State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1207

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donn Richard Ganske,
Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-18-2789

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant, convicted of driving while impaired (DWI), challenges the denial of his
motion to suppress the results of a search of his vehicle, arguing that there was not a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial traffic stop, and
the results of his blood test, arguing that the search warrant for the test was not supported
by probable cause. Because there was no error in denying appellant’s motion to suppress
the results of the vehicle search or of the blood test, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2018, an officer saw appellant Donn Ganske stop his car in the middle of a
highway, activate his turn signal, drive straight ahead, stop again on the shoulder, and twice
exceed the speed limit. When the officer stopped appellant and approached his car, he saw
a green, leafy material he recognized as marijuana, a torch lighter, and a digital scale in
plain view. A subsequent search of the car revealed an open can of beer, a white powder
and small crystalline shards that field -tested positive for methamphetamine, a small rock
that field-tested positive for cocaine, several hundred dollars, and shotgun ammunition.
The officer and appellant recognized each other from a previous stop of appellant,
and appellant asked the officer if he seemed “impaired like last time?” The officer applied
for a search warrant, received one, and took appellant to a hospital, where a blood test
revealed amphetamine and methamphetamine.

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Appellant was charged with: (1) DWI —under the influence of c ontrolled
substances, (2) DWI—body contains any amount of a controlled substance, (3) possession
of ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, and (4) driving after
cancellation—inimical to public safety. He was also charged with two counts of fifth -
degree possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the evidence resulting
from the search of his car and his blood test. Following a contested omnibus hearing at
which the arresting officer testified, the district court concluded that the officer had (1) a
particularized and objective basis to believe that appellant was engaged in criminal activity
when he stopped appellant and (2) probable cause to support a warrant to test a ppellant’s
blood. The district court denied the motion to suppress the evidence of the blood test. 1
Appellant stipulated to the state’s case to preserve the pretrial issue for appeal.
The district court found appellant g uilty of DWI—body contains cont rolled
substances, and dismissed the other counts. Appellant was sentenced to 42 months in
prison. The execution of the sentence was stayed, and appellant was placed on probation
for seven years. On appeal, he c hallenges the denial of the motion to suppress evidence
from the search of his vehicle on the ground that the officer lacked both a particular and
objective basis to believe appellant was engaged in criminal activity when he stopped

1 The district court also concluded that the officer had probable cause to search appellant’s
vehicle, that appellant’s challenge to the preliminary breath test (PBT) was moot because
he did not submit to a PBT, that there was probable cause for proceeding to trial, that the
officer’s statements should not be suppressed, and that appellant’s argument that nine
minutes between the prosecutor’s signing of the complaint and the officer’s signing of it
had no merit, but these conclusions are not challenged on appeal.

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appellant and probable cause to support the application for a search warrant to test
appellant’s blood.
D E C I S I O N
1. Traffic Stop
When reviewing a district court’s suppression order, this court independently
reviews the facts and the law to determine whether the dist rict court erred by suppressing
or refusing to suppress the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). A
district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378,
383 (Minn. 1998). The legal question of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. State
v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000) . “[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not
high.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). An
officer who “observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, . . . has an
objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn.
1997).
The officer testified that: (1) as he was waiting to turn south on to a highway, he
saw a car going south activate its turn signal as if the driver planned to turn on to the road
on which the officer was waiting; (2) the car came to a stop in the middle of the highway,
but did not turn; (3) the officer thought his squad car might be blocking the driver’s turn,
so he turned on to the highway and began driving south; (4) the car followed him south on
the highway, but then pulled halfway on to the shoulder and stopped ; (5) the officer,
concerned about signs of driver impairment, pulled off the highway to see what was going
on; (6) the car drove back on to the highway and passed the officer; (7) the officer lost

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visual contact with the car, but later, when going south on a county road, recognized the
car going north on that road by its license plate; (8) he turned around, followed the car, and
discovered it was going four miles per hour over the speed limit ; and (9) he activated his
lights and stopped the car.
The district court found:
[The officer] was justified in stopping the vehicle in this case
based on the observed driving conduct and the vehicle’s speed.
[He] testified that he observed the vehicle cross the lines on the
roadway during the initial encounter with the vehicle. Later,
after confirming it was the same vehicle based o n the license
plate number, he registered the vehicle driving 49 miles per
hour in a 45 mile per hour zone.

Appellant argues that the stop was unconstitutional because “ [t]he nature of the
driving violation during the initial encounter was brief, and minimal,” and the violation
might have resulted from the squad car blocking the road; the second violation was also
“minimal” and might have resulted from appellant’s being confused by the squad car;2 and
the speeding was “minor.” But any observed violatio n of a traffic law, “however
insignificant,” justifies a stop of the vehicle. Id. There is no support for the view that this
does not apply to minimal or minor violations.
Appellant goes on to argue that, because George includes the word “ordinarily”
before its assertion that any violation, however insignificant, can justify a stop, see id., “the
totality of the circumstances must be examined ,” and here, “[u]nder the totality of the

2 In light of the contraband in plain view in appellant’s car, appellant very possibly was
unnerved by the presence of a squad car, but this would not have prevented the officer in
the squad car from having a reasonable suspicion on which to base a stop of appellant.

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circumstances, there was no reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. ” But appellant does
not show any reason why this was not an ordinary situation in which the rule would apply,
particularly in view of the Timberlake holding that “t he reasonable suspicion standard is
not high.” 744 N.W.2d at 393 (quotations omitted).
Therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant’s vehicle.
2. Blood Test
An appellate court affords great deference to the issuing judge’s determination of
whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause. State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1,
11 (Minn. 2004). On appeal, this court’s task is to ensure that the issuing judge had a
“substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Rochefort , 631
N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001) . S ignificant deference is afforded to the decision of the
issuing judge, whose task is “ to make a practical, common -sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , including the veracity and basis of
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place .” State v. Jenkins ,
782 N.W.2d 211, 223 (Minn. 2010) (quotations omitted).
The application for the search warrant recounted the circumstances leading to the
stop, then stated that: (1) when the officer approached the stopped vehicle, he immediately
saw a scale with marijuana and methamphetamine residue in plain view, as well as a torch
lighter; (2) the officer recognized the driver as appellant from a previous arrest in which
the officer had located a methamphetamine pipe and one -half pound of marijuana in
appellant’s car; (3) the previous arrest resulted in a draw of appellant’s blood that tested

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positive for methamphetamine; (4) the search of appellant’s car revealed a small amount
of marijuana, a marijuana pipe, a snort straw and a scale that tested positive for
methamphetamine, small shards of a crystalline substa nce that field -tested positive for
methamphetamine, a white rock that crumbled and field-tested positive for crack cocaine,
and $1,800 in cash; and (5) appellant refused to perform any field sobriety tests. Based on
this information, the district court found probable cause to issue a search warrant for a
blood or urine sample from appellant.
Appellant argues that there was no probable cause because the totality of
circumstances must be considered and one circumstance was that the application said
nothing about appellant’s appearance or demeanor. But appearance and demeanor are not
essential to a finding of probable cause, and a substantial basis for the finding of probable
cause here was provided by four circumstances: (1) appellant’s driving prior to the stop;
(2) the scale with marijuana and methamphetamine residue in plain view at the time of the
stop; (3) the officer’s recognition of appellant from a prior arrest that had resulted in a
showing of methamphetamine in his system; and (4) the marijuana, pipe, snort straw,
crystalline substance, and white rock found in appellant’s car. 3
The issuing judge had a substantial basis to find probable cause for the warrant.
Affirmed.

3 Also, appellant’s recognition of the officer from a previous arrest and his reference to
“last time” could arguably be considered a circumstance that supports a finding of probable
cause for a warrant to search his blood or urine.