Terry Curtin, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1205

Terry Curtin, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

RS Eden,
Respondent.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-19-3889

Roderick Macpherson III, Mid-Minnesota Le gal Aid Minnesota Di sability Law Center,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Brian Hansen, Kevin M. Mosher, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Ir ons, LLP, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellants Terry Curtin and Rosana Pla za commenced a lawsuit against respondent
RS Eden, the owner of Reentry Metro, a halfway house. In the lawsuit, Curtin alleged that
she experienced discrimination at the halfway house because she is deaf. Although Curtin
and Plaza’s attorney serv ed the complaint, he did not file it with the district court by the
deadline set forth in Mi nnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 5. 04(a). As a result, the district
court dismissed the action. Curtin and Plaza filed a motion to vacate the dismissal. But
the district court denied the motion, determining that no reasonable excuse justified the late
filing and that the complaint did not establish a debatably meritorious claim. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining th at there was not a reasonable
excuse for the late filing, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Terry Curtin and Rosana Plaza are married. Both women are also deaf.
From May 9 through June 29, 2016, Curtin was a resident at Reentry Metro, a residential
halfway house owned and operated by respondent RS Eden. Specifically, Reentry Metro
houses women who are on probati on or supervised release for criminal offenses, and it is
a licensed adult community-based re sidential correctional facility. See Minn.
R. 2920.0100, subp. 2 (2019). Services pr ovided by Reentry Metro include a structured
living environment, alcohol and drug screening, case management, employment assistance,
and education groups and classes.

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According to Curtin, while she was a resident at Reentr y Metro, RS Eden did not
provide an American Sign Language (ASL) in terpreter to facilitate important
conversations, even wh en she requested one. Additionally , Curtin alleges that although
RS Eden provides residents with telephone s, it did not provide a video communication
system for her to communicate with Plaza and others. And although RS Eden eventually
permitted Curtin to use her cell phone to make video calls, Curtin contends that it imposed
more stringent rules and restri ctions on her ability to make calls than those in place for
residents with provided telephones. Curtin’s wife Plaza as serts that by failing to provide
Curtin with a video communication device, RS Eden harmed her as well.
Based on these actions, Curtin and Plaza commenced a lawsuit against RS Eden,
alleging that it violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 1 On February 5, 2018, the
summons and complaint was served on RS Eden. But Curtin and Plaza’s attorney did not
file the complaint with the district court at this time.
Over the next several months, the par ties discussed discovery deadlines and
schedules and began exchanging discovery. As part of this process, Curtin and Plaza’s
attorney drafted a discovery plan and sent it to opposing counsel. Included in that plan was
the deadline for filing the complaint with the district court: Febr uary 5, 2019—one year
after service of the summons and complaint. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a) (describing the
one-year deadline to file a lawsuit after service of the summons and complaint).

1 Curtin and Plaza also filed a similar lawsuit in federal court against the Sherburne County
Jail.

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But on February 14, 2019, Curtin and Plaza’s attorney realized that the deadline to
file the complaint in district court had passed. He had not filed the complaint. According
to counsel, he forgot to enter the filing de adline on his calendar, and his organization’s
scheduling system did not alert him of the d eadline. Counsel promp tly informed Curtin
and Plaza about his error, and the two authorized him to continue representing them. On
March 11, 2019, counsel filed the complaint with the district court. But because it was not
filed before the one-year deadline, the district court dismissed it.
Subsequently, Curtin and Plaza filed a motion to vacate the dismissal of their action
under rule 60.02 of the Minnes ota Rules of Civil Procedure. All parties agreed that the
delay in filing the complaint did not prejudice RS Eden. And they all agreed that Curtin,
Plaza, and their counsel acted diligently after receiving notice of the entry of a judgment.
The district court found that Curtin and Plaza did not know about the timeline for filing the
complaint. But the district court concluded that their attorney knew of the deadline and
did not have a reasonable excuse for failing to timely file the complaint. Further, the district
court determined that Curtin and Plaza did not have a debata bly meritorious claim. In
doing so, it agreed with RS Eden’s argumen t that a halfway house is not a public
accommodation and therefore is not subject to the Minnesota Human Rights Act. As a
result, the district court denied the motion to vacate the dismissal of the complaint. Curtin
and Plaza appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Curtin and Plaza challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to vacate. A
civil action commences when the summons is served on a defendant. Minn. R. Civ.

5
P. 3.01(a). And rule 5.04(a) of the Minneso ta Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
unless the parties stipulate otherwise, any action not filed with the court within one year of
commencing the lawsuit “is deemed dismissed with prejudice.”
When a district court dismisses a case ba sed on rule 5.04(a), a party may seek to
vacate that dismissal under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Gams v. Houghton,
884 N.W.2d 611, 617-18 (Minn. 2016). Pursuant to rule 60.02(a), the district court may
relieve a party from a final judgment for “mis take, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” Whether to grant relief under rule 60.02 is discretionary and “based on all the
surrounding facts of e ach specific case.” Id. at 620. Accordingly, we do not reverse a
district court’s decision under rule 60.02 absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
Before a district court can grant relie f under rule 60.02, the moving party must
satisfy four factors. Id. at 619. Those four factors “a re: (1) a debatably meritorious
claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for the movant’s failure or neglect to act; (3) the movant
acted with due diligence after le arning of the error or omi ssion; and (4) no substantial
prejudice will result to the other party if relief is granted.” Id. at 620 (quotations omitted).
The movant must establish all four factors to warrant relief. Cole v. Wutzke ,
884 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016).
Turning to this appeal, the district court found—and both parties agree—that Curtin
and Plaza satisfied the third and fourth factors. Accordingly, whether Curtin and Plaza are
entitled to relief hinges on the first two factors.
We begin with the second factor. Un der that factor, the moving party must
demonstrate “a reasonable excuse for the m ovant’s failure or neglect to act.” Gams,

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884 N.W.2d at 620 (quotation omitted). Mistakes of law or fact may provide a ground for
relief. Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638. And Minnesota ca selaw “generally reflects a strong
policy favoring the granting of relief when judg ment is entered through no fault of the
client.” Id. (quotation omitted). For instance, even in cases where a district court
determined that counsel’s neglect was inexcusable, “if such neglect has been purely that of
counsel, ordinarily courts are loath to punish the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect.”
Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn.1988).
But not all mistakes warrant relief. See Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638-39. For instance,
“mere carelessness or mistake alone is insufficient to prov ide grounds for Rule 60.02
relief.” Charson, 419 N.W.2d at 491. The district c ourt bears the responsibility of
determining “whether the excuse offered by th e movant is true and reasonable under the
circumstances.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 639. And such inquiry is “fact intensive.” Id.
Here, Curtin and Plaza’s atto rney did not file the comp laint within one year of
commencing the lawsuit. According to couns el, he forgot to enter the deadline on his
calendar, and his organization’s case-manag ement system did not remind him of the
deadline. The district court found that Curtin and Plaza “were not personally aware of the
rule [requiring filing within one year] or that their attorneys had not filed the [c]omplaint.”
As such, the district court ob served that the failure to timely file the complaint was
attributable to counsel, not Curtin and Plaza. 2 But the district court found that counsel

2 In a footnote, the district court noted that Curtin and Plaza’s lack of knowledge of the
filing deadline was “not entirely credible,” pointing to the parties’ written discovery plan.
We do not base our decision on this finding. Ou r review of the record reveals that it is
unclear whether Curtin and Plaza received the written discovery plan. Further, the record

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knew of the deadline. Further, the court determined that counsel was not actively pursuing
this case. Indeed, as the di strict court found, Curtin a nd Plaza’s counsel was pursuing
related litigation in federal c ourt, and he waited several m onths before making initial
disclosures in this case. And he requested several discovery extensions. Given counsel’s
knowledge of the deadline, the district court concluded that Curtin and Plaza did not have
a reasonable excuse for failing to timely file the summons and complaint.
Each of the district court’s factual findi ngs are supported by the record. Despite
Curtin and Plaza’s lack of knowledge of the f iling deadline, it is clear that their attorney
knew when the complaint needed to be filed. And his reason for missing the deadline is
also clear: he forgot to enter it in his cale ndar. Although Minnesota courts have a strong
policy of granting relief wh en a mistake is attributable to an attorney rather than a party,
“there are no per se rules of law” requiring a district court to grant relief on the basis of a
reasonable excuse. Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 639. Stated diffe rently, relief is not automatic.
Rather, the district court is tasked with conducting a “fact intensive” inquiry. Id. And here,
the district court did just that. Based on the facts in the record, the district court determined
that Curtin and Plaza did not have a reasona ble excuse for the untimely filing of the
complaint. Because the record supports the district court’s findings, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to vacate. See Cole, 884 N.W.2d
at 637 (stating that the movant must establish all four factors to warrant relief).3

contains a dispute over their level of comfort reading documents in English, given that both
women’s primary language is ASL.
3 Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
reasonable-excuse finding, we do not reach the question of the first factor: whether Curtin

8
In contesting the district court’s decisi on regarding reasonable excuse, Curtin and
Plaza focus their argument on the policy encouraging cour ts to forgiv e mistakes
attributable solely to counsel. Curtin and Plaza emphasize that the district court found that
they did not know about the filing deadline or their attorney’s failur e to timely file the
complaint. While we are symp athetic to this argument, we reiterate that caselaw is
clear: whether a party established a reasonable excuse is a “fact intensive” inquiry. Id. at
639. Although we believe this situation presents a close call, ultimately, the district court
is given broad discretion in this area. Even if we may have reached a different result, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by finding as it did.
Affirmed.

and Plaza have a debatably meritorious claim. We observe that whether a halfway house
is a public accommodation under the Minnesot a Human Rights Act appears to be an
unanswered question. On one hand, caselaw fro m this court suggests a test that indicates
a halfway house may not be a place of public accommodation. See Wayne v. Mastershield,
Inc., 597 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Minn. App. 1999) (identifying a two-factor test: “(1) the
selectiveness of the group in the admission of members; and (2) the existence of limits on
the size of the membership”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1999). On the other hand,
federal guidance on a similar provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act states that,
under federal law, halfway houses are public accommodations. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app.
C (2019) (“The category of social service center establishments would include not only the
types of establishments listed . . . but also establishments such as . . . halfway houses.”).