State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1256

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chinomso Emmanuel Onuoha,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-2440

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Following a bench trial, appellant Chinomso Emmanuel Onuoha appeals his
convictions for prostitution under Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3) (2016) and

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electronic solicitation of a child under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1) (2016). He
argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. He also
argues that the district court erred by entering multiple convictions in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.04 (2016). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Onuoha’s
convictions, but that the district court erre d in convicting appellant of both offenses.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
The state charged Onuoha w ith prostitution of an indivi dual aged 13 to 15 under
Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3) and el ectronic solicitation of a child under Minn.
Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1). Onuoha waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded
to a bench trial.
At trial, the state called three law enforc ement witnesses who were involved in the
operation that led to Onuoha’s arrest. On January 26, 2018, officers with the Minnetonka
Police Department placed multiple advertisements on backpage.com (Backpage) as a part
of the Guardian Angel Operation—an oper ation targeting individuals seeking and
soliciting minors to engage in prostitution. Backpage no longer exists, but in January 2018,
it was well known for being a website where people could solicit and engage in prostitution.
Police placed the advertisements on the “men seeking women” location of the website—a
location where prostitutes would commonly place advertisements.
The advertisements that police posted on this day stated that the posters were
18 or 19 years old. An officer familiar with Backpage testified that Backpage will “pull
the ad immediately” if the poster indicated th at he or she was under 18 years old. Each

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advertisement included a phon e number, the fictitious person’ s general location, and the
fictitious person’s age. The advertisements included photographs of women above the age
of 18. They did not explicitly advertise sexual services.
When a person responded to an advertisement, an officer would portray himself as
the fictitious person who posted it. Onuoha responded to one of the advertisements by
texting the phone number on the advertisement. The state submitted as evidence the text
message conversation between Onuoha and the fictitious person. Onuoha told the fictitious
person that he was looking for someone to “meet twice a week.” The following exchange
then occurred:
FP1: ok whats ur age and race?

A: I am 25 and a respectful black

A: would you be willi ng to have something
ongoing?

FP: ok im 15 and spunky white :-) and yes

A: ok cool. when are you free?

An officer with training and experience in investigating prostitution testified that a “larger
percentage” of potential buyers will disengag e a conversation when they learn that the
fictitious person is under 18. Onuoha did not disengage.
Onuoha and the fictitious person then disc ussed the price for a half hour or a full
hour of the fictitious person’s time, where the fictitious person was located, the fictitious
person’s physique, whether the fictitious pe rson would “go multiple times,” and whether

1 We refer to the fictitious person as “FP” and Onuoha as “A”.

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the fictitious person would be “c ool with [them] tongue kissi ng a lot.” He attempted to
negotiate a lower price with the fictitious pe rson because he planned to see her multiple
times per week. During this negotiation, both Onuoha and the fictitious person used slang
that, according to witness testimony, is commonly used in prostitution transactions. When
the fictitious person indicated that she would consider a lower rate, the following exchange
occurred:
A: ok cool. Just to confirm are u 15 or 16?

FP: 15

A: umm. That might be a probl em. It would be better if u
were at least 16

A: I could get in trouble for seeing someone who’s less
than 16

FP: oh. well lmk then if u don’t want to come i wont be mad

A: I will still come at least to get to know u. How does
6:30 sound?

FP: ok hit me up later i thought u were coming now, but ill
be around tonight too

A: Sorry about that. Are you usually available most days
of the week?

FP: no I skipped out of school today. i don’t actually post
that much

A: What about at night?

FP: sometimes today i am good all day

A: ok

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About three hours later, Onuoha contacted the fictitious person and discussed when
he could meet with her. Th e fictitious person gave instru ctions on how to reach her
location. Onuoha followed the instructions, appeared at the apartment that he was led to,
and was arrested by police. An officer searched Onuoha. The officer found Onuoha’s cell
phone, wallet, driver’s license, and a college ID. Onuoha did not have any money or
condoms.
Onuoha testified about his upbringing, his struggles with relating to women, and his
pursuit of a romantic relationship that purported ly led to this incident. Onuoha testified
that he began using Backpage after unsuccessfully attempting to find relationships on other
dating websites. He testified that he ha d arranged other meetups with women through
Backpage, but that those women’s characteristics—specifically their age, gender, or race—
were not consistent with the characteristic s identified on their Backpage posting. He
testified that at one meeting with a woman from Backpage, he was robbed. Consequently,
Onuoha stopped bringing valuables to meetings that he arranged on Backpage. Onuoha
found one relationship that he considered successful on Backpage, but that woman moved
away and he lost contact with her.
Onuoha testified that his goal in using Backpage was to find a companion, but that
if the relationship “turned out to also be sexual,” he was “fine with that.” He testified that
he was willing to pay for companionship and that he was “okay” if he also ended up having
sex with the person.
Onuoha testified that he knew that the fictitious person was an escort. He admitted
that when he discussed mee ting with the fictitious person, he was discussing meetings

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involving sexual contact. And Onuoha acknowle dged that he read the text message in
which the fictitious person reveal ed that she was 15 years old. But Onuoha testified that
when he responded “ok cool. when are you free” to that message, he was not paying
attention to her age. He also testified that he only went to the apar tment to “verify what
the situation was and who [the fictitious] person was.” He claimed that he did not intend
to have sex with the fictitious person, and that was the reason that he did not bring money
or condoms. He testified that if he found out the person was unde rage, he would have
walked out “immediately.”
The district court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order
finding Onuoha guilty of both counts. The district court adjudicated Onuoha guilty of both
counts but only imposed a sentence on the prostitution conviction.
Onuoha appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Onuoha argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions for prostitution and electronic solicita tion of a child. He also argues that his
multiple convictions violate Minn. Stat. § 609.04. We address each issue in turn.
I. The evidence was sufficient to support both convictions.
Onuoha maintains that the evidence introduced at tria l was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of either prostitution or electronic solicitation
of a child. The state argues th at the evidence was su fficient to support both convictions.
We first consider the appropriate standard of review and then address whether the evidence
was sufficient to support Onuoha’s convictions.

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A. We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the circumstantial-evidence
standard of review.

The parties disagree over whether the tr aditional direct-evidence standard or the
heightened circumstantial-evidence standard applies to our review of the sufficiency of the
evidence. The state argues th at the traditional direct-evidence standard applies because
Onuoha’s text messages to the fictitious person are direct evidence of his intent and beliefs.
The circumstantial-evidence standard is appropriate when the conviction is based
on circumstantial evidence, meaning that proof of the offense, or a single element of the
offense, is based solely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297,
307 (Minn. 2014). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the [fact-finder] can
infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
599 (Minn. 2017) (quo tation omitted). Direct evidence, on the other hand, is evidence
“based on personal knowledge or observation an d that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted). The traditional direct-evidence
standard applies “when a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone.”
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).
Onuoha’s text messages do not directly demonstrate his belief regarding the
fictitious person’s age or his intent without in ference or presumption. Instead, his text
messages must be interpreted to infer whethe r he believed that the fictitious person was
15 years old, at what point he developed that belief, and whether he intended the fictitious
person to engage in sexual conduct with him. Because there is no direct evidence of

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Onuoha’s belief and intent, we review th e sufficiency of the evidence under the
circumstantial-evidence standard of review.
A conviction based on circumstantial evid ence “warrants heightened scrutiny.”
State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). When the conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence, we conduct a two-step analysis. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601
(describing the two-step circumstantial-evidence standard of review in an appeal following
a jury trial). We apply the same standard of review to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim
following a court trial that we would following a jury trial. See State v. Franks ,
765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009). First, we identify the circumstances proved at trial,
disregarding evidence that is not consis tent with the fact-finder’s verdict. Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601. Second, we consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the circumstances proved. Id. At this stage of the analys is, we give no deference to the
fact-finder’s choice among reasonable inferences. Id. “To sustain [a] conviction, the
circumstances proved, when vi ewed as a whole, must be consistent with a reasonable
inference that the accused is guilty and inconsiste nt with any rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Id. But, “[w]e will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 330
(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). “This is because the State’s burden is not to remove all
doubt but to remove all reasonable doubt.” State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn.
App. 2019) (quotation omitted). Applying the two-step anal ysis, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain both convictions.

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B. The evidence was sufficient to support Onuoha’s conviction of engaging in
prostitution under Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3).

A person is guilty of prostitution of an individual aged 13 to 15 if he (1) intentionally
(2) hires or offers or agrees to hire (3) an individual who the actor reasonably believes to
be under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years (4) to engage in sexual penetration or
contact.2 Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3). The elements in dispute on appeal are
whether Onuoha reasonably be lieved that the fictitious person was 15 years old and
whether, at the time he offered or agreed to hire the fictitious person, he held the belief that
she was 15 years old.
The circumstances proved relevant to this offense include the undisputed substance
of Onuoha’s text message conversation with the fictitious person. In that conversation, the
fictitious person revealed that she was 15 ye ars old before Onuoha negotiated the price,
duration, and substance of sexual acts. Th en, Onuoha asked the fictitious person to
“confirm” whether she was 15 or 16 years old, despite having no in formation to suggest
that the fictitious person was 16 years old. In the same text message, Onuoha indicated
that he could get in trouble if the fictitious person was not at least 16 years old. Onuoha
told the fictitious person that he would still come to meet her to get to know her. Thereafter,
the fictitious person texted Onuoha directions to her location. In addition to the content of
the text messages, the other circumstances pr oved include: that Onuoha responded to an

2 “Sexual contact” means “the intentional t ouching by an individual of a prostitute’s
intimate parts” or “the intentional touching by a prostitute of another individual’s intimate
parts” if the act “can reasonably be construe d as being for the purpose of satisfying the
actor’s sexual impulses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.321, subd. 10 (2016).

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advertisement on Backpage that indicated that the poster was 18 or 19 years old; that the
advertisement contained a photograph depicting an adult woman; that Onuoha appeared at
the apartment that the fictitious person directed him to; that Onuoha had previously been
robbed at a meeting that he set up through Backpage, and he consequently stopped bringing
valuables to meetings he arranged on the website; and that Onuoha did not bring money or
condoms to the apartment but did have his phone, wallet, and identification with him.3
Onuoha concedes that the circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable
inference that he is guilty. But he argues that a rational hypothesis of innocence is
consistent with the circumstances proved—specifically, that it is rational to infer from the
circumstances proved that he did not believe that the fic titious person was 15 years old
until she confirmed it a second time in the text message conversation, and that after that
point, he did not intentionally hire, offer to hi re, or agree to hire the fictitious person to
engage in sexual conduct. The state argue s that Onuoha’s alternative hypothesis is
unreasonable given the circumstances proved.
We conclude that the hypo thesis that Onuoha did not offer to hire the fictitious
person at a time he believed her to be 15 years old is incons istent with the circumstances
proved. Onuoha negotiated the price, durati on, and substance of sexual acts with the
fictitious person after she revealed that she was 15 years old. He admitted that he read the
fictitious person’s text message that she was 15 years old. And when he later texted her to

3 We disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the district court’s guilty verdict and,
consequently, do not consider Onuoha’s testimony that he was not paying attention to the
fictitious person’s age when she first stated it. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.

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“confirm” her age, his confirmation text message did not indicate any genuine doubt as to
her age. He did not ask her whether she wa s 18 or 19, consistent with the Backpage
advertisement. Instead, he asked her “to conf irm” whether she was “15 or 16,” told her
that “it would be better” if sh e were at least 16, and indicate d that he could get in trouble
if she was not at least 16 years old. His statements that “it would be better” if the fictitious
person was 16 and that he “could get in troubl e” if she was not at least 16 are reasonably
interpreted as a suggestion that the fictitious person identify herself as 16 years old so that
Onuoha could engage in a sexual relationship with the fictitious person without getting in
trouble. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that, when he asked the fictitious
person to confirm whether she was “15 or 16 ,” Onuoha had no basi s to think that she
was 16, and not 15. Prior to his request for confirmation of her age, the only information
that she had provided to Onuoha during the text message conversation was that she was
15 years old.
Viewed as a whole, the circumstances pr oved do not support Onuoha’s alternative
hypothesis that he did not reasonably believe the fictitious person was 15 years old at the
time he offered to hire her to engage in sexual contact. It is not ra tional to conclude that
Onuoha had any real doubt as to the fictitious person’s age at the time he negotiated with
her. We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Onuoha is guilty
of prostitution of an individual aged 13 to 15 under Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3).

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C. The evidence was sufficient to support Onuoha’s conv iction of electronic
solicitation of a child under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1).

Onuoha also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he is guilty of
electronic solicitation of a child under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1). Again, we are
not persuaded.
A person is guilty of electronic solicitation of a child if (1) he is 18 years of age or
older, (2) using an electronic communication system (3) he solicits someone he reasonably
believes is a child to engage in sexual conduct, and (4) he has the intent to arouse the sexual
desire of any person. Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1). In this context, “child” means “a
person 15 years of age or younger.” Id., subd. 1(a) (2016). The only elements at issue on
appeal are whether Onuoha reasonably believed that the fictitious person was a child and
whether he solicited the person to engage in sexual conduct at the time he believed the
fictitious person was a child.
Solicitation means “commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade a specific
person in person, by telephone, by letter, or by computerized or other electronic means.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 1(c) (2016). In State v. Koenig, the supreme court clarified
the definition of “solicit” used in the statute:
“Solicit” is defined as “commanding, entreating, or attempting
to persuade a specific person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.352,
subd. 1(c) (2002). The dictionary definition of “solicit” is “[t]o
seek to obtain by persuasion, entreaty, or formal application.”
While we do not rely on this definition of solicit because the
statute provides a definition, we note that the statute’s
definition appears to be in accord with the general
understanding of the word “solic it.” “Entreat” is defined as
“[t]o make an earnest request of .” “Earnest” is defined as
“[m]arked by or showing deep sincerity or seriousness.”

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Regarding an attempt to persuade , an “attempt” is defined as
“[a]n effort or try.” “Persuad e” means “[t]o cause (someone)
to do something by means of argument, reasoning, or
entreaty.” “Command” means “[t]o direct with authority; give
orders to.” The statute requires that the acts of commanding,
entreating, or attempting to persua de be directed at a specific
person. Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 1(c).

666 N.W.2d 366, 373 (Minn. 2003) (citations omitted). “Solicitation, like the offer to
engage in sexual conduct for hire, is an in choate activity which pe rmits application of
Minn. Stat. § 609.352 to conduct that is in some degrees ambiguous.” State v. McGrath,
574 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. A pp. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
April 14, 1998).
Onuoha maintains that the h ypothesis that he did not believe the fictitious person to
be 15 years old until she confirmed it, and did not solicit the fictitious person thereafter, is
rational and consistent with the circumstances proved. For many of the same reasons that
we affirm the sufficiency of the evidence of th e prostitution conviction, we conclude
Onuoha’s hypothesis is not rational given the circumstances proved. As discussed above,
it is not rational to conclude, given the circumstances proved, that Onuoha did not believe
that the fictitious person was not 15 years old when he negotiated sexual services.
Considering the explicit text messages negotia ting the price, substance, and duration of
sexual services and the fact that Onuoha appeared at the apartment after these negotiations,
it is not rational to believe that Onuoha’s text messages after the fictitious person confirmed
her age were not a continuation of his efforts to establish an ongoing sexual relationship
with the fictitious person. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Onuoha solicited the fictitious person to engage in sexual contact at a time that

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he reasonably believed her to be 15 years old, and that the evidence was sufficient to
support his conviction.
II. The district court erred by convicting Onuoha of both prostitution and
electronic solicitation of a child.

Onuoha next asserts that the district court erred by convi cting him of both
prostitution and electronic solicitation of a child in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.04. The
state agrees that we should reverse and rema nd with instructions to vacate one of the
convictions.
Section 609.04 provides that a person “may be convicted of either the crime charged
or an included offense, but not both.” The statute provides th at an offense is an included
offense of the crime charged if it is “necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.04. Application of section 609.04 is a question of law, which we review
de novo. State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 839 N.W.2d 515, 522 (Minn. 2013).
We conclude that the parties are correct that each crime for which Onuoha was
convicted was “necessarily prov ed” when the state proved th e other. Consequently, we
reverse in part and remand with instructions that the distri ct court vacate one conviction
and correct the warrant of commitment, but keep its finding of guilt in place pursuant to
the procedure outlined in State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.