State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1074

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward Lataris Easton,
Appellant.

Filed December 21, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-28168

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa A. Haley, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presid ing Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.


Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Edward Lataris Easton was convicted of first-degree assault and first-degree
aggravated robbery based on evidence that he and an accomplice assaulted a pedestrian by
stabbing, punching, and kicking him and stealing his wallet. The victim suffered extensive
injuries with permanent consequences. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove
that Easton inflicted great bodily harm on the victim. We also conclude that there are
substantial and compelling circumstances to justify an upward sentencing departure on the
ground that Easton committed the offense with particular cruelty. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of Octobe r 25, 2018, D.G. purchased groceries at a supermarket
on West Broadway Avenue in Minneapolis. As he was walking home, he was attacked by
two men. Two surveillance video-cameras r ecorded the attack. The video-recordings
show that two men ran up behind D.G. and th at one man struck him in the back, causing
him to fall to the ground. While D.G. lay on the ground, the first attacker made motions
“consistent with stabbing motions” at D.G.’s torso. The second attacker kicked D.G. and
stomped on his head.
After the attack, D.G. was able to walk approximately one block to his apartment.
Officer Womble went to the ap artment in response to a 911 call. Officer Womble saw a
trail of blood and followed it to D.G.’s apartment, where th e officer found D.G. lying on
the floor with a large gash on his back. While in the apartment, D.G. told Officer Womble
that the attackers had stolen his wallet. Offi cer Womble rode with D.G. in an ambulance

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to a hospital because he believed that D.G. might soon die. While riding in the ambulance,
D.G. described the persons who had attacked him. In a subsequent interview with a police
investigator, Easton admitted th at he and Isaac Childress were the persons shown in the
video-recordings of the attack.
The state charged Easton with first-degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221, subd. 1 (2018), and first-degree aggravated robbery, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.245, subd. 1 (2018). A court trial wa s held in March 2019. The state called six
witnesses: D.G., Officer Womb le, a trauma surgeon who trea ted D.G. at the hospital, a
forensic scientist who gathered evidence at the scene of the attack, Childress, and a police
officer who conducted an investigation. Childress, who had pleaded guilty to aggravated
robbery, testified that he and Easton decided to rob someone for money. Childress testified
that he took D.G.’s wallet and that he and Easton left the scene and boarded a bus.
The trauma surgeon testified that D.G. had a large, deep cut on his back that
appeared to be caused by a knife used with a “slicing motion.” The surgeon also testified
that D.G. had extensive facial fractures around his eyes, nose, cheeks, and skull; a fracture
on his right hand; and a collapsed lung. He testified that D.G. required multiple surgeries
to repair the injuries to his face. The surgeon characterized the injuries as very serious and
potentially life threatening.
Easton testified on his own behalf. He admitted that he was the first attacker shown
in the video-recordings, but he denied that he used a knife and claimed that he struck D.G.
only with his fist.

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The district court filed a nine-page orde r in which it found Easton guilty of both
charges. The district court imposed a sent ence of 156 months of imprisonment on the
conviction of first-degree assault, which is an upward departure from the presumptive
sentencing range of 104 to 1 46 months. The departure is ba sed on a finding that Easton
committed the offense with par ticularly cruelty. The district court did not impose a
sentence on the conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery. Easton appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Easton first argues that the district cour t erred by finding him guilty of first-degree
assault on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to suppo rt the conviction.
Specifically, he argues that th e evidence is incapable of pr oving that he inflicted great
bodily harm on D.G. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
conviction of first-degree aggravated robbery.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake “a painstaking analysis
of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). We “carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and
the legitimate inferences dr awn from them would permit th e [factfinder] to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which
he was convicted.” State v. Waiters , 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (alteration in
original) (quotation omitted). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that

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conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). We will
not reverse a verdict if the fact-finder, “ac ting with due regard fo r the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof bey ond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at
100. This analysis applies in the same manner after either a jury trial or a court trial. State
v. Lopez, 908 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Minn. 2018).
A person is guilty of first-degree assault if he “assaults anothe r and inflicts great
bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2018). The term “great bodily harm” is
defined by statute to mean “bodily injury [1] which creates a high probability of death, or
[2] which causes serious perman ent disfigurement, or [3] wh ich causes a permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or [4] [which
causes] other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8; see also State v. Moore,
699 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Minn. 20 05) (inserting four numerals to identify four alternative
definitions).
In its findings of fact related to the offens e of first-degree assault, the district court
found as follows:
As a result of the assault by Defendant and co-defendant
Childress, D.G. suffered multiple fractures to the bones around
his eyes, nose, cheeks, and skull. D.G. also suffered a
punctured lung and a large lace ration on his back. Dr. Farhat
testified that these injuries were serious and could be life
threatening. D.G. required mu ltiple surgeries to repair the
damage to his face. D.G. ha s permanent visible scars on his
face and has suffered significant loss of vision in his right eye.

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The district court concluded th at “[t]he State has proven beyond a r easonable doubt that
the Defendant committed the crime of Assault in the First Degree—Great Bodily Harm.”
With respect to the first part of the defi nition of great bodily harm, Easton contends
that “there was no evidence that an injury caused a high probability of death.” (Emphasis
added.) To the contrary, the tr auma surgeon testified that th e size and depth of the knife
wound in D.G.’s back, which had caused a lung to collapse, was life- threatening. D.G.
testified that, when he was in his apartment after the attack, he believed that he was dying.
Officer Womble testified that when he saw D. G.’s injuries, he believed that D.G. might
soon die, so he rode in the ambulance with D.G. to make sure he could get a statement from
him. That evidence is enough to satisfy the first part of the definition of great bodily harm,
which is sufficient in itself to satisfy the element of great bodily harm.
With respect to the second part of th e definition of great bodily harm, Easton
contends that there is “no . . . evidence of permanent substantial disfigurement .”
(Emphasis added.) But D.G. testified that he has permanent scars. The district court, which
was able to observe D.G. in the courtroom, made a specific finding that he “has permanent
visible scars on his face.” The district court’s observations are corroborated by the trauma
surgeon, who testified that multiple surgeries were required to address the injuries to D.G.’s
face and head. That evidence is sufficient to satisfy the second part of the definition of
great bodily harm.
With respect to the third part of the defi nition of great bodily harm, Easton contends
that there is no evidence of “ permanent and protracted substantial loss in function of a
bodily member or organ.” (Emphasis added .) This argument is un dermined by D.G.’s

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testimony that, at the time of trial, he could not see well out of his right eye. D.G. also
testified that he has problems with his short- term memory and with the nerves around his
nose and mouth. That evidence is sufficient to satisfy the third part of the definition of
great bodily harm.
With respect to the fourth part of the definition of great bodily harm, there was
evidence of multiple additional injuries, the laceration on D.G.’s back, a collapsed lung, a
broken wrist, a broken thumb, and the need fo r a hospitalization of more than two weeks
in light of the totality of his in juries. That evidence is sufficient to satisfy the fourth part
of the definition of great bodily harm. See State v. Barner, 510 N.W.2d 202, 202 (Minn.
1993).
Easton relies on two opinions in which this court held that the evidence of great
bodily harm was insufficient. But those cases are distinguis hable. Both opinions relate
only to the first part of the definition of great bodily harm. In State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d
799 (Minn. App. 1992), the victim suffered knife cuts on the back of his neck and his ear.
Id. at 802. The state argued that one of the cuts was near a major artery and could have
caused death if it had hit the major artery. Id. This court rejected the argument, reasoning
that “the injury itself must be life-threatening” and that the first part of the statutory
definition is not satisfied if the injury merely “could have been more serious.” Id.
Similarly, in State v. Dye, 871 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. App. 2015), a bullet passed through the
victim’s body without harmi ng any internal organs. Id. at 920. The state argued that a
bullet passing through a person’s torso could hit “critical body parts” and cause death. Id.
at 921. This court rejected the argument, reasoning that a gunshot wound is life-threatening

8
only if it actually caused life-threatening injuries, not if it might have done so. Id. at 922.
These two opinions are distinguishable becau se the injuries Easton inflicted on D.G.
actually put his life in danger. Easton has not cited any caselaw in which an appellate court
has reversed a conviction of first-degree assa ult based on injuries as serious as those
suffered by D.G.
Thus , the evidence is sufficient to support the district c ourt’s finding that Easton
inflicted great bodily harm on D.G.
II. Aggravating Factor

Easton also argues that the district c ourt erred by departing upward from the
presumptive sentencing range after finding th at his commission of the offense of first-
degree assault was particularly cruel.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines sp ecify presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.C (2018 ). For any particular felony offense, the
presumptive sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal
history and offense severity characteristics. ” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.13 (2018).
Accordingly, a district court “must pronou nce a sentence . . . within the applicable
[presumptive] range unless there exist id entifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018). “Substantial
and compelling circumstances are those demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct in the
offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in
the commission of the crime in question.” State v. Hicks , 864 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn.
2015) (quotations omitted).

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The sentencing guidelines provide a non-excl usive list of aggravating factors that
may justify an upward departure. Minn. Se nt. Guidelines 2.D.3.b. Among them is the
aggravating factor that “[t]he victim was tr eated with particular cruelty for which the
individual offender should be held responsibl e.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b.(2). In
this context, the term “particular cruelty” me ans “the gratuitous infliction of pain and
cruelty of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.”
Tucker v. State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted).
In reviewing a departure from the applicable sentencing range, this court generally
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(Minn. 2014). A district court “has broa d discretion to depart” from the sentencing
guidelines “if aggravati ng or mitigating circumst ances are present.” State v. Best ,
449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989) (emphasis omitted). But “if aggravating or mitigating
circumstances are not present, the trial court has no discretion to depart.” Id. One way that
a district court may abuse its discretion is by basing its decision “on an erroneous view of
the law.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 n. 1 (quotations omitted). Whether an aggravating
circumstance is present is, in essence, a question of law. See Best, 449 N.W.2d at 427.
“[T]o the extent a decision to depart turns on a question of law, reviewing the decision for
an abuse of discretion . . . calls for resolving the legal question de novo.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d
at 308 n.1; accord State v. Jackson , 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 2008); State v. Dentz ,
919 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Minn. App. 2018); Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Minn. App.
2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010); State v. Grampre , 766 N.W.2d 347, 350
(Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009). If an aggravating circumstance

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is present, an appellate court applies an ab use-of-discretion standa rd of review to the
district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive sentence. State v. Robideau ,
796 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2011); Best, 449 N.W.2d at 427.
In this case, the district court made an oral finding of particular cruelty at the
sentencing hearing:
This act was particularly violent, particularly extreme, the
injuries inflicted were multiple. The victim was treated with
particular cruelty. Stomped, stabbed, and hit over the head for
absolutely no reason. . . . So I do find that this victim was
treated with particular cruelty . . . .

Easton contends that particular cruelty is not a substantial and compelling reason
for a departure in this case “[b]ecause the multiple, extensive injuries D.G. suffered are an
essential element of the offense of convicti on” and thus “can’t also be the basis for a
decision to depart based on par ticular cruelty.” Easton relies on State v. Osborne ,
715 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 2006), in which the supreme court stated that “the elements of an
offense cannot be used as a ggravating factors to impose an upward sentencing departure
for that same offense.” Id. at 446. He contends further that the district court “did not
identify specific additional facts that were proven beyond the elements of the offense.”
In response, the state contends that , despite the principle stated in Osborne, the
particular cruelty of Easton’s co nduct is demonstrated by “the extent of D.G.’s injuries.”
The state cites Dillon, a case of first-degree assault in which this court stated that the nature
and extent of a victim’s injuries are “a useful indicator of the degree of brutality involved
beyond the typical case and beyond what is necessary to meet the elements of first-degree
assault” and, furthermore, that the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries “can inform

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the factfinder of the attacker’s particular conduct, including the number of blows, the force
used, and the nature of the attack.” 781 N.W.2d at 601. We affirmed an upward departure
in Dillon because the victim’s injuries were numerous and serious and “satisf[ied] all four
categories of injuries that constitute great bodily harm.” Id. We also affirmed an upward
departure in State v. Felix, 410 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Sept.
29, 1987), another first-degree assault case, in similar circumstances. Id. at 401-02. We
reasoned that the victim’s injuries “did not simply involve one of the factors defining ‘great
bodily harm;’ it involved all of them.” Id. at 401.
In this case, we have determined that D.G.’s injuries satisfy all four of the alternative
definitions of great bodily harm. See supra part I. First, the knife wound to D.G.’s back
caused a high probability of death because it led to extensive bleeding and a collapsed lung.
Second, the injuries to D.G. caused permanen t substantial disfigurement in the form of
scars on his face. Third, D.G. suffered pe rmanent and protracted substantial loss in
function of a bodily member or organ because of impaired vi sion in his right eye, short-
term memory problems, and nerve damage around his nose and mouth. Fourth, D.G. also
suffered a broken wrist and a broken thumb, and he required hospitalization for more than
two weeks because of all of his injuries. The district court was justified in finding that
D.G. sustained “multiple” injuries and that the assault was “particularly violent” and
“particularly extreme.” As in Dillon and Felix, the variety and severity of D.G.’s injuries
demonstrate that Easton’s offense was particularly cruel.

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Thus, the district court did not err by imposing a sentence that is an upward
departure from the presumptive sentencing range based on the aggravating factor of
particular cruelty.
Affirmed.