State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1283

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eithan Armani Green,
Appellant.

Filed June 22, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-18-3503

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree robbery,
appellant Eithan Green argues th at the evidence is insufficie nt to prove that his presence

2
was intended to aid in the commission of the robbery, the pr osecutor committed
misconduct in summation by misstating the law, and the 98-month sentence imposed was
excessive when compared to the sentences of his codefendants. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2018, B.C. met K.G., al so known as “The Piercing Queen,” on a
dating app1 called Skout. K.G. worked at a strip club and also gave private lap dances2 at
her home in Duluth. B.C. engaged K.G. to give him lap dances on multiple occasions. He
also occasionally drove K.G. to work.
On the night of October 14, 2018, B.C. te xted K.G. and inquired whether K.G. was
available for a private lap dance. K.G., who was at her home with Cameron Richmond,
Chazmun McBeath, and appellant, responded that she was available. Richmond was using
K.G.’s phone that evening and saw the text messages from B.C. concerning B.C. coming
over for a private dance. Rich mond suggested to K.G., McBeath, and appellant that they
should rob B.C. when he arrived for the lap dance.
At approximately 11:50 p.m., B.C. arrived at K.G’s home. K.G. let B.C. into her
residence. Upon entering the home, B.C. noticed that K.G. was “acting funny” and seemed
nervous. Based on K.G.’s demeanor, B.C. had a “gut feeling” that something was not right.
He indicated that he was going to leave the home to retrieve something from his car.

1 An “app” is commonly defined as “[a] computer application.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 85 (5th ed. 2018).

2 At trial, K.G. testified that lap dances are “private dances” that she performs for
customers.

3
As B.C. turned to leave, Richmond su ddenly entered the room with McBeath and
appellant. K.G. turned off the lights. Rich mond, McBeath, and appellant had their faces
covered by either the hoods of their sweatshirts or by bandanas. B.C. “kind of froze up.”
B.C. testified at trial that the three me n approached him, removed his coat, and all
of them participated in emptying his pocke ts. They took his wallet, keys, watch, and
cellular phone. B.C. testified that he was scar ed, and pleaded with the men to “[j]ust let
me go, and take whatever you want.”
One of the men told B.C. to take off all of his clothes, including his shoes, socks,
and underwear. The men forced B.C. to sit in a chair. When B.C. tried to stand, one of the
men said, “Shut up or I’ll sm oke you[,]” which B. C. testified was “[s]lang for kill.”
Although B.C. did not see a weapon, one of the men “was making a gesture with his hand
in his pocket.” B.C. told the men to “[j]ust take whatever it is and let me take my car and
leave.”
The men took $400 in cash and B.C.’s automated teller machine (ATM) card from
B.C.’s wallet, and demanded that B.C. tell them the card’s PIN. 3 B.C. complied.
Richmond and McBeath then left the home, taki ng B.C.’s car keys with them. K.G. and
appellant stayed in the home with B.C. Whil e they were gone, appellant hit B.C. in the
face “three or four times.” Ap pellant then put a sock in B. C.’s mouth. After 10 to 15

3 A PIN, or personal identification number, is “a number allocated to an individual and
used to validate electronic transactions.” New Oxford American Dictionary 1308 (3d ed.
2010).

4
minutes, appellant removed the sock from B.C.’s mouth, and he eventually allowed B.C.
to clothe himself.
While K.G. and appellant stayed with B.C., Richmond and McBeath went to
multiple ATM locations in McBeath’s car and withdrew money from B.C.’s account. In
total, they withdrew $480 from two ATMs. Two other cash-withdrawal attempts were
unsuccessful.
Richmond and McBeath returned to K.G.’s home. Richmond and K.G. led B.C. to
his car, directing him to keep his head down until he reached the vehicle. Although he was
clothed, B.C.’s jacket and hat were not return ed to him. When they reached B.C.’s car,
Richmond asked B.C. if he had any weapons. B.C. indicat ed that he did not have a gun,
but did have a baton and a knife in the gl ove box. Richmond removed the weapons from
B.C.’s car. Richmond again threatened B.C., stating, “Go to the police and we’ll find you
and kill you, ‘cause we have your ID and your address.”
B.C. then drove home and told his sister, A. J., about the robbery. B.C. testified that
he “was scared and panickin g” and that he “couldn’t really process what had just
happened.” He preferred not to call the police “[b]ecause they said if I call 911, they would
kill me and they would kill my family.” A.J. eventually called 911 to report the robbery.
Officers responded to B.C.’s residence, and B.C. told officers that he was attacked
and robbed when he went to K.G.’s home for a private lap dance. One of the responding
officers testified that she notic ed that B.C.’s cheek was swollen and that he had a cut on
his lip.

5
B.C. identified the location of K.G.’s hom e, and officers set up surveillance of the
residence while an investigator obtained a search warrant. At 1:40 a.m., officers observed
McBeath get into his car outside of K.G.’s home and drive away. Officers initiated a traffic
stop of McBeath after they no ticed that his car had a broke n head lamp. McBeath was
wearing a jacket similar to the one taken from B.C., although officers did not know this at
the time. McBeath did not have a valid driver’s license and was taken to another residence.
Around 4:20 a.m., K.G. called 911 to re quest that officers remove Richmond from
her home because he was “tweakin’ out” and “breaking stuff inside [her] house.” An hour
later, officers executed a search warrant for K.G.’s home. Officers knocked on K.G.’s door
and announced their presence, but no one opened the door. Officers forced the door open.
As officers entered K.G.’s home, appellant attempted to leave the residence through
the back door, but was stopped by officers. Appellant was wearing black pants and a dark
hoodie that matched the description given by B.C. of one of the me n who robbed him.
Appellant also had $883 on his person. Appellant identified himself to police as “Orlando
James.”
A search of K.G.’s residence revealed several items belonging to B.C., including a
hat and B.C.’s fishing license. Officers also searched the home where officers had dropped
off McBeath earlier, and B.C.’s jacket was located inside that residence.
On October 22, 2018, the state charged appellant with aiding and abetting first-
degree aggravated robbery and providing a fa lse name to police. On March 26, 2019,
appellant pleaded guilty to provi ding a false name to police and proceeded to a jury trial
on the remaining charge.

6
At trial, B.C. testified th at he had gone to K.G.’s residence for a lap dance and was
attacked by three men, forced to sit naked in a chair, and threatened until he gave the men
his ATM PIN. B.C. testified that all three men actively participated in emptying his pockets
and taking his money. He did no t identify appellant at trial, but testified that two of the
men left with his property, while K.G. and the third man stayed with him in the home. He
testified that this third man hit him in the face and put a sock in his mouth. B.C.’s
description of this third man matched that of appellant when police apprehended him as he
left K.G.’s residence.
K.G. testified that the three men in he r home on the evening of October 14 were
Richmond, appellant, and a man she knew only as “Twin.” K.G. described the robbery,
and testified that she and appellant stayed behind with B.C. while Richmond and McBeath
withdrew money using B.C.’s ATM card. McBeath also tes tified. He said that he,
Richmond, and appellant were at K.G.’s home when the robbery occurred. There was no
evidence at trial of any other males—othe r than appellant, Richmond, and McBeath—
having been present in K.G.’s residence during the robbery.
A.J. testified that B.C. returned home in the early-morning hours of October 15,
crying and “was just freaking out.” She described B.C.’s face as being swollen and said
that he had a cut on the inside of his cheek.
Finally, the state presented photographi c evidence of Richmond and McBeath
withdrawing money from B.C.’s account during the time that appellant and K.G. stayed at
the home with B.C.

7
In its closing argument, the state, in explaining aiding and ab etting, argued to the
jury:
The case is charged that the Defendant here, Eithan Green—
the term is—the legal term is Aided and Abe tted, but, you
know, assisted. Aided in—in the commission of a robbery
. . . .
[A]nd there’s a definition in the instructions—as when a person
is responsible for crimes commi tted by others. It talks about,
you know, you got presence or—or actions. If you look at all
the evidence in this case, the Defendant’s presence and his
actions assisted in the commission of this crime.

In further explaining aiding and abetting, th e prosecutor argued that the jury needed to
focus on appellant’s “presence.” The state th en noted that, “it’s an intentional act, you
know.”
The jury found appellant guilty of aidi ng and abetting first-degree aggravated
robbery. Before sentencing, appellant moved the district court for a durational departure
from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied the motion and
sentenced appellant to the presumptive 98-month prison sentence on the aiding and
abetting first-degree aggravated robbery co unt and a concurrent 90-day sentence for
providing a false name to police.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
The evidence supports appellant’s convicti on for aiding and abetting first-degree
aggravated robbery.

Appellant argues that the evidence of hi s having aided the robbery is entirely
circumstantial and that the “the state fa iled to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

8
[appellant] intentionally aided the robbery. ” Appellant relies on the circumstantial-
evidence review standard requiring that circumstantial evidence must eliminate all rational
inferences inconsistent with guilt in order to support a guilty verdict. See State v. Al-
Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010) (describing the appellate standard of review
concerning appeals challenging the sufficiency of circumst antial evidence). Appellant
does not argue that no robbery was proved, but only that the state’s evidence of his having
aided in it is lacking.
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence suppor ting a defendant’s
conviction, we thoroughly analyze the record “to determine whethe r the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorab le to the conviction, was suffi cient to permit the jurors to
reach they verdict which they did.” State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989).
We assume that the jury “be lieved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to
the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). Appellate courts will
not “disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt
v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (alteration and quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has defined direct evidence as “evidence that is
based on personal knowledge or observation that, if true, proves a fact without inference
or presumption.” Id. at 477 n.11 (alterati on and quotation omitted). “Such evidence can
be provided in the form of testimony by a person who perceived the fact through her senses
or physical evidence of the fact itself.” State v. Brazil, 906 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Minn. App.

9
2017), review denied (Minn. Mar. 20, 2018). Circumstantial evidence, in contrast, is
“evidence from which the factfinde r can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an in ferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” Id. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that
appellant’s conviction does not depend on circumstantial evidence and that every element
of aiding and abetting robbery is supported by direct evidence.
A person is guilty of aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime “if
the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise
procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018). The term
“intentionally aides” means that “the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to
commit a crime,” and that “the defendant inte nded his presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 808 (Minn. 2012).
To prevail on a charge of criminal lia bility for aiding and abetting another in
committing a crime, the state is required to prove that appellant “played a knowing role in
the commission of the crime.” Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 477 (quotation omitted). We
distinguish a “knowing role in the crime” from “inaction, kn owledge, and passive
acquiescence.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Although B.C. did not identify appellant at trial as one of the three men who robbed
him, K.G. and McBeath both testified that a ppellant was one of the three males involved
in the robbery. Appellant con cedes that he was “present” at the time, but argues that the
evidence of his participation in the robbery is insu fficient to support the jury’s verdict

10
because it is all circumstantial. But B.C. testified that all three of the men whose faces
were covered rummaged through his pockets. This is direct evidence of all three men
participating in the robbery. The proof of a ppellant’s active participation in the robbery
required the jury to link together multiple pieces of direct evidence—the testimony of B.C.,
K.G., and McBeath—but combining multiple instances of direct evidence does not make
the evidence circumstantial. The jury had only to believe the testimony of B.C., K.G., and
McBeath to conclude that appellant participated in the robbery, and it need not have made
any inferential leap beyond that testimony to so conclude. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d
24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (defining testimony as to what a witness saw as direct evidence).
And, if any further evidence of appellant’s active participation in the robbery were
to have been needed, the record also contains direct evidence that appellant stayed with
B.C. while Richmond and McBeath went to withdraw money using B.C.’s ATM card. This
is also direct evidence of appellant’s active participation in a cont inuing robbery. K.G.
described at trial how she and appellant st ayed behind with B.C. while Richmond and
McBeath withdrew money from B.C.’s ATM card . B.C. testified to this as well, and
testified that, while Richmond and McBeath we re away, appellant forc ed him to sit in a
chair to prevent B.C. from leaving. The success of stealing money using B.C.’s ATM card
depended on detaining B.C. while the card was used—once the card was reported as stolen,
its usefulness to steal B.C.’s money would be reduced if not completely eliminated. So
this, too, is direct evidence that appellant actively participated in the robbery.
The record contains ample di rect evidence of appellant ’s knowing involvement in
the robbery to support the conviction.

11
The state did not commit misconduct in its closing argument by misstating the law.

Appellant argues that the state committed misconduct by “repeatedly [telling] the
jury in closing argument [that] it could find [appellant] guilty based on [appellant’s]
presence alone.” Appellant asserts that such error affects his substantial rights and warrants
the grant of a new trial.
Appellant did not object to the state’s su mmation, and we therefore review for plain
error. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under the plain-error standard,
a defendant must show “(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial
rights.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). “An error is plain if it is clear
or obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a
standard of conduct.” State v. Webster , 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). An appellant bears the burden of showi ng error that is pl ain and, upon that
showing, the burden of demonstrating that there was no effect on the appellant’s substantial
rights shifts to the state. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. If all three elements of the plain-
error test are met, we “address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of judicial
proceedings.” State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 508 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
“We will correct the error only if the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceeding is seriously affected.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
During a closing argument, a prosecutor may explain the state’s burden of proof to
the jury. State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 751 (Minn. 2010). But a prosecutor may
not misstate the law. Id. In determining whether a pr osecutor misstated the law and
reversible error has occurred, we must look “at the closing argument as a whole, rather than

12
just selective phrases or remarks that ma y be taken out of co ntext or given undue
prominence.” State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993).
Appellant points to the portion of state’ s summation where the prosecutor argued
that appellant’s “presence specifically, or a hypothetical defendant’s presence
hypothetically, is sufficient for aiding and abetting liability,” and argues that this is a clear
misstatement of the law. This specific portion of the prosecutor’s argument appears to be
a reference to appellant remaining with B.C. at K.G.’s home when Richmond and McBeath
left the residence with B.C.’s ATM card. The prosecutor al so made clear in summation,
however, that appellant needed to intentionally aid his confederates in furtherance of the
crime, analogizing appellant’s participation in the robbery as being part of a “team.” The
prosecutor argued that appellant was “there to help, if needed. . . . It’s an intentional act,
you know.”
Considered in isolation, the prosecuto r’s comments on presence alone come close
to misstating the law. See State v. Ostrem , 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. 1995) (holding
that “[m]ere presence at the scene of a crim e does not alone prove th at a person aided or
abetted, because inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of
criminal culpability”). But, after his co mments about appellant’s “presence,” the
prosecutor informed the jury that appellant needed to intentionally act to further the crime.
The prosecutor later told the jury that “[y]ou don’t gotta be the main person, the main actor
. . . if you intentionally assist,” and “the law says everybody is responsible and culpable if
you intentionally assist.” In viewing the state’s summation as a whole, we see no error in
the prosecutor’s statements that is plain.

13
And even if the prosecutor’s statements we re considered to be error that is plain,
which we do not think it was, the state nevertheless met its burden of showing that the error
did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. Misstatements of
the law during closing argument have been held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
when a prosecutor states the law correctly at some point during the argument and the
district court properly instructs the jury on the law. State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 648
(Minn. 1996).
Here, after the challenged statements in summation concerning appellant’s
“presence,” the prosecutor prope rly informed the jury severa l times that appellant must
have intended his presence and actions to aid the crime in order for the jury to convict him.
The district court properly instructed the jury concerning aiding and abetting. The evidence
against appellant was strong. For these reasons, any error that there may have been in the
prosecutor’s statements did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.
The district court acted within its sentencing discretion.

Appellant argues that his 98-month senten ce is excessive, unjustifiably disparate,
and exaggerates the crim inality of his conduct. Specific ally, appellant asserts that he
should not have received a longer prison se ntence than those give n to Richmond and
McBeath.
“Whether to depart from the sentencing guid elines rests within the district court’s
discretion, and the district court will not be re versed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 201 1). Sentences prescribed by the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “are pres umed to be appropri ate.” Minn. Sent.

14
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018). But we “may re view a sentence to de termine whether it is
inconsistent with the statutory requirement s, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive,
unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district court.”
Vickla v. State, 793 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Here, appellant requested a downward du rational departure because appellant was
“the least involved [in the robb ery] out of the three alleged co-defendants.” The district
court denied appellant’s depa rture request, and found that there were no “substantial and
compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines.”
Appellant makes no argument that the di strict court improperly computed his
criminal history score of five or that it erred in determining the severity level of his offense.
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.C.1 (2018). He ag rees that the relevant guidelines cell
provides for a presumptive 98-month sentence . Appellant’s involv ement in the robbery
appears to us to have been typical of the charged offense. Appellant was actively involved
in the crime, he played an ac tive role in emptying out B.C.’s pockets, and he forced B.C.
to sit naked in a chair and struck him in the face repeatedly while his confederates used the
ATM card taken from B.C. to steal money from B.C.’s bank account.
The sentences given to Richmond and McBeath do nothing to suggest that the
district court abused its discretion in sentencing appellant as it did. We do not know what
sentencing considerations may have been taken into account in those sentences other than
that appellant’s codefendants pleaded guilty to a lower-level offense than that of which
appellant was convicted after trial. What the codefendants’ criminal history scores were is
not revealed by the record. The district court was not require d to have detailed a

15
comparison of appellant’s sentence with t hose of his codefendants. It applied the
sentencing guidelines and declin ed to depart, a decision whic h we afford considerable
deference. Dillon v. State , 781 N.W.2d 588, 595-96 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied
(Minn. July 20, 2010).
The district court acted within its discretion in sentencing appellant.
Affirmed.