Randall Rahn, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1318

Randall Rahn,
Relator,

vs.

Midway Farm Equipment, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed April 6, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 37321542

Randall Jay Rahn, Odin, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Midway Farm Equipment, Inc., Mountain Lake, Minnesota (respondent)

Eli K. Best, Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
Relator appeals the unemployment law judge’s decision that relator’s discharge for
employment misconduct makes him ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. We
affirm.
FACTS
From April 2010 until his discharge on April 8, 2019, relator Randall Rahn worked
for respondent Midway Farm Equipment, Inc. (Midway). After Rahn refused to make
additional deliveries, Midway t erminated his employment. Rahn then applied for
unemployment benefits with respondent Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED). DEED initially determined that Rahn was ineligible for benefits
because his discharge resulted from employment misconduct. Rahn appealed that
determination and an unemployment law judge (ULJ) held a hearing to review Rahn’s
eligibility for benefits. The following issues require our attention : (1) Rahn’s job duties;
(2) Rahn’s dispute with Midway regarding a damaged lawn mower ; and (3) the
reasonableness of Midway’s employment expectations in light of Rahn’ s diagnosis of
cardiomyopathy and the circumstances surrounding Rahn’s refusal to make deliveries.
First, the merits of Rahn’s request for unemployment benefits required the ULJ to
determine whether Rahn’s job duties included driving and making deliveries. At the
hearing, both Rahn and Midway’s General Manager, Jerry Haberman, testified that Rahn’s
job duties included delivery driving. For instance, Rahn acknowledged that exhibit six
contained an accurate list of his job duties. This exhibit states that Midway considered it a

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“plus” for maintenance employees “to have a [commercial driver’s license], to help with
equipment delivery during busy times.” In addition, Haberman testified that Rahn
performed “some delivery work” as part of his job duties at Midway. The ULJ found that
“[h]elping make deliveries was part of Rahn’s job.”
Second, Rahn’s request also required the ULJ to make findings regarding a damaged
lawn mower. At some point in the spring of 2018, Rahn was moving a crated lawn mower
using a forklift. As he lifted the crate, the lawn mower became unbalanced and fell over,
damaging the lawn mower. Pursuant to Midway’s policy, Midway sent Rahn a bill for
$300 as a result of the damage . Rahn initially offered to pay for the damage to the lawn
mower, but after looking at the emp loyee handbook and the Minnesota statutes, Rahn
changed his mind. Midway continued to bill Rahn for the damage through the day of his
discharge, almost a year later . Rahn disputed the bill, and the ULJ found that Rahn “was
upset over the mower repair bill” when he refused to make deliveries.
Third, the ULJ received evidence and made determinations regarding the
reasonableness of Midway’s employment expectations in light of Rahn’s health issues and
the circumstances surrounding Rahn’s refusal and discharge . In April 2018, Rahn was
diagnosed with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. As a result, he could no longer drive
commercial vehicles unless and until he obtained an updated health card from the
Minnesota Department of Transportation. Shortly after his diagno sis, Rahn informed
Haberman that his “health card expired.” At the evidentiary hearing, Haberman stated that
in some cases, like diabetes, a person can obtain a current health card as long as they
manage and treat their medical conditions. Haberman and Rahn discussed the possibility

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of Rahn obtaining a current health card and commercial driver’s license with med ical
restrictions. Rahn testified that he “was supposed to have gone to renew it with the
restrictions,” but did not. Rahn did not tell Haberman that he neglected to obtain a current
commercial driver’s license, and Haberman did not “follow -up to see if [Rahn] got the
health card.”
After Midway’s primary delivery driver retired, Rahn agreed to fill in . Haberman
testified that, based on their conversations in 2018, he assumed that Rahn had a current
health card and commercial driver’s license when Rahn ag reed to make the deliveries.
Rahn testified that he ma de the deliveries “illegally” to be a “good employee” and “just
help[] out.” Rahn drove commercial vehicles for Midway without a commercial driver’s
license and completed about “a week and a half worth of deliveries” before his refusal and
termination on April 8, 2019. On that day, Midway asked Rahn to make another delivery.
Rahn refused, expressing his disappointment regarding how Midway handled the damaged
lawn mower. In the text message to Haberman refusing to make the requested delivery ,
Rahn stated the followin g: “Just wanted to let you know I’ m being billed f or that
lawnmower loyalty only runs one way with you but I’m done being your intermittent truck
driver I’m not doing it anymore I've told [two others] no more driving.” Haberman then
talked to Rahn in his office, where Rahn refused to make deliveries. In his testimony, Rahn
acknowledged that when he refused to make any more deliveries, h e did not mention his
health or his lack of a curren t health card or commercial driver’s license . Instead, Rahn
testified that he ref used to do any more deliveries because of the bill he received for the
damaged lawn mower.

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The ULJ found that Rahn provided only one reason for his refusal, the damaged
lawn mower: “Rahn acknowledged during the hearing the reason he refused to make
deliveries was not because of his license or health card. Rather, the reason was because
Haberman wanted payment for damages Rahn previously agreed to pay for .” The ULJ
further determined that Rahn’s refusal “ displayed clearly a serious violation of the
standards of behavior [Midway] had the right to r easonably expect.” Thus, the ULJ
concluded that Rahn was ineligible for unemployment benefits . Rahn requested
reconsideration and the ULJ affirmed. This certiorari appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Relator challenges the ULJ decision for the following four reasons: (1) Rahn argues
that his refusal did not constitute employment misconduct because his job description did
not include making deliveries; (2) Rahn argues that the evidence does not support the ULJ’s
finding regarding the reason why Rahn refused to make deliveries; (3) Rahn argues that his
refusal did not constitute employment misconduct because Midway’s expectation was
unreasonable; and (4) Rahn argues that Midway violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Act
when it discharged him.
The State of Minnesota provides workers who are unemployed through no fault of
their own a temporary partial wage replacement. Minn. Stat. § 268.03 (2018). Workers
discharged as a result of their own misconduct, however, cannot receive this partial wage
replacement. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2018) . The statute defines “employment
misconduct” as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job
that displays clearly: (1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has

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the right to reasonably expect of the employee; or (2) a substantial lack of concern for the
employment.” Id., subd. 6(a ) (2018).1 In determining eligibility for the unemployment
benefits, judges must also consider whether the conduct resulted from the worker ’s
“inability or incapacity,” id., subd. 6(b)(5) (2018), and whether the conduct involved “only
a single incident,” id., subd. 6(d) (2018). On certiorari appeal from a ULJ’s decision, this
court may affirm or remand the case for further proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd.
7(d) (2018). This court may also reverse and modify the decision of a ULJ if the decision
violates the constitution, exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the department,
is made upon unlawful procedure, is affected by other error of law, is unsupported by
substantial evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious. Id.
Whether an employee committed employment misconduct presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Peterson v. Nw. Airlines Inc., 753 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Minn. App.
2008), review denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008). Whether an employee committed a partic ular
act is a question of fact, but whether a particular act constitutes misconduct is a question
of law. Id.; Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011). We view the
ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to its decision , and “will not disturb the
ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially sustains them.” Skarhus v.
Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) . Questions of law are reviewed

1 The version of Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a), in effect at the time of the ULJ’s decision
was amended in 2019 to remove “a substantial lack of conc ern for the employment” from
the definition of employment misconduct. See 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 7, art.
7, § 9, at 1371. This change has no bearing on our analysis.

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de novo. E.g., Abdi v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 749 N.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Minn. App.
2008).
I. Rahn’s Job Description

Rahn argues that the ULJ erred when it found that his job included making
deliveries. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s finding.
As noted above, we will not disturb factual findings of the ULJ whe n the evidence
substantially supports them. At the evidentiary hearing, Rahn acknowledged that a list of
his job duties included the statement that Midway considered it “a plus” for a person in his
position “to have a [commercial driver’s license], to hel p with equipment delivery during
busy times.” Haberman also testified that Rahn performed “some delivery work” as part
of his job duties at Midway. Rahn had also performed this very type of work in the “week
and a half” preceding his refusal and discharge. The evidence in this case substantially
supports a finding that Rahn’s job description included making deliveries.
II. Rahn’s Reason for Refusal to Make Deliveries

Rahn argues that the ULJ erred when it found that Rahn refused to make deliveries
because of how Midway addressed the damaged lawn mower and not because of any health
concerns. We affirm the ULJ’s decision.
On appeal, Rahn and Midway identify two competing reasons for his refusal to
make deliveries. On one hand, Rahn argues that he refused to make deliveries because his
cardiomyopathy precluded him from driving commercial vehicles. On the other hand,
Midway argues that Rahn refused to make deliveries because he was upset about how
Midway handled the damaged lawn mower. The record supports the ULJ’s finding that

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Rahn refused to make the delivery “because Haberman wanted payment for damages Rahn
previously agreed to pay for. ” The record also supports the ULJ’s corresponding finding
that Rahn did not refuse “because of his license or health card.”
For instance, Haberman testified that Rahn was “upset because he was billed for
some lawnmower parts . . . and he came in and refused to do the delivery work apparently
over us charging him for t he lawnmower parts.” In addition, when Rahn communicated
his refusal in a text message, hi s own words show that he refused Midway’s request only
because of the lawn mower : “Just wanted to let you know I’ m being billed f or that
lawnmower loyalty only runs one way with you but I’m done being your intermittent truck
driver I’m not doing it anymore I’ve told [two other employees] no more driving.” Rahn
never mentioned his cardiomyopathy, his driver’s license, or his lack of a health card.
Instead, Rahn based his refusal only on the lawn mower issue. Finally, Rahn’s testimony
at the hearing confirmed that he refused to do any more deliveries because of the bill he
received for the damaged lawn mower, and not because of any health or driving concerns.
Based on this record, there is substantial evidence to support the ULJ’s finding that
Rahn refused to perform the requested deliveries because he was upset over the bill for the
damaged lawn mower and not because of his health.
III. Midway’s Reasonable Employment Expectations
Rahn’s appeal also requires us to review whether Rahn’s refusal to perform the
requested deliveries constitutes “employment misconduct.” Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315.
After a de novo review of the record, we conclude that Rahn’s refusal violated Midway’s
reasonable expectations for his behavior.

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To address this issue, we consider what standards of behavior Midway could
reasonably expect of Rahn. As noted above, the statute defines “employment misconduct”
as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job that displays
clearly: (1) a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to
reasonably expect of the employee; or (2) a substantial lack of concern for the
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a). An employee’s refusal “to abide by an
employer’s reasonable policies and requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.”
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. , 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002) ; see also McGowan v.
Exec. Express Transp. Enters., Inc., 420 N.W.2d 592, 594, 596 (Minn. 1988) (ruling that
a delivery driver’s intentional refusal to pick up employer’ s medication was misconduct);
Vargas v. Nw. Area Found. , 673 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that an
employee commits misconduct by intentionally refusing to perform a task), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 30, 2004); Bibeau v. Resistance Tech., Inc. , 411 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn. App.
1987) (ruling that an employee who del iberately disobeyed an employer’ s “stupid”
instructions to perform qua lity-control checks committed misconduct); Daniels v. Gnan
Trucking, 352 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. App. 1984) (determining that an employee’s
refusal to unload a truck was “a deliberate act of insubordination” that constituted
misconduct).
In this case, the record reflects that Midway’s primary delivery driver had recently
retired and Midway had not yet found a new driver. As a result, Midwa y had requested
that Rahn make deliveries. This request was reasonable under the circumstances for three
primary reasons. First, both Rahn and Haberman testified that shortly after Rahn received

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the cardiomyopathy diagnosis, the two of them discussed the possibility of Rahn obtaining
a current health card and commercial driver’s license with medical restric tions. Rahn
admitted that he “was supposed to have gone to renew it with the restrictions,” but he did
not do so. Second, Rahn testified that he never told Haberman about his failure to renew
his license and health card. Third, Rahn agreed to fill in for the retired delivery driver and
had completed (in his own words) about “a week and a half worth of deliveries.” Because
of these three reasons, Haberman reasonably assumed that Rahn had obtained the updated
health card and Haberman reasonably expected Rahn to continue making deliveries just as
he had for the previous week and a half. Rahn’s refusal in this case constituted employment
misconduct as defined in section 268.095, subdivision 6(a).
IV. Minnesota Whistleblower Act
Rahn also argues that Midway violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Act when it
discharged him. This argument lacks merit.
First, Rahn did not make any argument regarding the Minnesota Whistleblower Act
before the ULJ, and we do not consider new arguments on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Second, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act permits
employees to file a lawsuit for wrongful discharge of employment. Nelson v. Productive
Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Minn. 2006). Rahn submits no authorit y suggesting
that the Minnesota Whistleblower Act applies in the context of his claim for unemployment
benefits, and we consider such arguments waived on appeal. See State v. Modern
Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that an assignment of
error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by argument or authority is

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waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection) ; see also, e.g., State Dep’t.
of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drive rs, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address an inadequately briefed issue).
Third, even assuming the issue was properly before this court, the evidence
substantially supports the ULJ’s findings that preclude relief under the Whistleblower Act.
The Whistleblower Act prohibit s the discharge of an employee wh en the following two
elements exist: (1) the employee “refuses an employer’s order to perform ” because that
employee objectively believes the employer’s request “violates any state or federal law;”
and (2) the employee “informs the employer that the order is being refused for that reason.”
Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3) (2018). Here, the ULJ found that Rahn refused to make
the requested delivery because of the way the damaged lawn mower was handled, not out
of a concern about the status of his health card. In addition, Rahn never informed Midway
that the requested delivery violated any law or regulation. Therefore, the Whistleblower
Act does not apply to these facts.
Affirmed.