In re the Marriage of: Adetola Omolola Allen, n/k/a Adetola Omolola Abodunde, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1367

In re the Marriage of: Adetola Omolola Allen,
n/k/a Adetola Omolola Abodunde, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Temitope Oluwaseyi Allen,
Respondent.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-16-3337

Maury D. Beaulier, Beaulier Law Office, St. Louis Park, Min nesota; and

Victoria M.B. Taylor, Taylor, Krieg & Reinke, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

John M. Jerabek, Tuft, Lach, Jerabek & O’Connell, PLLC, Maplewood, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this appeal from a marriage dissolution, appellant-wife, Adetola Omolola Allen
n/k/a Adetola Omolola Abodunde , argues that the district court erred in awarding the
parties joint legal and joint physical custody of their two children and dividing the parties’
marital property. Wife asserts that the evidence presented at trial does not support the
district court’s best -interests findings and that the evidence does not support its property
division because respondent-husband, Temitope Oluwaseyi Allen, dissipated marital assets
in a Nigerian bank account. Wife also argues that the district court erred by denying her
request for conduct-based attorney fees . We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Wife contends that the district court abused its discretion by awarding the parties
joint legal and joint physical custody of their children because the record does not support
the district court’s best-interests findings.
A district court has broad discretion in making child -custody determinatio ns.
Matson v. Matson , 638 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. App. 2002). This court’s review of a
district court’s custody decision is “limited to determining whether the district court abused
its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying
the law.” Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 365 -66 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 14, 2006). This court will sustain a district court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Id. at 3 64. When determining whether findings are clearly

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erroneous, this court views the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s
findings and defers to the district court’s credibil ity determinatio ns. Vangsness v.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000).
The best interests of the child are central to custody determinations. Thornton v.
Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. 2019) . In evaluating the best interests of the child
to determine issues of custody and parenting time, the district court must consider and
evaluate all relevant factors, including the best -interests factors in Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a) (2018). The statute articulates 12 factors to consider in evaluating the be st
interests of a child:
(1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and
other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
child’s needs and development;
(2) any special medical, mental health, or educational
needs that the chil d may have that may require special
parenting arrangements or access to recommended services;
(3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to
express an independent, reliable preference;
(4) whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in the
parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the nature
and context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the
domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety, well -
being, and developmental needs;
(5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a
parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;
(6) the history and nature of each parent’s participatio n
in providing care for the child;
(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to
maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time;
(8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development
of changes to home, school, and community;

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(9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
ongoing relationships between the child and each parent,
siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life;
(10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting
time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting
parenting time with either parent;
(11) except in cases in which domestic abuse . . . has
occurred, the disposition of each parent to support the child ’s
relationship with the other parent and to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other
parent; and
(12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate
in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing infor matio n
and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to
utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding any major
decision concerning the life of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1)-(12). The district court must make detailed findings on
each factor based on the evidence presented, and “explain how each factor led to its
conclusions and to the determination of custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1)
(2018). The district court is prohibited from using “one factor to the exclusion of all
others.” Id.
In determining the child’s best interests, the district court must consider “whether
domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred in the parents’ or either
parent’s household or relationship; the nature and context of the domestic abuse; and the
implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and
developmental needs.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4). Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.
2(a) (2018), defines domestic abuse as “(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; (2) the
infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic
threats . . . criminal sexual conduct . . . or interference with an emergency call.”

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The district court must use “a rebuttable presumption that upon request of either or
both parties, joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(9) (2018). But i f domestic abuse has occurred between the parents as define d
in Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) , there is a rebuttable presumption that neither joint
legal custody nor joint physical custody is in the best interests of the child. Id. “In
determining whether the presumption is rebutted, the court shall consider the nature and
context of the domestic abuse and the implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and
for the child’s safety, well-being, and developmental needs.” Id. “Rather than impose a
presumption for or against a specific custodian, subdivision 1(b)(9) creates a rebuttable
presumption against a custodial arrangement: joint custody.” Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at
791. “The subdivision does not assign a burden of production or persuasion to rebut the
presumption to any particular party.” Id. at 793.
Wife argues that the district court’s findings and analysis of the domestic -abuse
factor in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4), are “against logic” and unsupported by the
record.
At trial, the evidence regarding physical abuse mainly consisted of hus band and
wife’s contradictory testimony. Wife testified that in May 2015, husband threatened to
harm himself while brandishing a knife. S he called 911 after the incident, but told police
she called because husband was having chest pains . Wife testified that in June 2015, she
and husband began arguing, and husband started hitting and slapping her, and dragged her
down the stairs. Wife testified that she sustained an injury to her leg from the incident and
went to the emergency room for treatment. Wife testified that she did not call the police

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about the incident because she feared husband w ould go to jail. Wife testified that the
instances of abuse in May and June 2015 occurred while the children were home. Wife
also testified that in February 2015, husband “squeezed [her] hand,” and that after she ran
outside to seek help, he would not let her back into the home, leaving her outside in the
cold. Husband testified at trial and denied all allegations of abuse.
The district court also heard testimony f rom the custody evaluator and received the
custody evaluator’s report into evidence. In the report, the evaluator noted that husband
denied all allegations of domestic abuse and that a petition for an order for protection wife
sought against husband had b een dismissed. The evaluator stated that although some of
wife’s allegations of domestic abuse were likely true, even if there was domestic abuse by
husband, the abuse “most likely [fell] into the situational violence category.” The evaluator
also opined that cultural tolerance and expectations of family roles may be a confound ing
factor as husband’s church “suggests that men rule the family, and that [wife] did not abide
by [the church’s] rules, values, and traditions.” The evaluator also noted that the children
“do not appear to have behaviors on the surface and it is unknown the extent that the y
cognitively internalized the experience or if they were indeed present .”
Based on the evidence at trial, the district court analyzed the domestic-abuse factor ,
noting that the incidents of alleged abuse occurred “when the children were quite young, ”
that a petition for an order for protection wife sought against husband was dismissed
because the allegations had not been established, an d that the alleged abuse “did not alter
[the custody evaluator’s] recommendation that the parties share joint legal custody , with
significant parenting time with [husband].” The district court concluded that “although the

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incidents relayed [were] concerning, the presumption against joint legal and joint physical
custody . . . ha[d] been rebutted.” Given the conflicting evidence on the domestic abuse
and its impact on the children, the district court made a credibility determination and chose
to rely mainly on the custody evaluator’s report to make its determination. As such, its
resulting finding is not clearly erroneous. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472 (“[A]ppellate
courts defer to [district] court credibility determinations.”).
Wife also argues that the district court’s findings on the remaining best -interests
factors are “scant in application both in evidence presented at trial” and in “analysis and
application as required by statute.” In particular, w ife challenges the district court’s
findings on the first, second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh factors .
Again, most of the evidence presented at trial was husband and wife’s conflicting
testimony and the testimony and report of the custody evaluator . In addressing the best -
interests factors, the district court found the custody evaluator to be credible, and as such,
largely relied on the evaluator’s testimony and report. In making its determination on the
first factor, the district court considered wi fe’s testimony that she had been the children’s
primary caretaker during the marriage, and noted that the parties had “cultural similarities”
and strong support fr om their communities and families. It concluded that the children’s
“emotional, spiritual and cultural needs are being met by both parents,” and because wife
resides in the home where the children have been raised, the first factor favored “joint
physical custody, with primary residence with [wife].”
On the second factor, the district court found that the children did not have needs
requiring special parenting arrangements, but noted wife’s testimony that the children had

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several incidents at daycare shortly after the temporary parenting schedule was put into
place and that those incidents indicated that the children were e xperiencing emotional
turmoil. Regarding the fifth factor, the district court found that the custody evaluator’s
psychological testing of the parties indicated that husband “may be perceived as
controlling” and that wife “may e xperience exaggerated distress.” The district court also
noted the custody evaluator’s observation that although the parties appeared to have a
“toxic” relationship, they agreed and compromised “on many more issues than the average
conflictual custody litigants.” On the sixth factor, the district court credited w ife’s
testimony and the custody evaluator’s report that wife had been the children’s primary
caretaker, and concluded that “both parents fully participate and are able to car e for the
children in an appropriate manner.”
Similarly, on the seventh factor, the district court found that both parents could
provide for the ongoing care of the children and meet their emotional, spiritual, and cultural
needs, and that both parents app eared to be able to effectively follow through with a
parenting schedule. On the eighth factor, the district court determined that there should be
minimal impact on the children’s well-being and development, because the parents lived
close to each other a nd there would be no change in the c hildren’s community. As to the
ninth factor, the district court found that the children would continue to have contact with
their extended families and communities. And on the tenth factor, the district court again
relied on the custody evaluator’s recommendation, acknowledging that although there had
previously been concerns regarding husband’s abusive behavior , those incidents were
described as situational, a nd the custody evaluator recommend ed shared joint legal

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custody. Lastly, on the eleventh factor, the district court found that the parties “have the
ability to foster a positive relationship between the children and the other parent” and
adopted the custody evaluator’s recommendation that the parties use a parenting consultant
to assist them with ongoing disputes.
In sum, the district court appears to have made credibility determinations based on
the evidence introduced during the trial. Its findings on the best -interests factors are
supported by the record, and t hose findings address the required statutory factors. Thus,
the district court’s determination that the parties share joint legal and joint physical custody
was not an abuse of discretion. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477 (stating that the law
“leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing
of best-interests considerations”).
II.
Wife contends that the district court erred by finding that husband did not dissipate
the Nigerian bank account.
Parties to a marriage dissolution owe each other “a fiduciary duty . . . for any profit
or loss derived by the party, without the consent of the other, from a transaction or from
any use by th e party of the marital assets.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2018).
Dissipation occurs when a party to a marriage, without the consent of the other party, in
contemplation of commencing or during the pendency of the current dissolutio n,
“transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of marital assets except in the usual
course of business or for the necessities of life.” Baker v. Baker , 753 N.W.2d 644, 653

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(Minn. 2008). A district court may attribute dissipated assets to the party who “transferred,
encumbered, concealed, or disposed of” them. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a .
Whether a party has dissipated marital assets is a question of fact. See id. (“If the
court finds . . . . ” (emphasis added)). Appellate courts review a district court’s factual
findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district
court’s findings and reversing only if the record “requires the definite and firm convictio n
that a mistake was made.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474.
After the dissolution trial, in April 2019, the district court held a separate hearing
on the parties’ Nigerian property. Wife argued that husband had dissipated mar ital ass ets
in a Nigerian bank account. Wife testified that she knew about the account, but was
unaware of the transactions going in and out of that account and that some transactio ns
occurred around the time she filed for dissolution. Wife suspected that husband was hiding
assets from her, but acknowledged that he started making “huge transactions” from the
account star ting around May 2012. Husband testified that the account was his “salary
account” while he was working in Nigeria and that h e also used it to manage family
business transactions. He testified that he used the account for family transactions because
“not everyone . . . has a bank account in Nigeria. It’s only people that can afford it th at
would have a bank account.” He agreed that money went out of the account several times
in the months before wife filed for dissolution, but stated that the transactions were for
land-development projects and that he did not spend any of his money or the parties’
money.

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The district court concluded that wife “[had] not proven her claim of dissipatio n”
and that the funds in the Nigerian bank account should therefore be equally divided as of
the date of valuation. In making i ts determination, the district court appears to have
credited husband’s testimony that the transfers were used for family transactions and that
no marital funds were dissipated in the account, and acknowledged wife’s testimony that
she had never been told that the account was used by other family members. The district
court also noted husband’s testimony that he had provided true and accurate copies of the
bank statements. Again, the district court appears to have made a credibility determinatio n,
and the record supports its determination that wife had not proved husband dissipated
marital assets.
III.
Wife contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for conduct -based
attorney fees.
Conduct-based attorney fees may be imposed “against a party who unreasonab ly
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1
(2018). Conduct-based attorney fees may be “based on the impact a party’s behavior has
had on the costs of the litigation regardless of the relative financial resources of the parties.”
Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991). “While bad faith could
unnecessarily increase the length or expense of a proceeding, it is not required for an award
of conduct-based att orney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.” Geske v. Marcolina,
624 N.W.2d 813, 818 -19 (Minn. App. 2001). The requesting party bears the burden of
establishing that the other party’s conduct unreasonably contributed to the length or

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expense of the p roceeding. Id. at 818. This court reviews a district court’s award of
conduct-based attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d at 766.
Throughout the proceedings, wife argued that she was entitled to conduct -based
attorney fees because she had incurred substantial costs in obtaining records and
information from husband regarding the Nigerian bank account. At the April 2019 hearing
on the parties’ Nigerian property, the district court heard testimony regarding husband’s
disclosure of those records to wife. Husband testified that he disclosed information about
the Nigerian bank account three times, and explained that the discovery process was
somewhat confusing because wife had been represented by three attorneys during the case.
He also testified that none of the documents he disclosed were fraudulent.
In its written order following the April 2019 hearing, the district court found that
information about the bank account had been provided in 2016, and that the records
provided were consistent with each other and did not establish wife’s claim that the records
were fraudulent. Those findings are supported by husband ’s testimony and therefore are
not clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in order ing each
party to pay their own attorney fees.
Affirmed.