State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1218

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jared Otha Washington,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-18-2636

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney , Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Co chran, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment, appellant argues that his guilty pleas to
three counts of first-degree aggravated robbery are invalid because they were inaccurate.
We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Jared Otha Wa shington with four counts of first-degree
aggravated robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (201 8), four counts of
second-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018), one count of
first-degree burglary under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b) (2018), one count of theft of
a motor vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(17) (2018), and one count of fleeing
a peace officer in a motor vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2018). The state
later amended one count of first-degree aggr avated robbery to attempted first-degree
aggravated robbery. The complaint alleged that on October 10, 2018, Washington and his
two cousins drove around the Twin Cities, robb ed three victims at gunpoint, attempted to
rob a fourth victim, and fled from police.
Washington agreed to plead guilty to three counts of first-degree aggravated robbery
(counts one, three, and eight), one count of fleeing a peace officer (count eleven), and one
count of attempted first-degree aggravated ro bbery (count five) in exchange for the state
dismissing the remaining charges. Before pleading guilty, Washington signed a plea
petition in which he acknowled ged, among other things, that he understood the charges
against him. Washington also signed a Norgaard addendum to the plea petition. In the

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addendum, he acknowledged that he did not r ecall the circumstances of the offenses, but
reviewed the evidence the state would offer against him at trial and believed there was a
substantial likelihood that he would be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Washington also confirmed that he was making no claim that he was innocent.
At the plea hearing, Washington pleaded guilty to the five offenses. Washington
explained that he signed the Norgaard addendum because he di d not have a complete
memory of the offenses. According to Washington, his memory was impaired because he
had taken a number of narcotics. Washingt on acknowledged that he had reviewed the
police reports related to his case and agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that he
would be found guilty of the o ffenses if evidence consistent with the police reports was
introduced at trial.
Washington’s attorney questioned hi m about the incidents. Washington
remembered the circumstances relating to the first count of first-degree aggravated
robbery. He recalled driving himself and his two cousins to Apple Valley to find a specific
person, whom the three believe d had cheated them during a recent drug sale. According
to Washington, when they found that person, Washington’s cousins got out of the vehicle,
pointed guns at the victim, and took his belong ings. Washington took the victim’s debit
card.
Washington stated that after the first robbery, he took more narcotics and, as a result,
his memory of the events involving the other victims was “hazy.” However, Washington
agreed that the police reports indicated: th at he drove the group to the robbery and
attempted robbery locations, that he obtained property from the robbery victims, that the

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victims were robbed at gunpoint, and that the police found multiple guns in the car he was
driving. Washington also remembered some of the events relating to the last robbery and
remembered attempting to flee from police to avoid being arrested.
After Washington was questioned by hi s attorney, the pr osecutor questioned
Washington about the state’s evidence. Washington agreed that he did not have any reason
to doubt the accuracy of the evidence. He also agreed that if he went to trial, the state
intended to present evidence showing that he was involved in each of the offenses as the
driver of the group, that he knew that his cousins were planning on robbing each of the
victims, and that police found multiple loaded guns in the vehicle. Washington agreed that
the evidence that the state would likely offer against him was sufficient for a jury to find
him guilty of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty.
The district court found a sufficient factua l basis for Washington’s guilty pleas to
count one (first-degree aggravated robbery) a nd count eleven (fleeing a peace officer)
based on Washington’s own memory and desc ription of the events involved in those
counts. The court then addressed count three (first-degree a ggravated robbery),
count five (attempted first-degree aggravat ed robbery), and count eight (first-degree
aggravated robbery) as Norgaard pleas. The district court found that there was sufficient
evidence to support a guilty ve rdict on all three counts and that Washington’s three
Norgaard pleas were “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered.” The district court
accepted all five guilty pleas and adjudicated Wa shington guilty of each of the offenses.
The district court then sentenced Washington on all five counts.
Washington appeals.

5
D E C I S I O N
Washington seeks to invalidat e his guilty pleas to the thre e counts of first-degree
aggravated robbery (counts one, three, and eight).1 We are not persuaded.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accura te, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). If a gu ilty plea fails to
meet any of these three requirements, the plea is invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643,
650 (Minn. 2007). Whether a guilty plea is valid is a question of law that we review
de novo. State v. Johnson , 867 N.W.2d 210, 214-15 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
Washington challenges only the accuracy of his pleas. The accuracy requirement
protects a defendant from “plead ing guilty to a more serious offense than he could be
convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 215 (quoting
State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (M inn. 1983)). A plea is accurate “if the record
contains a showing that there is credible evid ence available” that demonstrates that the
defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he is pleading guilty. Lussier v. State,
821 N.W.2d 581, 588-89 (Minn. 2012). The factual basis for the plea must establish all of
the elements of the offense to whic h the defendant is pleading guilty. State v. Jones ,
921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019).
The factual basis is usually established by questioning the defendant to prompt him
to explain the “circumstance s surrounding the crime.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8,

1 Washington does not challenge his pleas to the other two offenses: attempted first-degree
aggravated robbery (count five) and fleeing a peace officer (count eleven).

6
12 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994)), review
denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). But a defendant who claims a loss of memory regarding the
circumstances of the offense may still pl ead guilty to an o ffense by entering a Norgaard
plea. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17. A Norgaard plea is appropriate if the defendant
“claims a loss of memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of
the case.” Id. In such a case, “the record must establish that the evidence against the
defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and his or her counsel that the defendant
is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” Id. at 716.
An adequate factual basis for a Norgaard plea consists of two components: “a strong
factual basis and the defendant’s acknowledgm ent that the evidence would be sufficient
for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams, 760 N.W.2d
at 12-13. The defendant should “specifically acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing
that the evidence the State would likely offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying
a reasonable doubt standard, to find the defendant guilty.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Washington argues that his pleas to aggr avated robbery were not accurate when
entered because the factual basis was not su fficient to demonstrate that Washington’s
conduct falls within the charge of aggravated robbery for any of the three counts. The
crime of aggravated robbery involves the following elemen ts: (1) wrongful taking of
another’s personal property fro m the victim’s person or pres ence, (2) through force or
threat of force, and (3) while armed with a dangerous weapon. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.24, .25,
subd. 1. Washington argues that there is no factual basis of him personally taking personal
property, using or threatening to use force, or being armed with a dangerous weapon.

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Washington acknowledges that “the factual ba sis may have established that he aided and
abetted his cousins in committing aggrav ated robbery,” but argues that his
aggravated-robbery pleas were not valid be cause he was not char ged with aiding and
abetting aggravated robbery, “did not plead guilty to it, and was not convicted of it.” The
state responds that Washington’s argument lacks merit because there is no legal distinction
between a principal offender and an accomplice who aids and abets the principal’s crime.
We agree with the state.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long he ld that aiding and abetting is not a
separate substantive offense.” State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Minn. 1999); see
also State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. 1995) (“It is undisputed that aiding and
abetting is not a separate substantive offense.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018) (“A
person is criminally liable for a crime co mmitted by another if th e person intentionally
aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit
the crime.”). And, as the state points out, a factual basis that establishes that the defendant
is guilty of aiding and abetting a robbery is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated
robbery. See State v. DeFoe, 280 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 19 79) (affirming a defendant’s
conviction for aggravated robbery based on an aiding and abetting theory). Moreover, “a
jury can convict a defendant of aiding and abetting a substantive crime despite the absence
of any ‘aiding and abetting’ la nguage in the complaint.” DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 846.
Because aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense, Washington’s pleas to
first-degree aggravated robbery are accurate if they establish the elements of first-degree
aggravated robbery either as a principal or as an accomplice.

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With these legal principles in mind, we consider the accuracy of Washington’s pleas
to the three counts of first-de gree aggravated robbery (counts one, three, and eight). The
district court accepted Washington’s plea to count one based on his own memory of the
events. As such, Washington’s plea to count one was not a Norgaard plea. Based on his
memory, Washington admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the robbery,
and that he and his cousins specifically sought out the victim. He further admitted that his
cousins exited the vehicle with firearms, pointed the firearms at the victim, and took the
victim’s property. Washington’s description of the events provided a sufficient factual
basis to demonstrate that Washington aided and abetted the first-degree aggravated robbery
charged in count one. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, .24, .245, subd. 1; Jones, 921 N.W.2d at
779 (noting that for a guilty plea to be accurate a factual basis must be established for all
elements of the offense). Washington’s plea to count one was accurate.
We conclude that Washington’s Norgaard pleas to the other two first-degree
aggravated-robbery counts (counts three and eight) were al so accurate. Fi rst, the record
contains a strong factual basis to support th e pleas. Washington acknowledged that the
police reports and potential testimony reflect th e following facts: Wa shington drove the
vehicle involved in both robberies; in both instances, Washington and his cousins followed
the victim in their vehicle for a short time before two persons, armed with handguns, exited
the vehicle and robbed the victim; and the pe rsons armed with handguns took personal
property from each victim through force or the threat of force. Further, the police reports
and potential testimony indicate that police found multiple loaded weapons in the vehicle
that Washington was driving. The record cont ains a strong factual basis to demonstrate

9
that Washington aided and abetted the aggravat ed robberies charged in counts three and
eight. See Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12-13 (requiring a st rong factual basis to support the
plea).
Second, Washington repeatedly agreed that he was likely to be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of counts three and eight. At the plea hearing, defense counsel, the
state, and the district court each asked Washington if the evidence was sufficient for a jury
to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Washington agreed every time. It is clear
that when Washington entered his plea he di d so based on his belie f that a jury would
convict him based on the state’s evidence. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717 (concluding that
the defendant’s Norgaard plea was accurate because, am ong other reasons, the record
showed that he pleaded guilty “based on his probable guilt and the likelihood a jury would
convict him”). Therefore, Washington’s Norgaard pleas to counts three and eight were
accurate.
In sum, we conclude that Washington did not plead guilty to a more serious charge
than he could have been convicted of had he gone to trial on the three aggravated-robbery
charges because aiding and abetting a crime is not a lesser-charge from the crime charged.
And Washington’s three aggravated robbery pleas (counts one, three, and eight) were
accurate. Therefore, we conclude that Washington’s pleas are valid.
Affirmed.