Town of West Lakeland, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1211

Town of West Lakeland,
Respondent,

vs.

Karl E. Auleciems,
Appellant,

Susanne M. Auleciems,
Appellant,

Ethan Auleciems, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed March 9, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-18-2962

Viet-Hanh Winchell, Galowitz  Olson PLLC, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Karl E. Auleciems, Susanne Auleciems, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (pro se appellants)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of declaratory judgment, permanent
injunctive relief, and attorney fees for respondent . They also argue that the district court
erred by not dismissing them from the case, not ruling on their motion for summary
judgment, and not awarding them damages for being wrongfull y enjoined. Because the
district court did not err, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Karl and Susanne Auleciems own property on which they reside in West
Lakeland Township, Minnesota. They have rented out their property for weddings and
other uses and have used it to store a skid steer loader for their sons’ landscaping business.
In June 2018, respondent Town of West Lakeland sued appellants, as well as KEASons
Enterprises, LLC (KEASons) and Ethan Auleciems, for violating respondent’s zoning code
(the code). See West Lakeland, Minn., Town Code §§ 1.1-1.5.2, 2.1-2.10.3, 4.1-4.7.2.3,
10.1-10.6 (2017). 1 Respondent sought injunctive relief, an order to compel complianc e,
and a declaratory judgment.
In July 2018, the district court granted respo ndent’s motion for an ex parte
temporary restraining order restricting appellants from renting, leasing, or advertising their
property for rent . The next month, the district court granted a temporary injunction
prohibiting the same activities. Despite these orders, app ellants continued to list their

1 KEASons is a registered limited liability company ; i ts regis tered agent is Ethan
Auleciems. Neither Ethan Auleciems nor KEASons is a party to this appeal.

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property for rent online. Respondent then moved for a finding of contempt and sanctions
against appellants.
The district court held a two -day bench trial on both respondent’s original claims
and its contempt motion. After receiving testimony and exhibits, the district court issued
a detailed and well-written 49-page order. The district court , after finding that appellants
had violated both the code and the court’s orders, issued an order permanently enjoining
appellants from renting their property or advertising it for rent. The order also granted
respondent’s contempt motion and awarded attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 588.11
(2018). In a supplemental order, the district court awarded respondent all requested
attorney fees. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
To begin, we observe that appellants have not provided this court with a transcript,
which limits our review. Brown v. First Growth, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. App.
1986). It is the appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record. Noltimier v. Noltimier,
157 N.W.2d 530, 531 ( Minn. 1968). Without a transcript, we review whether the district
court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Duluth Herald & News Tribune v.
Plymouth Optical Co. , 17 6 N.W.2d 552, 555 ( Minn. 1970). And our review requires
deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765
N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009).
I. Interpretation of the code
Appellants raise two arguments about the district court’s interpretation of the code.
They argue first that the district court erred in finding that appellants engaged in

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commercial activity under the code. Second, they argue that the district court erred in not
applying an exemption in the code.
To resolve appellants’ arguments, we must interpret the code. We do so de novo,
Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis , 667 N.W.2d 117, 122 ( Minn.
2003), while applying statutory interpretation principles, Chanhassen Estates Residents
Ass’n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 n.3 (Minn. 1984).
State statutes allow townships to establish zoning ordinances and other controls.
Minn. Stat. §§ 462.351-.365 (2018). The district court’s order cites testimony and exhibits
establishing that respondent enacted the code under this statutory authority and that its
purpose is “to preserve and protect the rural character, natural landscape, and natural a nd
scenic beauty of the township and to provide for the compatibility of different land uses
and the most appropriate use of land.” WLTC §§ 1.3.1, 1.3.3.
The code also contains various zoning ordinances. Id., §§ 4.1-4.7.2.3. These zoning
ordinances create several zoning district s and specify each district’s primary uses, uses
allowed with a certificate of compliance, and uses allowed with a conditional use permit.
Id., § 4.2. Appellants’ property is in the single family estate (SFE) district, which has two
primary uses: agriculture and single family residential. Id., § 4.3.1. Appellants do not use
their property for agricultural purposes.
The code also allows limited business activities, called home occupations, in the
SFE district. Id., §§ 10.1-10.6. A “home occupation” is defined as “a business or
commercial use of a residential property where the residential use is the primary use.” Id.,
§ 10.1.2. The code then categorizes businesses into four types and provides that a

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homeowner may seek a home-occupation certificate of compliance or a home-occupation
permit from respondent’s town board. Id., §§ 10.2-10.6. The business type dictates which
approval a homeowner must seek. Id., § 10.6.
With that framework in mind, we examine appellants’ conduct here. Appellants
never obtained a permit or a certificate. On appeal, they do not challenge the district court’s
findings that they rented their property 18 times in 2 018, whic h included six wedding
rentals, and that they stored on their property a skid steer loader that their sons u se for a
landscaping business.
Based on these findings, the district court held that appellants violated the code ,
which explicitly prohibits home operation of a “bed and breakfast” or “wedding venue.”
Id., § 10.1.5. And a homeowner who operates a business without ob taining a permit or
certificate may not store business equipment on their property. Id., § 10.2.1.3. The district
court correctly applied the code to the testimony and exhibits cited in its order.
The order cites testimony both from appellants’ neighbors about the frequency of
the rentals and from several persons who rented appellants’ property for weddings. It also
cites exhibits from online rental sites showing that appellants advertise their property
online for weddings. Finally, the district court’s order reflects that appellants admitted to
owning the skid steer loader stored on their property.
In support of reversal, appellants contend that their actions meet the code’s
“occasional business activity” exemption. Under the code, certain business activities
conducted for less than 15 days in one year do not require town board approv al. Id.,
§ 10.1.4.2. For example, the code lists “garage or yard sales; craft sales; sale of individual

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vehicles or equipment; dinners; or pot -luck meals” as occasional business activities. Id.
Appellants’ actions do not match any of these uses. In an y event, appellants have
conducted their actions for more than 15 days, as they authorized 18 total rentals that each
included a minimum two-night stay.
Finally, appellants cite foreign authorities for the proposition that renting one’s
home does not equa l commercial activity under the code , but all of these cases interpret
home rental in the context of restrictive covenants, different from the code provisions here.
See Forshee v. Neuschwander , 914 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. 2018) ; Tarr v. Timberwood Park
Owners Ass’n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. 2018); Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys, Ass’n, 327
P.3d 614 (Wash. 2014) ; Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks , 70 P.3d 664 (Idaho 2003) ;
Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 360 P.3d 255 (Colo. App. 2015).
And these foreign decisions are not binding on a Minnesota court. See Mahowald v. Minn.
Gas Co. , 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984) (recognizing that foreign cases are not
binding authority but may retain persuasive value).
II. Alleged Fourth Amendment violation
Appellants next argue that the district court’s order violates the Fourth Amendment
by giving law enforcement unlimited access to their property. Respondent counters that
this issue is not ripe for review.
The federal and state constitutions protect in dividuals from unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
Appellants ask us to vacate this part of the district court’s order:

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Local law enforcement, including, but not limited to the
Washington Co unty Sheriff’s Office, [is] empowered to
enforce the Orders of this Court. Local Law Enforcement is
also empowered to gain access to the property in order to
properly investigate matters related to this Court ’s Order, i.e.
should there be suspicion of vio lations of this Court’s order,
law enforcement may inquire of the people in or on [appellants’
property] for information to include, but not limited to their
respective identities, their pu rpose for being on [appellants’
property], how they came to be on [ appellants’ property], and
the duration of their stay on [appellants’ property].

A justiciable controversy must exist before an appellate court will exercise its
jurisdiction. Bicking v. City of Minneapolis , 891 N.W.2d 304, 308 ( Minn. 2017). We
review justiciability issues de novo. McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing , 808 N.W.2d 331,
341 ( Minn. 2011). Issues involving only hypothetical possibilities are not justiciable
because “[n]either the ripe nor the ripening seeds of a controversy are present.” Lee v.
Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Minn. 1949).
When an individual has to submit to warrantless searches, but law enforcement has
made no searches, whether the requirement is unconstitutional lacks ripeness. See State v.
Colsch, 284 N.W.2d 839 , 842 (Minn. 1979). Accordingly, nothing in the record here
suggests that police have used the district court’s order to violate appellants’ Fourth
Amendment rights. A police report dated after the district court’s final order reveals that
one law enforcement investigation on appellants’ property occurred when appellants were
not home . But appellants do not suggest that this investigation violated the Fourth
Amendment. To accept appellants’ argument requires this court to speculate. We conclude
that this issue is not ripe for review.

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III. Temporary and permanent injunctions
Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of a temporary and permanent
injunction against them. “An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . from an
order which grants, refuses, dissolves, or refuses to dissolve an injunction.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.03(b). As to the temporary injunction order from August 2018, appellants
argue that respondent did not properly serve them and failed to submit the required security.
But this appeal is from the district court’s order and entry of judgment on June 24, 2019.
Appellants never appealed the temporary injunction order. Thus, we decline to consider
their arguments about the temporary injunction.
On the permanent injunction, appellants challenge the provision preventing them
from advertising or leasing property, arg uing that it violates their free speech rights and
their right to equal protection. For two reasons, we decline to address these arguments.
First, an appellate court normally considers only those issues presented to the district court.
Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 ( Minn. 1988). Here, appellants never made these
constitutional arguments below.
Second, these arguments lack citations to legal or factual support. “Summary
arguments made without citation to legal support are waived.” Fannie Mae v . Heather
Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2 (Minn. 2012); see also Ganguli v. Univ.
of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (noting that this court declines to
address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation). As a result, we do not reach
appellants’ constitutional challenges.

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IV. Failure to rule on appellants’ summary judgment motion
Appellants fault the district court for not ruling on their summary judgment motion,
but they do not argue this issue in the ir brief. Issues not argued in a brief are deemed
forfeited. Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982); see McKenzie v. State, 583
N.W.2d 744, 746 n.1 (Minn. 1998) (declining to consider issues raised in a brief when the
appellant alluded to them but failed to “address them in the argument portion of his brief”).
And even if we did reach this argument, the record shows that the district court orally
denied appellants’ motion at a February 9, 2019 hearing.
V. Failure to dismiss appellants from the case
Appellants argue that the district court erred by not dismissing them from this case
because they are not personally liable: they lease the property from KEASons and
respondent never alleged that KEASons represented appellants’ “alter ego.” We decline
to consider the issue because appellants cite no supporting legal authority. See Fannie
Mae, 811 N.W.2d at 600 n.2.2
VI. Attorney fees
Appellants next argue that “[t]here is no contract or law that entitles either the
appellant[s] or the responde nt [to] attorney’s fees in this action.” But this argument
overlooks the district court’s reliance on Minn. Stat. § 588.11 to award attorney fees.
Section 588.11 allows a court to order a person found guilty of contempt to pay the
opposing party’s attorney fees if three factors exist. Hanson v. Thom , 636 N.W.2d 591,

2 We note that appellants still own the property individually. They lease it to KEASons,
which sublets it back to them.

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593 (Minn. App. 2001). “First, the fees must be based on proof of actual damages. Second,
the award must not penalize the contemnor. Finally, the party receiving the fees must
actually incur the fees.” Id. (citations omitted). The district court analyzed these factors
in its order. We see no error in the court’s analysis.
VII. Wrongfully enjoined and award of damages
Lastly, appellants contend that the district court erred in not findin g that they were
wrongfully enjoined and in not awarding them damages. Again, we conclude that
appellants have forfeited this issue by not arguing it in their brief. See Melina, 327 N.W.2d
at 20.
Affirmed.