1

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-1229

Dakota County Anderson, J.
Took no part, Moore, J.
Shavelle Oscar Chavez-Nelson,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: September 16, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.
________________________

Shavelle Oscar Chavez-Nelson, Oak Park Heights, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Kathryn M. Keena, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying ap pellant’s petition for
postconviction relief without an ev identiary hearing because, ev en if the facts alleged in
the petition were proven by a preponderance of the evidence, appellant is conclusively
entitled to no relief.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

2

O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
A Dakota County jury found appella nt Shavelle Chavez-Nelson guilty of
first-degree premeditated murder and second-de gree intentional murder for the shooting
death of Palagor Obang Jobi. The district court convicted Chavez-Nelson of first-degree
premeditated murder and sentenced him to li fe imprisonment without the possibility of
release. On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction. On July 2, 2018, Chavez-Nelson
filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that, based on the affidavits filed in
support of the petition, both his trial counsel a nd his appellate counsel were ineffective.
The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Based on our
review of the record , even if the facts alleged in the petition were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, Chavez-Nelson is conclusively entitled to no relief and,
therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Around 2 a.m. on September 22, 2013, Ch avez-Nelson argued with Jobi outside
Nina’s Bar and Grill in Burnsville. During the argument, Jobi punched Chavez-Nelson in
the face, causing Chavez-Nelson to spin away from Jobi. Chavez-Nelson regained his
balance near the driver’s side headlight of a parked SUV. As R.C. remotely unlocked the
SUV and the headlights illuminated, she saw Chavez-Nelson pull out a gun. Jobi tried to
use the SUV as cover, but when he reached the rear driver’s side of the SUV, he was fatally
shot.

3

When the police arrived, they found Jobi lying face down on the pavement near the
rear driver’s side of R.C.’s SUV in a pool of bl ood. Jobi was declared dead at the scene.
Crime-scene investigators determined that at least nine shots were fired. One bullet and
one bullet fragment were located on the parking lot pavement di rectly under Jobi’s head.
One crime-scene investigator also identified four impact points from the bullets in the
pavement under Jobi’s head.
Following an autopsy, the medical examiner determined that Jobi had suffered eight
gunshot wounds that were the cause of death. Two of the gunshot wounds, one to the hip
and one to the forehead, were front entry wounds. The medical examiner found six other
wounds on the back of Jobi’s body. Four of the back entry wounds were consistent with a
“shored wound,” meaning Jobi’s body was in direct contact with the pavement when the
bullets passed through his body.
Chavez-Nelson was subsequently arrested. A search of the area near where
Chavez-Nelson was arrested revealed a 9mm pistol. Testing of the pistol by the Minnesota
Bureau of Criminal Apprehensi on (BCA) lab determined that all nine of the cartridge
casings recovered from the scene of Jobi’s shooting came from the pistol recovered at the
scene of Chavez-Nelson’s arrest. Swabs taken from various parts of the pistol revealed
DNA that matched the DNA profiles of Chavez-Nelson and Jobi.
A Dakota County grand jury indicted Chavez-Nelson for first-degree premeditated
murder, see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2018), and second-degree intentional murder, see
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018). Chavez-Nelson pleaded not guilty and demanded
a jury trial.

4

Four days before trial, Ch avez-Nelson fired his court- appointed attorneys, citing
disagreements in trial strategy, the decision of his attorneys not to hire an expert, and his
perception that his attorneys were hostile toward him. The district court denied Chavez-
Nelson’s request for a continua nce and appointed different a ttorneys as advisory counsel
for trial. During jury selection, Chavez-Nelson asked the court to allow advisory counsel
to assume full representation. The court denied the request. After the jury was selected,
Chavez-Nelson asked that his original attorn eys be reappointed, and his request was
granted.
The State presented evidence that was consistent with the facts discussed above. In
addition, R.C. testified that, after Jobi ran to the rear of the SUV, she felt the SUV shake
and believed that the two men were struggling near the driver’s side of her vehicle. R.C.
then heard several shots and saw Jobi fall to the ground. Wher e Chavez-Nelson was
standing when he fired the sh ot that entered Jobi’s forehe ad was disputed at trial.
According to the State, Chavez-Nelson was s till standing on the side walk when the shot
was fired. By contrast, Chavez-Nelson argued that he was struggling with Jobi near the
rear of the SUV when the shot was fired. Th e medical examiner testified that the shored
wounds were consistent with a scenario in which Chavez-Nelson stood over Jobi’s body
when firing the six shots that produced the back entry wounds. But the medical examiner
conceded that he could not be certain that Jobi was on the ground when the back entry
wounds were inflicted. Th e jury found Chavez- Nelson guilty of all counts, and Chavez-
Nelson was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for the first-degree
murder conviction.

5

On direct appeal, Chavez-Nelson raised a number of claims. In a brief submitted
by his appellate counsel, Chavez-Nelson argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel when the district court deni ed Chavez-Nelson’s request to have advisory
counsel assume full representation; that the district court made three evidentiary errors that,
either individually or cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial; and th at the district court
committed reversible error by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense
of first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter. State v. Chavez-Nelson , 882 N.W.2d 579,
584 (Minn. 2016). Chavez-Nelson also raised a variety of other claims in a pro se
supplemental brief. Id. Relevant here, Chavez-Nelson ar gued that his trial counsel was
ineffective because counse l failed to call a purported ly necessary crime scene
reconstruction expert, Dr. Nematollahi, and because trial counsel did not argue self-defense
due to a lack of “understanding the law con cerning self-defense.” We concluded that
Chavez-Nelson’s claims raised by his appellate counsel and in his pro se supplemental brief
were without merit, and we affirmed the conviction. Id. at 592.
Chavez-Nelson subse quently filed a motion for discovery and a petition for
postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to
investigate and failed to make trial objections. 1 As to his failure-to-investigate claims,
Chavez-Nelson alleged that trial counsel failed to (1) obtain a ballistics expert, (2) visit the
crime scene, (3) interview eyew itness R.C., and (4) retain or consult with a use-of-force

1 The discovery motion sought documents fro m his trial attorneys as well as tangible
items—the murder weapon, the bullet, and the bullet fragments—recovered from the crime
scene.

6

expert. As to his objection claims, Chavez- Nelson alleged that tria l counsel failed to
(1) object to prejudicial evidence offered by the prosecutor, (2 ) object to the prosecutor’s
improper closing argument, and (3) present an opening statement that supported a
reasonable self-defense theory.
Chavez-Nelson also argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
on direct appeal the above-descri bed claims of ineffective assist ance of trial counsel. In
addition, he argued that appellate counsel was ineffective when he advised Chavez-Nelson
that the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could not be raised on direct appeal
and that such claims could be raised in a subsequent postconviction petition.
In support of his postconviction petition, Chavez-Nelson attached the affidavit of
Deborah Collier, who investigated the scene at Nina’s, and p hotographs taken by Collier.
In the affidavit, Collier described how she took measurements of the scene outside Nina’s
and attempted to recreate the events leading up to Jobi’s death. Based on her measurements
and her review of police photographs in Chavez-Nelson’s case file, Collier alleged that the
length of R.C.’s SUV was 16 feet and that the distan ce from the sidewalk where
Chavez-Nelson was seen standing by R.C. to the back of th e SUV was 20 feet, 3 inches.
She also alleged that the dist ance from the sidewalk to where Jobi’s body was found was
15 feet, 3 inches. Collier’s affidavit did not include information regarding the accuracy of
her methodology, nor did she describe her experience or expertise.
Chavez-Nelson also submitted his own affi davits in support of his petition for
postconviction relief. In his affidavits, Ch avez-Nelson described the importance of
Collier’s affidavit, the conversations that he had with first trial counsel, and later appellate

7

counsel, regarding the trial d ecision not to hire a crime scen e investigator, and counsel’s
hostility toward Chavez-Nelson.
To support his claim of ineffective assi stance of trial counsel, Chavez-Nelson
submitted an affidavit alleging the following facts. While meeting with co unsel before
trial, counsel asked Chavez-Nelson to explai n what happened, and Chavez-Nelson drew
the parking lot area at Nina’s Bar and Grill to show counsel where he and Jobi were during
the moments leading up to the shooting. Tria l counsel also brought crime scene photos,
and Chavez-Nelson pointed out his relative locations in the photos. Chavez-Nelson asked
counsel whether counsel would interview any w itnesses or conduct an investigation, and
counsel told him that she would “speak to the Medical Examiner and BCA in the Jobi case,
but would otherwise rely exclusively on the investigative work of the S[tate] and limit their
investigation to review of the S[tate]’s file s in regards to the cr ime scene and eyewitness
accounts.”
To support his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Chavez-Nelson
attached a letter from his appellate counsel. In that letter, counsel stated that he would not
challenge the decisions of trial counsel on the use-of-force and self-defense issues on
appeal. Chavez-Nelson also submitted an affidavit in which he attested that he explained
to his appellate counsel that his trial counsel neither visited the crime scene nor retained a
use-of-force expert, and that his trial counsel failed to interview any eyewitnesses to the
shootings or call R.C. as a witness. Chavez-Nelson’s affidavit also stated that he was told
by appellate counsel that, on dire ct appeal, Chavez-Nelson could not hire an investigator
to visit the crime scene to take measurements or hire other experts because that evidence

8

was outside of the record. Chavez-Nelson’ s appellate attorney also told him that
Chavez-Nelson could hire expert s and could raise issues in a postconviction proceeding
after the direct appeal.2
The district court summarily denied Ch avez-Nelson’s claims of ineffective
assistance of both trial counsel and appellate counsel, and did so w ithout first holding an
evidentiary hearing. In its order, the court explained that Chavez-Nelson failed to alleged
facts that, if proven by a fa ir preponderance of the ev idence, would entitle him to
postconviction relief. More specifically, the court found that Chavez-Nelson’s claims of
ineffective assistance of tria l counsel were either proce durally barred or unreviewable
strategic decisions, appellate counsel’s decisi ons to raise issues on direct appeal were
matters of strategy, several of Chavez-Nelson’ s claims had been brought in his pro se
supplemental briefing and therefore were barred, and that Collier’s affidavit had no
evidentiary value.

2 Chavez-Nelson also submitted an affidavi t in support of his discovery request,
alleging that ballistics testing was necessary and would show that Jobi’s wounds could not
have been caused by a gunshot made from the distance of 15 to 20 feet (which is the
distance from where he alleged he stood on the sidewalk to where Jobi’s body lay on the
ground). He also alleged that this testing was necessary to argue the prejudice he suffered
by the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

9

ANALYSIS
Chavez-Nelson argues that the district c ourt committed reversible error when it
summarily denied his claims of ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and appellate
counsel without first holding an evidentiary hearing.3 We disagree.
We review the “denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for
an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Morrow v. State, 886 N.W.2d 204, 206
(Minn. 2016) (quoting Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (M inn. 2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when the
petitioner alleges facts that, even if true, ar e legally insufficient to entitle him to the
requested relief. Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 2007). Accordingly, a
district court may summarily deny a postconviction petition that is procedurally barred by
the rule announced in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Ouk v. State,
884 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Minn. 2016).
To be entitled to an eviden tiary hearing on an ineffe ctive-assistance-of-counsel
claim, an appellant must “alle ge facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the
evidence,” would satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Bobo v. State , 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012). Under the first
Strickland prong, an appellant must prove that his counsel’s representation “fell below an

3 Chavez-Nelson also argues that the distri ct court abused its discretion by denying
his discovery motion. The district court de nied the motion, sta ting that it needed no
additional evidence outside of the trial record to determine whether Chavez-Nelson’s trial
counsel was ineffective because counsel’s decision was a strategic choice. Because the
reasoning of the district court is sound, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.

10

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (citations omitted) (int ernal quotation marks
omitted). And under the second prong, an appellant must show “ ‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Generally, we will not
review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when the attorney’s conduct in question
is based on trial strategy. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Minn. 2014). Trial strategy
includes the extent of counsel’s investigation and the selection of evidence presented to the
jury. Id. Similarly, “[a]ppellate counsel does not have a duty to raise all possible issues,
and may choose to present only the mo st meritorious claims on appeal.” Morrow, 886
N.W.2d at 206. When a defendant raises an issue in a pro se supplemental brief, “counsel’s
failure to raise the same i ssue in the principal brief or at oral argument is not
prejudicial.” Id. at 206–07. We need not an alyze both requirements of Strickland when
either one is determinative. Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 266.
We begin our analysis by considering the facts that Chavez-Nelson alleged in
support of the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to investigate
the crime scene. Chavez-Nelson personally a lleged that, when he asked trial counsel if
counsel would interview any witnesses or conduc t an investigation, counsel told him that
she would “speak to the Medical Examiner and BCA in the Jobi case, but would otherwise
rely exclusively on the investig ative work of the [S]tate and limit their investigation to
review of the [S]tate’s files in regards to the crime scene . . . .” Deborah Collier alleged in
her affidavit that the SUV was about 16 feet long and that the distance from the sidewalk
to Jobi’s body was between 15 and 20 feet. Chavez-Nelson further alleged that his

11

appellate counsel advised him that he was una ble to raise the ine ffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim on direct appeal because it re quired evidence outside of the record, and
advised Chavez-Nelson to bring this claim on a subsequent postconviction petition.
Even if the alleged facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence, they fail
to satisfy the second requirement of Strickland. The measurement information obtained
by Collier indicates that the distance from the sidewalk to the back of the SUV was around
16 feet. According to Chavez-Nelson, when combined with the gunshot stippling evidence
that suggested the forehead shot was fired from no more than “sever al feet,” the 16-foot
measurement undermines the St ate’s theory that Chavez-Nelson shot Jobi from the
sidewalk. Although this is true, it does no t establish a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel presented such testimony
to the jury. The precise length of the SUV was not critical in this case because the jury had
access to the photograph of the SUV and could judge for itself the relevant distances.
Therefore, Chavez-Nelson’s additional measurements are cu mulative and do not support
the claim for relief here. Further, on direct a ppeal, we assumed that Jobi sustained all of
the gunshot wounds during the scuffle behi nd the SUV and concluded that there was no
reversible error. See Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d at 582–83, 591. For the above-stated
reasons, we conclude that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion by summarily

12

denying the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that was based on the failure of
the attorneys for Chavez-Nelson to visit the crime scene.4
We next consider the facts that Chavez-N elson alleged in support of the claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to (1) elicit favorable testimony from
a witness; (2) retain certain experts; (3) make certain objections during trial; and (4) present
a theory of self-defense. Chavez-Nelson personally allege d that, while counsel also
brought crime scene photos, counsel told him that counsel woul d not interview any
witnesses or conduct an investigation and would rely on the State’s evidence to form their
defense. Chavez-Nelson alleged that he belie ved that if R.C. had been asked by trial
counsel during cross-examination or called as a defense witness, she would have further
testified about the struggle that she observed between Chavez-Nelson and Jobi.
Even if the alleged facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence, Chavez-
Nelson’s claims are barred under the rule adopted in State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d (Minn.
1976). Under the Knaffla rule, claims that were raised on direct appeal are procedurally
barred on a postconviction appeal. Buckingham v. State, 799 N.W.2d 229, 231–32 (Minn.

4 In its order, the district court found that, because Ms. Collier is an unknown person
and was not subject to qualification or cross-examination as a witness, the information she
provided in her affidavit did not hold evidentiary value at this stage of the proceeding. On
appeal, Chavez-Nelson argues that the district court committed reversible error because the
above-quoted statement demonstrates that the district court improperly assessed Collier’s
credibility without holding an evidentiary hearing. Because Chavez-Nelson is
conclusively entitled to no relie f, even when the facts alle ged in Collier’s affidavit are
assumed to be true, we need not decide wh ether the above-quoted statement reflects an
improper credibility determination. Nevertheless, we reaffirm that a district court may not
find a postconviction affiant unr eliable without first holding an evidentiary hearing to
assess the affian t’s credibility. See, e.g., Wilson v. State , 726 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn.
2007) (stating that evidentiary hearings provide the means for evaluating credibility).

13

2011) (explaining that the first two allegations of error are undoubtedly Knaffla-barred
because we expressly considered and rejected identical arguments on direct appeal). The
Knaffla rule also “includes all claims that the a ppellant should have known of at the time
of appeal.” McKenzie v. State, 687 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Minn. 2004). For claims that were
not raised on direct appeal, two exceptions to the Knaffla rule exist: (1) a novel legal issue
is presented that was unavailable at the time of the direct a ppeal; or (2) the interest of
justice requires review. Id. at 905–06. Petitions allowed under the second exception must
have substantive merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.
Wright v. State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 2009).
The trial record and the facts alleged in Chavez-Nelson’s affidavits demonstrate that
he knew (1) that his trial counsel had neither called R.C. as a witness nor elicited the
additional testimony of Chavez-Nelson’s and J obi’s struggle for a gun behind her SUV;
(2) that trial counsel had secured neither a ballistics nor a use-of-force expert; (3) that trial
counsel failed to object to the introduction of his lineup photo at trial and the prosecutor’s
remarks during closing argument; and (4) the substance of trial counsel’s statements during
closing arguments. These claims, therefore, are Knaffla barred. Moreover, the alleged
facts, even if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, fail to establish the existence of
a novel legal issue or an excusable delay. Fo r these reasons, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Chavez-Nelson’s claim that trial
counsel was ineffective by failing to elicit favorable testimony from a witness, retain
certain experts, make certain objections during trial, and present a theory of self-defense.

14

Next, we consider the facts that Chavez-Nelson alleged in support of his claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective when he failed to raise certain arguments on direct appeal
and when he told Chavez-Nels on not to raise certain claims in his direct appeal.
Chavez-Nelson personally alleged the follo wing facts. Appellate counsel told
Chavez-Nelson that several of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could not
be raised on direct appeal because the reason why trial counsel may or may not have done
something was not part of the record on appeal. Appellate counsel also told Chavez-Nelson
that he could not hire an investigator to vis it the crime scene to take the measurements or
hire a ballistics expert to have the gunshot-distance-determination tests performed on direct
appeal or consult a use-of-force expert beca use those issues were not pursued during a
direct appeal. Instead, appellate counsel told Chavez-Nelson that his claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel concerning lack of investigation and failures in trial counsel’s
opening statement could be raised in a postconviction proceeding after the direct appeal.
Even if the alleged facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
Chavez-Nelson is conclusively entitled to no relief because the failure to raise the
arguments in question does not, by itsel f, satisfy the first requirement of Strickland. See
Morrow, 886 N.W.2d at 206 (explainin g that appellate counsel does not have a duty to
raise all possible issues and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims on
appeal). Instead, a defendant must establish that appellate counsel improperly concluded
that waived or unraised arguments would be unsuccessful on appeal. See Zornes v. State,
880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016) (“Appellate counsel does not act unreasonably by not
raising issues that he or sh e could have legitimately conc luded would not prevail.”).

15

Because Chavez-Nelson failed to allege such facts, he is conclusively entitled to no relief
on his claim that appellate c ounsel failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment in
selecting the issues to raise on appeal.5 For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily de nying Chavez-Nelson’s claim
that appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise certain claims on direct appeal.
Finally, we consider the facts Chavez-Nelso n alleged in support of his claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective when he told Chavez-Nelson not to raise certain claims
in his direct appeal. Chavez-Nelson persona lly alleged that appellate counsel told
Chavez-Nelson that his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel concerning the lack
of investigation and the failure s in trial counsel’s opening stat ement could be raised in a

5 As for Chavez-Nelson’s argument that hi s appellate counsel was ineffective when
counsel failed to argue on direct appeal that he was entitled to lesser-included-offense jury
instructions, on direct appeal we held that the ju ry instruction issue was without merit.
Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d at 592. Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective. As
to the equal protection argument, we hold Chavez-Nelson’s ar gument also to be without
merit. Chavez-Nelson cites State v. Galvan , 912 N.W.2d 663 (M inn. 2018), for the
assertion that he is entitled to relief. In Galvan, we clarified “the long-established,
uncontroversial proposition that premeditation and heat of passion cannot coexist.” Id. at
674. The effect of the holding was to overrule inconsistent language in State v.
Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 814–18 (Minn. 1995), and State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701,
711 (Minn. 2003). Chavez-Nelson asserts that because Auchampach and Quick were good
law at the time of his convictio n and at the time of his dire ct appeal, his equal protection
rights were violated when we did not grant re lief on direct appeal under the existing case
law. We disagree. On direct appeal, we found that Chavez-Nelson’s case was analogous
to Cooper v. State, 745 N.W.2d 188, 194 (Minn. 2008), which was consistent with our case
law then and now. If Chavez-Nelson disagreed with our holding, his remedy was a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. The district court did not err by denying
postconviction relief on this basis.

16

postconviction proceeding after direct appeal and advised him not to bring those claims on
direct appeal.
Even if the alleged facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
Chavez-Nelson is conclusively entitled to no relief because the unraised claims would have
been unavailing for the reasons outlined above.6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.

MOORE, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

6 Chavez-Nelson’s remaining claims of ineffe ctive assistance of appellate counsel are
that trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to (1) elicit favorable testimony from
a witness, (2) retain necessary experts, (3 ) object to closing remarks made by the
prosecutor, and (4) present a theo ry of self-defense. The thir d and fourth claims brought
by Chavez-Nelson in a supplemental petitio n in his direct appeal are barred by Knaffla.
See Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d at 592. The first and second claims are unreviewable trial
strategy. See Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).