Sara Solomonson, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1360

Sara Solomonson,
Relator,

vs.

City of Austin,
Respondent.

Filed February 3, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

City of Austin

James Heiberg, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

David V. Hoversten, Austin City Attorney, Craig M. Byra m, Assistant City Attorney,
Hoversten, Johnson, Beckmann & Hovey, LLP, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pr esiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Sara Solomonson challenges a decision by
respondent City of Austin (the city) declaring relator’s dog dangerous and ordering that the

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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dog be euthanized. Relator ar gues that the city’s dangerous -dog ordinance is preempted
by state statute and that the city violated her procedural-due-process rights. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator’s female dog, Rain, twice bit a dog owned by relator’s neighbor. On June 7,
2019, Rain attacked the neighbor’s dog. Although the attack was not fatal, the neighbor’s
dog suffered internal injuries. After this a ttack, the city issued relator a “Notice of
Potentially Dangerous Animal or Dangerous Animal.” On July 23, 2019, Rain again
attacked the neighbor’s dog, and the city issued another notic e on July 26, 2019,
designating Rain to be a dangerous animal. The city’s dangerous-dog ordinance authorized
the city’s animal control officer to “order the destruction” of any animal so designated.
Relator requested a hearing to contest this designation.
A hearing was held before the city council on August 5, 2019. At the hearing, the
city council was presented with evidence concerning the two attacks, including veterinarian
records, incident reports, and notice forms. The police officer w ho wrote the incident
report after the second attack was also present. He testified that he believed relator’s dog
was dangerous. Relator testified at the hearing that Rain has anxiety, but is not a threat to
human beings. She further testified that she had ordered a muzzle for Rain and was going
to have her spayed.
After relator’s testimony, the city attorney reminded the city council that the city’s
dangerous-dog ordinance does not distinguish between a dog’s aggression toward human
beings and aggression toward other domesticat ed animals. The city attorney also noted
that, unlike Minn. Stat. §§ 347.50-.54 (2018), the city’s ordinance provides that, once a

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dog is declared dangerous, the city council has the authority to order that the dog be
euthanized.1
The city council voted unanimously that th e evidence supported a declaration that
Rain is dangerous, and it ordered Rain to be euthanized. Relator appealed by writ of
certiorari. Rain remains alive during this appeal and is being boarded by the city. The city
has notified relator that it may seek to recover the costs of boarding Rain during the appeal
if the city prevails here.
D E C I S I O N
At the outset, we reject relator’s argumen t that the city violated her due-process
rights by failing to provide her with an “appeal form.” The record shows—and relator does
not dispute—that she received the written no tices designating Rain potentially dangerous
and dangerous, she appealed in her own handwriting, and she was afforded a review
hearing before the city counc il where she presented evidence and testimony. The city
accepted relator’s appeal as sufficient, after which the city provided relator with the basic
requirements of due process: notice and the opportunity to be heard. See Sisson v. Triplett,
428 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 1988).
Similarly, we do not consider relator’s argument that the city violated her due-
process rights by failing “to give [relator] the statutorily required notices . . . for the costs

1 The ordinance provides that the animal control officer “is authorized to order [that a
dangerous dog] be destroyed.” Austin, Minn., Code of Ordinances (ACO) § 10.10, subd.
20.F (2019). The city council’s order in this case used the word “euthanized.” The parties
also use the verbs “kill” and “terminate” in th eir arguments on appeal. We use the term
“euthanize” in this op inion, consistent with the city council’s order from which relator
appeals.

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of the care, keeping, and disposition of Rain.” As noted, Rain lives during this appeal. No
costs of her care have been determined or assessed. Counsel for the city committed at oral
argument that the city will not determine whether and in what amount costs will be assessed
against relator until after the conclusion of this appeal. This issue therefore is not now ripe
for our consideration. See Lee v. Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Minn. 1949) (holding that
“issues which have no existence other than in the realm of the future possibility are purely
hypothetical and are not justiciable”). We therefore do not address it.
The city’s dangerous-dog ordinance is not preempted by state statute.
Relator argues that the city’s dangerous-dog ordinance conflicts with state law and
is therefore preempted. The city asserts that, as a home rule charter city, it “may locally
regulate the ownership and keep ing of dangerous dogs in a ma nner more restrictive than
described in state statute[s].”
Whether a state statute preempts a munici pal-charter provision “present[s] a legal
question subject to de novo review.” Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis , 887 N.W.2d 467,
469-70 (Minn. 2016). This appeal presents th e legal issue of the scope of authority of a
home rule charter city to regulate dangerous dogs within the city.
The Minnesota Constitution grants local governments the authority to adopt a home
rule charter. Minn. Const. art XII, § 4; see Bicking v. City of Minneapolis , 891 N.W.2d
304, 306 (Minn. 2017) (explaining how a city charter is framed and amended). A city may
frame a charter for its own government under Minn. Stat. §§ 410.01-.33 (2018), and “may
provide for any scheme of municipal governme nt not inconsistent with the constitution.”
Minn. Stat. § 410.07. “[C]ities without home rule charters” are governed by chapter 412

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of Minnesota Statutes. Minn. Stat. § 412.0 15, subd. 2 (2018). That chapter provides a
“single code of statutes” for municipalities. Id. Here, it is undisputed that the city is a
home rule charter city.
Municipalities have no inhere nt powers and “can enact regulations only as expressly
conferred by statute or implie d as necessary in aid of t hose powers which have been
expressly conferred.” Bicking, 891 N.W.2d at 312 (quotations omitted). Local ordinances
must be consistent with the law, and “will be preempted when the legislature has fully and
completely covered the subject matter, clearly indicated that the subject matter is solely of
state concern, or the subject matter itself is of such a nature that local regulation would
have unreasonably adverse eff ects on the general populace.” Hannan v. City of
Minneapolis, 623 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. App. 2001).
The city’s dangerous-dog ordinance provid es that “[t]he Animal Control Officer,
upon finding that an animal is dangerous . . . , is authorized to order . . . that the animal be
[euthanized] . . . .” ACO § 10.10, subd. 20.F (emphasis added).
Relator argues that “the city’s ordinanc e[] on dangerous anim als conflict[s] with
state statutes[,]” and asserts that whether Rain may be terminated is governed by state law.
While it is true that Minn. Stat. §§ 347.50 -.54 do not expressly grant an animal-control
officer the authority to order th at an animal be eu thanized, that does not prohibit a home
rule charter city from lawfully granting such authority.
Concerning dangerous dogs, a subject wh ich logically would be a matter for local
control, we have held that “the legislature has neither expressly nor impliedly indicated
that the subject matter is sole ly a matter of state concern.” Hannan, 623 N.W.2d at 285 .

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Instead, the statutes concerning the regula tion of dangerous d ogs expressly permit
additional local regulation. “Any statutory or home rule charter city . . . may regulate
potentially dangerous and dangerous dogs.” Minn. Stat. § 347.53. The only restriction the
legislature has placed on the regulation of dangerous dogs is that a city “may not adopt an
ordinance regulating dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs based solely on the specific
breed of the dog.” Minn. Stat . § 347.51, subd. 8. Except for this narrow restriction,
“nothing in sections 347.50 to 347.565 limits any restrictions that the local jurisdictions
may place on owners of potentially dangerous or dangerous dogs.” Minn. Stat. § 347.53
(emphasis added). Because section 347.53 is unambiguous, the city’s ordinance providing
for designation and euthanization of a dangerous dog is not preempted.
Relator argues at length that the statutor y history underlying sections 347.50-.54
demonstrates the legislature’s intent to preempt local regulation in this realm. Because the
statute unambiguously permits local regulation, we have no occasion to speculate about
what the legislature meant. “When the word s of a law . . . are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the
spirit.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018).
Relator argues that, because Minn. Stat. § 347.541 (2018) refers to an “impartial
hearing officer,” error infects this case. Sh e argues that the city council having acted as
the hearing officer was improper and invalidates the decision. But nothing in the statute
prohibits a home rule charter city from adopting processes different than that provided by
statute. The legislature knows how to prohibit municipal ordinances inconsistent with state
statutes. This very statute prohibits cities from regulating dogs based on breed. Minn. Stat.

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§ 347.51, subd. 8. Other than that specif ic prohibition, the legislature granted local
jurisdictions broad discretion concerning regulation of dogs . Nothing in the statutes
prohibits the city council of a home rule charter city from pres iding at dangerous-dog
hearings. That is the process provided by this home rule charter city’s ordinance, and the
process provided by ordinance was followed.
Because home rule charter cities ar e not prohibited from implementing local
dangerous-dog regulations other than breed-specific restrictions, the city had the authority
to regulate dangerous dogs by ordinance. It did so. The city here complied with its
ordinances and did not violate relator’s constitutional or other rights.
Affirmed.