Margaret Campbell, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1232

Margaret Campbell,
Respondent,

vs.

Honor the Earth,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CV-19-266

Christy L. Hall, Gender Justice, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Frank Bibeau, Deer River, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Segal, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant-defendant Honor the Earth challe nges the district court’s order denying
its motion to dismiss respondent-plaintiff Margaret Campbell’s claims under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act for lack of subject-matter ju risdiction. Because we conclude that the
district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, we affirm.

2
FACTS
In January 2019, Minnesota resident Margaret Campbell sued her former employer,
Honor the Earth (HTE), alleging claims un der the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
Generally, Campbell alleged that HTE took no action to respond to her complaints that an
HTE coworker sexually harassed her. Campbe ll further alleged that HTE placed her on
unpaid administrative leave to punish her for “violat[ing] confidentiality” by speaking with
a community activist about her allegations against the colleague. Finally, Campbell alleged
that after she resigned from HTE, Winona LaDuke, HTE’s founder, told Campbell to “stay
quiet” about what had happened and threatened Campbell with a lawsuit for defamation.
HTE denied almost all of the allegations in Campbell’s complaint, but admitted that
it was “a nonprofit corporatio n under Minn. Stat. § 317A registered with the State of
Minnesota.” Its answer assert ed that the district court di d not have jurisdiction over the
matter. HTE also filed a separate motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
HTE argued that the district court lacks ju risdiction over Campbell’s claims because the
incidents alleged in the complaint occurred pr imarily within the White Earth Reservation
and because LaDuke is a member of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe. HTE asserted that
a federal law commonly known as Public La w 280 precludes the district court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.1
The district court denied HTE’s motion to dismiss. It concluded that it had
subject-matter jurisdiction over Campbell’s cl aims because (1) th e case involves a

1 Public Law 280 is codified as amended, in relevant part, at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2018) and
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2018).

3
Minnesota resident suing a Minnesota corpor ation under Minnesota law and, therefore,
neither tribal immunity nor Pu blic Law 280 apply to this ca se, and (2) even if Public
Law 280 did apply to this case, as argued by HTE, Minnesota courts retain jurisdiction
over Campbell’s lawsuit under the grant of state jurisdiction provided by Public Law 280.
HTE appeals.
D E C I S I O N
At issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred by exercising jurisdiction
over Campbell’s Minnesota Human Rights Act claims against HTE, a Minnesota nonprofit
corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota and founded by an enrolled member of
the White Earth Band of Ojibwe. Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a
question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Lemke ex rel. Teta v. Brooks, 614
N.W.2d 242, 244 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2000).
HTE argues that Minnesota courts do not have jurisdiction over Campbell’s claims
because Public Law 280 precludes it. Campbe ll argues that because neither party is an
Indian2 and because some of the activity alleged in the complaint occurred off of the White
Earth Reservation, the federal laws governing state court jurisdiction over Indians are not
implicated. Campbell emphasizes that HTE is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation and that
she is a resident of the State of Minnesota and not an enrolled member of any tribe.

2 We use the term “Indian” as it is the term used in Public Law 280.

4
I. The district court correctly concluded that Public Law 280 is not implicated by
Campbell’s complaint against HTE.

State district courts generally have ju risdiction over civil ac tions within their
respective districts. See Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(1) ( 2018). But Indian tribes retain
sovereignty over both their members and their territory. See California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians , 480 U.S. 202, 207, 10 7 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (19 87). Thus, in matters
involving Indians, state cour ts only have jurisdiction as permitted by federal law. See
State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Minn. 1997). “[A]bsent a grant of federal authority,
state courts have no jurisdicti on over Indians, Indian tribes , or other Indian entities.”
Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Minn. 1996).
In 1953, Congress passed what is commonly referred to as Public Law 280. Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588; State v. Manypenny, 682 N.W.2d 143,
148 & n.4 (Minn. 2004). Public Law 280 gran ted state court jurisdiction to designated
states, including Minnesota, over certain ma tters to which Indians are parties.
Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 1162, 1360, 67 Stat. 58 8-89 (relevant parts codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)). Our state supreme court has explained that
the law provided Minnesota “bro ad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over all Indian
country within the state, with the exception of Re d Lake Reservation.” Stone,
572 N.W.2d at 728 (footnote omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
The primary problem that Public Law 280 was intended to address was “lawlessness
on certain Indian reservations , and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law
enforcement.” Bryan v. Itasca County , 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S. Ct. 2102, 2106 (1976).

5
Thus, the law granted the specified stat es jurisdiction “over offenses committed by or
against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State or
Territory” and further provided that “the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have
the same force and effect with in such Indian country as th ey have elsewhere within the
State or Territory.” 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (em phasis added). For Minnesota, that criminal
jurisdiction extends to “[a]ll Indian country within the St ate, except the Red Lake
Reservation.” Id.3
The law also granted these states “jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving
reservation Indians and arisin g out of Indian country.” Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 729.
Specifically, the law provides Minnesota (and the other designa ted states) with
“jurisdiction over civil causes of action betw een Indians or to which Indians are parties
which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same
extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action.” 28 U.S.C. 1360(a).
For Minnesota, the civil jurisdiction gran ted by Public Law 280, like the criminal
jurisdiction, extends to all Indian country within the st ate, except the Red Lake
Reservation. Id. The United States Supreme Court de termined that the grant of civil
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 was “primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate
Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and
between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide

3 We also recognize that in 1973, Minnesota retroceded criminal jurisdiction for the Bois
Forte Indian Reservation at Nett Lake back to the federal government. See Stone ,
572 N.W.2d at 728 n.3 (noting the same and citing 1973 Minn. Laws ch. 625, § 3, at 1501).

6
such disputes.” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383, 96 S. Ct. at 2108. But while the law grants
jurisdiction over “private civil litigation involving reservation Indians and arising out of
Indian country,” the law “does not grant the state general civil regulatory authority” over
Indians or Indian country. Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 729 (citing Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384-88,
96 S. Ct. at 2108-11).
Public Law 280 also permits the existenc e of concurrent jurisdiction between state
courts and tribal courts:
Any tribal ordinance or cust om heretofore or hereafter
adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise
of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent
with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force
and effect in the determinati on of civil causes of action
pursuant to this section.

28 U.S.C. § 1360(c).
But Public Law 280 in no way limits st ate court jurisdiction over matters where
neither party to the proceeding is Indian. See Public Law 280 (codified as amended, in
relevant part, at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U. S.C. § 1360). A civil action between two
non-Indian parties is not within the scope of the law. See id. Because neither party to this
litigation is Indian, we conclude that Public Law 280 is not implicated. As the district court
correctly concluded, neither Pu blic Law 280 nor tribal immun ity apply because this case
involves a Minnesota citizen suing a Minnesota nonprofit corporation.
HTE argues that we should look beyond the parties to the proceeding and hold that
Public Law 280 applies because HTE was founded by an Indian. HT E asserts that it is
“merely a tool owned by” LaDuke, and that LaDuke should be considered a party for

7
purposes of determining whether Public Law 280 applies to this litigation. HTE points to
Morgan v. 2000 Volkswagen, 754 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. App. 2008) to support its argument.
In 2000 Volkswagen, the state sought forfeiture of a vehicle owned by an enrolled member
of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe that had been used in the commission of a DWI offense
on the White Earth Reservation. 754 N.W.2d at 589-90 & n.1. Because the state was
seeking forfeiture of a vehicle owned by an Indian for conduct occurring o n a n I n di a n
reservation, this court analyzed whether the district had jurisdiction under Public Law 280.
Id. at 590. In making this determination, we explained that
when a State seeks to enforc e a law within an Indian
reservation under the authority of Pub. L. 280, it must be
determined whether the law is criminal in nature, and thus fully
applicable to the reservation or civil in nature, and applicable
only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state
court.

Id. at 590-91 (quotation and footnote omitted). We determined that the vehicle forfeiture
statute that the state intended to enforce wa s civil/regulatory. Id. at 594. Consequently,
because Public Law 280 does not grant states civil regulatory authority, we concluded that
Public Law 280 did not grant state jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 594.
The 2000 Volkswagen case relied upon by HTE is dis tinguishable from this case,
and fails to support HTE’s ju risdictional argument, for se veral reasons. First, in
2000 Volkswagen, the owner of the vehicle was an enro lled member of an Indian tribe.
Here, neither party is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe. Second, HTE is not a “tool”
of LaDuke but rather is a distinct legal entity. It is well settled that a nonprofit corporation,
like any other corporation, is a separate legal entity, not a “tool” of its founder. See, e.g.,

8
Di Re v. Cent. Livestock Order Buying Co., 74 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1956). Third, even
assuming Public Law 280 did apply because HTE was founded by an Indian, the law would
expressly grant state court jurisdiction over this case because the cas e is a civil action
between private parties, not an enforcement action by the state like in the 2000 Volkswagen
case. See 28 U.S.C. 1360(a) (“Each of the States listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties
which arise in the areas of Indian country lis ted opposite the name of the State . . . .”). 4
HTE’s reliance on the 2000 Volkswagen case is misplaced.
Finally, HTE argues that Public Law 280 precludes Minnesota courts from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over th is case because the White Earth Band has
adopted its own tribal code after the passa ge of Public Law 280. HTE relies on the
following language of Public Law 280 to support its argument:
Any tribal ordinance or cust om heretofore or hereafter
adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise
of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent
with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force
and effect in the determinati on of civil causes of action
pursuant to this section.

4 And because this is a civil litigation between two private parties, it was not necessary for
the district court to apply the Stone analysis that we have adopted for determining when
the state, as a party to the litigation, has jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to enforce a
state law in Indian country. See 2000 Volkswagen, 754 N.W.2d at 590 (describing Stone
analytical framework as a te st to “determin[e] whether Minnesota has jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 to enforce a state law in Indian country” (emphasis added)). Here, the
state is not seeking to enforce a state law. Therefore, we do not address HTE’s arguments
that the district court erred in determin ing that the Minnesota Human Rights Act is
criminal/prohibitory under the Stone analysis. We express no opinion as to whether the
district court erred in its application of Stone.

9
28 U.S.C. § 1360(c). The White Earth Band of Chippewa Judicial Code provides, in
relevant part, that “[n]othing in this Code shall be deemed to constitute acceptance of or
deference to the jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota over any civil or civil regulatory
matter or crime associated thereto, where such jurisdiction does not otherwise exist .”
White Earth Band of Ch ippewa Judicial Code, tit. 1, ch. 2, § 2 (1997) (emphasis added).
Based on these provisions, HTE argues that the White Earth Band of Chippewa has
divested Minnesota of jurisdiction over civil actions involving members of the tribe.
As discussed above, we conclude that Public Law 280 is not implicated in this case
because this civil acti on does not involve an Indian. But assumi ng Public Law 280 was
applicable, the language of th e White Earth Band of Chippe wa Judicial Code that HTE
relies upon fails to support HTE’s argument. The code provision indicates that the code
shall not be deemed to constitute “acceptance of or deference to” the jurisdiction of the
State of Minnesota over any civil matter “where such jurisdiction does not otherwise exist.”
Id. (emphasis added). When the White Earth Band of Chippewa Judicial Code was adopted
in 1997, the Public Law 280 grant of civil jurisdiction to state courts over private lawsuits
existed. Therefore, even if this case involved an Indian party, the code would not preclude
the state court from exercising jurisdiction.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying HTE’s motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

10
II. The district court did no t err in exercising jurisdiction where the White Earth
Tribal Court shares concurrent jurisdiction over the claims.

Because some of the allegations in the complaint occurre d on White Earth
Reservation, the parties agree that White Eart h’s Tribal court also has jurisdiction over
Campbell’s claims against HTE.5 “[I]n cases involving concu rrent jurisdiction, instances
of jurisdictional disputes between tribal and state courts also raise the question of whether
that jurisdiction should be exercised.” Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 291. “[T]he governing
federal principle in determining whethe r a court should exercise concurrent
jurisdiction . . . is one of deference.” Id. To determine whether exercise of jurisdiction
over a case would infringe on Indian sovereignty, a court must consider the state and tribal
interests at stake. Id. “[T]he general rule is that the exercise of state court jurisdiction must
not ‘undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs’ nor ‘infringe on
the right of Indians to govern themselves.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
223, 79 S. Ct. 269, 272 (1959)).
HTE argues that exercising jurisdiction he re “infring[es] on every single tribal
member who has a right to bring this to tribal court under our treaties.” But, as discussed
above, neither party is a trib al member. Campbell’s claims are brought under Minnesota
law against a Minnesota corporation and do not undermine the authority of the tribal courts

5 While the parties agree that White Earth Reservation has jurisdiction, they disagree as to
whether it is exclusive. As discussed in the preceding section, we reject HTE’s exclusive
jurisdiction argument, and conclude that th e district court does have subject-matter
jurisdiction.

11
over Reservation affairs. Conseq uently, we conclude that the district court did not err in
exercising jurisdiction over this matter and denying HTE’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.