State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nyla Tomeka Murrell-French, Appellant.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.
08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1087
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Nyla Tomeka Murrell-French,
Appellant.
Filed May 18, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-4496
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After pleading guilty to first-degree assault for stabbing a woman in the neck during
a fight, appellant Nyla Tomeka Murrell-French challenges her conviction and sentence.

2
First, she contends that her criminal history score was inco rrectly calculated. In the
alternative, she argues that her plea was ina ccurate and that she sh ould be permitted to
withdraw it. Finally, she asserts that she should have been granted a downward
dispositional departure at sentencing. Because her criminal history score was correct, her
plea was accurate, and she is not entitled to a dispositional departure, we affirm.
FACTS
While in a car with two of her friends at a gas station in St. Paul, appellant Nyla
Tomeka Murrell-French observed a woman (L.B.) approach the store. Murrell-French and
L.B. had “bad blood.” As L.B. walked up, Murrell-French and her friend got out of the car
and Murrell-French grabbed a knife that was in the car. The friend and L.B. started
fighting, and Murrell-French jo ined in as the altercati on moved into the store.
Murrell-French stabbed L.B. in the neck with the knife she brought from the car. The stab
wound was close to an artery, and L.B. lost a significant am ount of blood. When police
arrived, L.B. told them that Murrell-French stabbed her.
The state charged Murrell-French with fi rst-degree assault (great bodily harm) and
second-degree assault with a dangerous w eapon. Murrell-French pleaded guilty to
first-degree assault, and th e second-degree charge (a lesser-included offense) was
dismissed. There was no agreement as to a sentence. During her plea colloquy,
Murrell-French acknowledged that the statutory maximum sentence for first-degree assault
was 20 years and that, based on her estimated criminal history score, she was facing a
presumptive prison sentence. She acknowledged that, while she would ask for a downward
dispositional departure, her plea came with “no promises” about sentencing and it would

3
be up to the district court’s discretion at the hearing. And Murrell-French offered the
following testimony to establish the factual basis for her plea:
[ATTORNEY]: Well, why don’t you tell me what happened
that day?

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: We were at a gas station and just at
the pump. It was three of us in the car. And we seen [L.B.]
and another girl walk up. Well, we don’t. The boy in the car
could. So me and my friend got out the car and I grabbed the
knife.

[ATTORNEY]: And where was the knife that you had to grab
it from?

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: It was in the passenger door.

[ATTORNEY]: So just a knife in the car and you grab it?

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: Yes.

[ATTORNEY]: Okay.

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: My friend and [L.B.] start fighting.

[ATTORNEY]: Yep.

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: And I jump in it outside of the gas
station.

[ATTORNEY]: Okay.

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: And then it spilled into the store and
I had the knife in my hand and I stabbed her in the neck.

. . . .

[ATTORNEY]: And it might not ha ve been your intention to
cause great bodily harm, but it was your intention to stab her
with that knife as part of the fight; is that right?

[MURRELL-FRENCH]: Yes.

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Murrell-French also acknowled ged that L.B. had serious injuries from the assault,
including a collapsed lung an d permanent nerve damage. Following the colloquy, the
district court accepted Murrell-French’s plea, finding that it contained a sufficient factual
basis for the offense. And—anticipating Murrell-French would make a request for a
departure at sentencing—the court told her that , in order to conclude she is particularly
amenable to probation, it was important for her to “have no new offenses between now and
then.”
Murrell-French cooperated w ith a presentence investigation. In the report, the
interviewer quoted Murrell-French’s version of her conduct:
When I got out of the car, I grabbed a knife that was in the
passenger door because there was two of them and just my
friend. When I jumped in the fight I still [had] the knife in my
hand, I forgot I had it. I didn’t intend to stab her. I didn’t know
I did until I saw the blood. I dr opped the knife, stepped back
and they still kept fighting. We all finally left. I didn’t know
how bad she was hurt.

The interviewer recommended Mu rrell-French be sentenced to 98 months in prison, a
guidelines sentence based on her criminal history score, because there was “nothing noted
to warrant a departure.”
On the sentencing worksheet submitted to the court, first-de gree assault is a
severity-level-nine crime. And Murrell-Fr ench had one criminal history point from
juvenile adjudications for fe lony theft and felony posse ssion of a weapon by a minor.
Based on these adjudications, her offense wa s subject to a presumptive sentence of
98 months in prison, with a range of permissible sentences from 84 to 117 months.

5
At sentencing, the district court noted that it had reviewed the presentence
investigation and Murrell-French’s downwar d-dispositional-departure request. And the
court expressed concern about Murrell-French being amenable to probation given the nine
or 10 additional criminal charges she incurre d since her plea hearing, a little over three
months before. Accordingly, the district court declined to grant the departure and
sentenced Murrell-French to 84 months in prison, the bottom of the guidelines range. The
defense then made a motion for a downward durational departure to 36 months, but the
district court again denied the request.
Murrell-French appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Murrell-French advances alternate theories on appeal. She contends first that her
criminal history score should have been zero, entitling her to a shorter sentence. In the
alternative, she asserts that she should be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea. And in a
pro se supplemental brief, she argues that she should have been granted a downward
dispositional departure. We address each issue in turn.
I. Murrell-French’s criminal histor y score was correctly calculated.

Murrell-French first argues that the district court erred by calculating her criminal
history score, resulting in a longer sentence. The district court accepted the sentencing
worksheet provided, which indicated a criminal history score of one. This score was based
on two juvenile adjudications: felony theft in 2017 and felony possession of a weapon by
a minor in 2016.

6
The district court’s determination of Mu rrell-French’s criminal history score will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Stillday , 646 N.W.2d 557,
561 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). And while the state must
prove the defendant’s criminal history score is warranted under the sentencing guidelines,
it is the role of the district court to reso lve any factual dispute regarding the score.
State v. Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 72 3 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Aug. 22, 2001).1
The key issue here concerns whether to include juvenile adjudications for felony
offenses in the calculation of Murrell-French’s criminal history score. Under Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines 2.B.4.a (Supp. 2017 ), sentencing courts “[a]ssign an offender one
point for every two adjudications for felony offenses the offender committed, and for which
the offender was prosecuted as a juvenile.”2 Given this guideline and the undisputed fact
that Murrell-French has two juvenile adjudica tions for felonies, her one criminal history
point is correct.
But, according to Murrell-Fr ench, her unlawful possessi on offense should not be
included in the calculation because it is a “sta tus offense,” which should not be accorded
felony status. For this argument, she relies on a comment to Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines 2.B.4.a. The comment explains: “[o]nly juvenile adjudications for offenses that

1 Although there was no dispute here about th e criminal history score at the time of
sentencing, the supreme court has held that failing to object to one’s score’s calculation
does not prevent review. See State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Minn. 2007) (“[A]
defendant cannot forfeit review of his criminal history score calculation.”).
2 There are a few other caveats to this ca lculation that are not relevant here. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.B.4.a.(1)-(3).

7
are felonies under Minnesota law will be cons idered in computing the criminal history
score. Status offenses, dependency and neglect proceedi ngs, and misdemeanor or gross
misdemeanor-type offenses will be excluded from consideration.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
cmt. 2.B.402 (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).
We disagree with this assertion. Here, the guideline is clear, while the comments to
the guidelines are not binding. See State v. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. 2018)
(“[W]e strive for an interpretation that is consistent with the comments to the [g]uidelines,
but the comments are merely advisory, not binding.”). When presented with this
conflicting language, we apply the clear language of the gui delines without regard to the
comment’s advice.
Our conclusion here is bolstered by the previous version of the guidelines and
comment. We note that the relevant provis ions of the sentencing guidelines were
substantively amended to the current language in 1997, and the previous language provides
insight into this issue. Before the 1997 amendmen ts, Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines II.B.4 (1996) read: “The offender is assigned one point for every two offenses
committed and prosecuted as a juvenile that would have been felonies if committed by an
adult . . . .” And the corresponding comment read:
First, only juvenile offenses that would have been
felonies if committed by an adult will be considered in
computing the criminal histor y score. Status offenses,
dependency and neglect proceed ings, and misdemeanor or
gross-misdemeanor type offe nses will be excluded from
consideration.

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Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. II.B.402 (1996) (emphasis added). But the phrase “felonies if
committed by an adult” was later replaced with “felonies under Minnesota law” in both the
guidelines and the comment. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.B.4 & cmt. II.B.402
(Supp. 1997). And the 1997 amendment su mmary described that these changes were
intended to “clarify that Minnesota felony le vel offenses that ca n only be committed by
juveniles should be included in calculating juvenile criminal history points.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines Comm’n, Summary of Adopted Modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines 5
(Aug. 1997), https://mn.gov/sentencing-gui delines/assets/1997-Modifications_tcm30-
31104.pdf. This amendment confirms our reading of the guidelines to permit inclusion of
Murrell-French’s juvenile adjudication for unlawful possession in her score.
In sum, the relevant comment to the se ntencing guidelines referring to status
offenses is not binding. But the district court was bound by the relevant guidelines
language, which permits c onsideration of Murrell-Fren ch’s unlawful-possession
adjudication in her criminal history score. Accordingly, her criminal history score was
calculated correctly, and the district court did not abuse its discretion.
II. The district court did not err by accepting Murrell-French’s plea.

In the alternative, Murrell-French asserts that the district court erred by accepting
her guilty plea because it was inac curate. This court reviews the validity of a guilty plea
de novo. State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 29, 2015). Murrell-French does not have an absolute right to withdraw her guilty
plea. See Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2002). Since her request was made
after her sentencing, a court must allow Murrell-French to withdraw her guilty plea only if

9
“withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
“A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
94 (Minn. 2010). To be valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”
Id.
Here, Murrell-French challenges the accuracy of her plea , arguing that the factual
basis was insufficient. To be accurate, a pl ea must contain a proper factual basis.
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). The district court is responsible for
ensuring that “an adequate factual basis has been established in the record.” State v. Ecker,
524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). But Murrell-French bears the burden of establishing
facts that show her gu ilty plea was invalid. State v. Mikulak , 903 N.W.2d 600, 603
(Minn. 2017).
To determine whether the factual basis is sufficient, this court must look at what is
required to prove the charge. A person who “assaults anothe r and inflicts great bodily
harm” commits first-degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2016). And great
bodily harm is “bodily injury which creates a high probability of death . . . or which causes
a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a ny bodily member or
organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2016).
During her plea colloquy, Murrell-French te stified that she grabbed a knife and
approached a fight between her friend and L.B. As she joined the fight, she stabbed L.B.
in the neck. Murrell-French responded in the affirmative when asked whether she intended
to stab L.B. And she acknowledged that L.B. suffered permanent injuries as a result of the

10
stabbing. The factual basis to which Murrell-French testified constitutes a sufficient factual
basis for her plea.
Still, Murrell-French advances two pr imary reasons for why her plea was
inaccurate.3 First, she asserts that the factua l basis was only established by leading
questions, which makes it invalid . Murrell-French correctly asserts that the Minnesota
Supreme Court discourages using leading que stions to establish a factual basis. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 95. The factual-basis require ment is typically satisfied by the defendant
expressing what happene d in her own words. Id. at 94. Here, Murrell-French’s plea
colloquy consisted of several l eading questions. But her atto rney also had her describe
what happened in her own words and she provided a narrative description of the altercation.
Thus, the factual basis was not provided entirely through leading questions.
Second, Murrell-French argues that she did not admit to the requisite intent for
first-degree assault. This is a general intent crime, requiring “only the general intent to do
the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , 887 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016).
And intent may be shown by inferences from a person’s actions in certain circumstances
and may be inferred “from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or
her actions.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
From the record, the district court could infer that Murrell-French intended to strike
L.B. after joining the altercati on. That satisfies the mens r ea requirement for this crime.

3 Murrell-French also argues that her later description of her intent during the presentence
investigation somehow invalidates her admissi ons during the plea colloquy. But we are
not persuaded that her subsequent statem ents, not made under oath, render her plea
inaccurate.

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But more than mere infere nces support her intent he re, including her testimony and
narrative of the altercation. In Murrell-French’s testimony, she said she grabbed the knife,
joined the fight, and stabbed L.B. in the neck . When asked if she intended to stab L.B.
during the fight, Murrell-French responded, “Yes.” In our review, there is ample evidence
in the record of Murrell-French’s intent.
In sum, Murrell-French fails to establish that her plea was inaccurate such that it
constitutes a manifest injustice. As a result, she is not entitled to withdraw it.
III. The district court did not abuse it s discretion by declining to grant
Murrell-French a dispositional departure.

Murrell-French also contends in a pro se supplemental brief that, if she is not
permitted to withdraw her guilty plea, th en a downward dispositional departure is
warranted. She appears to assert that the district court abused its discretion in not granting
her request for a departure during the sentencing hearing. The distri ct court determined
that a departure was not warranted because Mu rrell-French continued to engage in illegal
behavior after her plea hearing, accumulating at least nine new criminal charges.
This court reviews a district court’s d ecision about whether to depart from the
presumptive guidelines sentence fo r an abuse of discretion. State v. Solberg ,
882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). And this court will only reverse a sentencing court’s
refusal to depart in “rare” circumstances. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
To depart from the guide lines range, a sentencing court must find mitigating
circumstances that show “a substantial a nd compelling reason not to impose a guidelines
sentence.” State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 30 8 (Minn. 2014) (quota tion omitted). If a

12
defendant is particularly amenable to proba tion, a district court may grant a downward
dispositional departure but it is not required to do so. State v. Olson , 765 N.W.2d 662,
664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). Here, the district court was not satisfied that Murrell-French
was particularly amenable to probation. Nor was it satisfie d that there were compelling
reasons to grant her a dispositional departure based on her inability to remain law-abiding.
This was within the court’s wide discretion.
Still, Murrell-French maintains she should have been granted the departure for two
reasons. First, she contends that she was told that the probability was high for the district
court to grant her a departure, which she alle ges influenced her deci sion to plead guilty.
But she acknowledged dur ing the plea colloquy that she was not promised anything in
return for her plea and that it was a “straight plea,” which meant that the district court could
sentence her up to the maximum penalty. This claim does not support her argument that
the district court should have granted her a departure.
Second, according to Murrell-French, this was her “first and only crime committed
as an adult.” But her attempt to frame this crime as an anomaly is unavailing. Defendants
are not entitled to a downward dispositional departure on their first adult conviction. And
Murrell-French fails to show why she should be granted su ch a rare outcome here. See
Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
not granting her a departure on this record.
Affirmed.