In re the matter of: Eric Thurman Clinton, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1308

In re the matter of: Eric Thurman Clinton, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Gabriela Kathleen Linder,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-15-5238

Zachary Smith, Vox Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lateesa T. Ward, Ward & Ward, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s denial of her motion to modify custody, without
an evidentiary hearing, appellant-mother argues that the di strict court : (1) abused its
discretion in ruling that she failed to make a prima facie case to modify custody, and should
have held an evidentiary hearing on her motion , (2) awarded her insufficient parenting

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time, (3) should have vacated certain judgments against her , (4) should not have awarded
respondent-father conduct-based attorney fees, (5) violated her right to seek judicial relief
by its award of fees against her, and (6) was biased against her. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Gabriela Kathleen Linder and respondent -father Eric Thurman
Clinton are the parents of P.L.C. , who was born in 2012. Mother and father dated for a
short time while mother was a law student in Minnesota. Mother and father were no longer
dating when mother found out she was pregnant. Mother moved to Nevada in 2012, and
P.L.C. was born there. In 2013, mother move d back to Minnesota with P.L.C. Mother,
father, and P.L.C. lived together in Minnesota from October 2013 until June 2015. But
mother and P.L.C. returned to Nevada in July or August 2015.
In July 2015, father petitioned the Hennepin County District C ourt to establish
custody and parenting time. Mother filed an answer and counter -petition in September
2015. In May 2016, the district court granted mother and father joint legal custody and
joint physical custody of P.L.C. 1 The district court ordered mother to return P.L.C. to
Minnesota no later than July 1, 2016, and ordered parenting time as follows:
a. If Mother returns to Minnesota: the parties shall cooperate
to develop a parenting time schedule under which each parent
has equal parenting time. If the parties are unable to agree on
such a schedule, they shall submit the matter to mediation prior
to moving the court for further assistance. Unless and until an
alternative agreement or court order, Mother shall have
Monday and Tuesday (including overnights), Father shall have
Wednesday and Thursday (including overnights) and the

1 The district court granted father’s petition by default at his request after mother ignored
the court-ordered custody evaluation.

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parties shall alternate weekends (Friday eveni ng to Monday
morning).

b. If Mother remains in Nevada : Mother shall be entitled to
reasonable and liberal parenting time to occur in Minnesota.
Mother shall provide at least 10 days’ notice of her intent to
exercise parenting time in Minnesota. Father s hall not
unreasonably withhold parenting time when Mother is able to
exercise it in Minnesota. Additionally, Mother shall be entitled
to four one-week blocks of parenting time to occur in Nevada
per year: twice during summer break, once during winter
break, and once during spring break. All travel expenses shall
be borne by [Mother].

In August 2017, father filed a motion requesting, in part, an equal, rotating holiday
schedule, an increase in mother’s ongoing child support to reduce her arrears, an order
compelling mother to respond to father’s discovery requests and sanctioning mother $1,000
for failure to cooperate with the discovery request, and an award of $3,500 in conduct -
based and need-based attorney fees. Mother opposed father’s motion.
On November 13, 2017, the district court issued an order granting father’s requests.
The district court sanctioned mother $1,000 for her “failure to cooperate with the discovery
process.” The district court also granted father’s motion for need -based attorney fees in
the amount of $1,000 and conduct-based attorney fees in the amount of $2,500. Judgment
was entered on December 28, 2017, in the amount of $4,500.
In February 2018, father moved the district court for an order enforcing the terms
of the November 13, 2 017 order , including ordering mother to complete a passport
application for P.L.C., ordering mother to “personally handle all pick-up and drop-offs” of
P.L.C., making “inferred findings of fact . . . due to [mother’s] failure to respond to
discovery,” orde ring mother to drop P.L.C. off at school on time, and ordering that

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mother’s school-day parenting time schedule be forfeited for one school year if she has
more than three unexcused late drop -offs in a school year. Father also moved the district
court to sanction mother $1,000 for failin g to provide discovery, to award father $999 in
conduct-based and $999 in need-based attorney fees, and to grant other relief. The hearing
on father’s motion was scheduled for March 8, 2018, at 1:30 p.m. Mother, who had moved
back to Nevada, failed to appear for the hearing.
On June 19, 2018, the district court issued an order enforcing the previous order
from November 13, 2017, sanctioning mother $1,000 for failure to comply with court -
ordered discovery, and awarding father $999 in need-based attorney fees and $999 in
conduct-based attorney fees. Three separate judgments were entered on July 30, 2018 ,
totaling $2,998.
On December 10, 2018, mother moved the district court for an order (1) vacating
the three judgments entered on July 30, 2018; (2) modifying custody of P.L.C. and allowing
P.L.C. to move to Nevada with her; (3) modifying parenting time; and (4) requiring father
to provide information about incidents and injuries involving P.L.C. Father filed a motion
requesting, in part, that the district court deny mother’s requests, modify the parenting time
schedule to allow mother one weekend per month in Minnesota, five weeks per year in
Nevada, with alternating holidays.
On June 19, 2019, the district court issued an order . The district court denied
mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the modification of custody issue, ruling
that mother failed to make a prima facie showing of endangerment. The district court also
clarified the parenting time schedule. The district court acknowledged that mother “has a

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rebuttable presumption of at least 25% of parenting time or 91 overnights per year,” and
also acknowledged the “practicalities and logistics of bridging the distance” between the
parties who reside in different states. The district court awarded mother 21% of parenting
time or 78 overnights per year and created a holiday-parenting-time schedule. The district
court denied mothe r’s request to vacate the judgments entered on July 30, 2018 . The
district court also granted father’s request for attorney fees in the amount of $5,650.
Judgment was entered on June 20, 2019. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied , without an
evidentiary hearing, mother’s motion to modify custody.

Mother challenges the district court ’s denial of her request for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of custody modification. S pecifically, mother challenges the district
court’s determination that she failed to make a prima facie case for custody modif ication
based on endangerment.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (d)(iv) (2018):
the court shall retain the custody arrangement . . . specifying
the child’s primary residence that was established by the prior
order unless: . . . the child’s present environment endangers the
child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development and the harm li kely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child.

Before the district court holds an evidentiary hearing, the party seeking the
modification must make a prima facie case for modification. In re Custody of M.J.H., 913
N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 2018). To make a prima facie c ase to modify custody based on

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endangerment, the moving party must allege: “(1) the c ircumstances of the children or
custodian have changed; (2) modification would serve the children’s best interests; (3) the
children’s present environment endangers their physical health, emotional health, or
emotional development; and (4) the benefits of the change outweigh its detriments with
respect to the children. ” Id. (quoting Crowley v. Meyer , 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (M inn.
2017)). “Endangerment requires a showing of a significant degree of danger, but the
danger may be purely to emotional development.” Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778
(Minn. App. 1997) (quotation and citation omitted). “If the affidavits accompany ing the
motion for modification do not allege sufficient facts to allow a court to reach the findings
required by [section] 518.18, the [district] court is required to deny the motion.” Englund
v. Englund , 352 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Minn. App. 1984) (citing Nice-Peterson v. Nice -
Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 1981)).
On appeal from an order denying , without an evidentiary hearing, a motion to
modify custody, the court “review [s] three discrete determinations.” Boland v. Murtha ,
800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011). First, this court reviews “de novo whether the
district court properly treated the allegations in the moving party’s affidavits as true,
disregarded the contrary allegations in the nonmoving party’s affidavits, and considered
only the explanat ory allegations in the nonmoving party’s affidavits.” Id. Second, this
court reviews “for an abuse of discretion the district court’s determination as to the
existence of a prima facie case for the modification.” Id. Finally, this court reviews “de
novo whether the district court properly determined the need for an evidentiary hearing.”
Id.

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In her motion to modify custody, mother argued that custody modification was
warranted because father works “excessive hours,” and “the extent [father’s] girlfriend
inserts herself into the role of mother . . . is very concerning to [mother].” Mother alleged
that father’s work schedule and father’s “attempt to substitute [his girlfriend] as parent is
emotionally damaging to the minor child.” Mother also alleged endangerment based on an
incident in which a dog bit P.L.C. while in the care of father and his girlfriend.
The district court noted at the outset that “in reviewing the motion papers for
endangerment, the Court has (i) assumed that all of [mother’s] factual averments are true;
and (ii) not [relied] on any of [father’s] contrary averments (although the Court has
reviewed his averments and supporting materials to provide context for the Court’s
decision).” The district court first considered mother’s allegations about the dog bite. The
district court stated that mother’s “averments on endangerment stemmed from one accident
(the dog bite), and does not demonstrate a nexus between [father’s] conduct and any
physical or emotional harm suffered by the child.”
The district court next considered mother’s allegations about father’s girlfriend and
her role as “substitute mother.” The district court reasoned that because P.L.C, father, and
father’s girlfriend live together, it “is reasonable to assume that [father’s] live-in significant
other would be involved in [P.L.C.’s] life.” The district court also determined that mother’s
concerns stem from “third parties making assumptions about who [P.L.C.’s] mother is.”
But the district court determine d that it could not rule that a prima facie case for
endangerment exists based on “the assumptions of third parties.”

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Finally, the district court considered mother’s allegations about father’s work
schedule and his inability to provide a “consistent and sa fe environment” for P.L.C.
because of his busy schedule. The district court noted father “contextualizes this
argument,” explaining that “a majority” of the hours he works outside his full -time
employment are worked while P.L.C. is in school, at camp during the summer, or while he
is with his mother. The district court ruled that mother’s concerns about father’s work
schedule do not support a prima facie case of endangerment.
Our review of the record shows that t he district court treated mother’s allegati ons
as true, and only considered father’s explanatory allegations where helpful to provide
context for mother’s allegations. On this record, mother has not shown that the district
court abused its discretion in ruling that mother failed to make a prima facie case to modify
custody based on endangerment. Therefore, we also conclude that the district court
properly determined that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its parenting-time award.
Mother makes various arguments about the district court’s parenting -time award.
“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting -time issues and will not
be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Shearer v. Sh earer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75
(Minn. App. 2017) (quoting Dahl v. Dahl , 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009) ).
“Reversible abuses of discretion include misapplying the law or relying on findings of fact
that are not supported by the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
First, m other argues that the change in the parenting time schedule “makes it
impossible for her to achieve the true joint physical custody goal contemplated by the

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Custody Order” and essentially awards father sole physical custody of P.L.C. 2
Specifically, m other argues that when the district court modified the parenting time
schedule, it improperly modified the custody order because she was awarded less than 50%
parenting time. Mother cites no legal authority to support her claim. And this court has
stated that “[j]oint physical custody does not require an absolutely equal division of time;
rather, it is only necessary that physical custody of the child be the shared responsibility of
the parties.” Hegerle v. Hegerle, 355 N.W.2d 726, 731-32 (Minn. App. 1984); see Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(d) (2018) (defining joint physical custody). Here, despite the
allocation of parenting time, physical custody of the child is the shared responsibility of
the parties. As a result, we reject mo ther’s argument that the district court improperly
modified the custody order when it modified the parenting time schedule.
Second, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion because it awarded
her less than the 25% parenting time to which she is presumptively entitled under Minn.
Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2018) without a finding of endangerment. But this court has
held that “[a]lthough a ‘restriction’ requires a finding of endangerment or noncomplian ce
with court orders, parenting-time allocations that merely fall below the 25% presumption
can be justified by reasons related to the child’s best interests and considerations of what

2 Mother asserted in her brief and at oral argument that after the district court decided her
motion, mother moved back to Minnesota to be closer to P.L.C. She argues that the district
court erred in denying her requested alternative relief of alternating weeks of parenting
time in Minnesota. But the district court determined mother’s parenting time based on the
fact that mother was residing in Nevada at the time of the hearing. The district court also
stated in its order that i f mother moves back to Minnesota and lives in the state
permanently, “the Court would entertain a motion to modify [the] parenting time schedule”
after the parties attended mediation or another alternative dispute resolution process.

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is feasible given the circumstances of the parties.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212,
218 (Minn. App. 2010) (citation omitted). While the district court has the duty to consider
the presumption, “the statute does not restrict the bases for reducing parenting time.” Id.
“The district court has broad discretion in deciding this issue.” Id.
Here, the distr ict court acknowledged the presumption, noting that mother “has a
rebuttable presumption of at least 25% of parenting time, or 91 overnights per year.” The
district court also noted that it “would like to award [mother] as close to 25% of parenting
time as possible under the current circumstances and distance constraints.” As a result, the
district court awarded mother 21% of parenting time or 78 overnights per year. The district
court considered the “circumstances” namely “the practicalities and logisti cs of bridging
the distance with a child [P.L.C.’s] age” in coming to the parenting time determination.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded mother 21% parenting time
under the circumstances of this case.
Third, mother argues that the district court’s “refusal to allow alternating weeks of
parenting time in Minnesota is unwarranted on this record.” In her motion, mother
requested an order “clarifying/modifying the parenting time schedule between the parties
to ensure that [mother] is entitled to as close to 50% parenting time when she is physically
staying in Minnesota.” Mother noted in her submissions that “while [it] would be an
extreme hardship” for her, she would “continue to travel[] to and from Nevada twice a
month if the Court does not permit the child to move to Nevada.” The district court rejected
mother’s proposal, stating that because mother “still primarily resides in Nevada it is not
practical to award [mother] 50% parenting time as she requested and a week on week off

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schedule is not favorable for a chi ld of [P.L.C.’s] age even if [mother] were in Minnesota
50% of the time.”
Mother contends that the district court “speculated that it was not in the child’s best
interests to alternate weeks. In light of [father’s] excessive work schedule, that does not
appear reasonable because the child must then spend much of his time with a third party
and away from his parents.” But in considering mother’s motion to modify custody, the
district court rejected mother’s contentions over father’s work schedule. The district court
explained that father “contextualizes this argument,” clarifying that “a majority” of the
hours he works outside his full -time employment are worked while P.L.C. is in school, at
camp during the summer , or while P.L.C. is with his mother. And by mother ’s own
admission, travelling between Minnesota and Nevada every other week “would be an
extreme hardship.” The district court echoed this in its findings, stating that because
mother lives in Nevada it is “not pra ctical to award [mother] 50% parenting time.” The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s proposal for alternating weeks
of parenting time in Minnesota.
Finally, mother argues that the district court “erroneously placed unfair and onerous
terms on [mother’s] parenting time.” Mother challenges the district court’s “reducing her
access to the child to one weekend per month,” requiring mother to provide 30 days’ notice
before exercising parenting time, requiring mother to take P.L.C. to scheduled activities
during her parenting time, requiring mother to pick up the child for parenting time rather
than relying on a third party to do so, requiring mother to pay for all expenses related to
her parenting time, and allowing father’s girlfri end to pick up the child rather than father.

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Mother contends that these “restrictions adversely affect the parent -child relationship.”
Mother provides no citation to legal authority or legal analysis to support her position. The
district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting -time issues, mother has failed to
show affirmatively that the district court erred in imposing such terms, and no prejudicial
error is obvious on mere inspection of the district court’s ruling. See Schoepke v. Alexander
Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error
based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s
brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvio us on
mere inspection.”). As a result, we do not further address mother’s argument on this point.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied mother’s req uest
to vacate prior judgments.

Mother argues that prior judgments against her sh ould have been vacated because
they resulted from an abuse of the district court’s discretion. Under Minn. Stat. § 518.145,
subd. 2 (2018), “[o]n motion and upon terms that are just, the court may relieve a party
from a judgment and decree, order, or proceeding under [chapter 518]” including “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” The moving party bears the burden of proof.
Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb.
21, 2001). This court reviews a district court’s decision to reopen a judgment for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 761. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact
that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the l aw, or rendering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. App.
2016).

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Mother challenges the district court’s order from June 19, 2018, and the three
resulting judgmen ts entered on July 30, 2018 . In the June 19 order , the district court
granted father’s motion to enforce the previous order from November 13, 2017, and
sanctioned mother $1,000 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery.3 The district
court also awarded father additional ne ed-based attorney fees in the amount of $999 and
conduct-based attorney fees also in the amount of $999. The district court noted that
mother not only failed to respond to father’s motion but also failed to appear at the motion
hearing on March 8, 2018 .4 Pursuant to Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 303.03(b), the district court
found father’s motion unopposed and awarded attorney fees. Three separate judgments
were entered on July 30, 2018, totaling $2,998.
Mother moved to vacate the judgment s, arguing that she “has a reasonable excuse
for failing to respond to [father’s] motion below or appear at the March 8, 2018 hearing.”
Mother argued that she did not receive father’s notice of motion because she had moved
back to Nevada. The district court determ ined that mother’s failure to appear at the

3 Mother challenges the district court’s order from November 13, 2017, in which it
sanctioned mother $1,000 for her “failure to cooperate with the discovery process,” granted
father’s motion for need -based attorney fees in the amount of $1,000, and granted his
motion for conduct-based attorney fees in the amount of $2,500. Judgment in the amount
of $4,500 was entered on December 28, 2017 . Mother acknowledges that she did not
timely appeal this judgment and that the timeline for vacating that judgment had expired.
Because mother did not timely challenge the district court’s order from November 13,
2017, and subsequent judgment from December 28, 2017, we decline to consider her
arguments.
4 The district court provided other reasons for awarding attorney fees, including, but not
limited to, mother “purposefully” causing father to expend money and time in court
proceedings because mother is in a superior financial position, and mother has
“unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of the proceedings.” Mother does not
challenge any of these findings on appeal.

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scheduled hearing on March 8, 2018, did not result from “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.” The district court found that on January 19, 2018, in a separate
proceeding, Hennepin County moved the district court for an order finding mother in
contempt for fail ing to pay child support. In the order to show cause, in that separate
proceeding, mother was ordered to appear personally before a referee or judge at the Family
Justice Center on March 8, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. A Hennepin County deputy personally
served mother the order to show cause at her apartment in Minneapolis on January 28,
2018.
On February 19, 2018, father moved the district court for an order enforcing the
November 13, 2017 order and other relief. The hearing on father’s motion was scheduled
at 1:30 p.m. to immediately follow the contempt hearing on March 8, 2018. The affidavit
of service, filed February 19, 2018, shows that father’s motion was served on mother by
mailing it to mother’s apartment. Mother failed to appear for the contempt hearing and for
the hearing on father’s motion. The district court reasoned that mother’s failure to appear
at the contempt hearing on March 8 was “unexcused” because she was required to
personally appear. “And had [mother] complied with the Order to Show Cause, then she
would have appeared at the hearing on [father’s] motion at 1:30.”
Mother challenges the district court’s reasoning and its reliance on mother’s
unexcused absence from the contempt hearing. But the record supports the district court’s
findings, and we conclude that the district court did not render a decision that is against
logic and the facts in the record. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
denial of mother’s request to vacate the prior judgment.

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IV. Mother’s argument about prior awards of attorney fees and sanctions is not
properly before the court.

Mother argues that the district court’s repeated awards of attorney fees and
imposition of sanctions viola tes her constitutional right to seek judicial relief and that
sanctioning her for conduct “outside litigation” violated her right to procedural due process.
We decline to consider this argument for two reasons. First, mother cites neither the record
nor to any relevant legal authority to support th ese arguments. Because this issue is
inadequately briefed we decline to consider it. See Louden v. Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166
(Minn. 1946) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any
argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”). Second, mother appears to
challenge all previous awards of attorney fees and imposition of sanctions, but mother did
not argue to the district court that these awards and sanctions violated her right to seek
judicial relief. Because mother did not raise this issue below, we decline to consider it on
that basis as well. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court
must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)).
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded father conduct-
based attorney fees.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded father
conduct-based attorney fees in its June 19, 2019 order. “In proceedings under chapter 518,
a district court may, in its discretion, award attorney fees against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d

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471, 476 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1). Conduct-based attorney
fees are warranted when a party’s positions throughout the proceedings are “duplicitous
and disingenuous and have had the effect of further . . . lengthening [the] litigation, and
increasing the expense of [the] proceedings.” Redmond v. Redmond, 594 N.W.2d 272, 276
(Minn. App. 1999). “A district court’s attorney fee award will be reversed only for an
abuse of discretion.” Haefele, 621 N.W.2d at 767.
Mother argues that conduct-based attorney fees were improper because she “raised
legitimate legal and factual arguments to support her positions” in her motion. But the
district court did not award conduct -based attorney fees based on the lack of merit of
mother’s motion. Instead, the district court found that mother “has unreasonably
contributed to the length and expense of these proceedings.” Specifically, the district court
found that mother has raised “largely procedural . . . requests to relitigate issues after almost
every major decision in this case. This repeated, post -decision litigation has added
considerable expense and time to these proceedings.” Mother does not appear to object to
these findings. Instead, mother appears to challenge the district court’s finding that father
“incurred substantial expenses related to this motion, which was brought, in part, because
[mother] failed to appear at a hearing on March 8, 2018, withou t a reasonable excuse.”
Mother argues that her “reason for missing the hearing . . . was because she had not received
the motion or hearing notice.” Thus, mother again challenges the district court’s finding
that mother failed to appear at the hearing on March 8, 2018, without reasonable excuse.
As detailed above, the record supports the district court’s finding that mother failed to

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appear at the hearing without excuse. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s award of attorney fees.
VI. Mother has not proved judicial bias.
Mother argues that the district court’s “rulings and repeated sanctions . . . raises
concerns about judicial bias.” Mother essentially contends that because the district court
ruled against her and imposed sanctions, the district court was biased in favor of father.
But this court has held that “prior adverse rulings . . . clearly cannot constitute bias.” Olson
v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986) (citing U.S. v. Anderson, 433 F.2d 856,
860 (8th Cir. 1970)). Thus, we reject mother’s argument.
Mother also argues that the referee was biased because he “may have had a private
conversation with [father] about the case prior to the hearing.” Mother notes that at the
beginning of the hearing on March 25, 2019, her counsel received “anecdotal information”
that an off-the-record conversation occurred between the referee and father’s counsel. The
record shows that mother’s counsel indicated that she “had a request of the Court whether
the Court has had some ex parte communications with the . . . petitioner in this case about
this case?” The referee responded, “I don’t think I’ve ever talked to [father] outside this
courtroom before.” The referee asked, “Is there something that you want to get into?” to
which mother’s counsel responded, “not at this time.” Mother argues that the referee
incorrectly interpreted counsel’s comment “as excluding any conversation with [father’s]
counsel.” Even so, mother provides no explanation, argument or other citation to the record
to support an argument that any conversation that may have occurred between the referee

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and father’s counsel created bias and we otherwise discern no bias. Thus, we reject
mother’s argument.
Affirmed.