Robert Louis Freeman, III, petitioner, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1247

Robert Louis Freeman, III, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-13-347

John B. Orenstein, Amran A. Farah, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Ole T vedten, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
For a petitioner seeking exoneration compensation, the phrase “any evidence of
factual innocence” in Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2) (Supp. 2019), does not include
impeachment evidence about a victim’s prior acts of dishonesty unrelated to the
petitioner’s alleged commission of the underlying crime.

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O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition seeking eligibility for exoneratio n
compensation under the Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act
(MIERA). Because the district court correctly ruled that appellant did not meet the
threshold requirement of “exonerated,” we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged a ppellant Robert Freeman
III with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct. These charges arose after appellant’s daughter ( the victim)
reported to police that he touched her vagina over her clothing while they were traveling
in a vehicle.
Following a trial, the jury found appellant guilty as charged. The district court
granted appellant a dispositional departure , stayed the pres umptive 234 -month prison
sentence, and placed appellant on probation . Appellant appealed his conviction to this
court. After a probation violation, the district court executed appellant’s stayed prison
sentence. Appellant also appealed this decision. We consolidated those appeals and
granted appellant’s motion for a stay while he pursued postconvic tion relief in district
court, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted appellant’s
postconviction petition, vacated his convictions, and ordered his release from prison. The
state chose not to retry the case and dismissed the charges against appellant.

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In January 2019, appellant petitioned for an order declaring h im eligible for
exoneration compensation under MIERA. After both parties filed written arguments, the
district court denied appellant’s petition, determining that he did not qualify as
“exonerated” under Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (Supp. 2019). Appellant challenges this denial.
ISSUE
Does evidence about a victim’s prior acts of dishonesty constitute “any evidence of
factual innocence” under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2)?
ANALYSIS
I. Interpretation of MIERA

Under MIERA, persons released from incarceration after a court reverses or vacates
their convictions may seek exoneration compensation. See Minn. Stat. §§ 590.11, 611.362-
.368 (2018 & Supp. 2019). A person seeking compensation must first petition a court for
an order declaring them eligible for compensation based on exoneration under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11. See Back v. State , 902 N.W.2d 23, 26 ( Minn. 2017). In relevant part,
“exonerated” under MIERA means that “a court . . . ordered a new trial on grounds
consistent with innocence and the prosecutor dismissed all felony charges against the
petitioner arising from the same behavioral incident .” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd.
1(b)(1)(ii).
Whether appellant meets the statutory definition of “exonerated” presents a legal
question subject to de novo review. Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App. 2019).
Here, the parties dispute only whether appellant received a new trial “on grounds consistent
with innocence.” In Buhl, the appellant argued that he was eligible for exoneratio n

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compensation because this court had reversed his conviction based on improperly admitted
Spreigl1 evidence. Id. at 438 -39. But we rejected this argument becau se “on grounds
consistent with innocence” means “agrees with innocence,” and Buhl’s reversed convictio n
for improperly admitted Spreigl evidence did not agree with innocence. Id. at 440-41.
After we decided Buhl, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 590.11 to define “on
grounds consistent with innocence.” 2 019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. c h. 5, art. 2, § 13,
at 19. The statute now defines “on grounds consistent with innocence” as meaning either:
(1) exonerated through a pardon or sentence
commutation, based on factual innocence; or
(2) exonerated because the judgment of convictio n
was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and
there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was
available at the time of investigation or trial or is n ewly
discovered evidence.

Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Only the second definition is
relevant here.
Under MIERA, appellant satisfies the threshold exoneration requirement if he
received a new trial on grounds consistent with innocence. Id., subd. 1(b)(1)(ii). This
means that a court must have vacated or reversed appellant’s convictions, or ordered a new
trial, and some evidence of factual innocence must exist, no matter when it was discovered.
Id., subd. 1(c)(2). The word “and” in this second definition of “on grounds consistent with
innocence” is conjunctive and therefore requires a petitioner to meet both prongs of that

1 Evidence of a criminal defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts, called Spreigl
evidence, is admissible for limited purposes and only after the evidence satisfies procedural
safeguards. See State v. Smith , 932 N.W.2d 257, 266-67 (Minn. 2019).

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definition. See Back, 902 N.W.2d at 28 ( noting that the word “and” in a statute imposes
another requirement).
While neither party assigns an y ambiguity to the newly added, and undefined,
phrase “any evidence of factual innocence,” aspects of both parties’ arguments require us
to interpret this phrase. When interpreting and construing laws, we seek to ascertain and
effectuate the legislature’s intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018); Buhl, 922 N.W.2d at 438.
We give words and phrases within a statute their ordinary meaning, State v. Stru zyk, 869
N.W.2d 280, 284 ( Minn. 2015), and may consult dictionary definitions to determine an
undefined term’s common meaning, State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 ( Minn.
2017).
A “fact” is “[s]omething that actually exists; an aspect of reality” or “[a]n actual or
alleged event or circumstance, as distinguished f rom its legal effect, consequence or
interpretation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 735 (11th ed. 2019). In this way, “[f]acts include
not just tangible things, actual occurrences, and relationships, but also states of min d such
as intentions and the holding of opinions.” Id. “Innocence” means “[t]he absence of guilt;
esp[ecially], freedom from guilt for a particular offense.” Id. at 942.
By its plain terms, the phrase “any evidence of factual innocence” means any
evidence that shows some fact establishing the absence of the petitioner’s guilt. We
observe that the legislature excluded no particular type of evidence. See Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2). But the evidence must show factual innocence. See id.2

2 Because we conclude that the relevant statutory language is unambiguous, we need not
consider the parti es’ arguments about the legislative history surrounding the recent

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II. Appellant does not satisfy MIERA’s thres hold exoneration requirement
To determine whether appellant satisfied the threshold exoneration requirement, we
analyze the basis for the order vacating his convictions and granting him a new trial.
Appellant received a new trial for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984) (explaining that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of
counsel). To secure a reversal of his conviction, appellant had to show both that his
counsel’s performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and that this
deficient performance prejudiced him. See State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 ( Minn.
2019) (explaining the two -part Strickland test for ineffective -assistance-of-counsel
claims). Neither prong required appellant to establish his factual innocence.
In its order granting appellant a new trial, the district court explained that appellant’s
trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation by not requesting helpful
documents and not contacting witnesses who could have offered opinion testimony about
the victim’s character for untruthfulness.3 The documents not requested for appellant’s
trial chronicled the victim’s dishonest behavior while she was in the child -protectio n
system. The district court held that the opinion testimony and additional documents about

amendment. See Nelson v. State , 896 N.W.2d 879, 885 (Minn. App. 2017) (“[A]bsent
ambiguity, this court does not resort to legislative history to interpret a statute.” (quotatio n
omitted)), review denied (Minn. Aug. 8, 2017).
3 The victim had lied about conditions in her foster care placement to try to obtain a
different placement.

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the victim’s character for untruthfulness created a reason able pro bability that the trial
outcome would have been different.
The parties offer conflicting views about the implications of this evidence.
Appellant asserts that evidence of the victim’s past pattern of lying goes b eyond mere
impeachment evidence and this makes it more likely that he did not commit the charged
offenses. For its part, the state contends that appellant reads the statute too broadly and
that the evidence involving the victim’s previous lies is not “any evidence of factual
innocence.”
It is true that, at a new trial, the rules of evidence would have allowed appellant to
elicit reputation and opinion testimony from several witnesses about the victim’s character
for untruthfulness, and appellant could have cross-examined the victim about these prior
incidents as probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Minn. R. Evid. 608 (a), (b).
But evidence showing the victim’s pattern of past dishonesty does not constitute “any
evidence of factual innocence.” This evidence d oes nothing to show appellant’s lack of
guilt for the charged offenses.
Instead, evidence about the victim’s lying involves her credibility as a witness, not
appellant’s guilt or innocence for the charged offenses. Even though the victim lied about
past matters, this does not mean that she lied about appellant sexually abusin g her here.
Had there been a new trial, the fact -finder would have had the right to assess witness
credibility. Francis v. State, 729 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2007). The evidence underlying
the district court’s grant of a new trial shows only that the vic tim had lied several times
about prior, unrelated events; it does not show appellant’s guilt or innocence.

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Appellant did not establish that the victim had recanted her accusation that appellant
sexually touched her.4 And Minnesota law does not require corroboration of the testimo ny
of a victim of criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2018). Even still,
the record contains substantial corroboration; four other witnesses testified at appellant’s
trial about the alleged incident consistent with the victim’s testimony.
Based on the specific facts of this case, we hold that the impeachment evidence
about the victim’s pattern of dishonesty does not constitute “any evidence of factual
innocence” under MIERA. Appellant received a new trial based only on his trial counsel’s
failure to conduct a re asonable pretrial investigation, and that failure does not represent
“any evidence of factual innocenc e” because it does not show appellant’s absence from
guilt for the charged offenses.
Our analysis does not foreclose a petitioner’s ability to meet MIERA’s exoneratio n
requirement through impeachment evidence. For example, if a witness came forward and
explained that the victim told them that she had fabricated the entire sexual-assault claim,
this would represent “any evidence of factual innocence.” This hypothetical scenario
would represent an actual event or occurrence tending to show appellant’s lack of guilt

4 In his reply brief, appellant argues that the state forfeited any argument about the lack of
recantation here. We disagree. The record on appeal includes “[t]he documents filed in
the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 110.01. In its memorandum of law opposing appellant’s petition for exoneratio n
compensation, the state listed witness recantation as an example of evidence tending to
show factual innocence. Because the state made this argument below, we may consider it.

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from the charged offenses.5 In contrast, evidence about the victim’s past dishonesty does
not establish appellant’s factual innocence.
D E C I S I O N
Impeachment evidence about a victim’s prior dishonesty unrelated to the underlying
crime does not constitute “any evidence of factual innocence” under the statute’s definitio n
of “on grounds consistent with innocence.” As a result, appellant does not meet MIERA’s
threshold exoneration requirement, and the district court correctly denied his petition for
an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation.
Affirmed.

5 Other evidence of factual innocence would include DNA evidence establishing someone
else committed the charged offense o r an alibi witness who testified that a petitioner did
not commit the charged offense.