In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Matthew Lee DeRosia.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1350

In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Matthew Lee DeRosia.

Filed February 24, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-PR-09-2776

Matthew Lee DeRosia, St. Peter, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ali P. Afsharjavan, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Peter Orput, Washington County Attorney, James Zuleger, Assistant County Attorney,
Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent Washington County)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Matthew Lee DeRosia challenges the district court’s order authorizing
the administration of neuroleptic medication pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 5
(2018), to address his mental illness. DeRosia, appears pro se on appeal,1 and he asserts

1 DeRosia did have court-appointed counsel that represented him at the district court. On
appeal, however, he is without counsel.

2
that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the district court’s order is
not supported by the record.2 We affirm.
FACTS
On July 16, 2009, the district court committed DeRosia as mentally ill and
dangerous (MI&D) pursuant to what is now Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.02, subd. 17, 253B.18
(2018). Prior to DeRosia’s MI&D commitment proceedings, DeRosia was on provisional
discharge from a commitment order when he intentionally drove a vehicle onto a sidewalk
and collided with the front entrance to a Planned Parenthood building in Saint Paul ,
resulting in damage to the building. After first striking the building, DeRosia intentionally
struck the building a second time with the vehicle. The district court found DeRosia’s act
of driving into the Planned Parenthood building constituted an overt dangerous act capable

2 DeRosia also argued in his principal brief that the state’s use of psychiatry to address his
mental condition constitutes a religion and infringes on his free -exercise rights under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We carefully review ed DeRosia’s
claim and the record before us, and we conclude that the matter is not properly before us.
DeRosia’s legal claim is not adequately briefed. In re Civil Commitment of Knopp ,
895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2017). DeRosia
does not clearly explain his claim and the basis for that claim outside of broad assertions.
Moreover, we cannot address the matter as raised on the briefing because it would extend
outside our role as an error-correcting body. In re Civil Commitment of Travis, 767 N.W.2d
52, 67 (Minn. App. 2009). We therefore decline to address the merits of De Rosia’s First
Amendment claim.
We do not address the merits of DeRosia’s challenge under the Minnesota
Constitution because he failed to raise th is claim in his principal brief. See Moorhead
Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010). Because a claim under the
Minnesota Constitution would implicate a different standard than the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, we do not address this newly raised theory. Id. Even though
DeRosia appears as a pro se litigant, he must comply with the same duties as a lawyer. See
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001); Heinsch v. Lot 27, 399
N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. App. 1987).

3
of causing serious physical harm to others. Additionally, the district cou rt found that
DeRosia’s behavior was such that his mental illness present ed a clear danger to the safety
of others. DeRosia, through counsel, executed a waiver of a review hearing and stipulated
to entry of a final order committing him for an indefinite period. The district court granted
DeRosia’s waiver. DeRosia has been committed since 2009.
While DeRosia has been subject to his MI&D commitment, the district court has
granted approximately s even orders authorizing the administration of neuroleptic
medications to address DeRosia’s mental illness. On March 14, 2019, a petition for
administering neuroleptic medication to address DeRosia’s schizoaffective disorder,
depressive type, was filed. The petition requested the authority to administer the following
medications to DeRosia: Clozaril, Zyprexa, Haldol, and Loxitane . A subsequent request
to the district court also sought authorization to administer Seroquel to DeRosia . The
district court scheduled a hearing on the petition.
On June 14, 2019, DeRosia appeared at the hearing with his court -appointed
counsel. DeRosia’s counsel indicated that DeRosia wanted to discharge counsel and
represent himself. The district court denied DeRosia’s request and accordingly DeRosia
was represented by counsel for the proceeding.
The district court heard test imony from a psychiatric mental -health nurse
practitioner, the court -appointed examiner, and DeRosia. The district court found that
DeRosia suffers from a major mental illness based on his diagnosis for schizoaffective
disorder, which “primarily manifests itself through agitation, feeling of persecution, and
grandiose thoughts.” The district court also found that DeRosia does not acknowledge his

4
mental il lness and the consequences of DeRosia not taking this medication includes
“[DeRosia] continuing to have limited awareness of his condition, continued agitation, and
the inability to meaningfully participate in his treatment.” The district court further no ted
a concern that “[t]hroughout [DeRosia’s] placement, he has refused to take the neuroleptic
medication prescribed to him, and he is only medication compliant due to court orders or
emergency situations. Absent a court order, [DeRosia] would stop taking the neuroleptic
medication prescribed to him.”
In reaching its conclusion on the request to administer neuroleptic medication, the
district court credited th e testimony of the two experts who testified and opined that
DeRosia lacks the capacity to consen t or refuse the administration of neuroleptic
medication because he does not understand his mental illness, its symptoms, treatment
options, or the need for the medication. The district court explained that both experts
opined that “[DeRosia] lacks the ca pacity to give informed consent or refusal to the
administration of neuroleptic medication in that he does not have the ability to understand
and use information about his mental illness, its symptoms, and treatment, or to determine
whether neuroleptic medication is reasonable and necessary.”
DeRosia appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DeRosia’s request to
discharge counsel.
DeRosia claims the district court erred by denying his request to discharge court -
appointed counsel so that he may represent himself. This claim requires us to construe the

5
language of both procedural rules and statutes regarding the right to counsel in civil
commitments. Construction of rules and statutes are questions that we address de novo.
See Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn. 2016) (holding that interpreting rules
“is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo” ); Cocchiarella v. Driggs ,
884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016) (holding that interpreting statutes “is a question of law
that [appellate courts] review de novo”).
“The object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s
intent.” In re Welfare of Hofmaster , 434 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. App. 1989); see also
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). If the meaning of the statute or rule is unambiguous, we
interpret the text according to its plain meaning. Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n,
778 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2010); see also Sela Inv. Ltd., LLP v. H.E., 909 N.W.2d 344,
347 (Minn. App. 2018).
The rules involved in civil -commitment proceedings reflect that under the
Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA), Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.01-.24 (2018),
“[a]n attorney shall represent the respondent until the court dismissed the petition or the
respondent is discharged from commitment, and the c onclusion of any related appeal .”
Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(a) (emphasis added) ; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.07, subd. 2c (“The court shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent the proposed
patient if neither the proposed patient nor others provide counsel.”). The intention of rule
9 is to “ensure that committed individuals are continuously represented by counsel during
commitment proceedings and during all times the individual is under commitment.” Minn.
Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9 2016 advisory comm. cmt. But see Commandeur LLC v.

6
Howard Harty, Inc. , 724 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn. 2006) (“[A]dvisory committee
comments are included for conve nience and are not binding on the court.”) (quotation
omitted). A proposed patient or patient is permitted to “employ private counsel at [their
own] expense.” Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(b). “If private counsel is
employed, the court shall discharge the appointed counsel.” Id.
Both the applicable procedural rules and statutory scheme apply the mandatory
word shall to the appointment of counsel. Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(a) (“An
attorney shall represent the respondent . . . .”) (emphasis added); Minn. Stat. § 253B.07,
subd. 2c (“The court shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent the proposed patient if
neither the proposed patient nor other provide counsel.”) (emphasis added). The meaning
of “shall” reflects a mandatory requ irement that counsel be appointed for the committed
person. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2018). Because the plain language of both the
procedural rule and statute mandate that counsel be appointed to represent a proposed
patient or patient through out the commitment process, the district court’s denial of
DeRosia’s request to proceed pro se was mandated and, therefore, proper.
II. DeRosia failed to show that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.
DeRosia also contend s that his court -appointed counsel did not believe him and
refused to properly defend him at the hearing. We construe this as an ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claim . In commitment matters , ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims are examined in the same manner as criminal cases. See In re Civil Commitment of
Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Minn. App. 2019) (“This court analyzes ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claims in civil-commitment cases under the Strickland standard that

7
applies in criminal cases.”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel in a criminal case , a n appellant bears the burden to show that
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that “but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 -88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,
2068 (1984). We review ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. Johnson, 931
N.W.2d at 657.
Counsel appointed to represent a patient in a civil-commitment proceeding bears the
ethical obligation “to ensure that arguments, positions, and pleadings are meritorious with
the responsibility to be a vigorous advocate for the individual.” Minn. Spec. R. Commit.
& Treat. Act 9 2016 advisory comm. cmt. An attorney in civil -commitment proceedings
shall:
(1) consult with the person prior to any hearing;
(2) be given adequate time and access to records to prepare for
all hearings;
(3) continue to represent the person throughout any
proceedings under this chapter unless releas ed as counsel by
the court; and
(4) be a vigorous advocate on behalf of the person.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c. But counsel “is not required to file an appeal, commence
any proceeding, or advance a position asserted in a filing made by the respondent under
Minn. Stat. § 253B or Minn. Stat. § 253D if, in the opinion of counsel, there is an
insufficient basis for proceeding.” Minn. Spec. R. Commit. & Treat. Act 9(d).
DeRosia fails to identify any instance of his court -appointed counsel acting
unreasonably. Instead, DeRosia cites to his belief that counsel disbelieved him and did not

8
defend him in a manner that he believed was sufficient. “General assertions of error
without evidentiary support are inadequate to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 657. Also “a reviewing court generally ‘will not review attacks
on counsel’s trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Opsahl v. State , 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn.
2004)). Because DeRosia does not cite to any instance of improper performance by his
court-appointed counsel and counsel is permitted to decline to raise meritless claims ,
DeRosia fails to meet his burden on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See id. at
658-59.
III. The district court did not err by authorizing the involuntary administration of
neuroleptic medication.
DeRosia challenges the district court’s order permitting the involuntary
administration of neuroleptic medication. DeRosi a asserts that the evidence does not
support the district court’s order because : (1) there is no proof he is suffering a mental
illness; and (2) he experiences negative side effects from psychiatric medication.
The administration of neuroleptic medications to persons subject to civil
commitments is governed by Minn. Stat. § 253B.092. Neuroleptic medication may be
provided to persons that are subject to a MI&D commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.092,
subd. 1. The statutory authority to administer neuroleptic m edication in a nonconsensual,
nonemergency administration is based on caselaw addressing the invasion-of-privacy. See,
e.g., In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139,
144 (Minn. 1988).

9
If a patient refuses neuroleptic medication, court approval is necessary to administer
the medication. In re Thulin , 660 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn. App. 2003); see also Minn.
Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 8(a). “A patient is presumed to have capacity to make decisions
regarding administration of neuroleptic medication.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, subd. 5(a).
A district court may determine, however, that a person lacks capacity regarding the
administration of neuroleptic medication by addressing three statutory factors. Id., subd.
5(b)(1)-(3). If a patient lacks capacity in this regard, then a district court must address
whether “a reasonab le person would” agree to take the medication. Id., subd. 7(c). The
reasonable-person standard in this context requires consideration of: “(1) the person’s
family, community, morals, religious, and social values; (2) the medical risks, benefits, and
alternatives to the proposed treatment; (3) past efficacy and any extenuating circumstances
of past use of neuroleptic medications; and (4) any other relevant factors.” Id.,
subds. 7(c)(1)-(4), 8(e).
The district court explained in its analysis on the request to administer neuroleptic
medications to DeRosia that it was applying Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn.
1976). Since Price, however, the legislature amended the MCTA “to include a judicial
procedure for authorizing the administration of neuroleptic medication to unconsenting
patients.” In re Civil Commitment of Raboin , 704 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. App. 2005).
The factors identified in Price do not entirely encapsulate the factors that the legislature
adopted in the MCTA. Compare Price, 239 N.W.2d at 913, with Minn. Stat. § 253B.092,
subd. 7(c)(1) -(4). Although the district court identified and applied Price, the district

10
court’s analysis and findings cover the statutory factors in section 253 B.092, subdivision
7(c)(1)-(4).
A. The person’s family, community, morals, religious, and social values
Initially, DeRosia contends throughout his briefs to this court that psychiatry is a
“pseudo-science” that does not have tests sufficient to determine whether someone is
mentally ill. DeRosia has been subject to an ongoing MI&D commitment since 2009. At
the hearing on the administration of neuroleptic medication, the district court heard
testimony that DeRosia is diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. The district court found
that DeRosia has a major mental illness in this regard consistent with the findings in the
2009 order committing him as MI&D. The district court received testimony that it found
credible from experts about DeRosia’s psychological condition. See In re Knops ,
536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995) (recognizing deference appellate courts give to district
court judges evaluating credibility especially where findings a re based on expert
testimony).
Next, a district court must address the patient’s values when determining whether
to authorize use of medication against the patient’s will. DeRosia asserts religious claims
that he is not allowed to “harm or kill himself” and that Cloza ril, one of the drugs that the
petitioner requested authority to administer to DeRosia, is harmful to his body. DeRosia,
however, acknowledges in his briefs to this court that his religious beliefs allow him to use
medicine but he “[d]oes not and will never classify psychotropic drugs as medicine that is
good for people.” The district court found that “[t]here is no indication of any community,
social, religious, or moral values hel d by [DeRosia] that would prevent him from taking

11
neuroleptic medication.” The district court did not clearly err in making this finding
because DeRosia admits his religion allows for the use of modern medicine and it is his
own personal belief or interpretation that psychotropic drugs do not qualify as medicine.
B. The medical risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed treatment
The district court must also consider risks, benefits, and alternatives to the
neuroleptic medication. The district court noted that the neuroleptic medications at issue
in this case were not experimental nor prescribed as part of a r esearch project. In
addressing the side effects to the medication at issue, the district court recognized the
record contained a detailed explanation of the side effects and that the benefits to the
medication outweigh the risk and invasiveness of the tre atment regimen. Many of
DeRosia’s allegations made on appeal relate to broad assertions about psychotropic drugs
causing him pain. DeRosia’s only specific assertion of medication that he experiences
negative side effects relevant to this proceeding is Cl ozaril. DeRosia contends that he
suffers from dizziness, shortness of breath, chest pains, and nausea while taking Clozaril.
The district court’s order expressly denied the petitioner’s request to administer Clozaril.
Additionally, the district court no ted that the environment where the neuroleptic
medication would be administered would allow for adjusting medication for side effects,
if they do arise. Accordingly, the district court made sufficient findings in addressing the
risks, benefits, and alternatives to the treatment regimen at issue.

12
C. Past efficacy and any extenuating circumstances of past use of
neuroleptic medications

The district court must consider the circumstances around prior administration of
neuroleptic medication for the patient. The district court found that DeRosia has not been
compliant with neuroleptic medication in the past “and he is only medication compliant
due to court orders or emergency situations.” Although DeRosia is not compliant, the
district court acknowledged that the medication being requested for administration contrary
to DeRosia’s wishes are accepted in this state as a basis to treat DeRosia’s mental illness.
D. Any other relevant factors
Finally, the district court needs to consider any other relevant factors. On e factor
noted by the district court is that without treatment through neuroleptic medication that
DeRosia’s condition will deteriorate. And the district court found that treatment in this
manner “would render further custody, institutionalization, or oth er services to [DeRosia]
unnecessary.” Because DeRosia is subject to an indefinite MI&D commitment due to his
mental illness, the district court’s recognition of addressing the underlying mental illness
appears to be a significant factor in support of the administration of neuroleptic medication.
Based on the district court findings, we conclude that the district court properly
balanced the statutory factors necessary to address the administration of neuroleptic
medication.
Affirmed.