In re the Matter of the Children of: L.N.L. and S.J.R., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1165

In re the Matter of the Children of: L.N.L. and S.J.R., Parents.

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-19-1076

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for appellant mother L.N.L.)

Thomas N. Kelly, Wright County Attorney, Kari L. Willis, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Lisa Rutland, Princeton, Minnesota (for respondent father S.J.R.)

April Dekpoh, Fridley, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, appellant a rgues that the
record does not support the district court’s determinations that (1) she is palpably unfit to
parent; (2) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-
of-home placement because the county failed to make r easonable efforts to reunify the
family; (3) the children are neglected and in foster care; and (4) termination of appellant’s

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parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because clear and convincing evidence
supports the finding that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that termination was in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant is the biological mother of eight-year-old M.L.R. and six-year-old B.S.R.
B.S.R. suffered a traumatic brain injury at the age of two when her head was closed in a
community gate while playing outside. Appellant and the children’s father S.J.R. were
divorced in 2016. At the time the children were removed from appellant’s care, appellant
was married to and living with C.L.
In early April 2018, appellant had not heard from C.L. for several days after he had
left the home he shared with appellant and the children. On April 6, 2018, appellant sent
C.L. the following text message:
I am going to kill the kids and then myself. I hate you, this life
you hAve f ---ed up for everyone and it’s all over. So by the
time the police get here everyone will be dead. You can live
with being the reason for all of it. None of this would have
happened if I would have never have trusted you and left a year
ago. Good bye!

Appellant then sent her mother-in-law the following text message: “I am going to kill both
of the kids and then myself and you can blame your son for all of it. He is a nasty human
being! . . . So within an hour everyone will be gone.” Appellant also sent text messages
and left voice mails for her mother and father with similar messages. Additionally,
appellant posted a public message to Facebook in which she stated:

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[b]y morning [C.L.] will be making funeral arrangements (that
is of course if he even cares enough to do that) We are all 3,
me and the girls are going to be gone . . . . He has pushed me
for the last time and I am done. There is nobody to take care
of the girls therefore they are better off with me in heaven.
Good bye and I am sorry to those I have ever hurt and I love
you all more than you will ever know.

Appellant then turned off her phone and took the children to the basement. After receiving
multiple calls from several parties about the text messages, voicemail messages, and the
Facebook post made by appellant —all of which indicated she planned to kill herself and
her children—law enforcement respon ded to appellant’s home. Law enforcement broke
down appellant’s door and entered the home with their guns drawn after appellant failed to
answer the door. Law enforcement found appellant and the children in a basement
bedroom, hiding under a blanket. The children were placed in protective care and appellant
was transported to the emergency room.
On April 11, 2018, Wright County Health and Human Services (WCHHS) filed a
petition in Wright County District Court, alleging that the children were in need of
protection or services (CHIPS). Appellant admitted to the CHIPS petition and the children
were adjudicated CHIPS pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. (6)(9) (2018). The
out-of-home placement plan was approved by the district court on June 14, 2018.
On February 27, 2019, WCHHS filed a termination-of-parental-rights (TPR)
petition alleging that appellant is (1) palpably unfit to be a party t o the parent -child
relationship, (2) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement; and (3) the children are neglected and in foster care. A six-day
trial was he ld on the TPR petition in June 2019. At the trial, the district court heard

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testimony from former and current WCHHS case managers, appellant’s parenting skills
worker and domestic violence counselor, the children’s therapist, teachers and babysitter,
visit supervisors, multiple psychologists, a Buffalo police officer, appellant, and the
Guardian ad Litem (GAL).
Psychologists
Dr. George Petrangelo , a licensed psychologist, completed two parenting
assessments with psychological components with appellant. He testified that appellant’s
tests indicated markers of dependent personality, compulsive p ersonality, avoidant
personality and some antisocial personality traits. He stated that the tests revealed that
appellant demonstrated defensiveness about admitting to psychological problems. Dr.
Petrangelo further indicated that he g ave appellant anothe r Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory ( MMPI) test which indicated depression and anxiety .1 He also
testified that the results indicate that appellant has persistent depressive disorder and
generalized anxiety and that these could have an effect on her ability to parent. In January
2019, Dr. Petrangelo completed a second parenting evaluation with appellant. Based on
this evaluation, Dr. Petrangelo found that appellant was having more psychological issues
than she did during the previous administration of the testing. He testified that appellant’s
updated assessments showed that appellant had the same levels of depression but showed

1 Appellant completed three previous MMPI tests in April 2018, May 2018, and June 2018.
Appellant’s personality profile could not be interpreted on these tests because the validity
scale that detects an attempt to “present oneself in a non realistically favorable way” was
too high. Appellant’s response pattern indicated that “she was presenting herself in a very
favorable light” and not “wanting to admit to some of the things going on in her life.”

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increased levels of paranoia, suspicion and distress, as well as some indicators of
schizophrenia. Dr. Petrangelo testified that the data from his second parenting assessment
did not support reunification because “[t]he data got more serious . . . [and appellant’s]
symptoms got worse.” Dr. Petrangelo’s report indicates the following:
Perhaps a most critical element to these data is the
increasing symptomology [appellant] is experiencing. Her
2019 test profiles draw attention to an increased risk of self -
harm that should be monitored closely by her treatment team.
A particularly critical caution is if [ appellant’s] already high
levels of stress and psychological disorientation (more
confusion, more impulsiveness, more paranoia) worsens
further due to any major crisis or setback in her current status,
she could be at -risk for self -harm. If [appellant’s] mental
health worsens, hospitalization may be necessary.

(emphasis omitted).
Dr. Jonathan Hoistad completed additional psychological tests in March 2019 after
appellant requested a second opinion on Dr. Petrangelo’s evaluation. Dr. Hoistad
completed a Health Dynamics Inventory with appellant. Dr. Hoistad and his colleagues
created the inventory. The inventory relies on self -reports from the client and measures
emotional functioning. The results of appellant’s inventory showed that her “overall
emotional health right now was good.” Appellant reported good relationships with other
people and no difficulty in managing stress, though she did feel “somewhat anxious” at
times and has some depressive symptoms. Dr. Hoistad reviewed Dr. Petrangelo’s testing
and did not understand how Dr. Petrangelo came to the conclusion that appellant had a
“major mental illness.” However, Dr. Hoistad also testified that he only received a
summary of Dr. Petrangelo’s report contained in a report authored by appellant’s WCHHS

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case manager. Dr. Hoistad testified that there is nothing in his work with appellant that
would lead him to conclude that she is unable to safely and appropriately pa rent her
children. The district court only found “some” of Dr. Hoistad’s testimony credible, due in
part, to the district court’s concerns about the validity and reliability of Dr. Hoistad’s
testing method , Dr. Hoistad’s reliance on summaries of prior testing rather than the
assessments themselve s and Dr. Hoistad’ s lack of collateral information regarding the
special needs of the children.
Case Manager
Appellant’s current case manager testified that she continued to see evidence that
appellant’s mental health symptoms were not under control throughout the case and
expressed concerns that appellant’s mental health has not been sufficiently treated. The
case manager testified that she does not believe appellant is currently able to care for the
special needs of her children and that the children should not b e returned to appellant’s
care.
Visit Supervisors
The visit supervisors testified that appellant had “difficulty” during the visits, the
visits were “ [s]ometimes chaotic,” the children would fight, and the children had to be
redirected. The supervisors also testi fied that appellant would arrive late to visits , be on
her phone during visits, and that appellant fell asleep during visits.
Parenting Skills Worker
Appellant’s parenting skills worker testified that appellant did not have any
concerns about her parenting skills and that the only deficit appellant could identify was

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that she spoiled the children. The parenting skills worker agreed to end the service on Dr.
Petrangelo’s recommendation because appellant was not able to identify parenting issues
or recognize that there were parenting concerns due to her mental health.
Children’s Therapist
The children’s therapist testified that M.L.R.’s treatment goal w as to “reduce []
symptoms of p osttraumatic stress disorder.” The therapist explained that M.L.R.
completed a “trauma narrative” in therapy where M.L.R. talked about domestic violence
between appellant and S.J.R. and appellant and C.L., B.S.R.’s accident, and being spanked
by C.L. The therapist worked on skills with B.S.R. to help with relaxation and emotional
regulation. The therapist testified that B.S.R. disclosed to her that M.L.R. threatened to
kill her and also choked her on numerous occasions. The therapist further testified that she
sent a letter to the ongoing case worker in March 2019, requesting that visitation between
the children and appellant be decreased or stopped all together. She also sent a follow -up
letter in April 2019, recommending t hat visitation remain on hold to allow the girls to
progress through therapy, as she noticed progress with the girls while the visitation was on
hold.
B.S.R.’s Teachers
B.S.R.’s classroom teacher testified that B.S.R. has an Individualized Education
Plan (IEP) for social/emotional skills and academic skills. B.S.R.’s teacher further testified
that B.S.R. had a “calming corner” in the classroom that she used when she needed to calm
herself or when she was having a tantrum. The teacher noticed that B.S.R. use d the quiet
corner when there was a scheduled visit with her parents and the day after the visit. The

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teacher testified that during a writing activity, B.S.R. drew a picture of her sister M.L.R.
and explained that “[M.L.R.] said she would kill her when she got older.” 2 B.S.R.’s IEP
case manager testified that she noticed more “emotional instability” in B.S.R. following a
parent visit or when anticipating a parent visit.
Appellant
Appellant testified that she believes parenting skills are not relevant to her case and
not needed on her case plan. Appellant testified that the children never fought when they
were in her care. She also denied any issues between the children and testified that she did
not believe the reports regarding the fights between the children. Appellant testified that
there was extensive verbal and emotional domestic abuse in her relationship with the
children’s father, S.J.R. However, she also testified that if the children were to come home
but had to be separated, appellant would take one of the children and S.J.R. 3 would take
the other. Appellant denied that B.S.R. has any social or emotional deficits to work on in
therapy.
Appellant’s Therapist
Appellant’s therapist testified that the general goal of appellant’s therapy was to
address domestic violence. She testified that she and appellant discussed red flags of
domestic abuse, why people stay in relationships with domestic violence and why appellant

2 The children were placed in separate homes in December 2018 due to M.L.R.’s assaultive
behaviors toward B.S.R.
3 As part of her “trauma narrative,” M.L.R. talked about domestic violence between her
mom and S.J.R. Specifically, she described appellant and S.J.R. fighting and hearing loud
noises. M.L.R. described S.J.R. as the aggressor in the relationship.

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stayed in her relationships. She also testified that she gave appellant “handouts” regarding
domestic violence. Appellant’s therapist was not able to provide testimony regarding the
tests or assessments she administered to appellant. She testified that she believes appellant
has made progress in her treatment because she had taken accountability for the incident
on April 6, 2018, her criminal charges, and her “propensity to be involved with domestic
abusers” and has made progress in identifying problem relationships before she enters
them. Appellant’s therapist testified that she and appellant “talked about parenting” and
discussed disciplinary techniques. She testified that she planned to continue working with
appellant. Finally, appellant’s therapist testified that she believes appellant’s mental health
has stabilized enough to allow her to safely parent. The district court did not find the
therapist’s testimony credible.
Guardian ad Litem
The GAL testified that she doesn’t believe appellant has shown that she is capable
of meeting her children’s needs because her mental health concerns impact appellant’s
ability to place her children’s need s before her own. The GAL testified that she has seen
more emotional stability in B. S.R. than previously and that B.S.R. was calmer and more
settled after visitation with appellant ceased. The GAL testified that M.L.R. needs a
“structured, scheduled, stable setting” in order to do well. The GAL testified that both
children are doing wel l in their out -of-home placements and that she believes it is in the
children’s best interests that appellant’s parental rights be terminated.
Following trial, in a thorough and well -reasoned order, the district court
involuntarily terminated appellant’s parental rights to M.L.R. and B.S.R., finding that

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WCHHS proved all three bases for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that
it was in the best interest s of the children that appellant’s parental rights be terminated.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court’s finding that a statutory basis for termination of
parental rights exists is supported by the record.
This court will “affirm the district court’s termination of paren tal rights when at
least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence
and termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the county ha s made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted). “Considerable deference” is given to the district
court’s termination of parental rights decision; however this court carefully reviews the
sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it is clear and convincing. Id. On appeal
from a district court’s TPR order, “we will review the district court’s findings of the
underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of whether a
particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse
of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation and citation omitted).

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The district court determined that the county proved three statutory bases for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. The district court thoroughly analyzed the
statutory bases and found that (1) following the children’s placemen t out of home,
reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to out -of-home placement;
(2) appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship; and (3) the
children are neglected and in foster care. Appellant cha llenges all three statutory bases,
contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the district court’s termination of
her parental rights. We consider first whether there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding that following the children’ s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts failed
to correct the conditions that led to the children’s placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5) (2018).
A. Reasonable Efforts Failed to Correct the Conditions Leading to the Out-
of-Home Placement
A district court may terminate a parent’s rights if reasonable efforts have failed to
correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement. Id. It is presumed that
reasonable efforts have failed when: (1) a child has resided out of the home for a period of
12 months within the preceding 22 months or when the child is under the age of eight at
the time the CHIPS petition is filed, the presumption arises when the child has been in the
out-of-home placement for six months unless the parent has main tained regular contact
with the child and the parent is complying with the case plan; (2) the district court has
approved the out -of-home placement plan; (3) the conditions leading to the out -of-home

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placement have not been corrected; and (4) reasonable efforts have been made by the social
services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Id., subd. (1)(b)(5)(i-iv).
B. Uncontested Elements
Appellant does not appear to challenge elements (1), (2), or (3). First, appellant
concedes that the children have been out of the home for a period that exceeds 12 months
within the preceding 22 months. This is supported by the record. The children were
removed from appellant’s care on April 6, 2018 and remained in their out -of-home
placements up until the TPR trial in June 2019. As such, the children remained in out -of-
home care for just over 13 of the preceding 22 months at the time of the trial. Additionally,
the record shows that both children were under the age of eight years old at the time the
CHIPS petition was filed and remained in their out-of-home placements for more than six
months. Moreover, the district court found, and the record supports the finding , that
appellant did not comply with the out -of-home placement plan as appellant has fai led to
“demonstrate adequate mental health and maturity to consistently meet the children’s
needs” and failed to improve her parenting skills.
Second, appellant concedes that the district court approved the out -of-home
placement plan. This is also supported by the record, as the district court approved the case
plan on June 14, 2018.
Appellant does not appear to directly challenge element (3), nor does she explicitly
concede that it has been satisfied. Nonetheless, we conclude that, on this record, elemen t
(3) has been satisfied because the conditions leading to the out -of-home placement —
primarily appellant’s mental health —have not been corrected. “It is presumed that

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conditions leading to a child’s out -of-home placement have not been corrected upon a
showing that the parent or parents have not substantially complied with the court’s orders
and a reasonable case plan.” Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(iii). The district court found that while
appellant attended therapy throughout the case, “without taking responsibili ty for her
actions and being truthful with the participants of this case, there appears to have been little
to no improvement in her mental health since the beginning of this case.” The district court
also found that appellant “had the ability to comply w ith the court-ordered case plan and
did not do so.” These findings are supported by the record.
C. Reasonable Efforts Toward Reunification
Appellant challenges the district court’s finding regarding element (4) , WCHHS’s
efforts toward reunification. Appella nt contends that “[i]t is questionable whether or not
conditions leading to the out-of-home placement were adequately addressed by reasonable
efforts from the agency” and argues that WCHHS “failed to make genuine efforts” to
reunify appellant and her child ren. Notably, appellant does not offer alternative or
additional services that would have been helpful or provide any legal authority to support
her contention that WCHHS’s efforts were unreasonable under the facts of this case.
The district court found that WCHHS made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
appellant and reunite the family. Specifically, t he district court found that WCHHS
provided services and made numerous referrals for appellant’s benefit that were “directly
related to the specific i ssues [appellant] was facing.” The district court found that the
“efforts constitute[d] tangible resources that, if utilized and followed, could have addressed
[appellant’s] mental health, domestic abuse, and lack of parenting skills. The case plan

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was reasonably designed to address the conditions which led to the children’s out of home
placement.” The district court concluded that the efforts made by WCHHS were “relevant
to the safety and protection of the children; adequate to meet the needs of the children and
family; culturally appropriate; available and accessible; consistent and timely; and realistic
under the conditions.”
The record supports the district court’s findings that WCHHS made reasonable
efforts. Appellant was offered a number of psychological evaluations, a parenting
assessment and parenting assessment update, individual therapy, domestic violence
counseling, family therapy, parenting skills education, random drug testing, supervised
visitation, and assistance creating a safety plan. The children also participated in therapy.
The case manager’s chronology notes show WCHHS’s consistent efforts to communicate
with appellant and her providers.
Appellant contends that there is no record of the efforts or services being offered to
her at the time the state pursued termination. This is contrary to the record. Appellant
testified that she was still participating in individual therapy and domestic violence
counseling at the time of the trial. These services were part of ap pellant’s case plan and
were services appellant participated in throughout the case. It appears the issue in this case
was not that appellant was not completing the services, but rather that she was not able to
meaningfully address the issues she was faci ng even with services. The district court’s
findings are supported by the record. T he district court did not abuse its discretion when
it found WCHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify appellant with her children.

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The district court did not err when it found that the evidence supports termination
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). Because we conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to support one basis for termination, we need not add ress any other statutory
basis. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2018); see also In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554
N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996) (“To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the district
court must find that at least one of the eight statutory conditions for termination exist.”).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
termination is in the children’s best interests.
Appellant argues that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interests of
the children. In termination of parental rights proceedings, if a statutory basis for an
involuntary termination is present, the best interests of the child is the “paramount
consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018). When analyzing the child’s best
interests, the district court must balance three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving
the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” J.R.B, 805 N.W.2d at 905.
“Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations
and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992).
“Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. The court of appeals reviews “a district court’s ultimate
determination that termination is in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.”
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.

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Here, the district court concluded that it is in the childre n’s best interests that
appellant’s parental rights be terminated. The district court found that
[appellant] loves the children and the children love her.
However, [appellant] has not shown an ability to meaningfully
address the issues causing the child ren’s removal from her
care, including her mental health, lack of parenting skills,
inability to move on from abusive relationships in order to keep
the children safe, and inability to put the children’s needs ahead
of her own. Perhaps the most significan t barrier to
reunification is [appellant’s] complete inability to
acknowledge her mental health issues, the children’s mental
health issues, the seriousness of her threats against herself and
the children, and to take responsibility for her actions.

Appellant argues that the evidence shows that she and her children have a strong
bond and love each other. Though the district court recognized that appellant loves the
children and the children love her, “the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship” is only one factor that the district court must balance when considering the
child’s best interests. See R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4 (stating that the court must balance three
factors when analyzing the best interests of the child). T he district court, in properly
balancing the three factors, found that this love is outweighed by appellant’s inability to
“meaningfully address the issues causing the children’s removal from her care, including
her mental health, lack of parenting skills, inability to move on from abusive relationships
in order to keep the children safe, and inability to put the children’s needs ahead of her
own.” These findings are supported by the record.
Appellant next argues that the evidence suggests that removing the children from
appellant’s care caused more harm than good. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the record
shows that the children made progress after their removal from appellant. The children’s

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therapist testified that the girls experienced trauma due to the removal from their mother,
but that it is not the exclusive source of their trauma. The children’s therapist testified that
M.L.R. was able to make progress in her therapy and complete her tr auma narrative after
visits with her mother stopped. Both the GAL and B.S.R’s teacher testified that they have
observed more emotional stability in B.S.R. The GAL also testified that M.L.R.’s
psychological evaluation states that she needs a “stable, stru ctured environment” and that
she has observed that M.L.R. has shown that when “she has a structured, scheduled, stable
setting that she’s able to go forward and blossom and do very well.” Overall, the record
indicates that the children have done well and made progress since they were removed from
their mother’s care and visits were ended.
The d istrict court carefully considered the three factors outlined above and
concluded that the children’s best interests were served by terminating appellant’s parental
rights. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that it is in the best
interests of the children that appellant’s parental rights be terminated.
Affirmed.