Anthony Paul Schatz, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1394

Anthony Paul Schatz, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 18, 2020
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *

Le Sueur County District Court
File No. 40-CR-16-778

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brent Christian, Le Sueur County Attorney, Jason L. Moran, Assistant County Attorney,
Le Center, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M. , Judge;
and Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Anthony Paul Schatz challenges the district court’s denial of his petitio n
for postconviction relief in which he sought to withdraw his admission to a probation
violation. Because we conclude that Schatz’s admission was accurate, voluntary, an d
intelligent, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
In October 2016, Schatz pleaded guilty to one count of first -degree driving while
impaired (DWI). As part of his sentence, the district court imposed seven years of
probation. Less than two years later, Schatz pleaded guilty to another DWI, and the district
court ordered him to report to jail. At the jail, Schatz was given a urine test, which showed
the presence of THC—a chemical commonly found in marijuana —but did not meet the
threshold for a positive test. A few days after the test, Schatz signed a form admitt ing to
using marijuana. At a hearing on Schatz’s alleged probation violation, Sc hatz admitted to
using marijuana, and the district court revoked his probation.
Over nine months later, Schatz filed a postconviction petition seeking to withdraw
his admission to the probation violation. According to Schatz, his admission to the
probation violation was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent because officers at the jail
coerced him into admi tting that he used marijuana. The district court denied Schatz’s
petition, noting that it did not find Schatz’s testimony at the hearing on his postconvictio n
petition credible in light of his earlier testimony.

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Schatz argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
postconviction petition because his admission to a probation violation was not accurate or
voluntary. “We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we consider
legal issues de novo and review factual findings for clear error. Id.
We begin our analysis by noting that neither party has identified caselaw that
explicitly addresses the standard for a defendant seeking to withdraw an admission to a
probation violation. Rather, both parties rely on the body of caselaw establishing the
parameters for withdrawal of a guilty plea. Without deciding whether this standard applies
to requests to withdraw an admission to a probation violation, we review Schatz’s
admission under the framework of a guilty-plea withdrawal.
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it. Dikken
v. State , 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017) . After sentencing, a court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea only if “necessary to correct a manifest injustice. ”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. ”
State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 9 0, 94 (Minn. 2010). To be valid, “a guilty plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Id.
Schatz first contends that his admission was not accurate. Specifical ly, he asserts
that his admission to using marijuana was not accurate because his drug test was negative .
He also points out that the record contains multiple stories surrounding his alleged
marijuana use.

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“The accuracy requirement protects the defendant f rom pleading guilty to a charge
more serious than he could have been convicted of at trial.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d
600, 603 (Minn. 2017). And a proper factual basis for a guilty plea must be established for
it to be accurate. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). “The defendant bears
the burden of establishing the facts that support his claim that the guilty plea is invalid. ”
Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d at 603.
Here, Schatz signed a form admitting that he used marijuana. Additionally, at th e
probation-violation hearing, Schatz admitt ed to using marijuana. He told the court that he
got a chewable form of medical marijuana from a co worker to help with his back pain.
Counsel represented Schatz at the probation -violation hearing, and at no poi nt during the
hearing did Schatz indicate that anything in his admission was incorrect. Therefore, the
record provides a sufficient basis to conclude that Schatz’s admission was accurate.
Still, Schatz maintains that because his drug test was negative and a specific type of
testing was not performed, his admission was inaccurate. This argument ignores the fact
that, on two occasions, Schatz admitted to using marijuana—by signing the drug usage
form and by testifying during the probation-violation hearing that he used marijuana. Even
ignoring the results of the drug test, Schatz’s own statements support a conclusion that his
admission was accurate.
Additionally, Schatz points to the two separate descriptions of when he used
marijuana as evidence that his a dmission was not accurate. He notes that , at the
probation-violation hearing, he stated that he used marijuana he got from a co worker to
ease his back pain. B ut at a later hearing, his probation officer testified that Schatz said he

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was using marijuana with a “lady friend.” Regardless of when the alleged marijuana use
occurred, each scenario still involves Schatz using marijuana in violation of his probation
conditions. Because the key factual basis necessary to suppor t Schatz’s admission is the
use of marijuana, the inconsistencies about how and why Schatz allegedly used marijuana
do not render his admission inaccurate. Accordingly, we conclude that Schatz’s admissio n
was sufficiently accurate.
Schatz also contends that his admission was not voluntary. According to Schatz, he
only admitted to using marijuana after officers at the jail told him he tested positive for the
drug and convinced him that he had no other choice. “To be voluntary, a guilty plea may
not be based on any improper pressures or in ducements.” Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 876 -77
(quotation omitted). Improper pressures or inducements can include threatened or actual
physical harm or mental coercion. See State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994).
And “a plea is involuntary when it is induced by coercive or deceptive action.” Dikken,
896 N.W.2d at 877.
At the probation-violation hearing, w hen questioned by his attorney, Schatz testified
that no one was forcing him to make any admissions. Schatz was represented by counsel
and had the opportunity to explain his reasons for admitting to using marijuana. But he did
not do so. Instead, he later asserted that jail officials pressured him into making the
admission. But after a subsequent hearing, the district court found that Schatz’s testimo ny
about allegedly coercive actions by jail officials was not credible. Nothing in the record
suggests that this credibility determination is clearly erroneous. See State v. Olson, 884
N.W.2d 906, 911 (Minn. App. 2016) (noting that this court generally defers to a district

6
court’s credibility determinations), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2016). A ccordingly,
based on Schatz’s testimony at the probation -violation hearing and the district court’s
credibility determination, we conclude that Schatz’s admission was voluntary.
Schatz focuses his argument on why his initial admission—signing the drug -usage
form—was not voluntary. Even if we agreed that Schatz’s admission by signing the form
was not voluntary because it was obtained through coercive means, this does not explain
his admission during the probation -violation hearing. At the hearing, Schatz had an
opportunity to explain that he only ad mitted to using marijuana because of pressure from
officers at the jail. Instead, he testified that no one was forcing him to make the admissio n.
Therefore, Schatz has not demonstrated that his admission was involuntary.1
Affirmed.

1 In passing, Schatz suggests that his admission was not intelligent. “To be intelligent, a
guilty plea must represent a knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses
of action available.” Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 8 77 (quotation omitted). Determining
whether a plea was intelligent involves evaluat ing whether a defendant understood the
charges, the rights he waived by pleading guilty, and the consequences of the plea. Nelson
v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016). It is clear from the record that Schatz’s
admission was intelligently made . Schatz testified that he understood the rights he was
giving up by admitting to the violation. He also never indicated that he did not understand
what was happening or that he had any questions. Further, at the probation-violatio n
hearing, Schatz was repres ented by counsel. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that
Schatz’s admission was intelligently made.