State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1356

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clarence Joseph Gill, Jr.,
Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2020
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-242

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda McGeeney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KALITOWSKI, Judge
Appellant Midwest Bonding, LLC, (Midwest), challenges the district court’s order
denying its petition to reinstate and discharge a forfeited bond. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Midwest argues that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to
reinstate and discharge a forfeited bail bond it had posted for Clarence Joseph Gill, Jr. We
review a district court’s denial of a petition for reinstatement of a forfeited bail bond for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 ( Minn. 2010). A district court
abuses its discretion when it bases its conclusions on an erroneous view of the law. Id.
Under Minnesota law, when a defendant is released on bond and fails to perform on
the conditions of the bond, the bond is forfeited. Minn. Stat. § 629.58 (2018). But, upon
request, a district court may forgive the bond or reduce the amount forfeited if doing so
would be “just and reasonable” under the circumstances of the case. Minn. Stat. § 629.59
(2018). Generally, the surety—here, Midwest—has the burden to show the circumstances
that make reinstatement just and reasonable. In re Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 1953).
In considering whether to reinstate a bond after forfeiture, Minnesota courts balance the
four Shetsky factors:
[1] the purpose of bail and the civil nature of th e proceedings
and the burden of proof as well as the cause, purpose, and
length of defendant’s absence; [2] the good faith of the surety
as measured by the fault or wil lfulness [sic] of the defendant;
[3] the good faith efforts of the surety—if any—to apprehend

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and produce the defendant; and [4] the prejudice —by way of
delay or otherwise—to the state, in its administration of justice.

Id. at 46.
In its petition to reinstate Gill’s bond, Midwest submitted a three-page affidavit
written by its managing member and a verification of surrender and custody form filled out
by the fugitive recovery agent hired by Midwest , which was dated ten days after Gill was
apprehended by police officers. Relying on this record, the district court addressed the
Shetsky factors. Concluding that more factors weighed against reinstating and discharging
the bond, the district court denied Midwest’s petition.
A. The first Shetsky factor.
The district court concluded that the first Shetsky factor—the purpose of bail and
the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence —weighed against reinstatement.
In considering the purpose of bail, courts seek to ensure prompt administration of justice
by “ encourag[ing] a surety to voluntarily pay the penalty for the failure to ensur e the
presence of the accused without requiring the state to undergo the expense of litigation to
recover the defaulted amount. ” State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009) .
Another purpose of the bail system is to encourage sureties to locate and return defendants.
Id.
When addressing the first Shetsky factor, the district court found that “Gill’s abuse
of his procurement of bail in attempting to and actually delaying court proceedings for
several months belies the intended purpose” of bail bonds, and held that this factor weighed
against reinstatement of bail.

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Midwest argues that the district court based its finding on an erroneous view of the
law, alleging that the actions of the surety in locating and returning the defendant should
be addressed in the second factor, and not in the first factor. But our caselaw has addressed
the efforts of the surety in tracking the defendant under the first factor. See, e.g., State v.
Rodriguez, 775 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2010)
(discussing the surety’s efforts in keeping track of the defendant when analyzing the first
Shetsky factor).
Here, the district court noted that Gill delayed court proceedings for several months,
directly challenging the purpose of bail in ensuring the prompt administration of justice.
We conclude that the district court did not base this finding on an erroneous view of the
law because the record indicates that Gill delayed proceedings for five and a half months.
Thus, as this court stated in State v. Williams, “the fact remains that [defendant] failed to
make his scheduled court appearances,” delaying the proceedings. 568 N.W.2d 885, 888
(Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1997). Because Gill’s conduct delayed
the swift administration of justice, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the first factor weighed against reinstatement of the bond.
Midwest also argues that this case is factually similar to Askland, in which the
supreme court found the district court abused its discretion by not reinstating a bond and
thus remanded for reinstatement. 784 N.W.2d at 64. Midwest argues that, because the
defendant in Askland pleaded guilty after delaying the proceeding by being absent for seven
months, this court should reverse the district court because Gill delayed the proceeding by
his absence for a shorter period of time. But in Askland, the supreme court did not discuss

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the first Shetsky factor, and instead focused only on the fourth Shetsky factor—prejudice to
the state. Id. Accordingly, we reject Midwest’s reliance on Askland for the assertion that
the district court erred when analyzing the first Shetsky factor.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the first Shetsky factor weighed against reinstatement of the bond because there was
no clear error in the district court’s analysis.
B. The second Shetsky factor.
The district court concluded that the second Shetsky factor weighed against
reinstatement. The second Shetsky factor considers the good faith of Midwest as measured
by the fault or willfulness of Gill, as the “[d]efendant’ s willfulness or bad fait h is
attributable to the surety.” Vang, 763 N.W.2d at 358.
The district court held that this factor weighed against reinstatement because “the
evidence is not indi cative of any mitigating factors which lead this Court to believe Gill
absconded for any reason other than willful and intentional evasion of the swif t
administration of justice.”
Midwest argues that the district court abused its discretion in analyzing the second
Shetsky factor because it should have weighed Gill’s willfulness or bad faith against
Midwest’s good faith i n attempting to recover Gill. But t he second Shetsky factor
specifically addresses the fault or willfulness of the defendant , while the third Shetsky
factor addresses the good faith of the surety in locating the defendant. As the district court
weighed all four Shetsky factors, the district court properly considered Gill’s willfulness or
bad faith in delaying the proceeding when discussing the second Shetsky factor. Although

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Midwest is correct that a defendant’s bad faith does not “automatically trump[] the surety’s
good-faith effort to return the defendant to justice,” the district court must weigh each
factor separately. State v. Storkamp , 656 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 2003). Because the
district court did not clearly err in addressing Gill’s willfulness in delaying the proceeding
under the second Shetsky factor, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion.
C. The third Shetsky factor.
The district court concluded that the third Shetsky factor was neutral, acknowledging
Midwest’s “attempt to apprehend Gill by employing a fugitive apprehension service ,” but
noting that “its efforts were unsuccessful.”
Midwest argues that it made good faith efforts in attempting to locate and apprehend
Gill, which included hiring a fugitive recovery agent. On appeal, Midwest asserts that the
fugitive recovery agent assisted in locating Gill , but does not provide any suppor t in the
record for this assertion. In stead, in Midwest’s affidavit in support of its petition to
reinstate the bond, Midwest’s managing member stated that “the Agent was notified that
the Defendant was back in the custody of the Hennepin County Sheriff h aving been
arrested in Bloomington, Minnesota on or about February 5, 2019.”
At the time Midwest moved for reinstatement of the bond, it did not allege that the
fugitive recovery agent was involved in the arrest of Gill. And in its brief to this court,
Midwest does not provide any support for the assertion that the agent assisted the police in
locating Gill. Without more in the record to support the assertion that Midwest’s agent
assisted in recoverin g Gill, Midwest has failed to meet its burden of proving this factor

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weighs in favor of reinstatement. See Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62 (requiring the surety to
prove the first three Shetsky factors). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in its analysis of the third Shetsky factor.
D. The fourth Shetsky factor.
The district court concluded that the fourth Shetsky factor—prejudice to the state in
its administration of justice—weighed in favor of reinstatement of the bond. Midwest does
not challenge this finding. Because it is the state’s burden to prove the fourth Shetsky
factor, id., and the state did not submit a response to Midwest’s petition for reinstatement,
we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its determination.
In conclusion, b ecause the district court did not clearly err in its Shetsky-factor
analysis, our standard of review leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Midwest’s request for reinstatement and discharge of the bond.
Affirmed.