State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1305

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jessica Lynne Dahlgren,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-18-256

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County A ttorney, David M. Classen, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decide d by Worke, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After police discovered methamphetamine in a car in which she was a passenger,
appellant Jessica Lynne Dahlgren pleaded guilty to third-degree drug possession. Dahlgren

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now seeks to withdraw her plea on the basis that it was not accurate. Because Dahlgren’s
guilty plea met the strong-factual-basis requirement for an Alford plea, we affirm.
FACTS
While on patrol, a state trooper noticed a car with a large “s pider crack” in the
windshield cross the fog line. The officer stopped the car. After approaching the vehicle,
he observed two people in the car and smelled marijuana.
The officer spoke with the passenger, appe llant Jessica Lynne Dahlgren. He saw
needle marks on Dahlgren’s arms and aske d her if she was responsible for the car.
According to the officer, Dahlgren explained that she was not responsible for everything
in the car. The officer sear ched the car and discovered drug paraphernalia—including
hypodermic needles—and a lockbox. The lo ckbox contained more needles, “a white
crystalline substance,” a gas stati on receipt, and other items rela ted to drug use. The last
four digits of the credit card listed on th e gas station receipt ma tched the numbers on
Dahlgren’s credit card in her purse. Subsequent testing revealed that the white crystalline
substance was 10.82 grams of methamphetamine.
The officer arrested the driver and Dahlgren. Later that day, Dahlgren admitted that
two of the “loaded needles” in the car belonged to her. She also told police that she knew
about the lockbox but th at it belonged to the driver. The state charged Dahlgren with
third-degree possession of a controlled substance based on the methamphetamine
recovered from the lockbox.
Instead of going to trial, Dahlgren entered an Alford plea of guilty. At the plea
hearing, Dahlgren acknowledged that she understood an Alford plea required her to admit

3
that there was a substantial likelihood that a jury could find her guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. She did so. Dahlgren testified that she had enough time to consult with her attorney
and understood the trial rights she was giving up by pleading guilty. She also expressed
that some of the drugs belonged to her, but not over ten grams. At this point, the district
court noted that it appeared as if Dahlgren believed that less than ten grams of drugs
belonged to her and reminded her that she need ed to acknowledge th e sufficiency of the
state’s evidence.
The state then described the evidence it would likely submit at trial. The evidence
included the police officer’s testimony about discovering methamphetamine in the lockbox
in the car in which Dahlgren was a passenge r, needle marks on her arms, the gas station
receipt with her credit card number, and her ad mission that two of the “loaded needles”
belonged to her. Additionally, the state intended to call a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA) scientist to testify that the wh ite substance found in the lockbox was
methamphetamine weighing 10.82 grams. But the state acknowledged that no testing was
performed on the needles that Dahlgren admitted belonged to her.
The district court then asked Dahlgren if she believed there was a substantial
likelihood that the state could prove her gu ilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and Dahlgren
stated that she did. As a result, the district court found that Dahlgren made a valid waiver
of her trial rights and concluded that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea.
But Dahlgren’s counsel asked to make an additional record. Her attorney noted that
they discussed that the state’s case was ba sed on the theory of constructive possession
because a “couple of those need les that you claim were your s were found in a lock box

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with some other stuff that didn’t belong to you.” Dahlgren agreed. The court again asked
Dahlgren if she believed the state had suff icient evidence to pr ove her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and Dahlgren again stated that she did.
When the district court subsequently as ked Dahlgren if she was pleading guilty
because she believed she was gu ilty, she answered “[t]o part of what was found in the
possession, but not the ten grams that . . . [the state is] claiming.” The district court
expressed concern with Dahlgren’s plea and reminded her that she needed to acknowledge
that she constructively possessed more than te n grams of methamphetamine. For a third
time, the district court reminded Dahlgren th at she needed to ac knowledge that it was
“substantially likely, based on the evidence, that [the state] would successfully prove that
you possessed ten grams or more of the drugs that they are talking about.” And Dahlgren
responded affirmatively for the third time, saying “I do. I do believe that.”
Satisfied with Dahlgren’s plea, the district court set the matter for sentencing. And
the district court sentenced her to a stay of imposition, 15 days in jail, and ten years of
probation. Dahlgren appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Dahlgren argues that she is entitled to w ithdraw her plea because the record is
insufficient to satisfy the strong-factual-basis requirement for an Alford plea. Specifically,
she contends that the state’s circumstantial evidence of drug possession did not disprove
an alternative inference inconsistent with guilt: that the methamphetamine belonged to the
driver, not Dahlgren. We review th e validity of a guilty plea de novo. State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).

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There is no absolute ri ght to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it. Dikken v. State,
896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 20 17). But a court may permit a defendant to withdraw a
guilty plea in certain situations. After senten cing, a court is only required to permit the
withdrawal of a guilty plea if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. And to be valid, a “guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent.” Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Dahlgren’s argument that the record does not contain a sufficient factual basis for
her plea implicates the accuracy require ment. Because Dahlgren entered an Alford plea,
additional requirements must be met to ensu re the accuracy of her plea. Under an Alford
plea, a court may accept a defe ndant’s guilty plea despite th e defendant’s assertion of
innocence, provided that the state demonstrates “a strong factual basis for the plea” and the
defendant expresses the desire to enter the pl ea “based on [the] be lief that the [s]tate’s
evidence would be sufficien t to convict [her].” State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 647
(Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91
S. Ct. 160, 168 (1970). But when a defendant pleads guilty while simultaneously denying
his or her guilt, “the rationa lity of the defendant ’s decision is immediately called into
question.” State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977). As such, a district “court
should not cavalierly accept” an Alford plea. Id.
Accordingly, “careful scrutiny of the factual basis” supporting an Alford plea is
necessary. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 648-49. And a de fendant’s acknowledgement that the
state has sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the charged crime “is critical to the

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court’s ability to serve the protective purpose of the accuracy requirement.” Id. at 649. To
ensure this requirement is met, the best practice is for the district court, at the plea hearing,
to ask a defendant to acknowledge on the record “that the evidence the [s]tate would likely
offer against [her] is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find the
defendant guilty of the offense to which [she] is pleading guilty.” Id.
With these requirements for a valid Alford plea in mind, we turn to Dahlgren’s case.
Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that a strong factual basis supports Dahlgren’s
plea. At the plea hearing, the state described the evidence th at it expected to present at
trial. That evidence included a summary of the expected testimony from the police officer
who discovered the methamphetamine and the forensic scientist who weighed and tested
the drugs. Relevant expected testimony fro m the officer included that Dahlgren was a
passenger in the car where the officer discovered the lockbox. And the lockbox contained
a bag of methamphetamine, needles, and a gas station receipt displaying Dahlgren’s credit
card number. Further, the officer would testif y that Dahlgren admitted that two loaded
needles found in the car belong ed to her. The forensic scie ntist would testify that the
substance found in the lockbox weighed 10.82 grams and was methamphetamine, beyond
a 95% confidence level. Perhaps most importantly, in addition to this evidence, Dahlgren
acknowledged three times that the state ha d sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that she was guilty of third-degree possession.
Indeed, both the state and the district c ourt followed the best-practice procedures
for an Alford plea. The state, on the record, presen ted a summary of its evidence and the
testimony it anticipated introducing at trial. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (noting that “the

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better practice is for the factual basis to be based on evidence discussed with the defendant
on the record at the plea hear ing,” which “may occur thro ugh an interrogation of the
defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at
trial”). And it is clear that the district court exercised careful scrutiny of Dahlgren’s plea,
as evidenced by its repeated que stioning of her to be clear th at she believed that the state
had sufficient evidence to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Accordingly, we
conclude that Dahlgren’s plea was supported by a strong factual basis and was sufficiently
accurate.
Still, Dahlgren contends that the evidence presented at the plea hearing failed to
satisfy the strong-factual-basis requirement for an Alford plea. Dahlgren asks this court to
assess the validity of her plea using the standard of review used to evaluate convictions
based on circumstantial evidence. When appl ying that standard of review, this court
considers whether the circumstances proved are “consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any ra tional hypothesis except that of guilt.”
State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015). And, according to Dahlgren, the
evidence supporting the state’s theory of constructive po ssession did not disprove other
reasonable inferences, including an inference that the meth amphetamine belonged to the
driver and not Dahlgren.
We discern two problems with Dahlgren’s argument. First, Dahlgren does not
identify any caselaw to support her assertion that in order to determine if an Alford plea is
sufficiently accurate, this court should apply the standard used to review convictions based

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on circumstantial evidence.1 When evaluating an Alford plea, the relevant question is not
whether the state’s anticipated evidence would have eliminated any reasonable hypothesis
of innocence. Instead, before accepting an Alford plea, a district court must “independently
conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the
charge to which [she] pleaded guilty, notwithstanding [her] claims of innocence.” Theis,
742 N.W.2d at 649. Provided that a strong factual basis supports the plea, and the district
court is satisfied that there is a “strong probability” that a defendant would be found guilty,
it is unnecessary to eliminate every alternative hypothesis of innocence for an Alford plea
to be accurate. Dahlgren’s argument to the contrary is not persuasive.
Second, by creating an “either or” scenario—the methamphetamine either belonged
to the driver or Dahlgren—Dahlgren’s argu ment ignores the legal concept of joint
constructive possession. The state may prove possession “through evidence of actual or
constructive possession.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (M inn. 2017). And “[a]
defendant may possess an item jo intly with another person.” Id. at 601; see also
State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015) (stating that “constructive
possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared” (quotation omitted)).
When arguing that an individual constr uctively possessed an item that police
discovered “in a place to which others had access,” the state must demonstrate a “strong
probability . . . that at the time the defend ant was consciously or knowingly exercising

1 Dahlgren analogizes her case to State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 603 (Minn. 2017). But
Harris involved a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence and did not involve an Alford plea. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
As such, the standard of review applicable in Harris does not apply to Dahlgren’s case.

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dominion and control over it.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Proxi mity to the item is an
important consideration. Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 834. However, when an individual does not
have “exclusive possession” of an automobile, there is not an auto matic inference that
drugs found in the vehicle belong to that person. Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the evidence presented by the state establishes a “strong probability” that, at
trial, Dahlgren would be found guilty of third-degree drug possession based on the theory
of joint constructive possession. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. As noted by the state, the
methamphetamine was found in a lockbox in a car in which Dahlgren was a passenger.
Dahlgren acknowledged that she knew about the lockbox and admitted that two loaded
needles discovered in the car be longed to her. A gas station receipt found in the lockbox
showed Dahlgren’s credit card number, a nd the officer observed needle marks on
Dahlgren’s arms. This evidence establishes a strong probability that the state would prove
third-degree possession beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. As such, Dahlgren’s plea meets
the strong-factual-basis requirement for a valid Alford plea.
In sum, we are satisfied that the district court carefully scrutinized Dahlgren’s plea
and correctly determined that it was suppor ted by a strong factual basis. Because
Dahlgren’s plea was accurate, she is not entitled to withdraw it.
Affirmed.