State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1130

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Derek Alan Olson,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-17-1146

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, John P. Fitzgerald, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance and unlawful possession of ammunition, which stemmed from the discovery of
contraband during the execution of a search warrant at a residential property. Appellant
argues that the underlying search warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the
evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2017 , respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Derek Alan
Olson with third -degree sale of a controlled substance, fifth -degree possession of a
controlled substance, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The charges were based on
items recovered during the execution of a search warrant at a Litchfield home. The search-
warrant affid avit alleged that Olso n was “ selling methamphetamine” and that he lived
“with his mother” at the Litchfield home. The affidavit also stated that the affiant had
collected garbage from the home , which had been set out for collection. A search of the
garbage revealed 0.1 grams of marijuana concentrate on wax paper, which tested positive
for the presence of THC, three empty cans of pure butane gas, and residency documents
for two individuals, M.D. and N.O. The affidavit stated that M.D. is Olson’s mother. The
affidavit also stated: “Your affiant knows from his training and experience that pure butane
is used to make marijuana concentrate and possession of marijuana concentrate is a
felony.”

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When officers executed the search warrant , they found several baggies containing
methamphetamine, straws used to ingest methamphetamine, shotgun shells, rifle
ammunition, and documents listing Olson’s address as the Litchfield home. All of those
items were found in the home’s basement. Olson moved the district court to suppress that
evidence, arguing that the warrant “impermissibly relied on an unreliable informant” and
that the garbage collection “lacked sufficient probative value to support a search warrant.”
The district court denied Olson’s motion to suppress.
The state dismissed the third -degree sale charge , and the remaining charges were
tried to a jury. The jury found Olson guilty of fifth -degree possession of a controlled
substance and unlawful possession of ammunition and the district court entered judgments
of conviction for both offenses. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Olson contends that the underlying search warrant was not supported by probable
cause and that the district court therefore erred by denying his motion to suppress.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Police generally must
obtain a valid search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate before conducting
a search. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). To be valid, a search
warrant must be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. “Probable cause exists if the judge issuing a warrant determines that ‘there is a fair

4
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’ ” Yarbrough, 841
N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
A probable-cause determination “is limited to the information contained in the affidavit
offered in support of the warrant application.” State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn.
App. 1998).
When determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, this
court does not engage in de novo review. State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Minn.
App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006). Instead, “great deference must be given
to the issuing [magistrate’s] determination of probable cause.” State v. Valento , 405
N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. Ap p. 1987). “[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases
should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants.” State v. Wiley,
366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985) (quotations omitted). An appellate court limits its
review to whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that probable
cause existed. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622. In doing so, appellate courts consider the
“totality of the circumstances.” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common -sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that c ontraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332). “Elements bearing on this
probability include information linking the crime to the place to be searched and the
freshness of the information.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).

5
If a search-warrant application relies on an informant’s tip, the informant’s veracity
and basis of knowledge are factors to be considered under the totality-of-the-circumstances
test. State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. App. 2008). “Minnesota courts have
identified six considerations bearing on the reliability of an informant who is confidential
but not anonymous to police.” Ward, 580 N.W.2d at 71. For example:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can c orroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.

State v. Ross , 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. June 15,
2004).
Veracity can be established “by showing that details of the tip have been sufficiently
corroborated so that it is clear the informant is telling the truth.” State v. Siegfried , 274
N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1978). But an informant’s reliability is “not enha nced if the
informant merely gives information that is easily obtained.” Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 304.
“Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred
basis for an informant’s knowledge.” Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269.
In challenging probable cause for the search warrant, Olson first argues that the
informant’s unsupported allegation that he was selling methamphetamine did not establish
probable cause. For the reasons that follow, we agree.

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As to the informant’s relia bility in this case, the search -warrant application
provided:
Your affiant talked to a person wanting to provide
information to the task force, he/she is wishing to remain
anonymous but is known to your affiant. He/she said Derek
Olson is selling methamp hetamine. He/she said Olson lives
with his mother [at the Litchfield home]. I learned Derek Olsen
is, Derek Alan Olson . . . . He/she positively identified Olson
in front of [the Litchfield home]. Your affiant confirmed with
Litchfield Police Officer Aaron Nelson that Derek Alan Olson
lives with his mother at [the Litchfield home]. Your affiant
learned that [M.D.] . . . is Derek Olson’s mother.

Given the limited information regarding the informant and the basis for the
informant’s knowledge, as well as the lack of a controlled purchase, the only applicable
Ross reliability factor is the third one: “an informant’s reliability can be established if the
police can corroborate the information.” 676 N.W.2d at 304. The only part of the
informant’s tip th at the police corroborated was that Olson lived at the Li tchfield home
with his mother, information that was easily obtained. We therefore agree with Olson that
the informant’s tip alone did not establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Olson next ar gues that the results of the garbage search did not provide probable
cause to believe contraband would be found in the home. “Contraband seized from a
garbage search can provide an independent and substantial basis for a probable -cause
determination.” McGrath, 706 N.W.2d at 543. For example, in State v. Papadakis , an
officer collected and searched the defendant’s garbage and discovered correspondence
addressed to the defendant, a spoon with burn marks on the bottom, and plastic bags with
drug residue later identified as cocaine. 643 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. App. 2002). Based

7
on that discovery, officers obtained and executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home.
Id. The defendant challenged the validity of the warrant. Id. at 355. On appeal, this court
concluded that the garbage search provided an independent and substantial basis for the
search warrant because the cocaine residue in the trash “independently confirm[ed [the
officer’s] suspicion that contraband might be found in [the defendant’s] residence.” Id. at
356.
Similarly, in McGrath, an officer collected and searched garbage that had been set
out for pickup outside a home linked with drug use. 706 N.W.2d at 537. During one
search, the officer located a plastic bag that “smelled of and contained traces of marijuana,”
and during another found two plastic bags that he believed contained marijuana. Id. A
third search revealed a plastic bag with suspected marijuana residue. Id. Each bag later
tested positive for the presence of marijua na. Id. Based on the results of the search, the
police obtained and executed a search warrant for the home and seized cocaine and
marijuana. Id. at 537-38. The district court suppressed the evidence, reasoning in part that
because the bags of marijuana merely supplied evidence of noncriminal, personal use of
marijuana, the bags seized during the garbage searches did not establish an independent
basis for probable cause. Id. at 538. The state appealed, and this court concluded that the
bags provided pr obable cause for the warrant. Id. at 543-45. This court reasoned that
“Minnesota caselaw does not support the district court’s determination that small,
noncriminal amounts of marijuana cannot establish a fair probability that evidence of a
crime or cont raband will be found in a particular place” and concluded that “the plastic

8
bags with marijuana residue provided an independent and substantial basis to establish
probable cause to issue a search warrant.” Id. at 544.
Olson argues that the marijuana concentrate discovered in the garbage search in this
case did not provide probable cause to believe marijuana would be found in the Litchfield
home. He cites Souto for the principle that a warrant application must provide “ a direct
connection, or nexus, between the alleged crime and the particular place to be searched.”
578 N.W.2d at 747. Olson argues that because the garbage search did not reveal any
evidence supporting the allegation that he was selling methamphetamine, the results of that
search “undercut the accusation that formed the primary basis for the warrant application.”
However, the search-warrant application sought controlled substances “including, but not
limited to, methamphetamine.” The marijuana concentrate and empty cans of butane gas
recovered from the garbage confirmed law enforcement’s suspicion that drugs or
contraband might be present in the Litchfield home.
Olson next argues that “the single garbage search resulting in a miniscule amount
of marijuana concentrate smeared on a discarded piece of wax paper did not establish a fair
probability that drugs existed in the house at the time of the search.” That argument focuses
on the temporal connection between the garbage search and the warrant execution. See id.
(discussing the “freshness of the information” set forth in support of probable cause).
Olson cites cases from other jurisdictions in support of his argument that “[a] tiny amount
of marijuana concentrate in the garbage says next-to-nothing about whether drugs might
still be in the house.” Olson also distinguishes Minneso ta’s caselaw upholding probable-
cause determinations based on garbage sea rches, noting that the probable -cause

9
determinations in those cases were based on more than j ust the discovery of controlled -
substance residue in a single garbage search. See McGrath, 706 N.W.2d at 543 (involving
three garbage searches , which uncovered four plastic bags that tested positive for
marijuana); Papadakis, 643 N.W. 2d at 353 (involving garbage search that uncovered
correspondence addressed to the defendant, cocaine residue, and drug paraphernalia).
Olson’s argument ignores the probative value of the three empty butane cans that
were found in the garbage search and the affiant’s statement that he knew “from his training
and experience that pure butane is used to make marijuana concentrate and possession of
marijuana concentrate is a felony.” Indeed, Olson suggests that this court cannot consider
whether the butane cans provided probable cause because “[t]hat is not what the issuing
magistrate concluded.”
A probable-cause determination must be based on the totality of the circumstances,
as set forth in the search-warrant affidavit. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268. Olson does not cite,
and we are not aware of, authority prohibiting a reviewing court from considering
information set forth in a supporting affidavit that supports a finding of probable cause
simply because the issuing judge did not state whether that information influenced her
analysis. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 -39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (“[T]he duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed” (quotation omit ted)). We decline to adopt Olson’s reasoning
because ignoring such supportive information is inconsistent with the requirement that we
give great deference to the initial probable -cause determination. Moreover, we will not
reverse a correct decision simply because it is based on incorrect reasoning. Kahn v. State,

10
289 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Minn. 1980). We therefore consider whether the discovery of the
butane cans in the garbage search supports the issuing judge’s probable -cause
determination.
The presence of three empty butane cans suggested more sophisticated, ongoing
manufacture and possession of marijuana concentrate, a potential felony offense. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 152.02, subd. 2(h) (Supp. 2017) (listing marijuana and THC as schedule I
drugs), .025, subds. 2, 4 (2016) (making it a felony to possess a schedule I drug over a
specified weight or dosage, except “a small amount of marijuana”) , .01, subd. 16 (2016)
(excluding from the definition of a “[s]mall amount” of marijuana the “resinous form”) .
Based on the great deference that must be given to the issuing judge’s initial probable -
cause determination and our resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in accordance with
the preference for warrants, we conclude that the discovery of marijuana concentrate and
empty butane cans in garbage recovered from the Litchfield home provided a substantial
basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search the home. The district court
therefore did not err by denying Olson’s motion to suppress.
II.
Olson contends that the evide nce does not support his convictions. He argues that
the circumstantial evidence permits a rational inference that one of the Litchfield home’s
other residents “possessed the contraband.”
In considering Olson’s claim, we must carefully analyze the record to determine
whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to
permit the jury to reach its verdict. State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989).

11
We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”
State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998). We will not disturb a guilty verdict if
the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have concluded that the state proved the
defendant’s guilt. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of an offense,
we apply a heightened standard of review. See State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 -03
(Minn. 2017) (applying circumstantial-evidence standard to individual element of criminal
offense that was proved by circumstantial evidence). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence
from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
Id. at 599 (quotations omitted). In contrast, d irect evidence is “evidence that is based on
personal knowledge or observation and that, if t rue, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” Id. (quotations omitted). Circumstantial evidence always requires an
inferential step that is not required with direct evidence. Id.
Because the state relied on circum stantial evidence to prove Olson’s possession of
the methamphetamine and ammunition , we apply the two-step circumstan tial-evidence
standard of review. First, we determine the circums tances proved, “disregard[ing]
evidence that is inconsis tent with the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 601. Next, we “determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). We do not defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013 ). But we will reverse a conviction

12
based on circumstantial evidence only if there is a reasonable inference other than guilt.
Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
“To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a
defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other
than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). A defendant may not rely
on mere conjecture or speculation, but must instead point to specific evidence in the record
that is consistent with innocence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010);
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). “[P]ossibilities of innocence do not
require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes suc h
theories seem unreasonable.” Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206 (quotation omitted).
At issue is whether Olson possessed the methamphetamine and ammuniti on found
in the basement. Possession “may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”
State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015). “Actual possession, also referred to
as physical possession, involves direct physical control.” State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348,
353 (Minn. App. 2016 ) (quotation omitted). Because the evidence did not show Olson’s
actual possession of the items at issue, we turn to constructive possession. The purpose of
the constructive -possession doctrine is to establish po ssession in cases where the state
cannot prove actual or physical possession at the time of arrest, but where “the inference
is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the [item] and did not abandon
his possessory interest in the [item] but rather continued to exercise dominion and control
over it up to the time of the arrest.” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975).

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To establish constructive possession, the state must show either (1) the prohibited
item was found “in a place under [the] defendant’s exclusive control to which other people
did not normally have access” or (2) if police found the prohibited item “in a place to which
others had access, there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that [the]
defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. at 611.
“Proximity is an important consideration in assessing constructive possession.” State v.
Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
In Salyers, the supreme court concluded there was sufficient evidence to establish
exclusive control of firearms that had been found in a locked safe, in a bedroom, where the
defendant was the only person who resided at the home. 858 N.W.2d at 157, 160 -61.
Unlike Salyers, the evidence in this case indicated that other people resided in the Litchfield
home, and the record does not suggest that Olson exclusively controlled the basement. We
therefore consider whether there is a strong probability that Olson exercised dominion and
control over the methamphetamine and ammunition.
We begin with the circumstances proved. The Litchfield home contained two
bedrooms on the main floor and one bedroom in the basement. Agent Ryan Schutz
observed Olson outside the Litchfield home prior to the search, and officers found a number
of Olson’s personal documents in the basement bedroom during the search, including his
Social Security card, expired driver’s license (listing the Litchfield home as his address),
2014 paystubs, vehicle title (listing the Litchfield home as his address), a “legal court
document” (listing the Litchfield home as his address), and a letter addressed to Olson at
the Litchfield home. The basement bedroom also contained adult-male clothing. It was

14
the only location in the residence where Olson’s personal documents were found.
Residency documents for M.D. and N.O. , the home’s other residents , were found in the
other bedrooms, but not the basement bedroom.
Second, in the basement bedroom, law -enforcement officers found approximately
30 methamphetamine paraphernalia items, including baggies that contained
methamphetamine, snort tubes, and tinfoil containing trace amounts of methamphetamine.
The officers also found 44 rounds of ammunition. The officers found methamphetamine
under the bed in the basement bedroom and on a desk next to the bed . The officers also
found Olson’s Social Security card, expired driver’s license, and a letter addressed to him
on the desk . The offi cers found Olson’s legal document and a baggie containing
methamphetamine on the basement couch. The officers found ammunition on shelving in
the basement bedroom, as well as Olson’s old paystubs and his vehicle title. The basement
bedroom was the only location in the residence w here officers found methamphetamine
and ammunition.
The circumstances here are similar to those in decisions indicating that constructive
possession can be established based on the presence of contraband near documents bearing
the defendant’s name. For example, in State v. Mollberg, the supreme court concluded that
there was sufficient evidence that the defendant exercis ed dominion and control over
marijuana found in a bedroom closet. 246 N.W.2d 463, 472 (Minn. 1976). The defendant
frequently stayed at the residence, “there were numerous letters addressed to [the]
defendant scattered on the floor of the bedroom,” and part of the defendant’s motorcycle
was in the bedroom. Id.

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Similarly, in State v. Denison, law enforcement found marijuana “located in close
proximity” to the defendant’s “personal effects” and in areas where she “likely exercised
at least joint dominion and control.” 607 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 2000), review
denied (Minn. June 13, 2000). This court concluded both that there was sufficient evidence
of constructive possession, and that the defendant’s alternative hypothesis that she was
“merely a passive resident of the house” was not rational. Id.; see also State v. Colsch, 284
N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that
defendant constructively possessed drugs found in bedroom where male clothing was
found, as well as papers and a checkbook bearing the defendant’s name).
Olson argues that “the state did not prove [he] lived in the house at issue.” But the
state presented considerable evidence showing that Olson resided in the basement. He had
been seen outside the residence, law-enforcement officers found adult-male clothing and a
number of his personal documents in the basement bedroom, and some of those documents
listed the Litchfield home as his residence. Viewing that evidence in a light most favorable
to the verdict, as we must, the state proved that Olson resided in the basement bedroom.
See Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430.
Olson also argues that, even if the state proved constructive possession of the
methamphetamine, it did not prove constructive possession of the ammunitio n. We
disagree. Both the ammunition and methamphetamine were found in close proximity to
Olson’s possessions. Law -enforcement officers found Olson’s old paystub s and vehicle
title on the same shelving where they found the ammunition. The officers did not find
Olson’s personal documents or ammunition anywhere else in the residence. To the extent

16
that Olson argues that the state needed to prove actual possession of the ammunition, he is
incorrect. The constructive-possession doctrine applies when there is no proof of physical
or actual possession . Florine, 22 6 N.W.2d at 610 (applying constructive -possession
doctrine after noting that “there was no evidence of actual or physical possession by
defendant when arrested”).
In sum, the evidence at trial indicated a “strong probability” that Olson exercised
dominion and control over the illicit items. See id. at 611. The circumstances proved are
therefore consistent with guilt.
We next consider whether the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600-01. Olson asserts that the
circumstances support a rational hypothesis that the methamphetamine and ammunition
belonged to one of the house’s other residents. Olson argues that Agent Schutz’s responses
to questioning during cross -examination at trial “acknowledged that the evidence did not
exclude the reasonable hypothesis that someone other than [him] possessed the
contraband.” For example, Agent Schutz acknowledged that he did not know when the
methamphetamine paraphernalia had been used or when the ammunition was brought to
the house; he also acknowledged that he could not rule out N.O. as the owner of those
items. Relying on Agent Schutz’s acknowledgments, Olson concludes that “[i]n order to
be sufficient, the circumstances proved had [to] rule out the rational hypothesis that
someone besides Olson had brought the contraband into the house and had used the drugs”
and that “the circumstances proved did nothing of the kind.”

17
Olson’s reliance on Agent Schutz’s responses to cross -examination is unavailing
because those responses merely identified circumstances that were unknown and could not
be ruled out. The responses are not evidence that someone other than Olson possessed the
drugs and ammunition that were found near his possessio ns in the home. Once again, a
reasonable hypothesis is one that is not based on speculation or conjecture; there must be
evidence in the record to support it. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 480; Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d
at 858. Olson does not point to any record evidence that supports his theory that the
contraband belonged to someone other than himself. Because the record does not contain
evidence supporting Olson’s hypothesis of innocence, it is not reasonable. Instead, it is
based on speculation and conjecture, which do not provide a basis to reverse a jury’s
determination of guilt.
Olson cites an unpublished opinion from this court to support his alternative
hypothesis that someone else possessed the contraband. Unpublis hed opinions are not
precedential, but may hold persuasive value. Skyline Vill. Park Ass’n v. Skyline Vill. L.P.,
786 N.W.2d 304, 309-10 (Minn. App. 2010). However, the case that Olson relies on, State
v. Christensen, supports our conclusion that Olson failed to present a reasonable hypothesis
of innocence. No. A 11-2258, 2012 WL 5990236, at *1 -5 (Minn. App. Dec. 3, 2012),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2013).
In Christensen, officers executed a search warrant at a home and found cocaine in a
pair of pants in a bedroom closet . Id. at *1. In the bedroom , an officer also found mail
containing the defendant’s name. Id. The officer found a scale commonly used to weigh
narcotics in the home’s kitchen. Id. On appeal, this court determined th at the

18
circumstances proved established that the defendant had been partying with ten other
people in the home the night before t he cocaine was discovered. Id. at *3. Six of tho se
people stayed overnight, “one having occupied the same bedroom” where the cocaine was
found, and those “six people remained in the house for at least an hour after [the defendant]
left the house.” Id. The six other people had unfettered access to the bedroom where the
cocaine was found. Id. Moreover, the six other people ref used to exit the home earlier
because they knew that police were waiting for them outside. Id. This court concluded
that the circumstances proved supported the defendant’s alternative inference, reasoning
that “[a] logical conclusion from this evidence is that somebody other than [the defendant]
placed the cocaine in the pocket of [the defendant’s] pants.” Id.
This case is distinguishable from Christensen. Law-enforcement officers did not
find contraband in the kitchen of the Litchfield home. They found all of the contraband in
the basement bedroom. And there was no evidence that a group of people were using drugs
in the Litchfield home the night before the warrant was executed , that those people were
still present when the police arrived to execute the warrant , or that another person had
occupied the basement bedroom where the controll ed substances and ammunition were
found. In sum, the record in Christensen contained evidence that supported an alternative
hypothesis that someone other than the defendant placed the cocaine in the pants pocket.
Olson does not point to comparable record evidence here. Instead, he relies on speculation
and conjecture in the form of circumstances that are unknown and that cannot be ruled out.
That approach does not establish a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

19
Because the record does not contain evidence supporting Olson’s alternative
hypothesis of innocence, it is based on c onjecture and it is unreasonable. Because the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt, we do not disturb the jury’s guilty verdict.
Affirmed.