State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1257

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lee Daniel Williams,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-K1-05-003833

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In this appeal from an order revoking probation, appellant argues that the order must
be reversed because (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay

2
evidence at the probation-revocation hearing over his objection without analyzing whether
it was necessary and reliable , and (2) the record does not support th e district court’s
findings that the alleged violation was intentional or inexcusable and that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. Because the district court did not
plainly err when it admitted hearsay evidence and the re cord supports the district court’s
findings, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2005, appellant Lee Daniel Williams was charged in Ramsey County
District Court with one count of possession of firearm by an ineligible felon in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2004). Following a court trial, the district court found
appellant guilty of the charged offense . At sentencing, a ppellant received a downward
dispositional departure . He was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, execution of
which was stayed for 15 years, and appellant was placed on probation.
In October 2017, Ramsey County Community Corrections ( RCCC) filed its first
probation-violation report, alleging that appellant failed to abstain from the use of drugs,
failed to report for urinalysis testing, and failed to enter chemical dependency treatment as
recommended by his r ule 25 evaluation. In February 2018, appellant admitted to the
violations. The district court reinstated him on probation and set a review hearing in
August 2018 to address e arly discharge from probation if appellant completed treatment
and had no positive urinalysis tests.
In July 2018, RCCC filed a second probation violation report, alleging that appellant
violated the conditions of his probation when he failed to appear for drug testing, failed to

3
abstain from the use of drugs, failed to complete chemical dependency treatment (he was
unsuccessfully discharged from Resurrection Recovery), and failed to enter a chemical
dependency treatment program after discharge from Resurre ction Recovery. In August
2018, appellant admitted to the first three violations and RCCC agreed to dismiss the
remaining alleged violation. Appellant was reinstated on probation and ordered to
complete treatment and aftercare. As an intermediate sancti on for the violations, the
district court ordered appellant to complete 365 days in the Ramsey County Correctional
Facility (the correctional facility). The district court also ordered appellant to complete an
updated chemical use assessment.
Appellant b egan his 365 -day sentence on September 5, 2018 , and obtained a
chemical health ass essment on September 27, 2018. The assessor recommended that
appellant complete the Day One Treatment Program by Restoration Counseling and
Community Services (DORS treatmen t program) while at the correctional facility .
Appellant subsequently appealed the assessment. Appellant started the DORS treatment
program on December 12, 2018 , and was unsuccessfully discharged on December 19,
2018, for refusing services, refusing to p articipate in any treatment planning, and per his
request to be discharged from the program. Appellant wrote a letter to the district court in
March 2019, requesting that he be released from the correctional facility in order to attend
a different treatment program. The district court denied appellant’s request and indicated
that appellant should contact his probation officer.
In April 2019, RCCC filed a third violation report, alleging that appellant violated
the conditions of his probation when he failed to complete chemical dependency treatment

4
while in custody at the correctional facility. Appellant denied the allegation and the district
court held a contested probation-revocation hearing. At the hearing, appellant testified that
after receiving the recommendation to complete the DORS treatment program, he talked
to others who were involved in the treatment program and determined that it was not a
good fit for him. Appellant testified that he made multiple attempts to arrange oth er
treatment options while in the correctional facility, including calling his probation officer,
asking his case worker and friends to call his probation officer on his behalf, contacting
other treatment facilities, and requesting that the district court allow him to be released
from the correctional facility early to attend a different treatment program. Appellant’s
probation officer testified that appellant was unsuccessfully discharged from the DORS
treatment program after attending for seven days, that appellant refused the services offered
to him, did not perceive a need for services to prevent future substance use, refused to
participate in treatment planning, asked to be discharged from the program, and indicated
that he wished instead to execute hi s sentence. 1 Following the probation-revocation
hearing, the district court issued an order revoking appellant’s probation and executing his
60-month sentence. This appeal follows.

1 The probation officer relied on information contained in th e DORS treatment program
discharge summary (the discharge summary). The discharge summary is a confidential
court document not accessible by the public.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not plainly err when it admitted hearsay evidence
without first finding that it was necessary and reliable.

a. Standard of Review
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
hearsay evidence over his objection without first finding that it was necessary and reliable,
resulting in a violation of appellant’s due process and confrontation rights. The hearsay
evidence at issue is the discharge summary testified to by appellant’s probation officer who
did not author the discharge summary.
The parties disagree about which standard of review applies. Appellant argues that
this court must apply the abuse -of-discretion standard of review. Conversely, the state
argues that this court should review th e district court’s admission of the hearsay evidence
for plain error because appellant did not “put the prosecutor or [the district court] on notice
of the particular argument that he now raises on appeal.”
Typically, “[e]videntiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court,
and [appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). However, “[a]ppellate review
of an evidentiary issue is forfeited when a defendant fails to object to the admission of
evidence.” State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018). And, “unless . . . a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context,” appellate courts will not consider

6
the challenge to the admission of the evidence. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617-
18 (Minn. 2014) (emphasis added).
Here, appellant objected to the admission of evidence on hearsay grounds when the
probation officer testified about the contents of the discharge summary. The state argued
that the rules of evidence do not apply to probation-revocation hearings, and the district
court overruled the objection and admitted the disc harge summary into evidence.
Appellant did not specifically object that the admission of the hearsay evidence violated
his rights under the Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause. And, given that
appellant’s objection consisted only of “[o]bjection, hearsay,” and nothing more, it is not
apparent from the context of the objection that the Confrontation or Due Process Clauses
were the specific grounds for appellant’s challenge. Accordingly, because appellant failed
to object specifically , and therefore failed to preserve his challenge under either the
Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause, we review the district court’s admission of
the hearsay evidence for plain error. See id. (concluding that plain-error analysis applied
where appellant did not object specifically under the Confrontation Clause and it was not
apparent from the context of the objection that the Confrontation Clause was the spec ific
ground for the objection).
b. Plain Error Review
For an appellate court to review an unob jected-to error, there must be “(1) error;
(2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these three prongs are
met, the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.

7
1998). “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error
contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782,
787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Under the plain -error doctrine, an ‘error’ is a
‘deviation from a legal rule [] unless the rule has been waived.’” State v. Kelley , 855
N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted). An error is considered plain if it is “clear
or obvious.” State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that even under plain-error review, this court must reverse because
the district court erroneously admitted the hearsay evidence, the error was plain, and the
error affected appellant’s substantial rights. Appellant acknowledges that the rules of
evidence generally do not preclude the admission of hearsay evidence in probation
revocation proceedings. Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). However, appellant relies on State v.
Johnson, 679 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. App. 2004) to argue that the district court erred when it
admitted the discharge summary without first analyzing whether it was reliable and
necessary. Appellant misconstrues this court’s holding in Johnson. In Johnson, this court
considered whether a probation officer’s letter was inadmissible hearsay evidence at the
probation revocation proceeding. Id. at 173. After reviewing caselaw from other states,
we concluded that “when the defendant has had ample opportunity to present evidence in
a probation revocation proceeding, the rules of evidence do not preclude admission of
hearsay evidence, such as a letter reporting that defendant violated the terms of probation.”
Id. at 174.
The record shows that appellant testified and presented other evidence at the
hearing. Accordingly, under Johnson, the district court did not plainly err when it admitted

8
the discharge summary without having ana lyzed whether it was necessary and reliable .
Because we conclude that the district court did not plainly err, we need not address the
final prong under the plain-error analysis. See State v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324,
330 (Minn. 2016) (“If the dist rict court did not plainly err, then we need not address
whether appellant’s substantial rights were affected.”).
c. Credibility Determinations
Appellant also argues that even if the discharge summary was admissible, the
“district court clearly erred by over -relying on it to the de triment of the live testimony.”
Appellant relies on Andersen v. State , 913 N.W.2d 417 (Minn. 2018) to argue that the
district court erred when it “implicitly found” that the discharge summary was credible
because, under Andersen, district courts cannot make credibility determinations based on
affidavits alone. Appellant mischaracterizes the holding of Andersen. In Andersen, the
supreme court determined that the postconviction court erred when it found two affidavits
unreliable. Id. at 423 -24. The supreme court, concluding that the district court made
“improper credibility determinations . . . reiterate[d] that, when considering a
postconviction petition, a postconviction court cannot make credibility determinations
without first holding an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 424. The holding in Andersen is not
that district courts cannot make credibility determinations based on affidavits, it is that the
district court cannot make credibility determinations without first holding an evidentiary
hearing. Even if the holding in Andersen was directly applicable here, this case is
distinguishable. Here, a probation-revocation hearing was held and the parties were
allowed to present live-witness testimony and other evidence. At the conc lusion of the

9
hearing, the district court weighed the credibility of all the evidence, including appellant’s
testimony. The district court found the discharge summary and the probation officer’s
testimony more credible than appellant’s testimony , which is within its province as the
fact-finder. See DeMars v. State , 352 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 1984) (“The credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are determinations to be made by the
factfinder.”). Accordingly, we reject appellant’s argument.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probation
violation was intentional or inexcusable and that the need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.

Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion when it found that the
probation violation was intentional and inexcusable and that the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation. Before revoking probation, the distri ct court
must “1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the
violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs
the policies favoring probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). “The
purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort
when treatment has failed.” Id. District courts have “broad discretion in determining if
there is sufficient evidence to revoke probati on and should be reversed only if there is a
clear abuse of that discretion.” Id. at 249-50.
Appellant appears to concede that the district court properly designated the specific
conditions that were violated under the first Austin factor. Appellant instead challenges
the district court’s finding under factors two and three.

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Appellant argues that while the district court found that the violation was
“intentional and without excuse ” under the second Austin factor, this finding is not
supported by the record because although “leaving one particular program may have been
an intentional choice, the record shows that [appellant] sought appropriate treatment before
and after.” Appellant is correct that the record reflects that he app ealed the
recommendation of the chemical use assessment and that he wrote a letter to the district
court requesting that he be allowed to attend a different treatment facility. Appellant is
also correct that he testified that he made multiple attempts to arrange other treatment
options because he did not think th e DORS treatment program was a good fit. However,
the district court did not find appellant’s testimony credible and we defer to tho se
credibility determinations. See State v. Dickerson , 481 N.W. 2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992)
(recognizing that the “credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony
are determinations to be made by the factfinder” and district court’s credibility
determinations are “accord[ed] great deference” (citation and quotation omitted)). The
district court appears to have found that appellant’s violation of the condition was
intentional and inexcusable because he “opted out of the program when he refused to attend
and indicated that he did not believe he needed the services for future use prevention.” The
district court made its findings in the context of appellant’s probation violations. The first
probation violation report was filed in October 2017 and alleged drug use by the appellant.
In February 2018, appellant admitted the violatio ns and was given the opportunity to be
discharged early from probation, in August of 2018, if he completed drug treatment and
had no positive urinalysis tests. Instead, a second probation violation report was filed in

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July 2018, alleging that appellant continued to use drugs and failed to complete treatment.
By the time of the August 2018 probation review hearing, appellant had not successfully
completed drug treatment or abstained from drug use. Appellant was out of custody during
this time and could ha ve attended a number of treatment programs. Appellant’s own
behavior during the pendency of the probation violation proceedings, th e discharge
summary, and the probation officer’s testimony support the district court’s finding that
appellant’s violation was intentional or inexcusable.
Appellant also challenges the district court’s determination under the third required
Austin factor. When considering the third Austin factor, the district court must “balance
the probationer’s interest in freedom and the sta te’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation
and the public safety.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005) (quotation
omitted). The district court should consider whether “(i) confinement is necessary to
protect the public from further crim inal activity by the offender ; or (ii) the offender is in
need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not
revoked.” Id.
Here, the district court determined that allowing appellant to remain untreated in the
community while actively refusing treatment would depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if appellant’s probation were not revoked. Appellant argues that the record does
not support this finding because he “actively sought other options both before and after
trying [the DORS treatment] program,” he testified that he wanted treatment, and there is
evidence in the record corroborating his testimony. As noted previously, the district court

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did not find appellant’s testimony credible, and we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. Moreover, the discharge summary and the probation officer’s testimony
again support the district court’s finding that the need for confinement outweighs t he
policies favoring probation.
Affirmed.