State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1131

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chase Allen Holmes,
Appellant.

Filed June 8, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CR-19-114

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Seamus Duffy, Pennington County Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Ross, Judge; and Cochran, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment, appellant argues that his conviction of
threats of violence against his mother must be reversed because the alleged threat was
merely an expression of transitory anger and not a threat to commit a felony-level crime of

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violence. Appellant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the charges of threats
of violence an d misdemeanor domestic assault because the district court committed
reversible error by allowing the state to elicit unfairly prejudicial allegations of a prior
threat appellant made against his father as relationship evidence. Lastly, appellant argues
that the district court erred by entering separate convictions and sentences for threats of
violence and misdemeanor domestic assault where the offenses arose from the same
criminal act. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In February 2019, appellant Chase Allen Holmes lived with his mother, S.H., and
his father, R.H., in their home in Pennington County. His parents told him he could live
with them because he was having gastrointestinal health problems. Holmes sought the
assistance of doctors regarding his health issu es and, when his condition did not improve,
he began ordering home remedies off of the internet. Holmes believed that he was suffering
from intestinal parasites and hoped these remedies would cure him. He had multiple
packages sent to his parents’ house each week addressed in his name . S.H. opened
Holmes’s packages on multiple occasions. Because of this , Holmes became increasingly
irritated with S.H. and their relationship became tense.
On the evening of February 4 or 5, 2019,1 Holmes went into the kitchen and noticed
that another one of his packages had been opened by S.H. He became angry when he saw

1 Holmes states that this conversation occurred on February 5, and S.H. stated that the
conversation occurred on February 4. While there is a conflict over what day it occurred,
both agree that the altercation in the kitchen took place prior to the threat at issue in this
case.

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it had been taped back together to look like it had not been opened. He and S.H. got into
an argument, during which he called her a “f-cking b-tch.” S.H. asked him what was going
on, to which he replied, “You know.” They proceeded to have an argument about Holmes
moving out and finding his own place. After R.H. yelled for them to stop, the argument
ended and Holmes went to bed.
On the morning of Febru ary 6, 2019, S.H. was in the living room and R.H. was in
the kitchen when Holmes came out of his bedroom. Holmes yelled at S.H. “you’re a
f-cking c -nt!” He then walked downstairs and slammed the door to the lower -level
bathroom. After a bit, Holmes came back upstairs and, according to S.H., he “stopped in
the hallway and that’s when I turned to look and I made eye contact and he goes, ‘You’re
f-cking dead.’ and I said, ‘Chase did you just threaten me?’ He goes, ‘You’re f-cking dead.’
And then went into h is bedroom.” During the altercation, R.H. was in the kitchen and
could not see what was going on in the living room. He testified that he heard Holmes say
something to S.H., but could not hear what it was. He then heard S.H. say “[Holmes] are
you threatening me?” S.H. then told R.H. that Holmes had threatened her and they needed
to go to the police. She testified that she felt afraid of Holmes during the incident and felt
that his threat was serious.
According to Holmes, he was upset with S.H. because she kept opening his mail.
He admitted to calling her a “f -cking c-nt” and said he did so because she had opened
another package the night before and placed a note on it . He testified that, when he went
downstairs to use the bathroom , the intestinal parasites had been eliminated by the home
remedies. He testified that after he returned upstairs to go back to his room, he heard his

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mom “snickering” at him. He was angry because she had used that same tone when she,
months prior, had shown him a video about intestinal parasites. He then turned to her and
said, “They’re f-cking dead!” referencing the intestinal parasites that he stated he had just
voided from his body. He testified that, when he went into his bedroom, he heard S.H. say
“was that a threat?” but he did not have any further conversation with her about what was
said.
The jury found Holmes guilty of one count of threats of violence under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), and one count of misdemeanor domestic assault un der Minn.
Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2018). The district court entered convictions for both counts
and sentenced Holmes to a stay of imposition and probation on the threats -of-violence
count and imposed a 90-day sentence on the misdemeanor domestic-assault count with 90
days of credit. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The evidence is sufficient to support Holmes’s con viction for threats of
violence.

Holmes alleges that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of felony threats of
violence because he said “ You’re f-cking dead” in transitory anger and not as an actual
threat of future violence. When addressing a sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenge, this
court’s review “is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether th e
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit
the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
1989). This court assumes that “the jury believes the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any

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evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). This court
will not reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence if the jury, acting with due regard for
the presumption of innocence and the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684
N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
To convict Holmes for a threats-of-violence crime, the state must demonstrate that
Holmes threatened, directly or indirectly, to commit a felony -level crime of violence, and
acted either with a purpose to terrorize another, or in reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such terror. Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 .2 “Terrorize” is defi ned as causing
“extreme fear by the use of violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614
(Minn. 1975). A “threat” is a declaration of an intention to injure another by some unlawful
act. Id. at 613. “The test of whether words or phrases are harmless or threatening is the
context in which they are used.” Id.
This court has stated that “the statement, ‘I am going to kill you,’ is objectively a
threat to commit homicide, but the context may establish something else. ” State v.
Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. App. 2009) , review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009).
“Although the context might convey an actual intent to kill, it also may indicate anger, or
frustration without an intent to kill.” Id. “[I]t is not the purpose of the statute to authorize
grave sanctions against the kind of [threat] wh ich expresses transitory anger. ” State v.

2 The legislature recently amended the title of Minn. Stat. § 609.713 from “terroristic
threats” to “threats of violence.” See 2015 Minn. Laws ch. 21, art. 1, § 109, subd. 10,
at 234. The elements of the crime have not changed. See id. Much of the caselaw refers
to “terroristic threats” instead of “threats of violence.”

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Jones, 451 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn. App. 1990) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 21, 1990). Holmes argues that he was expressing transitory anger and did not have
the intent to threaten harm. Because the evidence of Holmes’s mental state is supported
by circumstantial evidence, we apply a heightened standard of review.
A two-step analysis is applied when reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence. State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). The first step is identifying
the circumstances proved, deferring to the fact -finder’s “acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence” that conflicted with those circumstances. State
v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 -99 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). Second, the
reviewing court independently examines “the reasonableness of all inferences that might
be drawn from the circumstances proved” to determine whether they are “consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599
(quotations omitted).
The circumstances proved are that (1) Holmes became aware at le ast the night
before the incident that his mother had opened another of his packages; (2) Holmes and his
mother got into an argument that evening during which he called her a “f -cking bitch”;
(3) when Holmes came out of his bedroom in the morning he yelled at his mother, “you’re
a f-cking c-nt,” then went downstairs and slammed the door to the lower -level bathroom;
(4) after coming back upstairs, Holmes said to his mother , “You’re f -cking dead” ;
(5) Holmes repeated this statement to his mother after she asked him, “Chase, did you just
threaten me?”; (6) Holmes then went into his bedroom; and (7) S.H. felt afraid and believed
his threat to be serious and reported this incident immediately to the police.

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This court must examine whether the circumstances surrounding Holmes’s
comment are consistent with a rational hypothesis of guilt, that the statement conveyed a
threat of violence with a purpose to terrorize or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror, and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence . See State v.
Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 669 (Minn. 2011). In making this assessment, “we do not review
each circumstance proved in isolation. Instead, we consider whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent, on the whole, with any reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Holmes’s argument is that the statement was just transitor y anger and that the
evidence of an actual intent to commit a felony -level crime of violence was lacking. We
are, however, constrained on this appeal to accept the evidence most favorable to the
verdict and to ignore evidence contrary to the verdict. In order to reverse we “must find
that the evidence indicates [that] he acted not out of an intent to terrorize but rather in the
midst of transitory anger.” State v. Marchand, 410 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn. App. 1987) ,
review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1987). We cannot conclude that the threat here was merely
transitory anger.
Holmes’s anger at his mother start ed at least the night before the incident when he
found out that she had opened another one of his packages. He called his mother a name
that night and then went to bed. As he left his bedroom the next mo rning, he again called
his mother a name and went downstairs to the bathroom. It was only after returning from
the bathroom that he made the statement “ You’re f-cking dead.” Moreover, he repeated
this statement after his mother asked if he was threatening her. The jury credited S.H.’s

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testimony that she felt threatened and bel ieved the threat was serious . We would be
involved in an inappropriate reweighing of the evidence if we were to conclude t hat
Holmes’s anger at his mother, which we know started the night before, carried over to the
next morning and then lasted through a trip downstairs to the bathroom and b ack again,
qualified as “short-lived” such that it is reasonable to conclude that the comment was not
made with a purpo se to terrorize or at least made with reckless disregard of the risk of
causing such terror. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was sufficient and affirm
the conviction of threats of violence.
II. The district court did not err when it allowed relationship evidence to be used
at Holmes’s trial.

At trial, the state was allowed to admit evidence of a prior incident between Holmes
and his parents as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2018). The incident
occurred in July 2018, when Holmes “pounded on the bathroom door [at his parents’]
residence and threatened to shoot [R.H.] in the head” and said, “You don’t think I’ll do it,
will you?” R.H. felt this threat was serious and reported it to police. Defense counsel
objected to this evidence on the ground that it was unfairly prejudicial. The district court
ruled that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and that it would provide a limiting instruction.
The information was used during dire ct examination of R.H., in the cross-
examination of Holmes, and in the prosecutor’s closing argument. The district court
provided a limiting instruction at the beginning of the direct examination of R.H. that stated
this testimony was allowed “for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent

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of the relationship between [Holmes] and other family members in order to assist [the jury]
in determining whether [Holmes] committed those acts with which [Holmes] is char ged.”
The district court also provided a limiting instruction to the jury at the end of the trial.
Holmes argues that the district court erred when it admitted evidence of this prior
threat because the state was really admitting it as propensity evidence and not relationship
evidence. He claims that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it led the jury to
conclude that he “threatened his father before, so he likely did it again to his mother.”
The district court’s decision to admit relationsh ip evidence under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 in a domestic -abuse prosecution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004); see also State v. Fraga , 864 N.W.2d 615,
626-27 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing that McCoy adopted section 634.20 as rule of evidence
that includes evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against family or household
members other than the victim). “[A]n appellant who alleges an error in the admission of
evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State
v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). In deciding what effect
erroneously admitted evide nce had on the verdict, the reviewing court considers “the
manner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, whether it
was used in closing argument, and whether the defense effectively countered it.” Townsend
v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 2002).
Evidence of another crime or act is not admissible to prove that a person acted in
conformity therewith. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); State v. Spreigl , 139 N.W.2d 167, 169

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(Minn. 1965). However, “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim
of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is admissible” as
relationship evidence, unless it should be excluded because “the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej udice” or for other reasons provided in
the statute. Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Relationship evidence is probative if it “could have assisted the jury by providing a
context with which it could better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship.”
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161. The evidence here established that Holmes and his parents
had a tense relationship and he had a history of making threats toward them. Additionally,
the district court provided multiple limiting instructions during the trial . Therefore, the
district court did not err when it allowed relationship evidence at trial.
Holmes also argues in a pro se supplemental brief that the relationship evidence
confused and misled the jury because “the police report contains plain error .” He claims
that the police report lists the date of the prior threat to R.H. as July 11, 2018 , instead of
July 7, 2018. Because the police report was not entered into evidence at trial, and all
testimony at trial identified July 7 as the date of the prior th reat, there was neither plain
error, nor was the jury confused or misled as a result of the alleged mistake in the police
report. Therefore, we affirm the admission of relationship evidence at Holmes’s trial.
III. The district court erred by entering convictions and sentences for both threats
of violence and misdemeanor domestic assault.

Holmes also argues that the district court erred by entering convictions and
sentences for both threats of violence and misdemeanor domestic assault. We agree.

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Upon prosecution for a crime, a person may be convicted of the crime charged or
an included offense, but not both. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2018) . A n included
offense includes “a lesser degree of the same crime” as well as “a crime necessarily proved
if the crime charged were proved.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1), (4). When a defendant
is convicted of more than one charge for the same act, the proper procedure for the court
to follow is “to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only. The remaining
conviction(s) should not be formally adjudicated at this time .” State v. LaTourelle , 343
N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
Similarly, a person whose conduct constitutes multiple punishable offenses may be
punished for only one offense , except under limited ci rcumstances not applicable here.
Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2018). Whether multiple offenses arose from a single
behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact that this court reviews de novo.
State v. Jones, 848 N.W. 2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014). Minnesota courts have interpreted
section 609.035 as contemplating “that a defendant will be punished for the most serious
of the offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Kebasso, 713 N.W.2d
317, 322 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Here, t he jury found Holmes guilty of threats of violence under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1, and misdemeanor domestic assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 1(1). The district court entered convictions and sentenced Holmes on both counts.
Both charges, however, stem from the same behavioral incident—that on February 6, 2019,
Holmes said, “You’re f-cking dead” to his mother—and the misdemeanor domestic assault
charge is a lesser degree of the threats-of-violence charge. Under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.035,

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.04, Holmes cannot be convicted of and sentenced on both charges. We, therefore, reverse
and remand this case to the district court with instructions to vacate Holmes’s conviction
and sentence for misdemeanor domestic assault.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.