State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1217

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kristoffer Marshall Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-18-2932

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney ,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica M. Surges, Laura
Heinrich, Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of the appellant Kristoffer Marshall Anderson’s
motion to suppress evidence because the record supports the district court’s conclusion that
the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize the appellant.
FACTS
Anderson moved to suppress any evidence flowing from the se arch following his
seizure and arrest, including a loaded firearm found in his pocket. At the December 2018
motion hearing, Anderson argued that the moment Officer Baumeister asked Anderson for
his name, Anderson was not free to leave. Anderson also argued that at that moment,
Officer Baumeister did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime was being
committed. Officer Baumeister tes tified that on November 9, 2018, at about 10:25 p.m. ,
he received a call from an employee at Discount Tire on Robert Street in West St. Paul .
Officer Baumeister was unable to provide any additional information about the caller. The
caller told Officer Baumeister there was an unknown individual , who appeared to be
wearing camouflage clothing, walking around the building after business hours. The
person was looking into vehicles, including a vehicle belonging to a Discount Tire
employee. The caller also stated that an employee approached the person in the parking
lot, and the person turned and walked toward the woods, located east of the business . The
employee lost sight of the person.
Officer Baumeister testified that based on his experience working the night shift on
Robert Street, there were only a few businesses open after 10:00 p.m. in that area, and

3
Discount Tire was not one of them. Officer Baumeister testified that “it is a tire business,
so sometimes customers drop off their cars, and that they’re there waiting to be serviced.”
When Officer Baumeister arrived at the scene, Anderson was the only person near Discount
Tire. Anderson was straddling a bicycle that had a sled attached to it , approximately 30
yards (or about 100 feet) from Discount Tire. Anderson was heading northeast. It was
dark, so Officer Baumeister put on his spotlight to illuminate the area. Officer Baumeister
stopped his car, and approached Anderson.
Officer Baumeister testified that Anders on’s behavior was suspicious. Officer
Baumeister testified Anderson was “turning and looking at [Officer Baumeister] rapidly,
moving his hands throughout his body.” This gave Officer Baumeister the impression that
Anderson was trying to conceal something . Anderson seemed calm when Officer
Baumeister approached him. Officer Baumeister told Anderson that he was making contact
with him because the Discount Tire staff had reported that there was an individual looking
in the vehicles at their business. Ande rson responded with a “rant” about how there were
“other kids” or individuals “up in the parking lot who were acting suspicious. ” Anderson
was talking rapidly, and it was difficult for Officer Baumeister to understand him.
Anderson admitted to Officer Baumeister that he had been in the Discount Tire parking lot.
Officer Baumeister asked Anderson if he had any form of identification on him and
Anderson said no. Then Officer Baumeister asked Anderson for his name and birthdate.
Anderson provided Officer Baumeister with a birthdate and a name other than his own .
Officer Baumeister testified that he did not believe that Anderson was free to leave once
he asked Anderson for his name. When the assisting officer, Officer Forester , arrived

4
Officer Baumeister asked him to stay with Anderson while he went back to his squad car
to check the name Anderson gave him in the state identification database. Officer Forester
testified that Anderson appeared to be homeless. Officer Forester stated that their
conversation was casual, though Anderson seemed uncomfortable talking with police
officers.
Officer Baumeister checked the spelling of the name Ander son gave him and ran
several variations of the name in the state identification database, but he could not find any
person with the name Anderson provided. Officer Baumeister then concluded that
Anderson had given him a false name. Officer Baumeister exi ted his squad car and told
Anderson to get off his bicycle because he was being detained. The district court found
that the officers had probable cause to arrest Anderson once they determined that he had
given them a false name. Anderson was searched incident to his arrest after arriving at the
jail. Anderson had a black .38 caliber revolver in his left breast pocket. The serial number
confirmed that it had been stolen from St. Louis County, Minnesota. Anderson’s backpack
contained a number of tools in cluding bolt cutters, heavy -duty scissors, wire cutters,
screwdrivers, and a crow bar. Anderson’s criminal history includes multiple convictio ns
for crimes of violence. Anderson was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm
or ammunition by an ineligible person pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 624.713.1(2)
(2018).
At the December 2018 motion hearing Officer Baumeister testified that Anderson
appeared to be wearing a camouflage hunting jacket. Officer Forester testified that
Anderson was wearing camouflage pants, but he could not recall the jacket Anderson was

5
wearing. After being shown a picture, Officer Forester testified that he recalled that
Anderson was wearing a black jacket and several layers of clothing. Officer Forester stated
that Anderson zipped up one of his layers of clothing while he was talking to him. Officer
Forester testified that there were no camouflage pants in the pictures he was shown in court,
but he could not say whether or not a picture of the camouflage pants e xisted, because he
was not the person who took the inventory of the defendant’s clothes. Officer Forester
testified that he believed that Anderson’s pants were similar to some hunting cover -all
pants that he himself owns, which have a kind of camouflage p attern.
The district court found that Anderson was not free to leave while he was being
questioned by Officer Baumeister. However, the district court found that the seizure was
reasonable based on what Officer Baumeister knew at the time : (1) that the police officer
arrived at the scene shortly after receiving a call; (2) that the caller stated that the person
they saw was wearing camouflage; (3) that the police officers arrived at the scene
approximately 30 yards from Discount Tire; and (4) that it was af ter business hours. The
district court stated, “I don’t think it’s critical that somebody has a black coat, green coat
or otherwise,” because eye -witness information is often inaccurate. The district court
stated that, for example, officers may hear that a person is six feet tall or five feet tall, and
they still have to determine what the person is doing there and what is happening. Based
on these facts, the district court concluded that the police had the right to investigate who
Anderson was, and what he was doing approximately 30 yards from Discount Tire after
hours.

6
In April 2019, Anderson agreed to a stipulated-facts trial under Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, rule 2 6.01, subdivision 3. The district court concluded that Anderson
was guilty of possession of both the firearm and ammunition. On appeal, Anderson argues
that Officer Baumeister’s seizure of him was not supported by reasonable, articulab le
suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur, or that Anderson was the person
described in the 911 call. Therefore, it is Anderson’s position that the court erred by
denying his suppression motion, because the firearm and ammunition discovered on his
person were uncovered as the result of an illegal seizure.
D E C I S I O N
Officer Baumeister had reasonable suspicion to seize Anderson.

Anderson argues that Officer Baumeister had no reasonable, articulable suspicio n
that a crime occurred or was about to occur. Anderson argues that when Officer Baumeister
seized him, he only knew five things: “an employee said a person was looking in a car,
Anderson was leaving the area on a bike, his eyes were wide, he was moving his hands,
and he was speaking rapidly.”
A seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98
(Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). Both the United States and Minnesota constitutio ns
protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. am end IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. “To lawfully seize a person temporarily to investigate a crime, a police officer
must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person was or will be engaged in
criminal activity.” State v. Wiggins, 788 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing Terry

7
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)) (additional citation omitted). “We
evaluate whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained
police officer, who may make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person.’” State v. Lemert , 843 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)). In reviewing whether a
warrantless seizure is justified, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Stavish , 868 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Minn. 2015).
A. The 911 call

Anderson argues that the information provided in the 911 call does not support
Officer Baumeister’s decision to conduct an investigative stop. He also argues that even if
it did, there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion that Anderson was the person
described in the 911 call. “The information necessary to support an investigative stop need
not be based on the officer ’s personal observations, rather, the police can base an
investigative stop on an informant ’s tip if it has sufficient indicia of reliability.” In re
Welfare of G.M ., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). To determin e an informant’s
reliability, “we look both at the informant and the informant ’s source of the informatio n
and judge them against all of the circumstances.” Id. (quotation omitted). An informant
who appears to be a private citizen is presumed to be relia ble. Marben v. State , Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980).
The employee that called from Discount Tire was apparently a private citizen, and
therefore presumed reliable. The caller told Officer Baumeister there was an unknown
individual wearing camouflage , walking around the building after hours and looking into

8
one of the employee’s vehicles. The caller stated that an employee approached the person
in the parking lot, and the person then turned and walked toward the wood s, located east
of the business. It was about 10:25 p.m. and Discount Tire, as well as most of the other
businesses in the vicinity, were closed. There were often multiple cars parked at Discount
Tire after business hours because customers drop off their cars to be serviced. The vehicle
that the unknown person was looking into at 10:25 p.m. did not belong to a customer, it
belonged to one of the employees. It was reasonable for officers to suspect that a car theft
may be underway based on a call from a business reporting that a stranger was looking into
an employee’s vehicle, in the business’s parking lot that was regularly full of unattended
vehicles, after normal business hours, at 10:25 p.m. at night.
When Officer Baumeister arrived on the scene , Anderson was approximately 30
yards from Discount Tire, headed northeast. Anderson admitted that he was in the
Discount Tire parking lot. It was dark. Officer Baumeister put on his spotlight to
illuminate the area and did not see anyone other than Anderson. Anderson p resented no
testimony or evidence that there was anyone else in the area, apart from his own statements
to Officer Baumeister that there were other people in the parking lot acting suspicious.
The only issue of fact Anderson disputes is th e color of his clothing, however the
district court chose not to make a finding of fact on this issue. Anderson argues that he did
not match the description provided by the 911 caller. Anderson points out that the 911
caller did not mention that Anderson had a bicycle or a sled, and the officers contradicted
each other when they described his clothing. A number of factors can affect the accuracy
of an eyewitness’s description of a suspect. See State v. Ferguson , 804 N.W.2d 586, 606

9
(Minn. 2011) (acknowledging that stu dies indicate certain factors affect the reliability of
eyewitness identifications). Both Officer Baumeister and Officer Forester testified that
Anderson was wearing some sort of hunting attire, however their accounts differ on the
exact color of his clothes. The district court reasoned that the exact color of the coat was
irrelevant because eye -witness testimony is often inaccurate . The court stated that , for
example, officers may hear a person is six feet tall or five feet tall, nonetheless they still
have to put together what the person is doing there and what is happening.
Officer Forester testified hunting attire often features camouflage. It is reasonable
that someone looking at a person wea ring hunting attire in the dark would assume that the
color of their clothes was some sort of camouflage. Furthermore, there is no reason to
assume that the presence of the bicycle and sled meant Anderson did not fit the descriptio n
just because the caller did not see, or perhaps just did not mention them. Anderson could
have returned to his bicycle and sled after looking into the window of the employee’s car.
Based on these circumstances , it was reasonable for Officer Baumeister to suspect that
Anderson was the person described in the call because he was the only person at the scene,
and he was heading in the general direction reported by the caller. Therefore the district
court’s ruling was not based on clear error due to inconsistent reports of the color of
Anderson’s clothes. Furthermore, in this case it was appropriate for the district court to
make its legal conclusions without regard to the color of Anderson’s clothes .

10
B. Officer Baumeister’s observations of Anderson
Even if we were to conclude that Anderson did not fit the description in the 911 call,
Anderson’s circumstances would merit a temporary seizure of his person to run his name
in the state database. On a motion to suppress , the district court must find that “under all
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that because of the conduct of
the police he was not free to leave, then there was a ‘seizure,’ and the police must be able
to articulate reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure, or else any evidence that is the fruit
of the seizure is suppressible.” In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993).
The precise meaning of “reasonable suspicion” cannot be reduced to a neat set of legal
rules. Ornelas v. Unite d States , 517 U.S. 690, 695 -96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996).
However, the police officer should be able to articulate that the nature, quality, repetitio n,
or pattern of the circumstances leading up to the stop beco me “so unusual and suspicio us
that they support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity.” State v.
Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d 844, 847 -48 (Minn. App. 2001) , review denied (Minn. July 24,
2001).
The district court found that Anderson was not free to leave while being qu estioned
by Officer Baumeister, however, the district court concluded that the surround ing
circumstances justified the seizure. Being in a parking lot late at night, after most
businesses in the area are closed , and for no apparent reason , could be consid ered
suspicious. See Thomeczek v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety , 364 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. App.
1985) (concluding that because Thomeczek was parked near an empty lot late in the
evening, in an area undergoing construction, there was a basis for suspicion); see also State

11
v. Lee, 225 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn. 1975) (reasoning the time (4:15 a.m.) was a relevant
factor because police know that tires are more commonly stolen from automobiles at night).
It is not necessary that the police must possess articulable suspicion before they approach
a person in public, unless that person is not free to leave. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783. It
was reasonable for Officer Baumeister to approach Anderson outside Discount Tire, when
Anderson was there after hours and for no apparent reason.
Once Officer Baumeister approached Anderson, Anderson’s behavior immediately
became increasingly suspicious. Furtive gestures and strange, evasive movements in the
presence of police can be considered factors raising justifiable suspicion. Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311 (1984); State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840
(Minn. 1992) , aff’d by Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S . 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
Officer Baumeister testified that Anderson’s behavior was suspicious. Anderson’s actions
gave Officer Baumeister the impression that Anderson was trying to conceal something.
Anderson moved away from Officer Baumeister as the officer approached him, and
Anderson was rapidly turning to look at Officer Baumeister while moving his hands
throughout his body. After Officer Baumeister told Anderson that he was making contact
because of a report that someone was looking in the vehicles at Discount Tire, Anderson
responded with a “rant” about how there were “other kids” or individuals in the parking lot
who were “acting suspicious.” Anderson was talking rapidly, and it was difficult for
Officer Baumeister to understand him. At this point it was appropriate for Officer
Baumeister to command Anderson to wait with Officer Forester while Officer Baumeister

12
ran a search of the name Anderson had given him. By this time , Officer Baumeister had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a temporary seizure.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Anderson’s motion to suppress
based on an allegedly illegal seizure. Based on our de novo review of the application of
the law regarding warrantless seizures, we conclude the district court properly dete rmined
that Officer Baumeister had reasonable, articulable suspicion to temporarily detain
Anderson while checking the name Anderson gave him in the state identification database.
Affirmed.