In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. A. R.-A., Father.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1203

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. A. R.-A., Father.

Filed December 23, 2019
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-19-1757

Mark D. Fiddler, Fiddler Osband, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellants adoptive parents
Jane Doe and John Doe)

Ronald M. Walters, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent mother S. B. A.)

Polly Ann Krause, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent father J. A. R.-A.)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellants John and Jane Doe challenge the district court’s dismissal of their private
petition to terminate J.A.R. -A’s parental rights for lack of a prima facie case. Because
appellant’s termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) petition fails to state a prima facie case
that father is a palpably unfit parent pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4)
(2018), we affirm.

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FACTS
D.A.R. was born to S.A.R. (mother) and J.A.R. -A. (father) in January 2019. After
D.A.R.’s birth, mother filed a consent to adoption . Appellants planned to adopt D.A.R. ,
and D.A.R. was placed with appellants pending the adoption.
Following mother’s consent to adoption, appellants petitioned to terminate father’s
parental rights to D.A.R. , alleging that father is a palpably unfit parent because of his
criminal history, traumatic brain injury, substance abuse, and potential future incarceration.
From our review of the record and the district court’s order, it appears father has never had
contact with D.A.R. Shortly after appellants petitioned to terminate father’s parental rights,
mother and father signed a recognition of parentage involving D.A.R.
After the admit/deny hearing, the district court dismissed the TPR petition for failing
to state a prima facie case in support of termination. The district court concluded that the
petition, despite appellants’ allegations about father’s criminal history, substance abuse,
traumatic brain injury, and potential future incarceration, failed to connect these allegations
to father’s ability to care for D.A.R.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Standard of Review

The parties, citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 12, contend that our standard of review for
dismissal of a TPR petition for failure to state a prima facie case is de novo. We disagree
in part. The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection make clear that the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure do not apply in juvenile protection matters. Minn. R. Juv. P. 3.01

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(“Except as otherwise provided by these rules, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do
not apply to juvenile protection matters.”). Therefore, rule 12 does not apply here.
A TPR petition must allege a prima facie case “in support of termination of parental
rights.” Minn. R. Juv. P. 55.03, subd. 2(c). 1 Similarly, both adoptive-placement matters
and motions to modify custody also require the party seeking relief to allege a prima facie
case for the relief sought. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a), (b) (2018) (adoptive
placement); Nice-Peterson v. Nice -Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471, 471 (Minn. 1981)
(modification of custody). Without being pointed to dispositive authority, we conclude
that a TPR petition is sufficiently analogous to adoptive -placement matters and
custody-modification matters that a similar standard should apply here.
When reviewing both dismissal of a custody-modification motion and dismissal of
an adoptive-placement motion for failure to state a prima facie case, we first review de
novo whether the district court properly viewed the movant ’s allegations and supporting
documents. Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011); see In re Welfare
of Children of L.L.P. , 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying the Boland
standard in an adoptive-placement appeal). In these circumstances, the district court must

1 The Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated amendments to the rules of juvenile
protection procedure effective September 1, 2019 “ to simplify the rules and incorporate
necessary changes for consistency with updated laws and regulations.” Order
Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure and the Rules of
Adoption Procedure, Nos. ADM10-8040, 10-8041 (Minn. May 13, 2019); see also Order
Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure ,
No. ADM10-8041 (Minn. Aug. 30, 2019) (amendin g Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 59 for
reestablishment of the legal parent and child relationship following legislative
amendments). The amendments to the rules are effective September 1, 2019 and apply to
cases pending on that date. Id.

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accept facts in the movant’s supporting documents as true, disregard contrary allegations,
and consider the non -moving party’s supporting documents only to the extent that they
explain or provide context. Boland, 800 N.W. 2d at 185; see L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570
(same). Second, we review the district court ’s determination of whether appellants
established a prima facie case for an abuse of discretion. Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185; see
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570 (same). Third, we review de novo whether the district court
properly determined the need for an evidentiary hearing. Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185; see
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570 (same).
We also note that the “quantum of proof is implicitly incorporated into the
requirement that the movant present a prima facie case.” Swanlund v. Shimano Indus.
Corp., Ltd., 459 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Minn. App. 1990). The evidentiary burden at a TPR
trial is clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R. Juv. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). Thus to avoid
dismissal of a TPR petition for failure to allege a prima facie case, a party seeking a TPR
must allege that the facts supporting the TPR can be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determ ining that appellants’
TPR petition fails to state a prima facie case in support of termination of
father’s parental rights.

All agree that the district court properly considered appellants’ allegations as true.
We therefore need not review de novo this first step and instead turn to whether the district
court abused its discretion in concluding that the petition failed to state a prima facie case.
See Boland, 800 N.W.2d at 185.

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Appellants allege one statutory ground for TPR in their petition: that father is
palpably unfit to parent “because . . . of specific conditions directly relating to the parent
and child relationship . . . of a duration or nature that renders” father unable to care for
D.A.R. for the reasonably foreseeable future. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). The
burden under this subdivision is “onerous ,” and requires t he movant “[to] prove a
consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the
hearing that, it appears, will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are
permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” In re Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d
656, 661 (Minn. 2008).
Appellants’ TPR petition alleges that father is palpably unfit because of (1) his
“extensive criminal background,” (2) a traumatic brain injury he suffered , and (3) his
history of substance abuse. The petition asserts that father’s “criminal conduct, aggressive
nature, mental limitation, and expected lack of freedom due to incarceration, deem him
unfit” to parent. Appellants contend that the district court incorrectly concluded that these
allegations do not state a prima facie case that father is palpably unfit to parent D.A.R. We
are not convinced.
The district court properly concluded that appellants’ petition fails to demonstrate a
causal connection between father’s specific alleged behavior and conditions to an inability
to care appropriately for D.A.R. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the TPR petition.
First, we address appellants’ contention that the district court misinterpreted section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), as prohibiting TPR if a parent has never had contact with

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the child. We do not interpret the district court’s order as construing the law in this way .
Instead, the district court properly noted that father had no contact with D.A.R. in its
analysis of whether the petition alleged facts that demonstrate that father is palpably unfit
to parent this child . Based on a plain reading of the statute, parental rights may be
terminated without that parent having contact with the child if there exist “specific
conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship . . . [that] are of a duration
or nature that renders the parent unable ” to care for the child for the foreseeable future.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (emphasis added). We see nothing in the district
court’s order that suggests otherwise.
In further support of their argument that the district court erred, appellants point to
father’s criminal history, arguing that this history shows a “propensity for anger” that
makes h im a palpably unfit parent. Though it may be true that this history could
demonstrate a “propensity for anger ,” to support a TPR, this history must be shown to be
“permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661 (quotation
omitted). Appellants’ TPR petition fails to connect father’s criminal history to the welfare
of D.A.R.
The petition also asserts that father’s “ frequent arrests will undoubtedly leave the
infant abandoned somewhere with some unknown adult for an extended period of time.”
Not only is this speculative, but “[i] ncarceration alone does not necessarily preclude a
person from acting in a parental role.” In re Welfare of Children of A.I., 779 N.W.2d 886,
892 (Minn. App. 2010) , review dismissed (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010). We agree that

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incarceration is not irrelevant, but the petition failed to connect speculations about future
incarceration to father’s inability to care for D.A.R.
Appellants next point to an alleged traumatic brain injury “due to a couple of heroin
or opioid overdoses which further limits [father’s] parenting capacity” as a basis to
establish a prima facie case for the petition. Developmental disabilities and mental illness,
alone, however, are insufficient to terminate parental rights; instead, courts must consider
a parent’s conduct to determine whether the parent’s condition permanently affects the
ability to parent. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661-62. Appellants’ petition fails to connect father’s
alleged traumatic brain injur y to an inability to parent in any substantive way , offering a
factually unsupported conclusion that the traumatic brain injury “limits his parenting
capacity.”
Similarly, appellants allege that father’s history of substance abuse makes him unfit
to parent this child. The petition, however, fails to establish any causal connection between
the history of substance abuse and father’s alleged inability to care for D.A.R. See id. at
663-64.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
appellants’ TPR petition for failure to state a prima facie case in support of terminating
father’s parental rights. We therefore affirm the district court.
Affirmed.