
$3,637.50 of respondent’s requested attorney fees.
Respondent moved for a new trial or amende d findings on the first fee order.
Appellant opposed the motion. The district court denied respondent’s motion.
II. Guardianship arrangement proceeding

A two-day hearing concerning the guardia nship arrangement occurred in January
2019. Appellant moved to remove respondent as guardian, and the district court considered
its own motion to determine if the guardianship arrangement set by the stipulation was in
J.E.K.’s best interest.
In a written order issued February 1, 2019 , the district court appointed respondent
as J.E.K.’s successor guardian with all seven statutory powers and duties, ordered appellant
“discharged as General Co-Guardian of [J.E.K.],” concluded that the parties were no longer

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bound by the original stipulation, and ordered that payment for guardianship services “shall
[after the order] be made pursuant to the Order Granting In Forma Pauperis Application
filed on September 18, 2017.”
III. Second motion to comp el and subsequent order

On March 12, 2019, respondent filed a second motion to compel payment of
guardianship and attorney fees incurred from November 2018 to January 2019.
Respondent requested $18,725.82 in guardianship fees and $10,313.85 in attorney fees. A
hearing was held on April 12, 2019. The district court received thirteen exhibits and heard
testimony from appellant and R.R. On July 10, 2019, the di strict court issued a written
order (second fee order) in which it partiall y granted respondent’s motion and ordered
appellant to pay respondent $ 10,811.95 in guardianship fees and $6,075 in attorney fees,
for a total of $16,886.95.
Concerning guardianship fees, the district court observed that respondent was not
“entitled to unfettered, unques tioned billing” and that appellant “is entitled to know the
basis for all charges.” The district court fou nd that section four of the service agreement
provided for “itemized monthly invoice” of its services and that “[b]ulk billings by which
individual services provided cannot be determined are not allowed under the Service
Agreement.” The district court analyzed each invoice, along with respondent’s exhibit 19,
which provided brief explanations for some invoiced charges. The district court excluded
charges for services rendered in October that appeared on the November invoice because
“[t]he Service Agreement specifies th at [respondent] will provide itemized monthly

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invoices,” excluded charges for tasks not re lated to guardianship duties, and excluded
entries it found to be duplicative or insufficiently precise.
Concerning responde nt’s charges for emails, th e district court found that
“[respondent] has completely failed to prove the number of emails sent or received and
whether its billing for emails is appropriate.” The district court was unable to “determine
which emails were included in the invoices.” It found that re spondent’s “method for
determining the number of emails sent and received during a month is unreliable” and that
many emails provided to the court were dup licative. The district court disallowed
$7,913.87 in requested guardianship fees.
Concerning attorney fees, the district court found the fees were “reasonable and
necessary” but addressed a few specific charges and made reductions for what it found to
be duplicate billings or inaccurate descriptions. The district court reduced some fees that
it determined were related to litigating the second motion to compel and disallowed a total
of $4,238.85 from the requested attorney fees.
These consolidated appeals follow.
D E C I S I O N
The guardian bears the “burden of providing evidence to support fee requests.” In
re Guardianship of Doyle, 778 N.W.2d 342, 351 (Minn. App. 2010) (citation omitted). “A
district court’s decision as to the reasonable value of a conservator’s or guardian’s services
is a question of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Id. We review the
district court’s award or denial of atto rney fees for an abuse of discretion. In re
Conservatorship of Miller, 642 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn. App. 2002).

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I. The district court did not clearly err in its award of attorney fees and
guardianship fees.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by awarding attorn ey fees for four
reasons. Appellant argues that the district court erred when it determined that Minn. Stat.
§§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 and th e parties’ stipulation and service agreement required
appellant to reimburse respondent for atto rney fees, when it aw arded attorney fees
unrelated to J.E.K.’s best interest, when it awarded guardianship fees before and after the
service agreement’s effective dates, and when it awarded attorney fees at an improper
hourly rate. We address each argument in turn.
A. Stipulation and service agreement

Appellant argues that the district court “a warded fees to [res pondent’s attorney]
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 524.5-502(b)” and that the statute “does not obligate [appellant]
to compensate [respondent’s attorney] for those services.”
The district court recognized that lawyer s are ordinarily “entitled to compensation
from the protected person’s estate or from the county.” But, because appellant “signed the
Stipulation and agreed to pay personally fo r [respondent’s] services” and signed “the
Service Agreement that requires [appellant] to pay [respondent’s attorney] fees related to
the services [respondent] provides the Ward,” appellant bears contractual responsibility for
respondent’s fees. The district court acknow ledged that respondent’s attorney performed
services that qualify for reimbursement unde r Minn. Stat. § 524.5-5 02(b) but concluded
that the parties’ stipulation and services agreement require appellant to pay the fees.

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We agree with the district court that the service agreement governs appellant’s
obligation to compensate respo ndent for its attorney fees. Appellant’s obligation to pay
respondent’s fees arises not by statute, but instead from the parties’ contract.
Next, appellant argues that the district court erred when it determined that the
service agreement and stipulation required appe llant to pay respondent’s attorney fees
because “[w]hen read together, these documents are ambiguous as to whether they allow
recovery of legal fees.” Respondent contends that the service agreement is unambiguous.
Whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de
novo. Pioneer Peat, Inc. v. Quality Grassing & Servs., Inc., 653 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn.
App. 2002). Contract language is ambiguous if the language itse lf, without extrinsic
evidence, is reasonably susceptibl e to more than one meaning. Id. at 473. “When the
language is clear and unambiguous, we enforc e the agreement of the parties as expressed
in the language of the contract.” Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Const. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776
(Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).
Turning to the contract, section four provides that, “Cus tomer will provide
compensation for all charges, materials and expenses associated with any service provided,
which includes but not limited to : Guardianship Duties, Guar dianship Attorneys, etc.”
This language unambiguously references guardianship attorneys and unambiguously
requires appellant to compensate respondent for “Guardianship Attorneys.” We conclude
that the unambiguous language of the serv ice agreement obligates appellant to pay
respondent’s attorney fees.

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B. Attorney fees unrelated to J.E.K.’s benefit

Appellant argues that the district court aw arded respondent attorney fees related to
its motion to compel and that these fees were not incurred for services that benefitted J.E.K.
as required by Minn. Stat. § 524.5-502(b) (perm itting compensation if the “necessary
services have been provided for the benefit of the ward”).
It appears that the district court may have awarded some attorney fees in the first
fee order related to collecting respondent’s guardianship fees, but we nevertheless discern
no clear error or abuse of discretion by the district court.
“The reasonable value of compensation or reimbursement is a question of fact,” and
we review a district court’s factual findings “under the clearly erroneous standard.” In re
Stisser Grantor Tr. , 818 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Minn. 2012). “[W]e take[] the view of the
evidence which is most favorable to the [district] court’s findings and defer to the district
court’s opportunity to assess th e credibility of witnesses.” Id. (alteration in original)
(citation and quotation omitted). “Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous unless we are
left with the definite and firm convic tion that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation
omitted). And, it is appellant’s burden to show error on appeal. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v.
Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975).
In her brief to this court, appellant identifies 39 entries from respondent’s attorney’s
invoices that she argues were “related solely” to respondent’s attorney’s “efforts to collect
his and [respondent’s] fees.” Outside of merely listing entries from the invoices, appellant
does not further demonstrate how the identified entries relate solely to litigating the motion
to compel. Appellant cites no specific total of erroneously awarded fees and cites no record

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evidence in support of her argument that the fees were related to solely litigating the motion
to compel. Midway Ctr. Assocs., 237 N.W.2d 76 (“It is well to bear in mind that on appeal
error is never presumed.” (quotation omitted)).
As discussed, appellate courts defer to th e district court’s determination of fees
unless the determination is in fected with clear error. Stisser, 818 N.W.2d at 507. The
district court carefully reviewed each of re spondent’s attorney’s invoices and provided
reasoning when it disallowed fees. Although th e district court explicitly stated in the
second fee order that it was disallowing fees that did not benefit J.E.K., perhaps suggesting
a slightly different approach than it took in the first fee order, that does not, without more,
demonstrate that clear error infects either order.
We affirm the district court’s award of f ees in the first fee order because appellant
fails to demonstrate clear error on appeal and we defer to a district court’s factual findings
“unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
We have no such definite and firm conviction on this complex record, the district court’s
mastery of which is evident to us.
C. Award of attorney fees at $250 per hour

Appellant argues that even if she is responsible for any amount of attorney fees, we
should remand for the district court to recalculate the fees at a maximum h ourly rate of
$100 because that was the rate identified in the service agreement.
Two statements in the servi ce agreement are help ful to our analysis. First, the
service agreement provides that “Service Provider will charge $100 per hour, charging in
6-minute increments for all phone calls, receiv ed text messages, emails, research, travel

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time, court time and any other time spent on this case.” That provider is respondent. This
language does not indicate that services of any attorney respondent hired will be billed at
a rate of $100. Second, the service agreem ent separately required appellant to pay the
“Guardianship Attorneys” in the list of “expenses associated with any service provided.”
Because the agreement states that the “service provider” will bill for its services at
a rate of $100 and contains nothing to indicate that guardianship attorneys would be billed
at that same rate, we see no error in the district court having awarded respondent’s attorney
fees at what it found to be a reasonable hourly rate of $250.
D. Guardianship fees awarded be fore March 1 and after August 10

Appellant argues the district court erred when it awarded guardianship fees incurred
before March 1, 2018, because the service agreement was not effective until that date, and
that it further erred when it awarded guardi anship fees after Au gust 10, 2018, because
appellant’s obligations under the service agreement had been materially altered.
The district court did not award guardia nship fees incurred before March 1.
Appellant had already paid the February invoice without any or der of the district court.
The district court denied appellant’s request to be reimbursed for that payment and denied
appellant’s request that the payment be a credit against later charges. It found that appellant
had “paid $741.61 toward the [February 2018] invoice balance,” that the charges were “to
assist in establishment of the guardianship,” that “[t]he entire balance of the February 2018
invoice is covered by [appellant’s] partial payment and the subsequent write-off,” and that
this invoice “will not be addressed further.” The record supports these findings in all

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respects. We see no error in the district court’s determination that appellant is not entitled
to a refund or credit for her voluntary payment made for respondent’s services in February.
Appellant argues that the district court’s aw ard of guardianship fees for periods after
August 10 was erroneous for two reasons. First, appellant argues that the district court’s
suspension of her general guardian duties materially altered her obligation to pay under the
service agreement and that she “never agreed to pay for the services of [respondent] in the
role of sole guardian.” Second, appellant ar gues that the district court erred when it
concluded that its August order did not discharge either party from its co-guardian duties.
The district court’s determination that its August order “merely suspended”
appellant’s duties, that appellant “was not di scharged as Co-Guardian of the Ward,” and
that appellant was required to pay respondent’s gua rdianship fees pursuant to the service
agreement are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
In the service agreement, appellant is identified as “(Parent/Co-Guardian for
[J.E.K.]), herein referred to as ‘Customer’” and respondent is identified as “Service
Provider.” Section two of the service agreement states that the agreement ends when “Co-
guardian” is discharged by the court. Se ction four of the service agreement requires
appellant to compensate respondent for “all ch arges, materials and expenses associated
with any service provided,” and GCS performe d guardianship services in reliance on the
service agreement. No provision of the agreement contemplates that respondent would not
be paid in the event of a suspension of appellant. The agreement plainly contemplates that
appellant would be responsibl e for all of respondent’s re asonable fees for guardianship
services.

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Appellant argues that the term “discharge” is ambiguous and that we should look to
the dictionary definition, the service agreement as a whole, and appellant’s testimony that
she expected to pay $500 a month in guardianshi p services to interpret the term. But the
term “discharge” is not ambigu ous. In its August order, th e district court “suspended”
appellant’s status. It did not discharge appellant until its February 1, 2019 order, in which
the district court also terminat ed the service agreem ent between the parties. The district
court’s finding concerning the date of appe llant’s discharge conforms to the parties’
unambiguous agreement.
II. The district court did not clearly err when it partially denied respondent’s
request for guardianship fees.

Respondent argues on appeal that the distri ct court erred when it disallowed some
of its requested guardianship fees and that th e district court misunderstood respondent’s
charging practices. Respondent also challenges specific district court findings.
“The burden of providing evidence to support fee requests lies with the
guardian/conservator.” Doyle, 778 N.W.2d at 351. “A gu ardian is entitled to reasonable
compensation for services as guardian and to reimbursement of expenditures made on
behalf of the ward . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-315(a).
Respondent appears to challenge two aspects of the district court’s orders reducing
its fees.
First, respondent argues that the district court “invited summary-type presentations”
of evidence but then later “adopted [a] detaile d but speculative rationale to deny fees for
the large bulk of the work performed.” Th e district court identified specific emails

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appearing on invoices that lacked explanations . It found that respondent did not provide
copies of any of the emails for which it bille d in March, April, May, June, July, August,
September, and October. The district court found that respondent did not submit copies of
emails to support bulk email charges on its invoices. 2 The record does not contain
explanations for these emails or copies of them. Respondent argues that there was time
spent to write and read these emails. But without explanations or copies, the district court
was unable to determine whether the charges were reasonably necessa ry. The district
court’s determination to not award fees for thes e emails is supported by the record and is
not clearly erroneous.
Respondent argues that appellant had the emails and could ha ve offered her own
evidence concerning the emails. Respondent cites Butt v. Schmidt for the idea that “at some
point the burden of proof/production shifts.” 747 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2008). In Butt,
the supreme court looked at the burden of proof under the child-support statute and stated
that the party in “exclusive possession” of the evidence had the burden to produce it. Id.
at 576. Butt does not support respondent’s argument that appellant was required to offer
copies of the emails she possessed because respondent failed to do so. Minnesota caselaw

2 The district court found that respondent did not produce any copies of emails to support
its invoice for 39.8 hours spent on emails in March. It disallowed $3,980 billed for these
emails. For the remaining months, the distri ct court determined that respondent did not
provide copies of emails to support its billing and that it bul k billed for emails instead of
itemizing the time spent receiving or respondi ng to each email. The district court
disallowed 46.4 hours ($4,640) in April, 41 hours ($4,100) in May, 74.4 hours ($7,440) in
June, 33 hours ($3,300) in July, 83.6 hours ( $8,360) in August, 48.1 hours ($4,810) in
September, and 48.2 hours ($4,820) in October.

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places the burden of establishing guardianship fees squarely on the guardian. Doyle, 778
N.W.2d at 351. And appellant did not have “exclusive po ssession” of the emails which
respondent received and responded to, and for which respondent sought payment.
Second, respondent challenges the district court’s reduction of requested fees related
to respondent’s time spent producing answ ers to appellant’s discovery requests.
Respondent argues that appellant requested detailed discovery requests which “required a
great deal of [respondent’s] time and attorney time to respond.”
It appears that respondent’s concern here is the district court’s findings in its first
fee order that reduced a 28-hour charge relate d to discovery. The district court did not
award fees for this charge because of “inconsistencies and lack of evidence.” For example,
the district court found that, for two dates on which respondent charged for meetings with
its attorney regarding discovery, respondent’s attorney did not bill for meetings. It also
found that other entries in re spondent’s invoices were incons istent or lacked supporting
evidence. The district court di d award fees for a portion of the attorney fee charges that
had a description. Respondent notes that exhibit 19, which was a document prepared in
response to appellant’s request for details re garding emails, demons trates the amount of
time and effort that went into responding to interrogatories. That document consists mostly
of statements about tasks that were accomplished. It does not state how much time it took
to compile responses to interrogatories or wh en that work was done. Respondent did not
provide evidence of what ta sks the 28-hour char ge included besides the information
provided in exhibit 19. The district court’ s reduction of the requested fee is not clearly
erroneous.

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Next, respondent challenges the district court’s having declined to award respondent
fees for tasks billed by a minimum of one-tenth of an hour. Respon dent argues that the
parties contracted for the one-tenth of an h our charge for email and phone calls and that
this practice is analogous to how attorneys customarily bill their time. Respondent argues
that the district court interpreted the contract provision “contrary to the plain meaning” and
that “[n]either party argued for the meaning that the court chose to apply.” Appellant
argues in reply that the service agreement does not include the word “minimum,” that the
provision is unambiguous, and that respondent’s reading is contrary to the plain meaning.
Simply put, the parties’ contract does no t provide any minimum attorney fee to be
charged per email. The contract is between appellant and respondent, and respondent’s
counsel is not a party to it. That agreement provides that time was to be billed in one-tenth
hour increments. Additionally, the district court’s first fee order indicates that it relied on
R.R.’s testimony, and not an in terpretation of the service ag reement, when it determined
that the billing of emails followed an “unofficial policy” of charging one-tenth of an hour
per email. R.R. testified that “[i]ts not a formal policy” “[b]ut typically [emails] are only
charged [at] .1 [hours] unless I’ve had to do or take some sort of action that required
additional time.”3 The district court was concerned with the lack of explanation for “most

3 Billing in one-tenth hour increments does not mean that every item of work done
necessarily results in one-tenth of an hour being the reasonable charge. By way of a simple
example, it is easy to imagine an attorney reading and responding to more than ten simple
emails in an hour. If a lawyer were able to read and respond to 15 emails in one hour, and
if that lawyer were to charge .1 hours for each of them, the lawyer would bill for 1.5 hours
by spending one hour on the task of reading and responding to emails. We see nothing in
the parties’ agreement to permit this. Neither did the district court.

19
of the emails” rather than the time allotted to the emails. The district court’s finding is not
clearly erroneous.
Lastly, respondent alleges th at an additional 14 specific findings of fact in the
district court’s first fee order are “erroneous and speculative court findings.” Although
respondent briefly identifies each finding, respondent does not make any further argument,
cite any authority, or referen ce evidence in the re cord that demonstrat es that any such
finding to be erroneous. When alleging error on appeal, it is the complaining party’s duty
to prove reversible error. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App.
2017) (“An assignment of error on mere assertion, unsupported by argument or authority,
is forfeited and need not be considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection.”), review denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017); Doyle, 778 N.W.2d at 351. These
claimed errors are unsupported by argument and therefore provide no basis for reversal.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion
when it partially granted both of respondent’s motions to compel payment and disallowed
portions of respondent’s requested guardianship and attorney fees in both motions. We
affirm the district court’s well-reasoned orders which are supported by record evidence.
Affirmed.