Joan Elizabeth Toll, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1337

Joan Elizabeth Toll, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed May 11, 2020
Remanded
Slieter, Judge

Aitkin County District Court
File No. 01-CV-19-225

Andrew Wipper, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leah M. P. Hedman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Joan Elizabeth Toll challenges th e district court’s order sustaining the
revocation of her driver’s license. Toll argues that the order should be reversed because

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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(1) the police wrongfully obtained a search warrant instead of an arrest warrant, (2) the
search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause that she was driving while
intoxicated, and (3) the search warrant affidavit contained false and misleading statements.
Because we conclude that th e district court did not make sufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law consistent with the implied -consent statute to allow for appellate
review, we remand.
FACTS
On February 9, 2019, at approximately 6:06 p.m., two Aitkin County sheriff’s
deputies and a state patrol responded to a 911 call. One deputy testified during the implied-
consent hearing that “what we had been told [by dispatch] was that the vehicle wa s in the
ditch, that Joan To ll was the driver of the vehicle, and she was intoxicated.” When the
deputies arrived, they saw the abandoned vehicle and observed footprints in the snow from
the driver’s-side door. The veh icle was registered to Toll and the deputies went to her
listed address located approximately ten miles away from the scene. The lights were off
in Toll’s home and no one answered the front door. Eventually, the de puties saw Toll
through a sliding glass door. One deputy shined his flashlight into the house to draw Toll’s
attention, but Toll did not respond and had a blank look on her face . Toll finally
approached them but would not open the door because she was afraid the deputies would
arrest her.
Toll admitted to the deputies that she drove her vehicle into the ditch and drank
“about a six-pack.” Both deputies testified at the implied-consent hearing that Toll showed
signs of impairment and seemed intoxicated. Realizing that they arrived at a standstill in

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their questioning , a deputy applied for a search warran t. The search -warrant affidavit
identified “Joan Elizabeth [Toll] ” as the property or things to be seized. One deputy
testified that he applied for the search warrant because, “I didn’t think that I had enough to
force the door open and place her under arrest.”
The deputies received the signed search warrant and told Toll that they had a warrant
to allow them to come in. Toll did not unlock the door, but she responded by walking back
to her chair and turning up the radio. The deputies then forced their way into her home and
immediately placed Toll in handcuffs. One deputy testified that, simultaneous to arresting
her for driving while impaired , he smelled alcohol on Toll . Toll, once placed in the jail ,
provided a breath test that revealed an alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.20. The
commissioner of public safety revoked Toll ’s driver’s license. Toll petitioned for the
reinstatement of her driver’s license.
Following the implied-consent hearing, the district court issued an order sustaining
the revocation of Toll’s driver’s license. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Toll claims that, if not for the invalid and improperly executed search warrant, the
officers would not have tested her BAC and her license would not have been revoked .
Minnesota’s implied-consent law is governed by statute. Appellate courts review findings
of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo. See Schultz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
760 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Minn. App 2009).
The scope of an implied-consent proceeding is limited to the 12 issues identified
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) (2018). Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,

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848 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Minn. 2014) (holding that appellant could not raise necessit y in an
implied-consent petition because, at that time, necessity was not included in the statute) .
A party’s petition must “state with specificity the grounds upon which the petitioner seeks
rescission of the order of revocation, disqualification, or denial.” Minn. Stat. § 169 A.53,
subd. 2(b)(3) (2018). This allows for the commissioner and the district court to know what
is being challenged. Toll filed an expansive petition which identified 38 challenges to her
driver’s license revocation. During the implied-consent hearing, the commissioner and the
district court asked Toll to narrow the issues. Toll responded by listing “a number of
issues,” all “relat[ing] to the search warrant and the search that took place resulting in the
test results here.” Although Toll did not mention the implied-consent statute, the
commissioner was satisfied with her narrowing of the issues. Though not clear from Toll’s
petition or the district court record, we conclude from the district court’s order that the sole
issue properly raised by Toll and considered by the district court pursuant to the implied -
consent statute is whether she was “lawfully placed under arrest f or violation of section
169A.20.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(2).
However, t he district court sustained Toll’s license revocation , not based up on
whether law enforcement properly arrested her pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20 (2018),
but by finding that the deputies lawfully arrested Toll for obstruction of legal process
pursuant to Minn. Stat. §609.50, subd. 1(2) (2018). The district court based its decision on
the fact that Toll was arrested for obstruction of legal proces s. Because this is not a basis
provided within the scope of the implied consent statute to review license revocation, we
cannot complete a meaningful review of the court’s order.

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Two cases guide our analysis: Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld , 249 N.W.2d 168 , 170 -72
(Minn. 1976) and In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Minn. App.
2014). In Rosenfeld, the supreme court affirmed a district court’s reversal of a referee’s
custody determination. 249 N.W.2d at 169. One of the issues on appeal was whether the
court made sufficient findings pursuant to the statute in determining the child’s best
interest. Id. at 169-170. The supreme court held that the district court needed to make
sufficient findings to show that it considered the statutory factors in its analysis. Id. at 171.
The supreme court noted that these “findings would (1) assure consideration of the
statutory factors by the family court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the family court’s
custody decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and
fairly considered by the family court.” Id. at 82.
In Spicer, this court utilized the Rosenfeld analysis in determining that the district
court’s order lacked particular findings to civilly commit the appellant. Spicer,
853 N.W.2d at 810. Even tho ugh the district court issued a 76 -page order, it failed to
“make sufficiently particular findings of fact on the key issues.” Id. Because the findings
were insufficient, we could not analyze the district court’s order against the applicable
statute. Id. at 811-12.
The district court’s order included factual findings and a legal conclusion that Toll’s
arrest was proper for the offense of obstructing legal process. Whereas, the issue raised in
the petition and as limi ted by the scope of the implied -consent statute is whether she was
“lawfully placed under arrest for violation of section 169A.20.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53,
subd. 3(b)(2). Because the court did not address in its order the basis alleged by Toll

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pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(2) , upon which her driver’s license
revocation should be rescinded, we cannot meaningfully review its order.1
Therefore, we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Remanded.

1 We acknowledge that the lack of clarity for the district court was compounded by the
overbreadth of the implied-consent petition and the unsuccessful oral attempt to narrow the
scope of the issue consistent with the implied-consent statute.