In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. D. T. and J. M. O., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1253

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. D. T. and J. M. O., Parents.

Filed January 21, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Grant County District Court
File No. 26-JV-19-69

Matthew P. Franzese, Wheaton, Minnesota (for appellant-mother J.D.T.)

Justin R. Anderson, Anderson Law Office, P.A., Elbow Lake , Minnesota (for respondent
Grant County Social Services)

Geri Krueger, Glenwood, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-mother J.D.T. challenges the dist rict court’s order denying her petition to
voluntarily terminate her parental rights to her children and granting respondent Grant
County Social Services (GCSS)’s petition to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to
the children. She argues that the district court erred by (1) denying her petition for
voluntary terminati on of her parental rights and (2) declining to treat her petition for

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voluntary termination of her parental rights as superseding GCSS’s petition for involuntary
termination. We affirm.
FACTS
J.D.T. does not dispute that her parental rights to the children should have been
terminated but argues that they should have been terminated voluntarily rather than
involuntarily. The district court found the following facts.
J.D.T. is the biological mother of C.K.O. and B.R.O. (the children),1 who were ages
three and two, respectively, when J.D.T.’s parental rights to them were terminated. J.D.T.
has another child who is not involved in this matter but who was involved in a prior child-
in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) proceeding initiated in 2015. That matter ended
when J.D.T. voluntarily transferred custody of the child to the child’s father. A few months
later, C.K.O. was born. When C.K.O. was only two days old, Pope County Family Services
opened a file relating to his neglect. In March 2016, when he was two months old, C.K.O.
was removed from the home on an emergency hold after law enforcement arrested his
father on felony drug charges and found controlled substances in the home where C.K.O.,
J.D.T., and father resided. The resulting CHIPS matter was closed in September 2016 after
C.K.O.’s father and J.D.T. complied with their case plan. In August 2017, B.R.O. was born.

1 The children’s shared biological father, J.M.O., was also a party to these proceedings in
the district court, as GCSS petitioned to terminate both his and J.D.T.’s parental rights, but
the district court denied the termination of parental rights (TPR) petition in regards to
father.

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GCSS filed the CHIPS petition underlying this case in May 2018. At that time, the
district court ordered that both parents provid e hair follicle samples. Both parents tested
positive for methamphetamine. B.R.O. also tested positive for high levels of
methamphetamine. As a result, law enforcement removed th e children from the home on
June 13. At a pretrial hearin g on June 26, J.D.T. admitted the allegations in the CHIPS
petition, specifically acknowledging that her children were in need of protection or services
due to her drug use. GCSS filed, and the district court approved, an out-of-home-placement
plan that required that J.D.T.
(1) remain sober from all illegal drugs; (2) complete a Rule 25
Chemical Assessment and follow all recommendations;
(3) complete a diagnostic assessment and follow all
recommendations; (4) complete a parenting education course;
(5) complete a parental-capac ity assessment and follow all
recommendations; (6) find employment or other services to be
able to provide for herself and her children financially.

A few months later, in an October 1 orde r, the district court noted that J.D.T. had
only minimally cooperated with social services. From June 26 to September 12, 2018, she
attended only two of the arranged parenting visits with the children, with the result that she
had engaged with them for only four hours in the span of 78 days. During the same period,
she had refused drug tests on multiple occasions and tested positive for methamphetamine
use on other occasions.
J.D.T. entered an in-patient chemical-dependency treatment program in December
2018 and was discharged in late-January 2019 . On February 25, 2019, she tested positive
for methamphetamine. At that time, she was about four months pr egnant. She did not

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appear for scheduled drug testing on March 7, 22, and 29, and then again tested positive
for methamphetamine on April 1.
On March 11, 2019, GCSS filed a petition to terminate J.D.T.’s parental rights to
C.K.O. and B.R.O. (GCSS’s TPR petition). GCSS’s TPR petition reque sted termination
based on Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b )(5) (2018), which perm its termination when
reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions
leading to out-of-home placement. At an admit-or-deny hearing on April 22, 2019, J.D.T.
offered to admit the allegations in GCSS’s TPR petition but wanted any termination of her
parental rights to be considered voluntary ra ther than involuntary. GCSS objected to a
voluntary termination, and the district court set another hearing to address the involuntary-
versus-voluntary issue. The parties appear ed again on May 13, a nd J.D.T. denied the
allegations in GCSS’s TPR petition.
On May 21, a few days before the scheduled TPR trial, J.D.T. filed a petition to
voluntarily terminate her pare ntal rights to the children (voluntary TPR petition). Her
supporting affidavit stated that she desired to terminate her parental rights for the following
reasons:
I am now and in the foreseeable future unable to comply with
the duties imposed upon me by the parent and child
relationship with my minor children, [C.K.O. and B.R.O.].
More specifically, I believe that the minor children have been
in foster care for too long a nd need to be placed with a
permanent family unit (prefera bly a family member), and I
further believe that I am presently unable to provide the minor
children with the care and stability that they need in order to
focus on the impending birth of my new child, maintaining my
sobriety, and obtaining gainful employment.

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The same day, GCSS filed an objection to J.D.T.’s voluntary TPR petition, with a
supporting memorandum. GCCS asked the district court to consider its TPR petition before
J.D.T.’s and made various arguments against voluntary termination, including that J.D.T.’s
petition was not supported by good cause be cause she merely filed it to avoid the
presumption of palpable unfitness to be a parent that would follow an involuntary
termination of her parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018) (“It is
presumed that a parent is palp ably unfit to be a party to th e parent and child relationship
upon a showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were
involuntarily terminated . . . .”).
At trial on May 24 and June 20, J.D.T. did not testify and rested on her voluntary
TPR petition and affidavit. In its July 23 order, the district court denied J.D.T.’s voluntary
TPR petition because it found that her stated basis for the request did “not rise to the level
of ‘good cause.’” It also granted GCSS’s involuntary TPR petiti on, though, because it
found that the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement had not been
corrected.
J.D.T. now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
J.D.T. argues that the district court erred by (1) denying her voluntary TPR petition
and (2) declining to treat her voluntary TPR petition as superseding GCSS’s TPR petition.
No other party participated in this appeal. We address each of J.D.T.’s arguments in turn.

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I. The district court did not err by de nying J.T.D.’s petition for voluntary
termination of her parental rights.

A district court’s finding regarding whether a parent’s desire for a voluntary
termination of parental right s is based on good cause “mus t be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481,
485 (Minn. 1997). On review, “[c]onsiderable deference is due to the district court’s
decision because a district court is in a superior position to a ssess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.1996). “Interpretation of
a statute,” though, “involves a question of law, which is subject to de novo review.” In re
Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. 2004).
Minn. Stat. § 260.301, subd. 1 (2018), provides that parental rights may be
terminated voluntarily or involuntarily. Parental rights may be voluntarily terminated “with
the written consent of a parent who for good cause desires to terminate parental rights.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a). Under this statute, the inquiry is simply not whether
good cause exists to terminate the parent’s rights; it is whether the parent “for good cause
desires” to have their rights terminated. Id. Subdivision 1(b) of th e same chapter governs
involuntary terminations. When one or more of the nine enumerated deficiencies exists, a
district court may terminate parental rights involuntarily. Minn. Stat. § 260.301, subd. 1(b).
“[C]ircumstances that justify involuntary term ination do not necessarily justify voluntary
termination.” In re Welfare of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. App. 2004).
J.D.T. argues that the district court erred in two ways in denying her petition. First,
she argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering the effect that an

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involuntary termination would have on her ability to parent future children. Second, she
argues that good cause does exist for a voluntary termination of her parental rights.
We turn first to whether the district court impermissibly considered the effect of an
involuntary termination on J.D.T.’s ability to parent future children. The “effect” at issue
is that, “[o]nce it has been shown that the parental rights to one or more children have been
involuntarily terminated, Minnesota law presumes the parent to be palpably unfit to be a
party to a parent-child relationship.” In re Welfare of Child of T.C.M. , 758 N.W.2d 340,
343 (Minn. App. 2008); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, su bd. 1(b)(4). Once this
presumption applies, the burden then shifts to the parent to produce evidence sufficient “to
support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the children.”
In re Welfare of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted).
J.D.T., who was pregnant at the time of tria l, essentially suggests that the district
court denied her voluntary TPR petition in favor of GCSS ’s TPR petition so that the
presumption of unfitness to parent would apply to her. For support, she points to the district
court’s finding in paragraph 42 of its order, which states:
[J.D.T.] understood that if her parental rights were involuntary
terminated, then the County would have the ability to take her
unborn child once that child wa s born, and she would have to
overcome the presumption of unfitness. She further understood
that if she were allowed to vol untarily terminate her parental
rights, then the presumption of unfitness would not arise.

J.D.T. then cites only an unp ublished opinion from this c ourt to support her argument.
Unpublished opinions are of limite d value in deciding an appeal. See Minn. Stat.
§ 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2018) (stating that “[u]npublished opinions of the Court of Appeals

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are not precedential”); In re Collier , 726 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. 2007) (noting that
unpublished opinions are not precedential).
We are unpersuaded by J.D.T.’s argument for several reasons. First, the unpublished
case that she cites references the permissible considerations for an involuntary, rather than
a voluntary, termination. Involuntary termination of parental rights is specifically governed
by the statutory conditions in Minn. Stat. 260C.301, su bd. 1(b)(1)-(9), whereas “good
cause” for voluntary termination is undefined by statute and is presented as a flexible
standard in the controlling caselaw. See A.S., 698 N.W.2d at 195. She cites no authority
that suggests that a court may not consider the effect on future children when determining
whether a parent desires, for good cause, to voluntarily terminate their parental rights.
Furthermore, J.D.T.’s argument appears to rely on the assumption that, if the district
court granted her volunt ary TPR petition, it c ould not also grant GCSS’s involuntary
petition. This assumption, though, is without support in any rule of procedure or controlling
caselaw; as explained below in section II, we see no reason why the district court could not
have granted either or both petitions.
Finally, even if J.D.T. had shown that the district court is prohibited from
considering the effect of an involuntary te rmination when assessing whether a parent
desires for good cause to voluntarily term inate their rights, her argument seems to
mischaracterize the import of the district cour t’s finding regarding the future effect. The
district court explained why it did not find J.D.T.’s request for voluntary termination
supported by good cause as follows:

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[J.D.T.’s] purported basis for requesting voluntary termination
does not rise to the level of “go od cause.” [J.D.T.] claims that
with the impending birth of her fourth child, she cannot provide
care and stability to her two youngest children and maintain
her sobriety and maintain ga inful employment. But these
obstacles are common obstacles fo r any parent with chemical
dependency issues. While she might have some stresses, such
is parenting. The basis advanced by [J.D.T.] for requesting
voluntary termination is simply not credible, given the timing
and the known impact.

(Emphasis added.) The “timing” of the moti on for voluntary termination was a few days
before the TPR trial. The “kno wn impact” seems to refer to the district court’s finding in
paragraph 42, quoted above, th at J.D.T. knew about the cons equences of an involuntary
termination on her ability to parent future children.
A district court, in assessing a good- cause desire for voluntary termination,
determines “whether [the parent ] had sound reasons for consenting at the time of
termination.” D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d at 486 (emphasis adde d). Here, the district court
questioned the grounds for vol untary termination advanced by J.D.T. in her petition and
affidavit, which she did not support with further evidence at trial. In doing so, the district
court found that J.D.T. knew about the consequences of an involuntary termination versus
a voluntary one and that her knowledge, along with the timing of her petition (filed a few
days before trial), called into question the credibility of the reason she advanced as her
good-cause desire to terminate parental rights. J.D.T. cites no law to suggest that a district
court cannot, in its determination of “good cause,” consider whether the parent’s purported
basis for seeking termination is credible. Accordingly, J.D.T. has not shown that the district

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court erred by considering an impermissible factor when it determined whether she desired
for good cause to terminate her parental rights to the children.
We turn to J.D.T.’s second argument, which is that “good cause exists to voluntarily
terminate [her] parental rights.” J.D.T. does not frame this argument in terms of a particular
appellate standard of review, but we understand her argument as implicating the clear-error
standard. “[T]ermination of parental rights is always discretionary with the juvenile court,”
In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014), and appellate courts
apply a clear-error standard of review to the district court’s factual findings that a statutory
ground for termination of parental rights exists, In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643,
648 (Minn. 1995). A district court’s finding on whether a parent for good cause desires to
terminate parental rights is reviewed for clear error. D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d at 485 (“The trial
court’s finding of good cause in this case mu st be upheld if supp orted by substantial
evidence and not clearly erroneous.”).
In her petition and affidavit for voluntary termination, J.D.T. offered the following
bases to support her request: her chemical dependency, her children’s need for a permanent
family unit, and her inability to provide care and stability for the children while she is
focusing on the impending birth of her ne w child, maintaining s obriety, and obtaining
employment. The district court found that J. D.T.’s asserted bases for termination were
“common obstacles for any parent with chemical dependency issues,” did not “rise to the
level of ‘good cause,’” and were “simply not credible, gi ven the timing and the known
impact” of her request.

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In support of her argument that the district court erred, J.D.T. asserts that her stated
reasons for voluntary termination “are sound [and] fall right in line with the cases” cited in
her brief. “Good cause” is a flexible standard, though, and it can be found “under a variety
of circumstances.” W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d at 712 (quotation omitted); compare In re Welfare
of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 17-19 (Min n. 1982) (upholding the tr ial court’s finding of good
cause when a one-year-old child had resided in a foster home since birth, the parent had
not visited the child, and the parent did not believe that she was able to take care of a second
child), and In re Welfare of J.M.S. , 268 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1978) (concluding that
mother had “good cause” for requesting termin ation where she desired that her child to
have two adoptive parents), with In re Welfare of Alle , 230 N.W.2d 574, 576-77 (Minn.
1975) (holding that good cause did not ex ist when the parent’s sole motivation for
voluntary termination appeared to be avoidi ng the financial burden of supporting his
adoptive children).
Here, the district court questioned whether J.D.T.’s desire to terminate her parental
rights was indeed motivated by good cause. J.D.T. did not offer anything in support of her
voluntary TPR petition beyond the affidavit that she submitted with it. Good cause exists
under circumstances “usually related to the best interests of the child.” A.S., 698 N.W.2d
at 195. And, here, the district court appears to have reasonably concluded that J.D.T. had
not demonstrated a concern with the best interests of the children but rather with protecting
her own interest in parenting her future child. In light of the timing of J.D.T.’s request and
the limited information that sh e presented to the district court regarding her purported
good-cause desire for termination, we discern no clear error by the district court.

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II. J.D.T.’s petition for voluntary term ination of her parental rights did not
supersede GCSS’s petition for involuntary termination of her parental rights.

J.D.T. also argues that, because the dist rict court erred by denying her petition for
voluntary termination, this court should (1) reverse the district court’s order granting
GCSS’s petition for involuntary termination and (2) remand to the district court to issue a
new order granting voluntary termination. She bases this request on an argument that her
petition for voluntary termination “supersedes ,” or “supplants,” GCSS’s petition for
involuntary termination. She cites the following language from W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d at 712,
in support of her argument:
[T]here are at least two proc edures parents can utilize to
convert an involuntary termin ation petition in to a voluntary
one. Parents can: (1) file a new petition supported by a factual
basis articulating good cause and cite to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(a), as th e statutory authority for the
petition; or (2) formally amend th e original petition to cite to
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( a), as the statutory basis for
the petition.

We disagree that J.D.T.’s petition has the pr ocedural effect that she asserts. J.D.T.
contends that, under W.L.P., a parent can, at any time during termination proceedings,
“convert” a county’s involuntary TPR petition to a voluntary TPR petition simply by filing
his or her own termination petition, thereby preventing the district court from granting the
county’s involuntary TPR petition. We disagree that W.L.P. permits this result.
In W.L.P., the issue before this court was whet her a parent, by simply admitting to
the allegations in the county’s involuntary TPR petition, “converted” the proceeding into a
voluntary termination. 678 N.W.2d at 711. We held that th e admission did not have such
an effect for several reasons, including that (1) circumstances that justify involuntary

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termination do not necessarily justify voluntary termination; (2) the county, rather than the
parent, filed the TPR petition; (3) the TPR petition alleged five grounds for involuntary
termination; and (4) the parent had “at leas t two procedures” available to “convert” an
involuntary TPR petition to a voluntary one—file a new petiti on and cite to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(a), or have the origin al petition amended to include the statutory
ground of subdivision 1(a). Id. at 712. The W.L.P. opinion does not cite to a case or rule of
procedure for the proposition about “convert[ing]” a TPR petition. See id.
We recently rejected an appellant-parent’s contention, which was likewise based on
W.L.P., that he had converted an involuntary TPR proceeding into a voluntary proceeding
by filing his own voluntary TPR petition. See In re Welfare of N.E.R., No. A17-1112, 2018
WL 492654, at *5 (Minn. Ap p. Jan. 22, 2018). Though unpublished and thus not
precedential, N.E.R. usefully lays out three reasons why the parent’s argument and reliance
on W.L.P. was “unavailing.” Id. at *4. First, the language in W.L.P. was dicta, as the court
was not presented with a parent’s attempt to convert the proceedings via filing their own
termination petition in that case. Id. Second, the W.L.P. court provided no authority for its
“convert” language and the Rules of Juveni le Protection Procedure authorize no such
conversion. Id. at *5.
Third, and most importantly, allo wing a parent to unilaterally
prevent the involuntary termination of his parental rights even
if statutory grounds for an involuntary termination are alleged
and proved is inconsistent with “[t]he paramount consideration
in all juvenile protection proc eedings,” which is the health,
safety, and best interests of the child.

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Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2( a) (2016)). We reasoned that “allowing a
parent to unilaterally ‘convert’ an involun tary TPR proceeding into a voluntary one and
thereby eliminate a potential presumption of palpable unfitness that could protect other
children who may be affected by the TPR woul d usurp the district court’s authority to
provide for the best interests of children.” Id. We adopt this rationale here and decline to
hold that J.D.T.’s voluntary TPR petition “converted” or “supplanted” GCSS’s involuntary
TPR petition. The district court had the authority to grant termination of J.D.T.’s parental
rights to the children on the basis of either or both petitions.
Affirmed.