Jessica Hagen, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1224

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

Jessica Hagen, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: August 11, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Steven Scott Management, Inc.,

Respondent.

________________________

A.L. Brown, Joshua R. Williams, Marcus L. Amon, Capitol City Law Group, LLC, Saint
Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Andrew E. Tanick, Ogletree, Deakins, Na sh, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for respondent.

Charles H. Thomas, Thomas Godfrey, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Southern
Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. Under the Minnesota Fair Labor Sta ndards Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 177.21–.35
(2020), rent credits qualify as wages so long as the employer complies with the applicable
rule adopted by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, specifically Minnesota
Rule 5200.0070 (2019).
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2. Under Minn. Stat. § 181.79 (2020), the term “wages” is defined by the Equal
Pay for Equal Work Law, Minn. Stat. § 181.66, subd. 4 (2020), and rent credits qualify as
“wages” under that definition.
3. The issue of whether the on-call em ployee was “performing any duties of
employment” in this case cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage by looking
solely at the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 10 (2020).
4. Under Minnesota Rule 5200.0120, subp. 2 (2019), the time when an on-call
employee is required to remain on the employer’s premises, or so close to it that they cannot
use their time effectively for their own purposes, is compensable “hours worked” under the
Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act. Beca use the employee presen ted specific facts
showing that she could not use her time effectively for her own purposes while on call, the
district court erred in granting summary judgment to the employer.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant Jessica Hagen sued her former employer, respondent Steven Scott
Management, Inc. (“Scott Management”), a lleging that it failed to pay her wages in
accordance with Minnesota law. Hagen worked as an on-site property caretaker at an
apartment complex owned by Scott Management. She also lived in an apartment on the
property. She was compensate d primarily with credits towa rd her monthly rent. Hagen
alleges that Scott Management’s use of rent credits to pay her wages violated the Minnesota
Fair Labor Standards Act (“MFLSA”), Minn. Stat. §§ 177.21–.35 (2020), and Minn. Stat.
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§ 181.79 (2020). She also alleges that Scott Management failed to pay her for every hour
she worked during her on-call shifts. Scott Management moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted th e motion and dismissed all thre e claims, and the court of
appeals affirmed.
We conclude that rent credits qualif y as wages under both the MFLSA and
section 181.79 and therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to Scott Management
on the first two issues. We further conclude that, for the purposes of calculating hours
worked, Hagen presented specific facts that could lead reasonable persons to reach
different conclusions as to whether she could use her time effectively for her own purposes
while on call. Accordingly, we hold that district court erred in granting summary judgment
to Scott Management on the third issue. We th erefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
In 2015, Scott Management hired Hagen to work part-time as an on-site property
caretaker at one of its apartment complexe s. Hagen signed an offer of employment
outlining her compensation schedule and job responsibilities. The employment offer
provided that Hagen would be compensated, in part, in the form of rent credits.
The rent credit arrangement worked as follows. For each hour Hagen worked, her
monthly rent owed to Scott Management would be reduced by $8.50. Hagen was assigned
to work 99.75 hours each month for a maximum rent credit value of $845 per month. If
she worked more than 99.75 hours in a mont h, Scott Management issued her a check for
the excess hours worked at her hourly rate of $8.50. The record shows that Hagen received
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a paycheck, in excess of her rent credits, approximately half the time she worked for Scott
Management. She reported the rent credits (as well as the cash) as income on her federal
and state tax returns.
Payment of wages in the form of rent credit was an express condition of Hagen’s
employment. She signed an employment offer which provided that “[t]he employee must
be a resident of the property where he/she works and must be in a position that requires the
employee to live on site in order to qualify for rent credit.” She also signed a separate rent-
credit agreement stating the same. Hagen did, in fact, live in an apartment on the property
where she worked.
According to Hagen’s job description, one of her essential job duties and
responsibilities was that she “may be required to work on an on call basis.” Hagen was
required to work an on-call shift at least once per week, every fifth weekend, and two
holidays each year. While on call, Hagen was required to carry a cellphone owned by Scott
Management and to stay within a 20-minute radius of the apartment complex to respond
promptly to calls from tenants.
Hagen was not paid for every hour she spen t on call. Instead, in accordance with
Scott Management’s Property Employee Policy Statement, Hagen was compensated “only
for the hours actually worked during that time.” Hagen’s on-call tasks were wide-ranging,
and included responding to calls from tenants, shoveling snow, maintaining the community
pool, inspecting recently-vacated apartments, and preparing unoccupied apartments for
new tenants. Although Hage n was paid for her time spen t actually performing these
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various tasks, she was not paid for the time she spent waiting for calls that might require
her to perform them.
While on call, Hagen was subject to certai n restrictions. She was required to stay
within a 20-minute radius of the apartment co mplex. As a result, she was unable to visit
her family members, all of whom lived at least 30 to 45 minutes away. She was prohibited
from drinking alcohol. And, at times, Hagen’s daily activities, such as grocery shopping,
were interrupted by calls from tenants on the cellphone that she was required to carry with
her at all times while on call.
Hagen worked as an on-site property ca retaker under this arrangement for three
years. In November 2018, Hagen sued Scott Management, alleging (1) failure to pay her
the minimum wage in violation of the MFLS A; (2) improper deduc tions from her wages
in violation of section 181.79; and (3) failure to pay for all time worked, including her time
spent on call and time spent on site waiting to work, in vi olation of the MFLSA rules
promulgated by the Department of Labor and Industry (“Department”). Scott Management
filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed
Hagen’s complaint with prejudice. Hagen appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 947 N.W.2d 847
(Minn. App. 2020). On the MFSLA wages claim, the court held that an employer may pay
the wages of an on-site property caretaker w ith rent credits so long as the employer
complies with the administrative rules adopted by the Department. Id. at 852. On the
improper deductions claim, the court held that Scott Management did not violate
section 181.79 by paying Hagen with rent credits because it concluded that “section 181.79
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does not apply when the caretaker agrees to be compensated in the form of rent credits.”
Id. at 853. In addressing Ha gen’s MFLSA claim that she wa s not paid for every hour
worked, the court held that a plain reading of the definiti on of “hours worked” in the
MFSLA and the accompa nying Department rule foreclosed Hagen’s argument that time
spent on call and on site, but not actually performing tasks, was compensable. Id. at
853−55. Finally, the court of appeals found there to be no disputed issues of material fact
and affirmed the district court’ s grant of summary judgment. Id. We granted Hagen’s
petition for review.1
ANALYSIS
This case presents three related wage-and-hou r issues. First, Hagen alleges that she
was not paid the minimum wage as defined in the MFSLA, Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4.
Second, she alleges that the manner in which she was compensated—that is, crediting her

1 After the briefs were submitted, Hagen filed a motion to strike portions of Scott
Management’s brief pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110. 01 and Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
127. She asserts that the brief contains citations to documents outside the record that should
not be considered. The challe nged citations included links to the public ly available
websites of two state agencies: the Minnes ota Department of Human Services and the
Minnesota Department of Revenue. On occasion, we have considered publicly available
state records that are included in a brief on appeal even though they were not part of the
record. See, e.g., State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Min n. 2000) (denying motion
to strike where documents that were not part of the appellate record concerned various
Minnesota and federal sentencing statistics which were publicly available); In re Estate of
Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1986) (denying the estate’s motion to strike because
there is “no reason why a party may not submit . . . a [publicly available state statistical]
report to us as part of its br ief when we could refer to such a report in the course of our
own research, if we were so inclined.”). But cf. State v. Cao , 788 N.W.2d 710, 718 n.2
(Minn. 2010) (granting motion to strike where the defendant cited an article from the
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism). Beca use we conclude that the
citations to publicly available state agency websites are sufficiently analogous to publicly
available state records, we deny the motion to strike.
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hours worked against her monthly rent—was through improper deductions from her wages
in violation of section 181.79. Third, she alleges that she was not paid for every hour she
worked, arguing that Scott Management faile d to pay her for ever y hour she worked on
call “performing . . . duties of [her] employ ment” as required by Minn. Stat. § 177.23,
subd. 10.
These issues require us to interpret vari ous statutes and administrative regulations
governing the calculation and payment of wa ges. We review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2013). The
objective of statutory interpretation is to “e ffectuate the intention of the legislature,”
reading the statute as a whole. Id. at 536; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). The first
step of statutory interpretation is to “determine whether the statute’s language, on its face,
is ambiguous.” Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). In
doing so, we “construe the statute’s words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary
meaning.” Christianson, 831 N.W.2d at 536 (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks
omitted). “A statute is only ambiguous if its language is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 537. When a statute is unambiguous, our “role is to
enforce the language of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.” Caldas
v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc. , 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012), superseded by
statute on other grounds as recognized in Hall v. Plainview, 954 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 2021);
see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). But if the text of the statute is unclear or ambiguous, we
“will go beyond the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature.”
Rohmiller v. Hart , 811 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 2012 ). Administrative regulations are
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governed by the same rules of cons truction that apply to statutes. Citizens Advocating
Responsible Dev. v. Kand iyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 713 N.W.2d 817, 828 n.9 (Minn.
2006).
I.
We first turn to whether rent credits qualify as “wages” under the Minnesota Fair
Labor Standards Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 177.21–.35 (2020). The MFSLA requires employers
to pay their employees a minimum wage for every hour worked. Minn. Stat. § 177.24,
subd. 1(b)(1)–(2). The term “wage” is defined by the MFLSA. Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd.
4.
“Wage” means compensation due to an employee by reason of employment,
payable in:

(1) legal tender of the United States;

(2) checks on banks conver tible into cash on demand at full face
value;

(3) except for instances of written objection to the employer by the
employee, direct deposit to th e employee’s choice of demand
deposit account; or

(4) an electronic fund transfer to a payroll card account that meets
all of the requirements of sec tion 177.255, subject to the
allowances permitted by the rules of the department under
section 177.28.

Id. This definition, on its face, does not incl ude rent credits. But, the final clause of
subdivision 4 notes that the definition of “wage” is also subject to “allowances” permitted
by the Department under the authority granted in Minn. Stat. § 177.28.
Section 177.28 is a rules enabling statute. It provides, in part, that the Department
“shall adopt rules under sections 177.21 to 177.35 defining and governing: . . . allowances
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as part of the wage rates for board, lodging, and other facilities or services furnished by the
employer and used by the employees.” Minn. Stat. § 177.28, subd. 3(2). In other words,
the Legislature delegated authority to the Department to create rules for certain
“allowances” for the minimum wage related to lodging provided by the employer for its
employees. Id.
We begin our analysis by de termining whether the defin ition of “wage” in Minn.
Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4, is am biguous. To determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we
analyze “the statute’s text, structure, and punctuation” and use the canons of interpretation.
State v. Pakhnyuk , 926 N.W.2d 914, 921 (Minn. 2019); see State v. Riggs , 865 N.W.2d
679, 682 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (distinguishin g between pre-ambiguity “canons of
interpretation” and post-ambiguity “canons of construction”). The canons of interpretation
include the ordinary-meaning canon, 2 see Riggs , 865 N.W.2d at 682, the whole-statute
canon, id. at 683, and the canon against surplusage, see State v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d
65, 69 (Minn. 2020).
When interpreting statutes, the whole-st atute canon provides that “language in
dispute is not examined in isolation; rather, all provisions in the statute must be read and
interpreted as a whole.” Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d at 920. “We interpret each section in light
of surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d

2 The ordinary-meaning canon is not relevant to this first issue because the disputed
term, “wage,” is defined by the Legislature. See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609
(Minn. 2011) (“ In the absence of a statutory definition , we generally turn to the plain,
ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.” (emphasis added)). “When a word is defined in a
statute, courts are guided by the definition provided by the Legislature.” Wayzata Nissan,
LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2016).
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280, 287 (Minn. 2015). The canon against surplusage advises us to “avoid interpretations
that would render a word or phr ase superfluous, void, or insi gnificant, thereby ensuring
each word in a statute is given effect.” Thompson, 950 N.W.2d at 69.
Hagen focuses primarily on the text and st ructure of Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4.
She argues that the Legislature defined “wage” as “compensation . . . payable in” only four
ways: (1) cash; (2) check; (3) direct deposit; or (4) electronic fund transfer to a payroll
card account. Id. Because rent credit is not one of those four enumerated forms of wages
in Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4, she contends that Scott Management’s use of rent credits
to pay her wages violated the MFLSA.
Scott Management contends that reading the statute as a whole reveals that the
Legislature did not intend to limit the defin ition of “wage” only to the forms of payment
listed in Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4. Instead, Scott Management relies on the final clause
in subdivision 4—“subject to allowances permitted by rule s of the department under
section 177.28”—which it claims allows fo r the payment of wages in other forms
contemplated by the Department. See Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4(4). Scott Management
also directs us to other provisions in the MFLSA which show that rent credits are an
acceptable form of paying an employee’s wages. See Minn. Stat. §§ 177.23, subd. 10,
177.28, subd. 3(2).
We agree with Scott Management that th e term “wage” includes rent credits.
Reading the MFLSA as a whole, it is significant that two other sections endorse the use of
rent credits to pay an employee’s wages. First, the MFLSA defines the term “hours
worked” as it relates to “a caretaker . . . who receives a principal place of residence as full
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or partial compensation for duties performed for an employer.” Minn. Stat. § 177.23,
subd. 10. If the Legislature had not intended for rent credits be a form of wages under the
MFLSA, it would not have provided that employees could receive their principal place of
residence as “full or partial compensation” for the hours worked. Second, the rules
enabling statute charges the Department to adopt rules “defining and governing . . .
allowances as part of the wage rates for boa rd, lodging, and other facilities or services
furnished by the employer and used by the em ployee.” Minn. Stat. § 177.28, subd. 3(2).
Again, if the Legislature had not intended for rent credits to be a form of wages under the
MFLSA, it would not have direct ed the Department to make “allowances” as part of the
wages of employees receiving lodging from their employer. For the same reason, Hagen’s
interpretation of the term “wage” is unreasonabl e as it violates the whole-statute canon.
Limiting the definition of “wage” solely to the four types of wages listed in Minn. Stat.
§ 177.23, subd. 4, would lead to conflicting in terpretations between provisions within the
statute that approve the use of rent credits. See Minn. Stat. §§ 177.23, subd. 10, 177.28,
subd. 3(2).
We therefore conclude that the statute is unambiguous because Scott Management
has presented the only reasonable interpretati on: rent credits qualify as wages under the
MFLSA. Yet, in reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the definition of “wage” in
the MFLSA is a limited one. The language “s ubject to the allowanc es permitted by the
commissioner” in Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 4, means that the only permissible types of
wages not listed in the definition of wage are those specifically included in section 177.28
and authorized by a Department rule. Thus, rent credits only qualify as wages under the
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MFLSA to the extent provided for by the Department in Minnesota Rule 5200.0070 (2020)
(the “lodging allowance” rule).
The lodging allowance rule authorizes an employer to “credit toward the minimum
wage the cost of lodging” if “the employee must accept that lodging as a condition of
employment.” See id., subp. 1. And, as relevant here , the rule provides that “[l]odging,
the nature of which is ordina rily and commonly considered to be a tenancy in the chief
place of residence of the employee, shall be credited toward the minimum wage of that
employee at the rate of the fair market value of the lodging.” Id., subp. 3. Hagen contends
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because she had presented facts
showing that Scott Management failed to comply with the lodging allowance rule.
Summary judgment is proper when the record before the district court “shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. The district court “must not weigh the evidence
on a motion for summary judgment,” and the nonmoving party “must do more than rest on
mere averments” to create a genuine issu e of material fact that precludes summary
judgment. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70–71 (Minn. 1997).
Hagen argues that she showed genuine issues of fact as to whether Scott
Management complied with the lodging allowance rule. In particular, Hagen contends that
the district court failed to credit the statements from her affidavit in which she claims that
she and other caretakers were not required to re side at a Scott Management property as a
condition of their employment. She also claims Scott Ma nagement failed to present
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evidence that her rent credits represented the fair market va lue of the lodging received,
resulting in an issue of fact that should have precluded summary judgment.
We disagree with Hagen on both counts. As noted ab ove, the lodging allowance
rule requires that lodging be a condition of the employment offer accepted by the employee.
See Minn. R. 5200.0070, subp. 1. Hagen’s employment offer plainly states that she “must
be a resident of the property where [she] works and must be in a position that requires [her]
to live on-site in order to qualify for rent credit.” Hagen signed the employment offer and
accepted lodging as a condition of her employment. Hagen’s affidavit, filed in response to
the motion for summary judgment, contained a general statement that she was not required
to live on the property and that she knew of another caretaker that lived off-premises. Her
affidavit did not include any information con cerning the terms of the employment of the
other caretaker or whether that other caretaker signed a document similar to the one Hagen
signed. The signed employmen t offer provides definitive proof of the conditions of
Hagen’s employment. On the record before us, Hagen’s self-serving affidavit that
contradicts the plain language of an employment offer is not sufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact th at precludes summary judgment. Cf. Sampair v. Vill. of
Birchwood, 784 N.W.2d 65, 75 n.9 (Minn. 2010) (n oting that “a party cannot create an
issue for trial by directly contradicting prior sworn testimony with a later-filed self-serving
affidavit”); U.S. ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Light , 766 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that, when reviewing a grant of summary judgment related to a contract,
appellate courts may apply the parol evidence rule and need not look outside the terms of
an unambiguous contract to determine its intent).
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Nor does a genuine issue of fact exist as to whether th e rent credits exceeded the
fair market value of the lodging Hagen rece ived. In support of its motion for summary
judgment, Scott Management submitted an a ffidavit from its Human Resources Director
supporting its claim that Hagen’ s rent credits did not exceed the fair market value of her
apartment. We have held that “[w]hen affi davits are submitted in support of the motion
[for summary judgment], the nonmoving pa rty cannot simply rely upon general
allegations . . . but must present specific facts showing that there is an issue for trial on the
merits.” Eakman v. Brutger , 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979); see also Lundgren v.
Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn. 1985) (“ It is incumbent on the party opposing
a summary judgment motion made on depositions or affidavits to counter with sufficient
specific facts to raise a jury issue.”). Hagen submitted her own affidavit in opposition, but
in it provided no facts, or even allegations, to dispute Scott Management’s claim. Because
Hagen did not present specific facts that the rent credits applied to her monthly rent
exceeded the fair market value of her apartment, we conclude that summary judgment on
that issue was appropriate.
Thus, because rent credits paid in acco rdance with the lodg ing allowance rule
qualify as wages under the MFLSA and the undisputed facts show that Scott Management
complied with that rule, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Scott Management. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals
on that issue.
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II.
Next, we must determine whether rent credits are improper deductions from an
employee’s wages that violate Minn. Stat. § 181.79.3
Section 181.79, subdivision 1(a) prohibits employers from making deductions from
an employee’s wages except under specific circumstances. The statute makes it illegal for
an employer to “make any dedu ction from the wages due or earned by any employee . . .
for lost or stolen property, damage to property, or to reco ver any other claimed
indebtedness running from employee to employer.” Id. The employee may “voluntarily
authorize[ ] the employer in writing to make the deducti on” or the empl oyer may make
deductions if “the employee is held liable in a court of competent jurisdiction for the loss
or indebtedness.” Id. In other words, section 181.79 prohibits an employer from making
any deduction from an employee’s wages to recover a debt, unless the employee agrees to
the deduction, in writing, after the debt has arisen.

3 Throughout the litigation, th e parties, the district court, and the court of appeals all
referred to section 181.79 as part of th e Payment of Wages Act (PWA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 181.01–.1721 (2020). Accordingly, the parties both contend that the meaning of “wage”
in the MFLSA should inform the meaning of “w ages” in section 181.79. See Milner v.
Farmers Ins. Exch. , 748 N.W.2d 608, 617 (Minn. 2008) (holding that the MFLSA and
PWA are “related” and “provide a comprehensive statutory scheme for wages and payment
in Minnesota and should be interpreted in light of each other”).
But we have repeatedly held that section 181.79 is not part of the PWA. See, e.g.,
Karl v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 835 N.W.2d 14, 18 n.4 (Minn. 2013) (“[S]ection 181.79 is not
part of the PWA or the MFLSA.”); Erdman v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 788 N.W.2d 50, 55
(Minn. 2010) (“Minn. Stat. § 181.79 is not . . . part of the PWA.”). Therefore, we reiterate
that the meaning of wages as interpreted in the MFLSA has little bearing on the meaning
of wages as interpreted in section 181.79.
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The parties dispute whether rent credits should be considered “deductions” or
“wages” under section 181.79. The Legislature did not define either term for the purposes
of section 181.79. When interp reting a statute, we may refer to dictionary definitions to
discern its plain meaning. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685–86. The term “deduction” means
“[t]he act or process of s ubtracting or taking away.” Deduction, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019). This definitio n of “deduction” brings into focus the difference between
the interpretations proffered by Hagen and Scott Management.
Hagen argues that section 181.79 applies because rent credits are deductions; that
is, she earned her wages as a property caretaker and then Scott Management applied rent
credits to subtract or take away from he r wages due or owed. In contrast, Scott
Management argues that rent credits are themselves wages; therefore no deductions
occurred that would implicate section 181.79. Thus, at its core, the key inquiry is whether
rent credits qualify as wages under section 181.79.
We have been down a similar road before. See Karl v. Uptown Drink, LLC ,
835 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn. 2013). In Karl, we addressed the question of “whether gratuities
satisfy the definition of ‘wages’ under section 181.79.” Id. at 17. There, a group of servers,
bartenders, and security guards brought a cl ass action against their employers, alleging
violations of the MFLSA and unlawful deductions from their wages in violation of section
181.79. Id. at 15. The employees argued that we should define wages as we had done in
a prior decision, Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc ., 683 N.W.2d 771, 7 75 (Minn. 2004).
Karl, 835 N.W.2d at 16. In Brekke, we applied the definition of “wages” from the Equal
Pay for Equal Work Law, Minn. Stat. § 181.66, subd. 4 (2002 ), to the term “wages” in
17
section 181.79. 683 N.W.2d at 775. We agreed with the employees in Karl and held that
the term “wages” in section 181.79 means “all compensation for services by an employee
for an employer whether paid by the em ployer or another person.” 835 N.W.2d . at 18
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 181.66, subd. 4 (2012)). Under that definition, we concluded that
gratuities plainly qualified as wages and reversed the cour t of appeals’ holding to the
contrary. Id.
Once we have interpreted a statute, that prior interpretation “guides us in reviewing
subsequent disputes over the meaning of the statute.” Caldas, 820 N.W.2d at 836. Our
interpretation “becomes part of the statute as though written therein.” Id. Just as in Brekke
and Karl, we apply the definition of “wages” fro m the Equal Pay for Equal Work Law,
Minn. Stat. § 181.66, subd. 4, to section 181.79. The Equal Pa y for Equal Work Law
defines “wages” to mean “all compensation for services by an employee for an employer
whether paid by the employer or another person including cash value of all compensation
paid in any medium other than cash.” Id.
Under this definition, rent credits cl early qualify as wages. Hagen’s signed
employment offer describes the rent credit arrangement using almost identical language to
the definition of “wages” in section 181.79. Hagen’s employment offer provided that
“[y]our compensation will be paid to you in the form of Rent Credit.” This language
parallels the definition of “wage” used in section 181.79 as “all compensation . . . paid by
the employer .” Minn. Stat. § 181.66, subd. 4. Moreover, the definition of wages in
section 181.79 broadly incorporates “all co mpensation paid in any medium other than
cash,” such as rent credits. Because we adhere to our prior definition of the term “wages”
18
in section 181.79 and rent credits clearly fit under that definition, we affirm the court of
appeals’ decision on that issue.
III.
Finally, we must determine whether Sco tt Management paid Hagen for every hour
she worked in accordan ce with the MFLSA. The MF LSA provides that, for on-site
employees who reside on their employer’s prem ises, “the term ‘hours worked’ includes
time when the caretaker, manager, or other on-site employee is performing any duties of
employment, but does not mean time when [the employee] is on the premises and available
to perform duties of employment and is no t performing duties of employment.” Minn.
Stat. § 177.23, subd. 10 (emphasis added). The Department has also adopted a rule
providing guidance for calculating “hours wo rked” for the purposes of the MFLSA. See
Minn. R. 5200.0120 (2019) (the “hours–worked” rule). In reference to on-call shifts, the
hours–worked rule states that:
An employee who is required to remain on the em ployer’s premises or so
close to the premises that the employee cannot use the time effectively for the
employee’s own purposes is working while on call. An employee who is not
required to remain on or near the employer’s premises, but is merely required
to leave word at the em ployee’s home or with company officials where the
employee may be reached is not working while on call.

Id., subp. 2 (emphasis added).

Hagen argues that Scott Management was required to pay her for every hour she
was on call, even if she was not actively resp onding to a tenant’s ca ll for assistance or
performing other work-related ta sks. She broadly interpre ts the phrase “performing any
duties of employment” in Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 10, to include minor duties involved
19
with being on call such as carrying an employer-provided cell phone and staying within a
20-minute radius of the apartment complex. In the alternative, Hagen contends that district
court erred in its grant of summary judgm ent because, when in terpreting the “hours
worked” rule, the court made a factual de termination that Hagen could use her time
effectively for her own purposes.
Scott Management maintains that it paid Hagen for every hour she worked as
required by the MFLSA. Focusing on the last clause of Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 10,
Scott Management argues that the time when an on-site employee is “available to perform
duties,” (i.e., on call) but not actually “p erforming duties of employment,” is not
compensable. Because it is undisputed that Hagen was paid for every hour she spent
actively performing tasks related to her empl oyment while on call, Scott Management
argues that it did not violate the MFLSA. Moreover, Scott Management asserts that
summary judgment was appropriate because, in light of anal ogous federal decisions, it is
clear that Hagen could use her time effectively for her own purposes while working on call.
The court of appeals agreed with Scott Management, co ncluding that “[u]nder the
plain language of section 177.23, subdivis ion 10, the time during which an on-site
employee of a residential build ing who receives a principal place of residence as full or
partial compensation is ‘available to perform duties’ but is not actually ‘performing duties
of employment’ is not compensable time.” Hagen, 947 N.W.2d at 855.
We disagree. Unlike the court of appeals, we are not convinced that the issue of
whether Hagen was performing “any duties of [her] employment” can be resolved based
solely on the plain language of Minn. Stat . § 177.23, subd. 10. We have previously
20
explained that “[t]he word ‘any’ is given broad application in st atutes, regardless of
whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dept., 691 N.W.2d 824,
826 (Minn. 2005). And although the statute distinguishes between time spent “performing
any duties” (which is compensable) and time where one is “available to perform duties and
is not performing duties of employment” (which is not compensable), that distinction does
not answer the factual question presented in this case: whet her the mere act of being on
call was considered a duty of Hagen’s employ ment. That question is complicated by the
fact that Hagen’s job description lists “work[ing] on an on-call basis” as one of the essential
duties of being a property caretaker.
Moreover, the definition in Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 10, applies only to a specific
category of workers: “any caretaker, manager, or other on-site employee of a residential
building or buildings whose principal place of reside nce is the residential building .”
(emphasis added). This distinc tion is notable because on-site property caretakers are, in
effect, always “available to perform duties” even when they are no t on call because they
live and work on their employer’s premises. In this sense, the phrase “available to perform
duties of employment and is not performing [those] duties” could be interpreted as referring
to the time when an on -site property caretaker is off the clock and free from any and all
duties of employment, including duties related to being on call. In short, the plain language
of Minn. Stat. § 177.23, subd. 10, does not compel the conclusion that Hagen’s time spent
21
on call, and not actively completing tasks related to her employment, is not a performance
of her duties in this case.4
For this reason, we conclude that the phrase “performing any duties of employment”
and “available to perform duties of employment ” creates ambiguity in the statute. When
interpreting ambiguous statutes , “we will go beyond the plain language of the statute to
determine the intent of the legislature.” Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 589. In doing so, we
look to the rule promulgated by the Department for calcula ting hours worked for further
guidance. See Minn. Stat. § 177.28, subd. 1 (authorizi ng the Department to “adopt rules,
including definitions of terms, to carry out th e purposes of sections 177.21 to 177.44, to
prevent the circumvention or evasion of those sections, a nd to safeguard the minimum
wage and overtime rates established by sections 177.24 and 177.25”); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(8) (2020) (permitting reference to “legislative and administrative interpretations”
of an ambiguous statute); Resident v. Noot, 305 N.W.2d 311, 312 (Minn. 1981) (observing
that in general, we defer “to an agency’s interpretation when the language subject to
construction is so technical in nature that only a specialized agency has the experience and
expertise needed to understand it, when the language is ambiguous or when the agency
interpretation is one of long standing”) (citation omitted). The hours–worked rule provides

4 The hours–worked rule, Mi nn. R. 5200.0120, further supports this conclusion. The
rule provides guidance on how to calculate an employee’s hours worked for the purposes
of the MFLSA. See id. It states that “hours worked ” includes “any other time when the
employee must either be on th e premises of the employer or involved in the performance
of duties in connection with his or her employment .” Id., subp. 1. Thus, the definition of
hours worked, as interpreted by the Depart ment, hinges on what types of conduct are
“performance of duties.”
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that the time during which “[a] n employee . . . is required to remain on the employer’s
premises or so close to the prem ises that the employee cannot use the time effectively for
the employee’s own purposes ” is considered compensable under the MFLSA. Minn. R.
5200.0120, subp. 2 (emphasis added).
When interpreting the hours– worked rule, the court of appeals acknowledged that
there is “no precedential Minne sota case law address[ing] th e distinction between being
able to use one’s time effectively or not.” Hagen, 947 N.W.2d at 854. The court, however,
found persuasive the decisions from federa l courts applying the analogous federal rule 5
promulgated under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19.
947 N.W.2d at 855. The court determined that Hagen’s on-call conditions were “factually
analogous to the cases in wh ich federal courts have held non-compensable on-call time
with more-restrictive on-call conditions than those present here.” Id. The court of appeals
thus concluded that “as a matter of law, Hagen could use her time effectively and is
therefore not entitled to compensation.” Id.
Yet, the determination of whether Sc ott Management’s pa rticular on-call
restrictions made it so that Hagen could not use her time effectively for her own purposes
is a factual one that cannot be resolved by a court at the summary judgment stage. As we
have explained before, “summary judgment is inappropriate when reasonable persons

5 The federal counterpart to Minn. R. 52 00.0120, subp. 2, provides that “where the
conditions placed on the employee’s activities are so restrictive that the employee cannot
use the time effectively for pers onal pursuits, such time spen t on call is compensable.”
29 C.F.R. § 553.221(d) (2019). As noted by the court of ap peals, “[t]he parties do not
dispute, and we agree, that using time effec tively for an employee’s ‘own purposes’ or
‘personal pursuits’ are equivalent.” Hagen, 947 N.W.2d at 854 n.5.
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might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.” DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d
at 69. We also “view the evid ence in the light mo st favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was granted.” McBee v. Team Indus., Inc. , 925 N.W.2d 222, 230
(Minn. 2019).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hagen, we conclude that she
has presented sufficient evid ence to survive summary judgment. Hagen submitted an
affidavit outlining how Scott Ma nagement’s on-call restrictions limited the extent of the
activities she could do while on ca ll. She claimed that certain activities, such as grocery
shopping, were occasionally in terrupted by calls from tenant s seeking assistance. She
could not drink alcohol. Nor was she able to visit any of her family members, all of whom
lived outside a 20-minute radius of the apartment complex. Reasonable persons
considering these types of on- call restrictions could reach different conclusions as to
whether Hagen could use her time effectively for her own purposes.
We recognize that a distinction between being able to use one’s time effectively or
not, while working on call, is an issue that has not been addr essed by Minnesota courts.
But, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that such a determination
is for a jury, not a judge, to make. By relying on federal ca ses with similar, but distinct,
fact patterns to resolve a genuine material issue of fact (i.e., whether Hagen could use her
time effectively for her own purposes), the di strict court erred when it granted summary
judgment to Scott Management. We therefor e reverse the court of appeals’ decision
upholding the grant of su mmary judgment and remand for trial on whether Scott
Management paid Hagen for every hour worked in accordance with the MFLSA.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the
court of appeals and remand to the district c ourt for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.