A19-1076 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed March 1, 2021

The holding in the court’s own words

We conclude that Abdul-Zahir’s claim that there was a difference between the plea agreement and his understanding would not entitle him to relief under Blondheim .

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1076

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nashid Asmir Abdul-Zahir,
Appellant.

Filed March 1, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Nicollet County District Court
File No. 52-CR-18-320

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Zehnder Fischer, Nicollet County Attorney, Megan E. Gaudette Coryell,
Assistant County Attorney, St. Peter, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold , Presiding Judge; Worke , Judge; and Reilly ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant seeks review of the district court’s order denyin g his petition for
postconviction relief. Appellant pleaded guilty to a drug c rime and filed a direct appeal,
which this court stayed to permit appellant to file a postconviction petition and “develop a
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record on the terms of the plea agreement.” After the district court’s summary order
denying relief, we reinstated his appeal. Appellant argues that the district court erred by
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his petition that sought specific performance of
the plea agreement, which he alleged did not include a fine. Because appellant’s petition
conclusively shows that he is not entitled to relief, the district court did not abuse its
discretion. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
After a July 2018 traffic stop in St. Peter, the state charged appellant Nashid Asmir
Abdul-Zahir with fifth-degree marijuana possession, driving after license revocation, and
possessing drug paraphernalia. In April 2019, Abdul-Zahir entered into an agreement with
the state that he would plead guilty to fi fth-degree possession of a controlled substance.
The state agreed to dismiss the other charges and recommend a 21-month sentence. The
agreement did not discuss imposing a fine.
The district court heard the parties’ plea agreement, and received Abdul -Zahir’s
written plea petition. B efore accepting the plea, the district court informed Abdu l-Zahir
that the maximum sentence was five years in prison and the maximum fine was $10,000.
Abdul-Zahir confirmed that he wanted to enter into the plea agreement and entered a guilty
plea, which the district court accepted. The district court then sentenced Abdul -Zahir to
21 months in prison and imposed a $500 fine.
After pronouncing the sentence, the district court asked, “Any clarification on any
of that?” To which Abdul-Zahir’s attorney responded, “[Abdul-Zahir is] wondering about
the fine given that he’s doing all the prison time. He’s asking that the Court waive an y
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monetary conditions?” The court responded , “I understa nd that’s the request Mr.
Abdul-Zahir, but my practice is to go ahead and . . . impose a fine. So, I do go ahead and
do that.” Abdul-Zahir made no other comment or objection.
After this court stayed his direct appeal, Abdul-Zahir filed a postconviction petition
in December 2019 and submitted an accompanyi ng affidavit. The affidavit stated that
“[Abdul-Zahir’s] understanding of the plea agreement was that [he] would not be required
to pay an additional fine as part of [his] sentence,” his attorney did not advise him
otherwise, and the imposition of the “fine was contrary to [his] understanding of the plea
agreement.” Abdul-Zahir asked that the district court correct his sentence and “reduce [the]
fine to the statutory minimum of $50 so that the sentence [would be] consi stent with the
plea agreement.”
The district court held a hearing in December to discuss how the petition should
proceed and, after the scheduled hearing, scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Three days
before the hearing, the state filed an answer to Abdul-Zahir’s petition for postconviction
relief, arguing that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The district court held a
telephone conference with both parties on the morning of the scheduled hearing and then
cancelled the evidentiary hearing. Abdul -Zahir submitted a written reply to the state ’s
arguments. The district court’s order denied postconviction relief.
DECISION
Abdul-Zahir raises one issue on appeal: whether the district court erred by denying
his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. We note that
Abdul-Zahir’s brief to this court does not argue whether his plea was unintelligent and
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therefore invalid. See Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016) (“The
intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the
rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.”) (quoting State v. Raleigh ,
778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 2010)). We also note that Abdul -Zahir does not ask for plea
withdrawal; his requested relief is specific performance of the plea agreement. 1 We
therefore address only whether the district court erred by denying the petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
“We review the ultimate decision by the postconviction court to grant or deny an
evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Caldwell v. St ate, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Minn. 2014). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Andersen v.
State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018).
A court will hold an evidentiary hearing for a postconviction petition “[u]nless the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief.” Minn . Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018); see Henderson v. State ,
906 N.W.2d 501, 507 (Minn. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 271 (2018). In postconviction
proceedings, the district court should consider the “facts alleged in the petition as true and
construe[] them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d

1 We have acknowledged in prior cases that a plea agreement may be invalid because it is
unintelligent if the defendant did not understand the direct consequences of the plea,
including the defendant’s sentence. State v. Noreen, 354 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. App. 1984).
If a plea agreement is invalid, a court “must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.”
State v. Theis , 7 42 N.W.2d 643 , 646 (Minn. 2007) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1).
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612, 618 (Minn. 2017) . “An ‘evidentiary hearing is not required unless the petitioner
alleges such facts which, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would entitle
him or her to the requested relief.’” Id. (quoting Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d 428, 436
(Minn. 1998)).
Here, the district court denied an evidentiary hearing because it determined that the
issue presented was governed by Blondheim v. State , 573 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1998). In
Blondheim, the Minnesota Suprem e Court reversed this court and reinstated the district
court’s decision in an order opinion. Id. at 369. Blondheim’s postconviction appeal claimed
that he was entitled to withdraw his plea, in part, because the district court imposed a fine
contrary to the plea agreement. Id. The supreme court reasoned that the fine was not
mentioned in the plea agreement and Blondheim did not object to the district court’s
imposition of a fine during sentencing . Id.at 368 -69. The supreme court, therefore,
reinstated the district court’s decision to deny Blondheim’s postconviction petition. Id. at
369.
In Abdul-Zahir’s case, the district court considered the affidavit attesting that
Abdul-Zahir “believed that his se ntence would not include a fine.” B ut the district court
concluded that Blondheim controlled the issue:
[B]ased on Blondheim , . . . where a plea agreement is silent
about the imposition of a fine, the district court has been left
with the discretion to decide whether a fine should be imposed,
along with the amount of fine to impose. As such, the [district
court] does not view its decision herein as being contrary to
law, nor does it represent an abuse of such discretion.

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On appeal, Abdul- Zahir does not argue that Blondheim is not binding or that it
should be overruled. Rather, Abdul-Zahir argues that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing because there is a factual dispute about whether
Abdul-Zahir understood that the plea agreement did not address imposing a fine.
Abdul-Zahir argues that if this factual dispute is decided in his favor, he would be entitled
to relief.
Abdul-Zahir’s affidavit asserts that he understood there would not be a fine. Even
taking this as true, as we must during our review of postconviction proceedings, it does not
show Abdul-Zahir is entitled to relief. Blondheim does not refer to a party’s understanding,
and instead instructs us to focus solely on whether the fine was part of the plea agreement
and whether the defendant objected during sentenc ing. Also, t he caselaw cited in
Abdul-Zahir’s brief does not support his claim that a difference between the plea agreement
and his understanding creates a factual dispute that could entitle him to relief.
Here, the district court correctly applied Blondheim and determined that the plea
agreement was silent regarding a fine so the court had discretion to impose the fine .
Abdul-Zahir’s opening brief states that “[t]he written plea petition” has “no reference to a
fine.” His brief also states that, after the district court imposed his sentence, his attorney
“asked the court not to impose the fine,” but the district court denied the request.
We conclude that Abdul-Zahir’s claim that there was a difference between the plea
agreement and his understanding would not entitle him to relief under Blondheim . Thus,
the district court acted within its discretion by denying Abdul-Zahir an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.