In re the Marriage of: Jill Melisa Sinda, petitioner, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1291

In re the Marriage of:
Jill Melisa Sinda, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Joseph Sinda,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2020
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-13-5280

Rodney H. Jensen, Mark E. Mullen, Jensen, Mullen, McSweeney & Meyer, PLLP,
Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)

Edward F. Rooney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Becky Toevs Rooney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
A spousal-maintenance obligee’s “cohabitation” with another adult constitutes a
substantial change in circumstances that justifies modifying maintenance if consideration
of the four factors enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6 (2018), indicates that
cohabitation makes the existing maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.

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O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant-husband challenges the order reducing his spousal -maintenance
obligation, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by declining to terminate or
further reduce the obligation because it (1) made clearly erroneous findings as to
respondent-wife’s income , (2) made insufficient findings regarding her expenses , and
(3) made insufficient findings regard ing the economic benefit she receives from
cohabitation. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by making
the reduction retroactive without also ordering specific relief regarding the resulting
overpayment. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2014, the 23-year marriage of appellant Richard Sinda and respondent Jill
Sinda was dissolved based on a stipulated agreement. For purposes of spousal
maintenance, the parties agreed that husband earned $20,000 per month and wife earned
$5,286 per month. The parties did not detail their expenses but agreed that, after the sale
of the marital home, each party would have monthly expenses of between $6,500 and
$6,900, including $2,000 per month for either rent or a mortgage payment. Based on those
income and expense figures, the parties agreed that husband would pay wife spousal
maintenance of $4,500 per month for 60 months; then maintenance would increase by $300
(to $4,800) per month until husband turns 65, at which point his o bligation would
terminate.
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In February 2018, husband moved to terminate or reduce his spousal -maintenance
obligation, asserting that wife’s circumstances have changed because (1) she is “cohabiting
with her longtime partner,” which reduces her need, and (2) her income has increased since
the maintenance obligation was established. Wife opposed husband’s motion, moved for
a “cost of living adjustment” to meet her increased expenses, and requested conduct-based
attorney fees.
After a hearing in October, the district court g ranted husband’s motion, decreasing
his spousal-maintenance obligation by $1,270 (to $3,230) per month , retroactive to when
husband served the motion. The court based its decision on wife’s acknowledgement that
her housing costs are reduced by that amount because she is cohabiting. The district court
denied wife’s requests for a cost-of-living adjustment and attorney fees.
Husband moved for amended findings, urged the district court to reduce his spousal-
maintenance obligation to $900 per month, and requested that the district court award him
a credit against future maintenance payments to address the overpayment resulting from
retroactive modification. The district court denied the motion in all respects . Husband
appeals.
ISSUES
I. Are the district court’s findings as to wife’s income clearly erroneous?

II. Are the district court’s findings regarding wife’s reasonable monthly expenses
sufficient?

III. Did the district court correctly apply the law and make sufficient findings in
addressing modification of spousal maintenance based on cohabitation?

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IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding retroactive maintenance
modification without ordering a remedy for the overpayment?

ANALYSIS
A district court has broad discretion in its decisions regarding spousal maintenance,
and we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion. Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d
411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009). A court abuses its discretion “if it makes findings of fact that
are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that
is contrary to logic and the facts on record. ” Madden v. Madden , 923 N.W.2d 688, 696
(Minn. App. 2019).
A party seeking to modify a spousal-maintenance obligation must demonstrate that
a substantial change has occurred in the parties’ circumstances and that the change renders
the existing obligation “unreasonable and unfair. ” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a)
(2018); see Youker v. Youker , 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that the
moving party must first demonstrate substantially changed circumstances, then
“demonstrate that the change renders the original award unreasonable and unfair”), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003). T he legislature has identified several types of changes that
may warrant maintenance modification, such as a substantial increase in the obligee’s
income, Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a), and several specific changes that presumptively
justify maintenance modification, see Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b), (4), (5) (2018).
Maintenance also “may be modified pursuant to section 518A.39, subdivision 2,” based on
an obligee’s cohabitation with another adult. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a).

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I. Husband has not demonstrated that errors in the district court’s findings
regarding wife’s income warrant reversal.

“A district court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding
of fact and is not set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Melius, 765 N.W.2d at 414 (quotation
omitted). Factual findings are clearly erroneous when they are “manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”
McConnell v. McConnell, 710 N.W.2d 583, 585 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Husband argues that the district court made clearly erroneous findings regarding
wife’s gross income at the time of the dissolutio n and at the time of the motion —facts
bearing on whether her increased gross income warr ants modification of maintenance
under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a). This argument has merit.
First, the district court found that wife’s income at the time of the dissolution was
$68,802. But the dissolution judgment establishes that wife earned gross income of $5,286
per month, which equals $63,432 per year. Wife does not dispute this $5,370 error in the
district court’s findings.
Second, regarding wife’s gross income at the time of the motion, 1 the district court
found that she earned annual in come of $76,776, describing the change as an 11.5%
increase. Husband asserts that wife’s annual income was “at least” $78,000. We agree that
all of the record evidence, including wife’s August 2018 deposition testimony, reveals
annual earnings of approximately $78,000 per year. The district court’s lower figure comes

1 On a motion for modification of maintenance, a district court must look to the conditions
that exist “at the time of the motion.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (2018).
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from wife’s 2017 income tax return , which deducted wife’s 401(k) contribution from her
gross income. Consideration of the deduction was error. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a)
(2018) (disallowing deductions for “401 K” contributions in calculating gross income ).
Because the record evidence does not support a finding that wife’s gross income at the time
of the motion was $76,776, that finding also is clearly erroneous.
Husband also contends that the district court should have found wife’s gross income
to be nearly $80,000 because she receives bonuses. Gross income is “any form of periodic
payment to an individual.” Id. Bonuses may be included in a party’s gross income, but only
if they are a regular, dependable form of payment. See Haasken v. Haasken, 396 N.W.2d
253, 261 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding annual bonuses ranging from $0 to $9,000 did
not constitute income); Desrosier v. Desrosier , 551 N.W.2d 507, 508 -09 (Minn. App.
1996) (concluding annual bonuses ranging from $7,000 to $17,000 constituted income).
The only evidence that w ife receives bonus income is her limited testimony that her
employer “gives us a bonus at the end of the year” and her 2017 tax form indicating that
she received a $1,784 bonus that year. Because this evidence provides little basis for
determining that wife regularly receives a dependable amount of bonus income, we discern
no clear error by the district court in declining to include bonus payments in wife’s gross
income.
In sum, the district court’s findings regarding wife’s gross income at the time of the
dissolution and at the time of the motion are clearly erroneous. After accounting for the
district court’s exclusion of bonus payments, the only findings that the record supports are
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that wife earned $63,432 at the time of the dissolution and approximately $78,000 at the
time of the motion. The increase is not 11.5%, as the district court found, but 21%.
These errors require reversal only if they resulted in prejudice. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61
(requiring reviewing court to disregard harmless error); see also Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d
835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (stating that a district court will not be reversed if it reached a correct
result for the wrong reason). It is husband’s burden to demonstrate prejudice. See Melius,
765 N.W.2d at 418 ( requiring appellant to demonstrate both abu se of discretion and
prejudice to warrant reversal); Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Minn. App. 2001)
(same). He has not done so.
Husband argues that he was prejudiced by the district court’s failure to recognize
that wife’s income increased 21%, because th at percentage of i ncrease supports a
presumption in favor of modification. He points to Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5),
which establishes a presumption in favor of maintenance modification if an obligee’s gross
income has decreased by at least 20% “through no fault or choice of the party.” Husband
essentially assumes that a 20% increase in income is equally as significant as a 20%
decrease in income. By expressly establishing a presumption in cases of decreased income
but not in cases of increased income, the legis lature indicated that it does not consider the
two changes equivalent . See State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. 2017) (stating
“presumption th at an omission in a statute is by deli berate choice, not inadvertence ”
(quotation omitted)); Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012) (“We cannot
add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).
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Moreover, husband identifies no other basis for determining that the agreed-to
maintenance obligation is now unreasonable or unfair. W ife’s income increased by 21%
in the intervening four years. During that same time, husband’s income increased even
more substantially. And the parties’ agreement regarding maintenance unambiguously
reflects a commitment to supporting wife at the high marital standard of living. See Peterka
v. P eterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that t he purpose of a
maintenance award is to allow the parties to have “a standard of living that approximates
the marital standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the circumstances”). That
agreement is the baseline against which the district court evaluated husband’s motion.
Kemp v. Kemp , 608 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Minn. App. 2000) . Because husband failed to
demonstrate that the 21% increase in wife’s income makes his maintenance obligation
unreasonable and unfair, we discern no prejudice to him from the district court’s erroneous
findings regarding wife’s income.
II. The district court made sufficient findings regarding wife’s reasonable
monthly expenses.

In maintenance-modification proceedings, “particularized findings are necessary to
show that relevant statutory factors have been considered.” Tuthill v. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d
230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987). A remand is warranted if “ the findings are insufficient to
determine that the [district] court addressed the factors expres sly mandated by the
legislature.” Id. But remand is not appropriate if the findings indicate that the court
considered the relevant factors. Id.
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Husband argues that remand is required because the district court made insufficient
findings regarding wife’s reasonable monthly expenses. This argument is unavailing.
Wife claimed expenses of $9,066 per month; husband countered that a reasonable monthly
budget is $4,720. The district court considered both parties’ arguments, but also noted the
difficulty in evaluating wife’s claimed expenses when the baseline the parties stipulated to
at the time of the dissolution —that each party will have reasonable expenses of between
$6,500 and $6,900, including approximately $2,000 for housing —is so vague . See
Maschoff v. Leiding , 696 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn. App. 2005) (noting importance of
identifying baseline circumstances in stipulated dissolution judgments). Nonetheless, the
district court expressly assessed the reasonableness of wife’s claimed expenses, rejecting
as unreasonable wife’s claim for debt payments of $1,853. The court also found that wife
failed to substantiate the “high” amounts she claimed for medical expenses ($500), food
and restaurant expenses ($1,000), and clothing ($400). While wife’s evidentiary
shortcomings would not have justified excluding those items from her budget entirely, her
unsupported claims combined with the ambiguous baseline amply support the district
court’s finding that wife’s reasonable expenses remain at the level the parties contemplated
in the dissolution judgment.
III. The district court correctly a pplied the law and made sufficient findings in
addressing modification based on cohabitation.

In 2016, the legislature added a new basis for modifying spousal maintenance—an
obligee’s cohabitation with another adult. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6 ; 2016 Minn.
10
Laws ch. 132, § 1.2 In doing so, it articulated four factors that a district court must consider
before reducing, suspending, reserving, or terminating maintenance based on cohabitation:
(1) whether the obligee would marry the cohabitant but
for the maintenance award;
(2) the economic benefit the obligee derives from the
cohabitation;
(3) the length of the cohabitation and the likely future
duration of the cohabitation; and
(4) the economic impact on the obligee if maintenance
is modified and the cohabitation ends.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a).
Husband argues that the district court did not make sufficient findings as to the
second factor —the economic benefit that wife derives from the cohabitation. And he
contends that cohabitation entitles him to further reduce his maintenance obligation,
regardless of whether the cohabitation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances or
causes his existing obligation to be unreasonable and unfair. The sufficiency of the district
court’s findings r egarding cohabitation depends on what standard applies to a motion to
modify maintenance based on cohabitation —an issue that no precedential case ha s
addressed since the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6. Accordingly, we
turn first to the interpretation of the cohabitation statute.
A. The cohabitation statute require s a showing of “cohabitation” and
resulting unreasonableness and unfairness.

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. Muschik
v. Conner-Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Minn. App. 2018). Our goal when interpreting

2 We observe that this statute applies only to cohabitation by a “maintenance obligee,” not
an obligor. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6.
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a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018);
Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013). We presume the legislature
intends all provisions in a statute to be effective. Wolfer v. Microboards Mfg., LLC , 654
N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2002) , review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003) . “ When the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we will look only to th at language in
ascertaining legislative intent. ” Haefele v. Haefele , 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013) .
If a statute is unambiguous, our role “is to enforce the language of the statute and not
explore the spirit or purpose of the law.” Christianson, 831 N.W.2d at 537.
The cohabitation statute provides: “Spousal maintenance may be modified pursuant
to section 518A.39, subdivision 2 , based on the cohabitation by the maintenance obligee
with another adult following dissolution of the marriage. ” Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 6(a). Cohabitation may only support downward modification —“a reduction,
suspension, reservation, or termination of maintenance”—as it is premised on its economic
benefit to the obligee. Id.; accord Abbott v. Abbott , 282 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Minn. 1979)
(stating that cohabitation “may be a basis for reducing or terminating [maintenance]” under
what is now Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (2018), “to the ext ent it improves a former
spouse’s economic well -being). Consequently, in determining whet her to reduce
maintenance, a district court must consider the extent of that economic benefit, as well as
the three other enumerated factors , to determine whether the cohabitation warrants
modification of maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a).
Husband contends that the cohabitation statute supplants the standard two-part
modification test because it does not expressly require a district court to consider
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(1) whether the cohabitation constitutes a substantial change in circumstance or
(2) whether that change renders the existing maintenance obligation unreasonable and
unfair. He argues that this omission signals the legislature’s intent that the four factors
listed in the cohabitation statute substitute for the standard two -factor test and create a
rebuttable presumption in favor of modification, like the circumstances listed in Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(b). We are not persuaded.
We begin by noting that the legislature did not omit the two factors set out in Minn.
Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a), from the cohabitation statute. Rather, it expressly incorporated
that test by permitting cohabitation -based modification of maintenance “ pursuant to
section 518A.39, subdivision 2.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a). It then identified four
factors sp ecific to the cohabitation context that district court s should consider in
determining whether cohabitation “may” warrant maintenance modification. Id. Far from
establishing a presumption favoring modification when an obligee cohabits , this layered
framework underscores the fact -specific analysis that guides the court’s discretion in
determining whether modification is appropriate. And while the reference to section
518A.39, subdivision 2, necessarily includes a reference to subpart (b), nothing in the two
portions of subpart (b) that relate to spousal maintenance warrants a presumption in favor
of modif ication when an obligee cohabits. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(4)
(permitting presumption when “the existing support obligation is in the form of a statement
of percentage and not a specific dollar amount ”), (5) (permitting presumption when “ the
gross income of an obligor or obligee has decreased by at least 20 percent through no fault
or choice of the party”).
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In short, if the legislature had intended for cohabitation to support a presumption in
favor of maintenance modification, it would have said so. That it knows how to do so is
demonstrated by Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b).3 Its use of expressly conditional, fact-
specific language in the cohabitation statute indicates a contrary intent.
Having concluded that the cohabitation statute is an adjunct to and not a substitute
for the standard two-part modification test, we consider how the two statutes work together.
Our e xamination of the cohabitation statute as a whole , including the t wo factors
incorporated from Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a), leads us to two conclusions.
First, by designating cohabitation as a basis for modifying maintenance “pursuant
to” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2, the legislature signaled that cohabitation constitutes a
substantial change in circumstances like those indicated in that statute. Among those
changes is a substantial decrease in the obligee’s “need.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(a). Minnesota courts have long recognized that sharing a residence with another
adult may substantially decrease an obligee’s need. E.g., Abbott, 282 N.W.2d at 566. By
enacting the cohabitation statute, the legislature likewise signaled that such an arrangement
may afford the obligee an “economic benefit.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a)(2).
The legislature also ensured that the cohabitation statute applies only to those shared
living arrangements that represent a true change in circumstances, limiting its application
to cohabitation “following dissolution of the marriage.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a).

3 Similarly, the legislature knows how to state a categorical rule for terminating
maintenance, as it has in cases of an obligee’s remarriage. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3
(2018).
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And it ensured that the change is a substantial one. The statute applies only to a long-term
cohabitation arrangement. Id., subd. 6(a)(3) (requiring consideration of length and likely
future duration of the cohabitation), (c) (providing that cohabitation cannot support
modification unless a year has passed since the dissolution) . And it contemplates a
cohabitation arrangement that is simi lar to marriage. Id., subd. 6(b) (providing that
cohabitation may justify modification only if the cohabitants could legally marry) ; accord
Abbott, 282 N.W.2d at 565 -66 (describing co habitation as similar to common -law
marriage, which Minnesota does not recognize). Thus, an obligee’s establishment of a
long-term cohabitation arrangement with another adult after the dissolution constitutes a
substantial change in circumstances.
Second, the determination whether cohabitation renders the existing maintenanc e
obligation unreasonable and unfair turns on the four factors enumerated in the cohabitation
statute. Those factors require consideration of t he obligee’s motive in cohabiting rather
than marrying, the actual benefit the obligee obtains from cohabitation , the durability of
the cohabitation, and the likely effect of a reversal of cohabitation if maintenance is
modified. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6(a). These mirror considerations of fairness and
reasonableness relevant to other changes in circumstances . See Hemmingsen v.
Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn. App. 2009) (permitting consideration of a
party’s motives in voluntarily creating a change of circumstances). But they also account
for considerations that are unique to the cohabitation context. See Abbott, 282 N.W.2d at
566 (noting that a cohabitation arrangement “can be readily broken off without obligation,”
leaving the obligee in need). By enumerating these factors, the legislature established
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almost the opposite of the presumption husband urges—it is fair and reasonable to reduce
or terminate maintenance based on cohabitation only if that arrangement actually reduces
or eliminates the obligee’s need, the change in need is reasonably expected to be long-term
and durable, and the arrangement is not merely a means of avoiding the automatic
termination of maintenance that remarriage would necessitate.
In sum, a maintenance obligee’s cohabitation with another adult constitutes a
substantial change in circumstances that justifies modifying mainten ance if consideration
of the four factors enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 6, indicates that cohabitation
makes the existing maintenance obligation unreasonable and unfair.
The district court correctly followed this framework, finding that wife is in a long-
term relationship that is likely to continue for some time, the two have shared a residence
for multiple years, and they do not intend to marry rega rdless of the maintenance award.
And the court found that this cohabitation arrangement affords wife an economic benefit
of $1,270 per month in the form of reduced housing costs , making it unreasonable and
unfair not to reduce husband’s maintenance obligation accordingly. Husband challenges
only this last aspect of the district court’s findings.
B. The district court made sufficient findings regarding wife’s economic
benefit from cohabitation.

Husband contends the district court made insufficient findings to address the extent
of wife’s economic benefit from cohabitation. He asserts that the court should have found
that wife receives a greater economic benefit because her cohabitant can afford to
contribute more than $1,270 per month. The district court considered husband’s argument
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that wife’s cohabitant should contribute toward other expenses, such as pet care and
insurance premiums, and agreed that “it is reasonable for [wife] to expect him to contribute
more financially to the household. ” But there is no evidence that he actually does so.
Absent such evidence, we discern no error by the district court in declining to find that wife
receives a greater economic benefit.
We conclude the district court’s finding that wife receives an economic benefit of
$1,270 per month from cohabitation is sufficient to demonstrate the court addressed that
aspect of the cohabitation statute . That finding has ample support in the record, and it
supports the court’s determination that it would be unfair and unreasonable not to reduce
husband’s maintenance obligation by that amount. Accor dingly, husband’s challenge to
the $1,270 reduction of his maintenance obligation based on wife’s cohabitation fails.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding retroactive
maintenance modification without ordering a remedy for the overpayment.

A district court may make a modification of spousal maintenance “retroactive only
with respect to any period during which the petitioning party has pendi ng a motion for
modification.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f) (2018). We review the district court’s
decisions regarding retroactivity for an abuse of discretion. See Melius, 765 N.W.2d at 414
(recognizing that a district court has broad discretion in decisions regarding spousal
maintenance); Kemp, 608 N.W.2d at 920 (stating that t he dec ision to set a retroactive
effective date for the modification of maintenance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
The district court modified maintenance in January 2019, making the modification
retroactive to March 2018, when husband served his motion. An 11-month overpayment
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of $1,270 per month results in a total overpayment of $13,970. Wife does not dispute this
amount or her obligation to repay it. And the record shows she is making payments to
husband, albeit not in the manner or amount than he would like.4
Husband contends the district court erred by declining to order a specific “remedy”
to address the overpayment. He is correct that when a retroactive reduction or termination
of maintenance results in an overpayment, the obligor “has a right” to recover the
overpayment. Peterson v. Lobeck, 421 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Minn. App. 1988) (addressing
overpayment after obligee’s remarriage). But he identifies no authority requiring any
particular remedy to effectuate that right. Indeed, when husband requested that the district
court order a 20% credit against his modified maintenance obligation ($180 per month)
until the overpayment is eliminated, he candidly acknowledged that , while Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.52 (2018) prescribes that a pproach to resolve a child -support overpayment , no
caselaw requires such an approach with respect to a maintenance overpayment.
Husband contends it would be inequitable to require him to submit the arrearage
order to a judgment because a maintenance obligee is afforded a “simple” statutory remedy
to obtain a judgment for unpaid maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 548.091, subd. 1 (2018).
But that remedy, by its terms, does not apply to an obligor who is held to have overpaid
maintenance by virtue of a retroactive modification , particularly absent any evidence that
failure to provide the remedy will cause hardship. On this record, husb and has not

4 At the April 2019 hearing on husband’s motion for amended findings, wife stated that she
“made at least three payments” of $50 toward the overpayment since the court’s January
2019 order. The parties disputed the process for delivery of the payments, but husband has
not denied that wife is actually making payments.
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demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by declining to order wife to repay
the overage at a particular rate or in a particular way.
D E C I S I O N
Despite flaws in its factual findings, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to reduce husband’s spousal-maintenance obligation based on wife’s increased
income. In determining the amount by which to reduce that obligation based on wife’s
cohabitation, the district court correctly applied the cohabitation statute and made sufficient
findings regarding the applicable factors. And the district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to order specific relief regarding the overpayment that resulted from
retroactive modification.
Affirmed.