In re the Marriage of: Donald Henry Off, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1395

In re the Marriage of: Donald Henry Off, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Sandra Lee Off, n/k/a/ Sandra Lee Dodgson,
Appellant.

Filed July 20, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-FA-16-3469

Jon Jay Cline, Mary N. Kaasa, Cline Jensen P.A., Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lindsay K. Forsgren, Krekelberg Law Firm, Pelican Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s designation of a line of credit balance due
and two parcels of real property as marital property. Appellant argues that the district court
abused its discretion in holding her responsible for one-half of the line of credit and erred
in her nonmarital claim to the Fergus Falls, Minnesota and Mesa, Arizona houses. Because
the record supports the district court’s discretionary decision to designate the parties’ line

2

of credit balance and the district court correctly concluded that the contested real estate
properties are marital property, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Sandra Lee Dodgson and respondent Donald Henry Off married on
September 22, 2007, and separated in April of 2016. When the parties met, Off was retired
and Dodgson was a manager of a company that operated nationwide liquidation and
promotional sale events for furniture companies . Off eventually joined the company and
became an event manager and manage ment consultant. In 2008, the parties beg an their
own furniture liquidation and promotional sales company called Lincoln Managem ent
Group (LMG). They ultimately formed LMG as an LLC with equal ownership between
Off and Dodgson. To purchase inventory for their first sale, Off borrowed $78,000 secured
by a home equity line of credit by providing his lender a mortgage of his nonmarital home
in Peoria, Illinois.
The line of credit is the first of three interests that are central to this appeal. The
parties regularly dr ew money from the line of credit as an advance to pay the cost s of
LMG’s projects. Once money was returned from the projects , the parties paid back the
advanced money. The court valued the line of credit balance at $37,833.04.
The second contested issue involves a home in Fergus Falls. The parties purchased
the property “for approximately $75,000 .” At the time of the purchase, the parties
withdrew $74,000 from an LMG accou nt. One half was used as a down payment on the
Fergus Falls home and the other was deposited into Off’s private bank account. The court
valued the house at $92,000.

3

The final contested issue involves a home in Mesa, Arizona which the parties
purchased in July 2010 from Dodgson’s parents for “approximately $99,751.” The parties
used $50,000 from an LMG account as down payment and financed the balance secured
by a home mortgage . Neither party made payments on the property after they separated,
and Dodgson paid $6,838.95 to stop a f oreclosure action. The court found the loan had a
$26,463.23 balance.
The district court issued its order dissolving the parties’ marriage and dividing the
parties’ assets and debts. The district court stated that “consideration of all relevant factors
supports a substantially equal division of marital p roperty and debt.” The district court
awarded Dodgson the Fergus Falls and Mesa, Arizona properties, directing that she had
full responsibility for the ongoing mortgage, taxes, and utility payments. The district court
also awarded Off his nonmarital Illinois residence, determined that he is responsible to pay
the $37,833 line of credit loan, and ordered Dodgson pay him $140,000 which “roughly
represents [Off’s] portion of the equity from the Fergus Falls property and the Mesa
property, and for payment of the one half of the [line of credit] loan.” The district court
denied Dodgson’s motion for amended findings and motion for a new trial. Dodgson
appeals.

4

D E C I S I O N
I. The district court correctly designated the parties’ contested assets and debt as
marital property. 1

The district court has broad discretion in allocating marital property in marriage
dissolution cases. Crosby v. Crosby , 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn. App. 1998), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). “Debt is apportionable as part of the marital property
settlement.” Justis v. Justis , 384 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied
(Minn. May 29, 1986). All property acquired by the parties to a dissolution is considered
marital unless it was (1) acquired as a gift, (2) acquired before marriage, (3) “acquired in
exchange for or is the increase of property described in” the other options, (4) acquired
after the valuation date, or (5) “excluded by a valid antenuptial contract.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3b (2018). Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law
that we review de novo, “but a reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s underlying
finding of facts.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). These findings will
not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous if they are not

1 In district court, the parties did not bri ef, and the district court understandably did not
address, the implications of the facts that (a) LMG has a separate existence from the parties;
and (b) LMG was not a party to the proceedings in that court. Similarly, these matters were
not raised in, and LMG is not a party to, the proceedings in this court. See Danielson v.
Danielson, 721 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. App. 2006) (“[I]n a dissolution proceeding, a
district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s
property rights.”); see also Blohm v. Kelly , 765 N.W.2d 147, 153 (Minn. App. 2009)
(“Corporate assets do not belong to the stockholders, but to the corporation.” (quotation
omitted)). Therefore, we also do not address the implication of these facts. See Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address an inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471,
479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal).

5

supported by the record. Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press , 589 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn.
1999).
A. Outstanding Line of Credit

Dodgson argues that the district court abused its discretion by holding her
responsible for one-half of the line of credit despite purported evidence that Off dissipated
assets in violation of Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2018). She claims that Off misused
marital funds he had received and which w ere intended to be applied to the line of credit.
The district court concluded that the evidence Dodgson provided to support her claim “was
vague, at best, and not conclusive of the funds being used for either marital or non-marital
purposes.”
Section 518.58, subdivision 1a , refers t o a party who “has in contemplation of
commencing, or during the pendency of, the current dissolution, separation, or annulment
proceeding, transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of marital assets.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1a. The record does not support Dodgson’s argument that Off violated this
statute.
The district court found that both parties stopped making payments on the line of
credit by early 2014, two years before the parties separated. The court found no evidence
suggesting that the parties were “in contemplation of commencing” a dissolution at that
time. Dodgson also argues that Off concealed the money. However, the district court
found that Dodgson knew about the balance because she filed the party’s taxes and did so
in 2014, the first year that no payments were made to the line of credit. Dodgson has not
shown how this finding was clearly erroneous and has not met her burden in showing how

6

the district court abused its discretion in concluding Off did not violate Minn. Stat.
§ 518.58, subd. 1a.
B. Fergus Falls Property

Dodgson next argues that the district court erred in ruling that the Fergus Falls home
was marital property. Dodgson claims that the evidence demonstrated the parties agreed to
an allocation of $74,000 from their business account during the marriage, and she used her
one-half to purchase the home . Therefore, she argues, the district court should have
considered “at least” the $37,000 she used for down payment as nonmarital property.
The district court found that t he parties did not reach an agreement regarding
ownership of the Fergus Falls home. We defer to these findings of facts. Olsen,
562 N.W.2d at 800. The district court correctly concluded that the Fergus Falls home is
marital property.
C. Mesa Property

Dodgson argues that the district court erred in ruling that the Mesa home was marital
property because her parents gifted it to her. Her support for this argument from the district
court’s record is that her parents (1) wanted to thank her for going “above an d beyond,”
(2) left the home fully furnished, (3) sold the property at a significant discount, and (4) were
adamant that she be the family member to purchase the property. Alternatively, she argues
that the current award results in her unfair hardship.
The district court found that t he parties purchased the Mesa property from
Dodgson’s parents during their marriage. All real property purchased during the marriage
is considered marital property unless, among other things, it “is acquired as a gift, bequest,

7

devise or inheritance made by a third party to one but not the other spouse.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3b. The intent of the donor is the most important factor in determining
whether a gift is marital or nonmarital. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. Intent is a question of
fact that is determined by looking at all the circumstances. Id.
Even if property is initially considered nonmarital, “it must either be kept separate
from marital property or, if commingled with marital property, be readily traceable.” Id.
“To overcome the presumption that property is marital, a party must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital.” Id.
Dodgson’s arguments as to why the district court erred are based solely upon trial
testimony which has been weighed by the district court. For example, Dodgson argues that
she “and her adult daughter testified convincingly and credibly about the intent of
[Dodgson’s] mother, including specific details such as where they were at the time th e
conversations took place.” The parties also testified that Off was not particularly close to
Dodgson’s parents. The district court weighed the evidence and concluded that Dodgson
did not overcome the presumption that gifts received during marriage are marital. On
appeal, she asks us to reweigh the evidence presented to the district court, but that would
infringe on the province of the district court. See Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn.
Pollution Control Agency , 644 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. 2002) (ruling that the court of
appeals erred because it “weighed the evidence as a trier of fact instead of analyzing the
issue properly under the supported by substantial evidence standard of review”).
Finally, Dodgson argues that the court should consider the Mesa property as her
nonmarital property because she would suffer an unfair hardship if it were not . If the

8

district court finds that the division of marital property is “so inadequate as to work an
unfair hardship,” it may “apportion up to one half of the property excluded” as nonmarital.
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2018). The district court did not make a finding on this issue
because Dodgson is raising it for the first time on appeal. Appellate courts generally will
not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich ,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Therefore, we decline to consider this argument.
Affirmed.