State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1154

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Danielle Yvonne Coleman,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-24773

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal after she was convi cted of theft, appellant Danielle Coleman
argues that the circumstantial ev idence of her mental state is insufficient to prove the

2
charged crime. Appellant alternatively argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the
prosecutor’s summation urging jurors to lo ok to their own expe riences in judging
appellant’s credibility constituted plain error. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2018, X.V. worked as an agency operator for Avis in Rogers. Under Avis
company policy, customers can rent a car for 30 days on a single rent al contract, and can
extend a shorter rental period three times, for up to a total of 30 days. If a customer wants
to rent a car for longer than 30 days or extend a rental pe riod more than three times, the
customer is required to return the car to Avis and enter into a new contract.
On July 20, 2018, appellant rented a 20 17 Toyota Corolla from the Avis agency in
Rogers under a written rental agreement ending on July 23 at 1:00 p.m. Appellant and
X.V. checked the vehicle for preexisting damages. Although there were some scratches on
the back bumper and a dent on the right fender, neither of the driver’s-side doors were
damaged. Appellant left the agency with the car.
At appellant’s request, X.V. extended appe llant’s rental contract from the original
July 23 return date to July 27. Appellant did not return the car on July 27. Instead, she
contacted the agency and again requested to extend the rental contract, this time to
August 3. She then requested a third extension to August 17. When appellant requested a
fourth extension, she was informed that Avis policies prohibited a fourth extension and that
she was required to return the vehicle and open a new contract.
Appellant did not return the car on August 17. Instead, appellant informed X.V. by
telephone that she would return the car on A ugust 20. Avis genera ted a missing-vehicle

3
report. When appellant did not return the ca r on August 20, the Avis corporate security
office became involved and called the phone num ber appellant provided when she rented
the car. Appellant did not answer. The Avis corporate security office called appellant on
August 24, 27, 28, and 30, but was unable to reach her. A certified demand letter was
mailed to appellant, explaining that that the rental car must be returned immediately. That
letter went unclaimed and was returned to Avis on September 12.
On September 5, D.H., a field agent for A sset Retrieval Investigations, was assigned
by Avis to locate and retrieve the rental car from appellant. On September 6, D.H. texted
appellant and told her to return the car immediately. According to D.H., appellant promptly
returned a text message stating that she agreed to return the car. But she did not return the
car.
On September 7, D.H. went to appella nt’s address and left a demand note on
appellant’s door. D.H. also texted appellant who again promised to return the car. The
following day, D.H. visited tw o other addresses trying to re trieve the car, but was unable
to locate it.
On September 11, D.H. texted appellant a nd some of her relatives, but appellant did
not respond. D.H. again called and texted appellant the following day. Appellant informed
D.H. that the car was at her hou se. But when D.H. went to appellant’s residence, the car
was not there. D.H. unsuccessfully tried calling appellant again on September 14, and was
unable to find the car when he went to appellant’s house on September 15.
On September 17, D.H. texted appellant and informed her that the car was now a
month past due for return and that Avis may report it stolen. The next day, appellant called

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D.H. and told him the car would be at her house. D.H. did not find the car at appellant’s
house. The Avis corporate security office sent an email to appellant to inform her that the
car would be reported to police as stolen. The Avis agency in Rogers also called appellant,
who stated that she had made arrangements with D.H. to retrieve the car the next day.
On September 19, the Avis agency in Roge rs called appellant and informed her that
the car would be reported stolen to police if she did not return the car by 6:00 p.m. that day.
When appellant did not return the car by that time, the police were ca lled and told of the
facts.
On September 20, D.H. found the car at appellant’s house with the keys in the
ignition. The car had damage to the front and rear driver’s-side doors.
Avis attempted to charge appellant’s cr edit card $2,127.50 for the rental fees
accrued between July 20 and Sept ember 20, 2018, in addition to a recovery investigation
fee, but was paid only $1,748.97.
The state thereafter charged appellant with theft of rented property in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii) (2016), based on the state’s allegation that appellant
rented a car but did not return it at the end of the rental ag reement, with the intent to
wrongfully deprive Avis of the car. Appellant pleaded not guilty and the case was tried to
a jury.
At trial, appellant’s trial strategy was that there had been a “miscommunication”
concerning when the rental car was to be returned. The state, in rebuttal, argued that there
was no miscommunication and argued:

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I think, during jury selection, every one of you raised your hand
when we asked if you guys rented a car before. None of you
raised your hand about—if you’ve been charged with a crime
that involved a rental car. People said, like, minors or
whatever; so I’m assuming none of you ever got in trouble for
something like this. It’s pretty clear to you, looking at a rental
agreement, through your commo n sense and life experience,
when that vehicle is due back—when it says it’s due back, not
34 days later. Not, I’ll turn it in tonight, but I never do; not,
it’s at my house, but it isn’t.

The jury found appellant guilty of the charge d theft of rented property. The district
court stayed imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation for three years.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
The evidence supports appellant’s conviction.
Appellant was charged with theft of rent ed property in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii). A person is guilty of theft of rented property if she: (1) leases
or rents the property “under a written instrument”; (2) “does not return the property to the
lessor at the end of the lease or rental term , plus agreed-upon exte nsions”; and (3) acts
“with intent to wrongf ully deprive the lessor of possessi on of the property.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii); see also 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 16.15 (2017).
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of th e evidence for her conviction of theft of
rented personal property. She argues that the evidence of her intent is entirely
circumstantial and is insufficien t to eliminate rational inferen ces inconsistent with guilt.
The state agrees that the evidence of appellant’s intent is circumstantial, but contends that
it is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.

6
When analyzing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, “we review the evidence
to determine whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them
would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Al-Naseer , 788
N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotati on omitted). “A conviction supported by
circumstantial evidence requires us to a pply a two-step [analysis] . . . .” State v. Ortega,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). First, re viewing courts “iden tify the circumstances
proved.” State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). Second, courts
“independently examine the r easonableness of all inferen ces that might be drawn,
including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d
at 100 (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in
view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude
beyond a reasonable doubt any reasona ble inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted).
In identifying the circumst ances proved, appellate cour ts “defer to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that
conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-
99 (quotations omitted). Stated differently, “we construe conflicting evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and assume th e jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and
disbelieved the defense witnesses.” State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). Reviewing courts therefore “disregard testimony that is inconsistent
with the verdict.” Id. at 669.

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Appellant’s argument that she did not inte nd to “wrongfully deprive” Avis of the
car proceeds on the theory that the circumstantial evidence does not eliminate the rational
inference that appellant intended to repair the damage to the car’s doors and that her
retention of the car was related to her inten tion to fix the damage. But the trial record
contains no evidence suggesting that appellant was retaining possession of the car in order
to do repairs. Appellant did not testify at trial, and was cer tainly not obligated to do so.
But the circumstantial-evidence review standard requires that we identify the
circumstances proved at trial. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. The record here includes
nothing about any plans or efforts on appellant’ s part to repair the damage to the rented
car. And appellant seems to confuse the intent to “wrongfully deprive” with the intent to
“permanently deprive” Avis of the car. Careful attention to the elements of the charged
offense is necessary to properly analyze the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence.
A person is guilty of theft of rented pr operty when that pers on “leases or rents
personal property under a written instrument” and “does not return the property to the
lessor at the end of the lease or rental term , plus agreed-upon extensions, with intent to
wrongfully deprive the lessor of possession of the prope rty.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd.
2(a)(9)(iii) (emphasis added). This particular provision of the theft statute does not require
proof of intent to permanently deprive the owner of the rented property. The required intent
under the statute is instead the intent to “wrongfully deprive the lessor of possession” after
the end of the agreed-u pon rental period. Id. (emphasis added). In other sections of the
same statute, the legislature has prohibited acts done with the “intent to deprive the owner
permanently of possession of the property.” See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1)-

8
(2) (2016). It did not use that term in section 609.52, subd. 2( 9)(iii). The use of
“wrongfully” in section 609.52, subd. 2(9)(iii), clearly signifies the mental state that must
be proved—the intent to “wrongfully” depr ive the lessor of possession. Intent to
“permanently” deprive the owner of the property need not be proved.
The term “wrongfully,” or “wrongful,” is often defined as something that is
“[c]haracterized by unfairness or injustice, ” something that is “contrary to law,” or
something of which a person is “not entitled to the position occupied.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1932 (11th ed. 2019). In th e context of rental of personal property, such as a
vehicle, timely return of the le ased property goes to the essenc e of the lessor’s interest in
the property. The lessor must have possession of the property to lease it to customers. As
such, the statute recognizes that timely retu rn of the leased property is the critical
component. By her refusal to return the property here, appellant retained possession of the
car beyond the date on which the lessor was entitled to have possession of the car returned
to it.
With this understanding of what the stat ute prohibits, we tu rn to whether the
evidence is sufficient to prove that appellant intended to wrongfully keep the rental car past
the agreed-upon end date of the rental agreement with Avis. And we begin by identifying
the circumstances proved at trial.
Here, the circumstances proved are that a ppellant rented a 2017 Toyota Corolla from
Avis in Rogers on July 20, 2 018. The rental agreement stat ed that the rental contract
expired on July 23 at 1:00 p.m. Appellant extended her rental contract to July 27 and again
to August 3. Appellant then extended her rental contract to August 17. When appellant

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tried to extend her rental contract a fourth time, X.V. told appellant that, under company
policy, appellant could only extend her rental contract three times, after which she would
have to return the car, and could open a new contract to keep the car longer. Appellant did
not return the car on August 17, and did not return it to Avis to open a new contract. When
appellant did not return the car on August 20, the Avis corpor ate security office became
involved and called the phone number appella nt provided when sh e rented the car.
Appellant did not answer. On August 23, a certified letter was mailed to appellant
demanding the return of the car. The letter was unclaimed and returned to Avis. On
August 24, 27, 28, and 30, calls to appellant went unanswered. On September 5, D.H. was
assigned to locate and repossess the car, and a ppellant similarly dodged and resisted his
attempts to recover possession of the car, repeatedly misleading him about where he could
locate it. On September 17, 2 018, D.H. informed appellant th at if she did not return the
car, Avis may report it stolen. The Avis agency in Rogers also called appellant, who stated
that she had made arrangements with D.H. to re trieve the car the following day. Finally,
on September 19, the Avis agency called appella nt and informed her that, if the car was
not returned by 6:00 p.m. that day, the car would be reported st olen to police. It was not
returned, and a stolen-vehicle report was made. D.H. found the car in appellant’s driveway
on September 20—a month after appellant was contractually obligated to return it.
Having identified the facts c onsistent with guilt that were proved at trial, we next
“independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100 (quotatio n omitted). The inferences

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to be drawn from the circum stances proved are consistent with appellant’s guilt and
inconsistent with any other reasonable inference.
Appellant rented a car under a written contract that specified when the car was to be
returned. Appellant knew when she was requi red to return the ca r, because she thrice
extended the contract. She tried to extend it a fourth time. But Avis policies, disclosed to
appellant in July when she rented the car, prohibited anot her extension without the car
being returned and a new contract created. Appellant did not return the car. On numerous
occasions, appellant falsely informed D.H. th at he could retrieve the car from locations
where the car was not to be found. Appellant knew that Avis wanted the car returned, but
chose not to return it.
Appellant concedes that these circumstances are consistent with guilt, but contends
that “they also did not exclude the reasonable possibility that [appellant] . . . did not have
the specific intent required by the statute,” and that it is ra tional to infer that appellant
wanted to keep the car until sh e could fix the damage to it. But, as discussed above, the
statute requires proof that appellant have in tended to “wrongfully deprive” the lessor of
possession of the car “at the end of the lease or rental term, plus agreed-upon extensions.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(9)(iii). It cannot be rationally inferred on these facts that
appellant did not intend to wrongfully deprive Avis of the car past the contractually agreed
return date. Appellant knew very well—and was told repeatedly—that Avis wanted the
rental car returned. She chos e to wrongfully deprive Avis of the rental car after the
expiration of the rental contract, plus any agreed-upon extensions.

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The evidence of appellant’s intent to wrongfully deprive Avis of the rental car
beyond the end of the lease term is overwhe lming and the circumstantial evidence admits
of no rational conclusion other than that ap pellant committed the charged offense. The
evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
Appellant is not entitled to relief for prosecutorial misconduct.
Appellant argues that the state “committe d plain, prejudicial misconduct” during
summation “by urging the jurors to look to their own experiences as proof that [appellant]’s
defense was not credible.” Appellant contends that the error affects her substantial rights
and warrants the grant of a new trial.
“When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we
consider the argument as a whole, rather th an focusing on particular phrases or remarks
that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d
677, 691 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). Because appellant did not object at trial, we
review the alleged misconduct for plain error. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998). Under the plain-error standard, a defendant must show “(1) error; (2) that is plain;
and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” Id. “An error is plain if it is clear or
obvious, which is typically established if th e error contravenes case law, a rule, or a
standard of conduct.” State v. Webster , 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). To meet the substantial rights re quirement, an appellant bears the burden of
showing “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had
a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). If all three elements of the plain-error test are met, we “address the

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error to ensure fairness and the inte grity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Dobbins ,
725 N.W.2d 492, 508 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted). “We will correct the error only
if the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judici al proceeding is seriously
affected.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, appellant asserts that the state plainl y erred when the prosecutor told the jury:
I think, during jury selection, every one of you raised your hand
when we asked if you guys rented a car before. None of you
raised your hand about—if you’ve been charged with a crime
that involved a rental car. People said, like, minors or
whatever; so I’m assuming none of you ever got in trouble for
something like this. It’s pretty clear to you, looking at a rental
agreement, through your commo n sense and life experience,
when that vehicle is due back—when it says it’s due back, not
34 days later. Not, I’ll turn it in tonight, but I never do; not,
it’s at my house, but it isn’t.

Appellant argues that the statement was im proper because it “urged the jurors to put
themselves in [appellant]’s shoes and ask themselves whether they would [return] a rental
car when it was due.” It is improper to request jurors to “look at their own experiences as
proof that the defendant’s de fense is not credible.” State v. Williams , 525 N.W.2d 538,
549 (Minn. 1994). However, the supreme court ha s also held that jurors “are free to (and
undoubtedly do) bring their ow n experiences to bear in assessing the credibility of a
defendant’s claim.” Id.
In context, we see no error in the state’s comment to the jury. Although somewhat
awkwardly worded, the statement amounted to an invitation to the jurors to apply their
collective common sense to the facts of the case. Cf. 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG

13
3.03 (2017) (providing for a model jury inst ruction defining reasonable doubt as a doubt
based on “reason and common sense”).
Additionally, and even if the prosecuto r’s brief reference to the collective
experiences of the jurors were considered to be error, that brief comment was not error that
is plain. Appellant argues that the argument here resembles that held to be improper in
Williams. In Williams, the supreme court concluded that the prosecutor, in a prosecution
for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, could not “urge the jurors to put themselves in
the defendant’s shoes and ask themselves if they ever had traveled and opened their
luggage to ‘just magically find something in your bag that you hadn’t put in there when
you packed.’” 525 N.W.2d at 549. But the prosecutor here made no use of any disparaging
characterization of the defens e argument as was present in Williams. Instead, the
prosecutor urged the jury to apply its collective common sense and life experiences to the
evidence in the case. The statement was not so clearly obvious or wrong so as to constitute
error that is plain.
Finally, the state has demonstrated that the prosecutor’s isolated statement did not
affect appellant’s substantial rights in any event. The supreme court has held that
prosecutorial misconduct does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights when “there is no
reasonable likelihood that the absence of th e misconduct in question would have had a
significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Jones, 753 N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted).
Here, we see no possibility that this fleetin g comment significantly impacted the jury’s
verdict. When viewed in the context of the prosecutor’s entire summation, it was of little
import. As detailed above, the evidence agai nst appellant was extremely strong, and the

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district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the crime. We therefore
conclude that the challenged statement did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.
In sum, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to eliminate any rational inference
inconsistent with appellant’s guilt, and appe llant is not entitled to plain-error relief on
appeal based on her claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
Affirmed.