In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. R. H., R. W. G., and M. L. R., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1275

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. R. H., R. W. G., and M. L. R., Parents.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-17-136

Mallory K. Stoll, Natalie Netzel, Elizabeth Slama (certified student attorney), Mitchell
Hamline School of Law Child Protection Clinic, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Jeanine M. Putnam, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago County Health and Human Services)

James F. Schneider, Butts, Schneider, & Butts, LLP, Forest Lake, Minnesota (for
respondent foster parents)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
This is an appeal from a district court order denying appellant-paternal
grandmother’s motion for adoptive placement of her grandson and the district court’s order
denying appellant’s motion for amended findings. Appellant filed her motion one month
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after the district court terminated parental rights. The district court stayed appellant’s
motion during the yearlong appeal of the termination of parental rights. After the appeal
concluded, the district court held a nine-day evidentiary hearing and denied appellant’s
motion.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in three ways: (1) by
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing while the parents appealed the termination of their
parental rights; (2) by determining that respondent-agency was not unreasonable in failing
to place the child with her; and (3) by determining that it was in child’s best interests to be
placed with his foster parents rather than with appellant. We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion and thus affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s findings of fact, which are in 190
separately numbered paragraphs spanning 37 pages and followed by 14 pages of legal
conclusions. T.R. was born in March 2016, and is the son of A.R.H. (mother) and M.L.R.
(father). T.R. is biracial; mother is Caucasian, and father is African American and
Caucasian. Appellant-grandmother L.R. (grandmother) is T.R.’s paternal grandmother and
is also biracial. Grandmother and father were at the hospital when T.R. was born.
T.R. was born with health issues stemming from prenatal drug exposure.
Respondent Chisago County Health and Human Services (the agency) opened an
investigation, placed T.R. on a 72-hour hold, and assigned a child-protection investigator
to oversee T.R.’s placement. When the 72-hour hold lapsed, father and grandmother met
with the child-protection investigator to discuss emergency placement options for T.R.
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upon his discharge from the hospital. Grandmother said that she wanted to be a placement
option. Father requested a DNA test to establish paternity.
The hospital discharged T.R. into the care of a foster family on April 1, 2016. T.R.
was not transferred to grandmother’s care for several reasons: father’s paternity had not yet
been confirmed by the DNA test, grandmother had a harassment restraining order against
mother, father lived with grandmother, and there was a domestic-abuse no-contact order
between mother and father. Grandmother told the child-protec tion investigator that she
would begin the process of applying for a foster-care license. The record is unclear when
the DNA test results returned, but they confirmed paternity sometime in April 2016.
Grandmother and father met with an agency case manager to discuss transitioning
T.R. to father by the end of April 2016. Father lived in grandmother’s home at that time.
The case manager later “suspended” T.R.’s transition to father because mother told the case
manager about a recent physical altercation between mother and father.
Over the next several months, grandmother told the case manager that she wanted
to be a placement option for T.R. and that she wanted to have her own visitation schedule.
In September 2016, mother told the case manager that she was “very against” grandmother
being a permanent placement option for T.R. because she had concerns about T.R.’s safety
if he was placed with grandmother. Mother asked that T.R.’s foster family be a permanent
placement option.
Grandmother moved homes several times between August 2016 and April 2017. In
August 2016, grandmother’s home was foreclosed. Grandmother told the case manager
that she and her children were going to stay with family and friends. Grandmother moved
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into a townhome by late September 2016. She stayed in the townhome for six months
before moving to her current home in April 2017. During this time, the agency worked to
reunify T.R. with mother but still considered grandmother as a placement option.
In April 2017, the agency petitioned to terminate mother’s and f ather’s parental
rights for T.R. 1 T.R.’s foster mother told the case manager the following month that she
was interested in adopting T.R. if mother’s and father’s parental rights were terminated.
Grandmother became foster-care licensed in August 2017.
After a termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) trial, the district court issued an order
in November 2017 terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights to T.R. The district
court ordered that legal custody and guardianship of T.R. and sister be transferred to the
Minnesota Commissioner of the Department of Human Services (commissioner). Two
weeks later, in December 2017, grandmother moved to intervene and for the district court
to grant her the right to participate in adoption proceedings. Mother and father appealed
the TPR.
The district court held a post-TPR hearing in January 2018. Foster mother orally
moved to intervene at the hearing. The district court granted grandmother’s and foster
mother’s motions to intervene and stayed grandmother’s motion to order adoptive
placement pending the conclusion of the TPR appeal. The district court found that it was
in T.R.’s best interest to remain with the foster parents. In March 2018, after denying

1 The TPR petition also sought termination of mother’s rights to her daughter, L.M.- R.G.
(sister), who has a different father. Sister’s paternal grandparents adopted her. Sister’s
adoption is not at issue in this appeal.
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grandmother’s motion for increased visitation, the district court ordered that an assessment
be completed to evaluate T.R.’s placement options with grandmother and the foster family.
About three months later, this court remanded the district court’s order terminating
mother’s and father’s parental rights for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The district court issued Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in
June 2018 (TPR order). Mother and father appealed the district court’s amended TPR order.
In June 2018, Deena McMahon, a licensed social worker who specializes in
childhood trauma, child development, and child attachment, submitted an assessment
report that had previously been ordered by the district court. McMahon concluded that
the agency’s visitation plan for grandmother was “unreasonably punitive and restrictive.”
McMahon recommended that T.R. be transitioned to grandmother’s home within six
weeks. McMahon found that the foster parents could not “provide [T.R.] with a rich and
meaningful experience of what it means to grow up as a biracial man” and it was likely
that T.R. would “be denied meaningful contact with his biological family” if he remained
with the foster parents. An agency permanency worker submitted a report disagreeing with
McMahon’s recommendation that T.R. be transitioned to grandmother’s home.
Grandmother moved the district court to transition T.R. into her home and increase
visitation. The motions were heard at a post-TPR hearing. The district court granted
grandmother’s motion for increased unsupervised visitation but denied the request that T.R.
be immediately transitioned to grandmother’s home. The district court ordered that an
evidentiary hearing be set to address the issue of permanent placement. The hearing was
set and then rescheduled for September 2018.
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T.R.’s foster parents executed an Adoption Placement Agreement in early
September 2018.2 Two days later, the foster parents moved the district court for an order
designating them as T.R.’s adoptive placement. In a written order, the district court found
that the “matter is not ripe for an evidentiary hearing, as there has not been a final Order
issued from the Court of Appeals in this matter.” The district court converted the previously
scheduled hearing into a post-TPR hearing. The district court also ordered that, once the
TPR appeals concluded, it would “evaluate whether [grandmother’s] Motion and
supporting documents make a prima facie showing that the agency has been unreasonable
in failing to make the requested adoptive placement of the child.”
The following month, grandmother moved for an order for adoptive placement of
T.R. under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a) (2018). This court affirmed the termination
of mother’s and father’s parental rights in November 2018. The district court scheduled a
pretrial hearing for January 2019. After the hearing, the district court found that
grandmother made a prima facie showing that the agency had “been unreasonable in failing
to make the adoptive placement with her” and ordered an evidentiary hearing.
The evidentiary hearing occurred on March 6, 7, 11, and 28, and April 1-5, 2019.
The district court heard testimony from 19 witnesses. Grandmother testified that her culture
and heritage are very important to her and that she thought it was in T.R.’s best interest to
live with blood relatives. Grandmother expected that she would allow T.R. to have ongoing
contact with the foster parents if she were awarded custody. She did not expect that T.R.

2 The Department of Human Services approved the agreement in December 2018.
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would have contact with father. Grandmother testified that she thought the foster family
was not culturally competent, citing an instance when the foster family dressed T.R. as a
monkey for Halloween in 2017. She testified that this was “disrespectful” and that “today
you don’t dress a biracial child up as a monkey.”
Foster mother testified that T.R. calls her “mom” and sometimes cries before
visiting with grandmother. She believed that it was in T.R.’s best interests to continue
having contact with grandmother and that she would maintain contact between T.R. and
grandmother. Foster mother testified that T.R. receives therapy for anxiety that developed
when his visits with grandmother became unsupervised. She said that she and her family
have attended camps to become more culturally aware and they continue to educate
themselves about cultural competence. Foster mother intends to include grandmother to
help T.R. with his cultural needs in the future.
T.R.’s guardian ad litem (GAL), who was appointed shortly after T.R.’s birth,
testified that she had no concerns with grandmother’s support for T.R. and that T.R. is a
part of his foster family. The GAL said that T.R. has a mother-child relationship with foster
mother and a primary attachment with his foster family. She had no concerns about
grandmother’s care for T.R. but was worried that breaking T.R.’s primary attachment with
his foster family could cause lasting harm. She believed it was in T.R.’s best interest to
remain with his foster family and have grandmother involved in his life. The GAL
disagreed with McMahon’s June 2018 report recommending that T.R. be transferred to
grandmother’s care.
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Three of the agency’s employees testified. The case manager and the
child-protection investigator testified to the timeline of events discussed above. The agency
permanency worker testified that it was in T.R.’s best interests to be adopted by his foster
parents, partly because the foster parents are the only parents T.R. has known.
Several experts testified, submitted reports, and opined about whether T.R. should
be placed with grandmother or the foster parents. First was Lauren Sinn, a licensed
marriage and family therapist who specializes in early childhood mental health. Sinn works
with T.R. twice per week and performed a mental-health assessment of T.R. when he was
two years old. Sinn diagnosed T.R. with generalized anxiety disorder. Sinn testified that
T.R. has a primary attachment to his foster mother and that breaking that primary
attachment would “cause trauma” and negatively impact T.R.’s behavioral development.
Sinn believed it was in T.R.’s best interest to stay with his foster parents and have an
ongoing relationship with grandmother.
McMahon testified about the recommendations she made in her June 2018
assessment report. McMahon submitted an updated assessment report in January 2019
after observing T.R.’s behavior during a transition to grandmother for a scheduled visit.
She observed that T.R. “shook his head no” when he learned it was time to see
grandmother, “clung on” his foster mother, and cried when he left the foster family’s home,
but seemed happy upon arriving at grandmother’s home. McMahon testified that she did
not offer a recommendation in her updated assessment because she “lack[ed] the clarity as
to the right thing to do.” McMahon stated that T.R. “i s not as resilient as she had first
thought” and that he would suffer traumatic harm if the foster family was no longer
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available to him. She further stated that, “in an ideal world,” it would be best for T.R. to
remain with his foster family and maintain contact with grandmother.
Dr. Carol Siegel, a clinical psychologist, did not interview T.R. but testified that
T.R.’s foster parents are his parents “in his mind.” She opined that T.R. would suffer
“bereavement, grief, and loss” if he lost his foster parents. Susan Haugen, a family
therapist, also testified about the importance of a child’s attachment to their primary
caregiver during the early years of life.
Cemina Gordon, a licensed independent clinical social worker, testified. She did not
meet with T.R. or observe him. Gordon testified generally that a child with a primary
caregiver can successfully transfer to a new home if they are able to have a continuing
connection with the primary caregiver. Gordon also testified that children who are adopted
into a transracial family “with no participation from their biological family” can experience
lasting identity issues. She opined that it is important for biracial children to have peers
and role models that reflect their identity. The district court expressly found Sinn’s and
McMahon’s testimony to be more credible and persuasive than Gordon’s testimony
because Gordon had no contact with the parties. The other witnesses who testified at the
hearing include T.R.’s foster father, two friends of grandmother, grandmother’s niece, and
T.R.’s babysitter.
On June 25, 2019, the district court denied grandmother’s motion to order adoptive
placement. The district court concluded that the agency was not unreasonable in failing to
place T.R. with grandmother and that T.R.’s most suitable home is with the foster parents.
10
Grandmother moved for amended findings and judgment. After a hearing, the district court
denied grandmother’s motion. Grandmother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by staying grandmother’s motion
for adoptive placement or by conducting an evidentiary hearing four months
after the TPR appeal concluded.
Grandmother argues that the district court abused its discretion by “substantially
delay[ing]” proceedings after she filed her motion for adoptive placement. First,
grandmother contends that the district court abused its discretion when it stayed her motion
while mother and father pursued an appeal of the order terminating their parental rights.
Second, grandmother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it did not
begin evidentiary hearings until four months after this court affirmed the TPR order. We
address each argument in turn.
A. The district court’s decision to stay grandmother’s motion while mother
and father appealed the TPR order
Grandmother first argues that the district court erred when it “misapplied the plain
language” of Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 1(c) (2018) and stayed her motion to order
adoptive placement while the parents appealed the TPR order. A district court “abuse[s] its
discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the
law.” Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996). We review a district
court’s interpretation and application of the law de novo. In re Guardianship of O’Brien,
847 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. App. 2014).
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Grandmother focuses on her motion to intervene and for adoptive placement, which
she filed on December 5, 2017, shortly after the district court terminated mother’s and
father’s parental rights for T.R. and appointed the commissioner as T.R.’s guardian. Mother
and father appealed the TPR order on December 6 and December 8, 2017, respectively.
The district court held a post-TPR hearing on January 5, 2018; foster mother attended and
orally moved to intervene at the hearing. The district court granted grandmother’s and
foster mother’s motions to intervene and stayed grandmother’s motion for adoptive
placement “pending the appeal of this matter.” At the same hearing, the district court
determined that it was in T.R.’s best interest to remain in his current placement with his
foster parents. Because mother ’s and father’s TPR appeals were remanded for further
findings, this court did not issue its final decision affirming the TPR order until November
13, 2018.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.607 (2018) governs judicial review of an agency’s progress
towards finalizing adoption of a child under the commissioner’s guardianship. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 1(a). The district court must conduct review hearings “at least every 90
days” to review the responsible social services agency’s “reasonable efforts to finalize
adoption.” Id. The agency must make “progress toward adoption” even if a party appeals
the district court’s order for guardianship. Id., subd. 1(b)-(c). The agency’s “reasonable
efforts to finalize the adoption must continue during the pendency of the appeal and all
progress toward adoption shall continue except that the court may not finalize an adoption
while the appeal is pending.” Id., subd. 1(c) (emphasis added).
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A district court must provide notice of the review hearings to the agency, the child,
the GAL, relatives who have kept the court informed of their whereabouts, and the current
foster parents, among others. Id ., subd. 2. At the review hearing, the district court is
directed to review the agency’s reasonable efforts to finalize adoption and the child’s
current out-of -home placement including visitation, medical care, and education. Id.,
subd. 4.
At “any time” after the district court places a child under the commissioner’s
guardianship, “but not later than 30 days after receiving notice” of a fully executed
adoption placement agreement, “a relative or the child’s foster parent may file a motion for
an order for adoptive placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a). If the district court
determines that “the motion and supporting documents do not make a prima facie
showing . . . [that] the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the requested
adoptive placement, the court shall dismiss the motion.” Id., subd. 6(c). “If the court
determines a prima facie [showing] is made, the court shall set the matter for evidentiary
hearing.” Id.
Grandmother contends that the district court had authority to dismiss her motion or
grant an evidentiary hearing, but lacked authority to stay her motion. We disagree. While
it is true that the plain language of section 260C.607, subdivision 6(c) authorizes a district
court to dismiss or grant an evidentiary hearing under certain conditions, the statute does
not limit the district court’s broad discretion to manage its docket. See TC/Am. Monorail,
Inc. v. Custom Conveyor Corp., 840 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Minn. 2013). Docket management
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is particularly important in time-sensitive matters, like those involving the custody of
children.
Here, a stay was appropriate for several reasons. First, the district court could “not
finalize an adoption” while the TPR appeal was pending. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 1(c). Second, before finalizing T.R.’s adoption, the district court needed current
information on T.R.’s adoptive placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b)(1), (9)
(2018) (requiring district court to consider child’s “current functioning and behaviors” and
“relationship to current caretakers, parents, siblings, and relatives” when determining
adoptive placement). Thus, by staying grandmother’s motion, the district court avoided
conducting duplicative evidentiary hearings, which not only threaten limited court
resources, but also would have placed unnecessary strain on the families involved. Simply
put, a district court does not abuse its discretion by staying a motion for adoptive placement
until the TPR appeal is resolved, so long as the agency otherwise continues “reasonable
efforts to finalize the adoption” during the pendency of the appeal. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 1(c).
Grandmother argues that the district court’s decision to stay her motion undermined
the purposes of the rules governing adoption proceedings and contends that the rules of
juvenile protection procedure apply to these proceedings. We disagree. Generally, the
Minnesota Rules of Adoption Procedure govern the “adoptions of children under the
guardianship of the commissioner of human services pursuant to Minnesota Statutes,
sections 260C.601 to 260C.637.” Minn. R. Adopt. P. 1.01. The statute governing motions
for adoptive placement contains two exceptions to this general rule, but those exceptions
14
pertain to the rules for serving the motion and for appealing the district court’s decision on
the motion. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(b), (g). The exceptions do not pertain to the
district court’s authority to stay the motion or schedule an evidentiary hearing.
Grandmother moved to order adoptive placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607. Thus, the
Minnesota Rules of Adoption Procedure apply to the district court’s discretion to stay
grandmother’s motion.
More importantly, the district court’s decision to stay grandmother’s motion did not
undermine the purposes of the applicable rules. The rules of adoption procedure are meant
to ensure that “the best interests of adopted persons are met in the planning and granting
of an adoption.” Minn. R. Adopt. P. 1.02(a). The district court kept its focus on T.R.’s best
interests throughout many review hearings.
It is undisputed that t he district court held the required 90 -day review hearings,
provided the required notices, and conducted the review hearings as outlined by statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subds. 1(a), 2, 4. After each of these hearings, the district court
issued an order that found that the agency had made reasonable efforts to find an adoptive
placement for T.R.
And during each 90-day review hearing, the district court found that it was in T.R.’s
best interests to remain with the foster parents. The district court’s findings were supported
by the recommendations of those participating in the TPR trial and the review hearings.
For example, when the district court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights, the
GAL recommended that it was in T.R.’s “best interest to continue to be cared for in [his]
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current placement” because of the “stability and consistency of care” provided by the foster
parents. The district court continued this placement at the January 2018 review hearing.
At the June 2018 review hearing, the district court considered McMahon’s
recommendation that T.R. be immediately transitioned to grandmother’s care. But the
district court also considered the agency’s and the GAL’s recommendation that moving
T.R. from his foster home would cause harm because he would grieve the loss of his foster
parents and that there was “no guarantee that he [would] settle into another home and
continue to thrive.” The agency’s permanency worker also recommended that it was not in
T.R’s best interests to move to grandmother’s care. The district court granted
grandmother’s motion for increased visitation, but denied an immediate transition of
placement based on its evaluation of T.R.’s best interests.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by misapplying Minn. Stat. § 260C.607
or by staying grandmother’s motion while mother and father appealed the TPR order.
B. The district court’s decision to schedule an evidentiary hearing
beginning in March 2019
Grandmother next argues that “the district court erred when it further delayed the
evidentiary hearing” after this court affirmed the TPR order in its November 2018 opinion
by scheduling an evidentiary hearing beginning in March 2019. The agency responds that
section 260C.607, subdivision 6, “does not include timelines for conducting an evidentiary
hearing on a motion for adoptive placement, or for issuing a final order following the
hearing.” We agree with the agency that the decision about when to schedule an evidentiary
hearing is entrusted to the district court’s sound discretion.
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The party moving for adoptive placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6, is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing after the district court determines that she has made a
prima facie showing that the agency was unreasonable in failing to make the requested
adoptive placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(c); cf. Szarzynski v. Szarzynski,
732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007) (“Whether a party makes a prima facie case . . . is
dispositive of whether an evidentiary hearing will occur” under Minn. Stat. § 518.18
regarding modification of custody ). Subdivision 6 is silent about the timeframe within
which the evidentiary hearing must occur. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6.
Generally, a district court has authority to continue a scheduled hearing if it makes
written or oral findings on the record that the continuance was necessary for “the
accumulation or presentation of evidence or witnesses, to protect the rights of a party, or
for other good cause shown.” Minn. R. Adopt. P. 5.01.
On October 4, 2018, while the TPR appeal was still pending, grandmother filed a
second motion for adoptive placement and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November
2018. The TPR appeal concluded when this court issued its decision affirming the TPR
order on November 13, 2018.
On January 23, 2019, the district court found that grandmother made a prima facie
showing that the agency was “unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement with
[grandmother] and [that grandmother] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” The district
court then scheduled an evidentiary hearing for several days in March and April 2019. The
evidentiary hearing began on March 6, but on March 7, 2019, the district court found good
cause to continue the hearing because the GAL’s attorney was ill.
17
Grandmother does not argue that the district court abused its discretion when it
issued its January 23 decision that she made the required prima facie showing. Indeed,
grandmother was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before January 23, 2019, because
the district court had not yet made the required prima facie determination. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(c). Thus, grandmother’s argument asks us to find an abuse of
discretion in the district court’s decision to schedule the evidentiary hearing beginning on
March 6. We discern no abuse of discretion in scheduling an evidentiary hearing involving
19 witnesses beginning less than six weeks after the January 23 determination that
grandmother had made a prima facie showing.
The district court continued only one of the scheduled dates for the evidentiary
hearing over grandmother’s objection: when it found that good cause existed for the
continuance of the March 7 hearing because the GAL’s attorney was ill. Stated differently,
the district court found on the record that the continuance was necessary to protect the
rights of the GAL (and by extension the rights of T.R.). By doing so, the district court
complied with the requirements for continuing hearings under Minn. R. Adopt. P. 5.01 and
did not abuse its discretion. See generally Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Minn.
1977) (in a dissolution case, “[t]he granting of a continuance is a matter within the
discretion of the [district] court and its ruling will not be reversed absent a showing of clear
abuse of discretion”).
We also reject grandmother’s argument that the district court was required to issue
its order within 15 days of the evidentiary hearing. Grandmother relies on rules governing
contested adoption trials, which provide that “[w]ithin fifteen (15) days of the conclusion
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of the trial in a contested matter, the court shall issue findings of fact, conclusions of law,
an order for judgment, and an adoption decree.” Minn. R. Adopt. P. 44.06, subd. 1
(emphasis added). But grandmother filed her motion for adoptive placement under section
260C.607, subd. 6(c), in which the statute provides for an “evidentiary hearing” and not a
“trial.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(c). Moreover, rule 1.01 of the adoption rules
specifically states that rule 44 regarding contested adoptions does “not apply to children
under the guardianship of the commissioner of human services.” Minn. R. Adopt. P. 1.01.
Thus the 15-day written-decision deadline did not apply to this case.
We pause to emphasize that we understand grandmother’s frustration with and
concern over the lengthy procedural history of this case. Grandmother visited T.R. shortly
after his birth and immediately expressed interest in caring for him . The agency placed
T.R. with foster parents sh ortly after his birth. And grandmother filed her first
adoptive-placement motion in December 2017, shortly after the TPR order was issued and
before the TPR appeal began. Yet, the evidentiary hearing on grandmother’s motion began
in March 2019.
Time is of the essence when determining where a child will live and in providing a
stable and loving home for a child. It is unfortunate that the district court proceedings were
extended by not just one, but two, appeals involving the TPR order. But our role on appeal
is to review the record to determine if the district court improperly applied the law or made
findings unsupported by the record. Based on that review, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by scheduling an evidentiary hearing beginning in March
2019 on grandmother’s motion for adoptive placement.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the
agency was not unreasonable in failing to place T.R. with grandmother.
Grandmother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded
that the agency did not act unreasonably when it failed to place T.R. with her, contending
that each of the district court’s reasons are legally and factually insufficient. The district
court concluded, after making detailed findings, that the agency’s refusal to place T.R. with
grandmother “was not irrational and is supported by the record” and that grandmother
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency ’s decision was
unreasonable.
We review a district court’s decision whether a county agency unreasonably failed
to make an adoptive placement for abuse of discretion. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 6(e) (stating that district court “may” order relative adoptive placement if the agency
unreasonably fails to make requested placement); see also In re Welfare of L.L.P. ,
836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision that movants had not met their burden to obtain an evidentiary hearing on
their motion for adoptive placement).
The party moving for adoptive placement bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency was unreasonable in failing to make the
requested placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(d). While the terms are not defined
by statute, we generally review whether an agency’s action was “reasonable” or
“unreasonable” according to two factors: (1) whether the agency’s reasons for acting in a
certain manner are legally sufficient, and (2) whether the legally sufficient reasons have a
20
factual basis in the record. See RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76
(Minn. 2015).
The district court identified four reasons supporting its determination that the
agency acted reasonably when it did not alter T.R.’s placement with his foster family and
instead place him with grandmother. We begin our analysis with the agency’s emergency
placement of T.R. shortly after he was born. First, the district court found that the agency
acted reasonably when it placed T.R. with the foster parents rather than with grandmother
after T.R.’s discharge from the hospital. An agency may make an emergency placement of
a child with a relative who is not licensed to provide foster care. Minn. Stat. § 245A.035,
subd. 1 (2018). A “relative” is “a person related to the child by blood, marriage, or
adoption.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 27 (2018). While grandmother expressed interest
in having T.R. placed with her on an emergency basis, father disputed paternity shortly
after T.R. was born and asked for a DNA test. Thus, at the time T.R. was discharged from
the hospital, whether grandmother was even eligible to be an emergency placement option
was unclear because it was not certain that she was T.R.’s “relative.” The agency’s decision
not to place T.R. with grandmother upon discharge from the hospital is legally and factually
sufficient.
Second, the district court also found that the agency acted reasonably in not
changing T.R.’s placement to grandmother after father’s paternity was established because,
after T.R.’s emergency placement with the foster parents, grandmother needed to have a
foster-care license bef ore T.R. could be placed with her. In contrast to being an eligible
emergency placement option, where grandmother only needed to be foster-care licensable,
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grandmother needed to be foster-care licensed before T.R. could be placed with her after
the emergency placement with the foster parents. Compare Minn. Stat. § 245A.035,
subds. 1, 3 (2018), with Minn. Stat. § 245A.03, subd. 1 (2018). Grandmother did not
become foster-care licensed until August 2017. Thus, until at least August 2017, the
agency’s decision not to place T.R. with grandmother is legally and factually sufficient.
Third, the district court found that the agency was appropriately concerned about
changing T.R.’s placement while the TPR petition was pending because T.R. may have
been reunified with mother or father as a result. The agency was required to exercise due
diligence to reunify T.R. with his parents. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012, subd. (e)(1) (2018).
The agency’s reunification efforts are factually supported until the TPR order was issued
on November 22, 2017.
Fourth, the district court found that the agency acted reasonably when it did not
place T.R. with grandmother while the parents appealed the TPR order because the parents
may have reinstated their parental rights. The district court found that the agency
“reasonably determined that disrupting a stable placement with the [foster parents] by
placing [T.R.] with [grandmother] with the possibility of [the TPR being reversed] was not
in child’s best interest.”
We agree with the district court that stability is a “competing interest of the child.”
In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). Stability is also a common theme underpinning the statutory
best-interest factors. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (2018). Both before and during
the TPR appeal, the district court was presented with evidence that it was in T.R.’s best
22
interest to remain with the foster parents because of the importance of stability a nd
consistency in his care.
We recognize the tension between grandmother’s love for T.R. and the agency’s
concern about moving T.R. between homes before and during the TPR appeal. On one
hand, the agency was required by statute to continue “all progress toward adoption” while
the TPR appeal was pending. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 1(c). On the other hand,
the agency acted on evidence that it was in T.R.’s best interest to remain in a stable home
during the TPR appeal because of T.R.’s lack of resiliency . We conclude that, on this
record, the agency’s concern that T.R. could be harmed by multiple placement changes
before and during the TPR appeal is both legally and factually sufficient and therefore
supports the district court’s decision.
We are not persuaded by the district court’s other reasons for concluding that the
agency acted reasonably in failing to place T.R. with grandmother. For example, the district
court cited the agency’s concern about grandmother’s changes in residence between
August 2016 and April 2017. Specifically, the district court said that neither it nor the
agency could “ignore the instability in [grandmother’s] change in residences.” We
acknowledge that foreclosure may cause housing instability. But in this case, this basis is
factually insufficient because there is no evidence in the record that grandmother was ever
homeless or that T.R. would have been harmed by moving residences with grandmother .
In short, we differentiate between placement changes and changes in a child’s actual
shelter. More fundamentally, grandmother filed her first motion for adoptive placement in
December 2017—after her final move in April 2017.
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The district court also relied on “both parents requesting that [ T.R.] remain with”
his foster parents. We recognize a parent’s ability to strike a possible placement for their
child: “If the child’s birth parent or parents explicitly request that a relative or important
friend not be considered, the court shall honor that request if it is consistent with the best
interests of the child . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 260C.193, subd. 3(e) (2018) (emphasis added).
Mother explicitly requested that T.R. stay with the foster parents and father told the agency
that he preferred that T.R. stay with the foster parents for stability. This is not the same as
explicitly requesting that grandmother not be considered as a placement option. See id. We
also find it puzzling that the agency relies on this factor while simultaneously saying that
it considered grandmother as a placement option throughout the proceedings. This basis is
factually insufficient.
Lastly, the district court relied on the agency’s concern about the history of domestic
violence on each side of T.R.’s family. The agency was required to ensure T.R.’s “safety
and protection” during placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012, subd. (h)(1) (2018). In
support of the agency’s decision to decline placement with grandmother, the district court
identified several restraining orders between father, mother, grandmother, and one of
father’s ex-girlfriends. But this record does not establish that these restraining orders
amounted to a potential safety issue for T.R. if he was in grandmother’s care. Indeed,
grandmother appears to have been protected by these restraining orders, which were
intended to shield her from harm.
While we disagree with some of the district court’s reasons for finding that the
agency acted reasonably in failing to place T.R. with grandmother and may have reached
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a different placement decision were we the finders of fact, we conclude that the district
court nonetheless identified legally and factually sufficient reasons supporting the agency’s
actions. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that it was in
T.R.’s best interests to be placed with his foster parents.
Grandmother argues that the district court erred when it balanced the best-interest
factors. Appellate review of the best-interest factors is not required because we have upheld
the district court ’s determination that the agency was reasonable in failing to place T.R.
with grandmother. A district court may not grant a motion for adoptive placement unless
it finds both that the agency was unreasonable in not placing the child with the moving
party and that the moving party is the “most suitable adoptive home” based on a
multi-factor analysis. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(e).
Still, we consider the district court’s analysis of T.R.’s best interests due to the
sensitive and weighty issues in this case. We review a district court’s balancing of the
best-interest factors for abuse of discretion and accord a district court “a substantial degree
of latitude.” In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 125-26 (Minn. 2013). In exercising its discretion,
“a trial court must make detailed factual findings showing that the child’s best interests are
being served.” Id. at 126.
Following an evidentiary hearing on a motion for adoptive placement , a district
court determines the suitability of the moving party’s “adoptive home to meet the child’s
needs using the factors in section 260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).” See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(e). While section 260C.607, subd. 6, does not expressly refer to a
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“best-interests” analysis, it directs the district court to use 11 non-exclusive factors
identified in section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b), which governs out- of-home placement.3
The 11 best-interest factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors; (2) the
medical needs of the child; (3) the educational needs of the
child; (4) the developmental needs of the child; (5) the child’s
history and past experience; (6) the child’s religious and
cultural needs; (7) the child’s connection with a community,
school, and faith community; (8) the child’s interests and
talents; (9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers,
parents, siblings, and relatives; (10) the reasonable preference
of the child, if the court, or the child-placing agency in the case
of a voluntary placement, deems the child to be of sufficient
age t o express preferences; and (11) for an Indian child, the
best interests of an Indian child as defined in section 260.755,
subdivision 2a.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (2018). See also S.G., 828 N.W.2d at 125 (referring to
these 11 factors as part of the best-interests determination for adoption under Minn. Stat.
§ 259.57).
The district court found that factors one ( current functioning and behaviors), four
(developmental needs), and nine (relationship to current caretakers) weighed in favor of
the foster parents, factor six (religious and cultural needs) weighed in favor of grandmother,
and the rest of the factors were either neutral or did not apply. Relying on testimony that if

3 The Minnesota Supreme Court has referred to these 11 factors for adoptive placement as
a “best interests” analysis. S.G., 828 N.W.2d at 125. Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 2(a) specifically states that Minnesota’s policy for out-of -home placement is “to
ensure that the child’s best interests are met by requiring an individualized determination
of the needs of the child and of how the selected placement will serve the needs of the child
being placed.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a). See generally Pikula v. Pikula,
374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985) (stating that the best interest of the child is the “guiding
principle” in all custody cases).
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T.R. lost his primary attachment with his foster parents, it “would cause significant grief
and loss and would be like the death of a parent,” the district court determined that it was
in T.R.’s best interest to remain with the foster parents and that the foster parents were the
most suitable adoption home for T.R.
Two prior appellate opinions are instructive. In In re Welfare of D.L., an African
American child was placed with a Caucasian foster family for two years before the child’s
grandparents located the child and petitioned for adoption. 486 N.W.2d 375, 377
(Minn. 1992). The district court granted the grandparents’ petition based on several factors:
the county’s recommendation, the grandparents had legal and physical custody of two of
the child’s sisters, the statutory preference for family placement, and credible expert
testimony that the trauma of breaking the child’s primary attachment would be temporary
and leave no lasting harm. Id. at 377-78. The supreme court affirmed, holding that adoptive
placement with a relative is presumptively in the child’s best interests absent a showing of
good cause to the contrary or detriment to the child. Id. at 380.
More recently, in S.G., grandparents petitioned for adoption of their two
grandchildren who had been in foster care since birth. 828 N.W.2d at 119-20. The foster
parents also petitioned for adoption. Id. The district court found that it was in the children’s
best interests to be adopted by the foster parents, in part because the district court found
“that there is a real risk of future emotional and developmental damage if the children are
removed from the foster parents’ home.” Id. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
supreme court affirmed because the district court’s order included “detailed findings and
analysis demonstrating that the court focused on the best interests of the children” and the
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evidence in the record supported the district court’s findings. Id. at 126-27. This was so
even when considering the children’s cultural needs as African Americans being raised in
a Caucasian household. Id. at 127.
This case is more like S.G. than D.L. The district court made detailed factual
findings on the best-interest factors over ten pages. While weighing the factors, the district
court gave careful consideration to “the challenges faced by biracial children” and
understood that T.R. would “experience some difficulties in the future.” Still, the district
court found that the harm caused by removing T.R. from his primary attachment with his
foster parents took priority over the potential cultural benefits of being placed with his
grandmother, who is also biracial. The record supports the district court’s conclusion: the
agency’s employees, the GAL, a family therapist, Sinn, McMahon, and Dr. Siegel had
significant concerns about the harm to T.R.’s behavioral and emotional development if his
primary attachment with his foster parents was broken. Given that caselaw “leaves scant if
any room” for us to question the district court’s balancing of the best-interest factors,
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000), we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that T.R.’s best interests favored
adoptive placement with his foster parents and not with his grandmother.
As a final note, we agree with the district court’s concluding words:
The decision as to who is better suited for [ T.R.] is an
extremely difficult decision that this Court has to make due to
the sincere love and qualifications of both [grandmother] and
the [foster parents]. The Court admires [grandmother]’s
commitment and involvement in this process and her desire to
do what is in [T.R.’s] best interest. However, given the facts of
this case, the testimony of the experts as to the secure primary
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attachment [ T.R.] has formed with the [foster parents],
testimony that losing such attachment would cause significant
grief and loss and would be like the death of a parent, testimony
that [ T.R.] is not as resilient as originally believed . . . and
concerns about his development if he loses the attachment with
the [foster parents], the Court finds that it is in [ T.R.]’s best
interest that [he] remains with the [foster parents].
We also commend the grandmother and the foster parents. Both have stated that they intend
to maintain contact with one another to foster meaningful ongoing relationships with T.R.
after his adoption is finalized. This is a difficult path, but we sincerely hope that the parties
will continue to work together for T.R’s benefit.
Affirmed.