State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1397

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeremy Lee Krier,
Appellant.

Filed June 15, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-174

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
A jury convicted appellant Jeremy Lee Krier of second-degree assault after he
stabbed his ex-girlfriend in the back. Becaus e we are satisfied that sufficient evidence
proves that Krier used a dangerous weapon during the attack, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jeremy Lee Krier developed a fri endship with S.K. se veral years ago.
They began dating in mid- 2016, and initially, S.K. thought the relationship was
“wonderful.” But within a year, the relationship turned abusive. Although S.K. obtained
an order for protection (OFP) against Krier, th e two later rekindled their relationship and
moved in together. After a few months, Krier punched S.K. in the mouth, and she decided
to permanently leave the relationship.
A few weeks later, S.K. was removing some of her belongings from a storage unit,
with Krier present. Once she was finished, S.K. agreed to drop Krier off at his house. But
she reiterated to him that she was done with the relationship. Around the same time, S.K.’s
male friend texted her and asked if she would give him a ride home from the grocery store.
S.K. believed that Krier knew she agreed to help her male friend, with whom Krier thought
she was romantically involved.
After dropping off Krier, S.K. picked up her friend and drove him home. When
S.K. parked at her friend’s house, another car containing Krier and two of his friends pulled
behind her, preventing her from leaving. Krier jumped out of the car and yelled something
like “[y]ou’re caught.” Attempting to ignore him, S.K. finished carrying groceries into her

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friend’s home. When she came back outside, Krier was sitting in the driver’s seat of her
car. Krier told her to get in the car, but S.K. refused. S.K. attempted to walk away, but
according to her, Krier “raced” around and got in front of her. S.K. testified that Krier ran
towards her and “bearhug[ged]” her. Feeling like Krier punched or hit her in the back,
S.K. heard Krier say something like “[n]ow you’re stabbed” or “[w]hat are you going to
do now?”
Initially, S.K. felt shocked. She immediat ely applied pressure to the area, though
still unsure if Krier actually stabbed her. In an effort to get away from Krier, S.K. agreed
to get in the car with his friends. Wary of Krier’s friends, S.K. declined their offer to take
her to the hospital. Instead, she asked to go to her child’s father’s house. Krier left
separately in S.K.’s car.
S.K.’s child’s father took her to the hospital, where doctors discovered two wounds
on her back. The smaller cut required one stitc h, and the larger wound required two or
three stitches. Someon e at the hospital alerted police, a nd S.K. reported what happened.
Police arrested Krier. And because Krier left the scene of the attack in S.K.’s car, police
impounded it. When searching S.K.’s car, po lice discovered a black folding knife on the
floor on the driver’s side. The state char ged Krier with second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, S.K. testified about the inci dent, as described ab ove. Although S.K.
testified that Krier said something like “[ now] you’re stabbed,” she did not provide any
testimony about a weapon. The officer who interviewed S.K. at the hospital also testified
that there was nothing in his report about S.K. seeing a weapon.

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But the police investigator testified that S.K. told him she remembered seeing
something black in Krier’s hand after the attack, but she coul d not tell what it was. And
the investigator described the black knife polic e discovered in S.K.’s car after the attack,
which S.K. said did not belong to her. The state also submitted photos of the knife. Still,
the investigator acknowledged that he did not know if the knife was the weapon used during
the attack.1
At the close of the state’s case, Krier moved for a judgment of acquittal on the basis
that the state did not prove he used a danger ous weapon. The district court denied his
motion. Krier then presented testimony from his two friends that were present for the
attack. Both testified that Krier and S.K. were arguing, but they did not hear what was
said. Neither friend saw Krier physically touch S.K. Neither saw him with a weapon. And
both testified that S.K. said something like she th ought she was stabbe d when she got in
their car, but they each thought it was odd she declined their offer to take her to the hospital.
The jury found Krier guilty of second-degree assault. The district court sentenced
him to a guidelines sentence of 57 months in prison. Krier appeals.

1 Additionally, an employee fr om the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension described DNA
testing she performed on samples from the knife handle and blade. The knife blade had a
DNA profile that was insufficien t for comparison. Th e handle had five or more profiles,
meaning that the scientist could not ma ke comparisons. The BCA employee also
performed testing on Krier’s jeans because they had blood on them. The major source of
the blood was from Krier.

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D E C I S I O N
Krier challenges his conviction, arguing that the state did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he used a dangerous weapon to assault S.K. To evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence, we “carefully examine the reco rd to determine whether the
facts and the legitimate inferences drawn fro m them would permit th e jury to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which
he was convicted.” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted). In doing so, we view the evidence “in the light mo st favorable to the verdict”
and assume that the jury did not believe any evidence inconsistent with the verdict. Id.
Appellate courts apply the circumstantial- evidence standard of review in cases
where, like here, “the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient
to sustain the verdict.”2 Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). Convictions
based on circumstantial evidence ar e subject to “heightened scrutiny.” State v. Porte ,
832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). Therefore, when reviewing
the sufficiency of circumst antial evidence, we undertak e a two-step analysis.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the
circumstances proved by the state. State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013).
At this stage, we defer “to the jury’s accepta nce of the [s]tate’s evidence and its rejection

2 Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the
facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). And “circ umstantial evidence always requires an
inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. Here, the
question of whether Krier used a dangerous weapon to assault S.K. largely rests on
circumstantial evidence, including the discovery of a black folding knife in S.K.’s car.

6
of any evidence in the record that is inconsistent with th e circumstances proved by the
[s]tate.” Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
In the second step, we consider “whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted). In doing so, we independentl y examine all
reasonable inferences that may be reached from the circumstances proved, including those
“consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If a reasonable
inference other than gu ilt exists, then [appellate courts ] will reverse the conviction.”
Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
In order to obtain a conviction for second -degree assault, the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Krier used a dangerous weapon to assault S.K. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018 ). Here, Krier acknowledges that the evidence “arguably”
proved that he stabbed S.K. and that he used “an object” to do so. But he contends that the
state did not prove he used a dangerous weapon.
With the statutory requirements for seco nd-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
and Krier’s argument in mind, we now review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
Krier’s conviction. We turn first to the circumstances proved at trial. Bahtuoh,
840 N.W.2d at 810. After reviewing th e record, the state pr oved the following
circumstances at trial:
S.K. is Krier’s ex-girlfriend; When S.K. dropped off a male friend at his home, Krier
arrived and yelled something like “[y]ou’re caught”; S.K. took groceries inside her friend’s
home; Krier was sitting in S.K.’s car when she returned outside; S.K. tried to walk away;

7
Krier raced in front of her; Krier approached S.K. like he was going to “bearhug” her; Krier
did so; S.K. felt like he punched or hit her in the back; Krier said something like “[n]ow
you’re stabbed”; S.K. had two significant cuts on her upper back near her left shoulder
requiring stitches; Krier left the attack in S. K.’s car; police found a black folding knife in
that car; S.K. told police the knife did not belong to her; S.K. also told police she
remembered seeing something black in Krier’s hand after the attack; and forensic testing
did not connect the knife to the attack.
Having identified the circumstances proved, we turn to the second step of the
analysis, which requires us “to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted). The only rational hypoth esis based on the
circumstances proved is that Krier used the bl ack knife found in S.K.’s car to stab her.
Krier left the scene of the assault in S.K.’s car. Police recovered a black knife from that
car. The knife did not belong to S.K., and the police investigator testified that S.K. told
him she remembered seeing something black in Krier’s hand after he stabbed her. And
S.K.’s injuries are consistent with wounds resulting from a very sharp object, like a knife.
It is not rational to conclude that, despite the presence of a black knife in S.K.’s car
shortly after the assault, Krier did not use it. See State v. Seefeldt, 292 N.W.2d 558, 562
(Minn. 1980) (concluding that the jury coul d infer the nature of the weapon from the
evidence presented). Accordingly, we conclude that the only rational hypothesis from the
circumstances proved is that Krier used the black knife to stab S.K. See State v. Al-Naseer,

8
788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (noting that the state is not required to remove all
doubt, but only all reasonable doubt).
Still, Krier argues that, assuming he used the black folding knife, the knife does not
fall within the statutory definition of a da ngerous weapon. A “d angerous weapon” is
defined by statute as:
any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device
designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great
bodily harm, any combustible or flammable liquid or other
device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or
intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or
great bodily harm . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2018) (emphasis added). Under the final prong of the
dangerous weapon definition, an object may be a dangerous weapon if it “is calculated or
likely to produce death or great bodily harm” in the manner in which it is used. Id. “Great
bodily harm” is defined as “bodily injury wh ich creates a high prob ability of death, or
which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bod ily member or organ or other serious bodily
harm.” Id., subd. 8 (2018). To determine if an object is a dangerous weapon, we “examine
not only the nature of the object itself, but also the ma nner in which it was used.”
State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997).
Here, circumstantial evidence provided a basis to conclude that Krier used the knife
to stab S.K. twice in the back, near her upper left shoulder.
3 Despite his argument that all

3 Krier points to the fact that, at trial, the state acknowledged that it could not prove “for
sure” that Krier used the knife during the assault. But caselaw does not require the state to
prove the exact weapon us ed during an assault. See Scott v. State, 390 N.W.2d 889, 892

9
knives are not inherently dangerous weapons, the manner in which Krier used the knife is
dispositive here: he used the knif e to stab his ex-girlfriend. Using a knife to stab another
person constitutes using it in a manner that “is calculated or likely to produce death or great
bodily harm.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6.
In addressing the manner in which he used the knife, Krier ma intains that using a
knife to stab a person in the back could result in bodily harm, but not great bodily harm.
And he points out that, at trial, there was no testimony about the long-term medical effects
of the wounds or their proximity to S.K.’s vital organs. But this argument is contrary to
Minnesota law. The statutory definition of “dangerous weapon” does not require a victim
to actually suffer great bodily harm before an object can be classified as a dangerous
weapon. Instead, an object meets the definition of “dangerous weapon” if it is used in a
way that is “calculated or likely to produce great bodily harm.” Id. (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stat ed that whether an object is a dangerous
weapon does not depend “on the nature or se verity of the victim’s injuries.” Basting,
572 N.W.2d at 285. The supreme court concluded that doing so “would lead to a backward
analysis which would begin and end with assessing the ensuing injury, a result inconsistent
with both the legislature’s definition of a da ngerous weapon and with the structure of the
criminal second-degree assault statute, which establishes infliction of bodily harm and use
of a dangerous weapon as two separate elements.” Id.

(Minn. App. 1986) (noting that “[t]he fact s that the weapon was not recovered and the
victim did not see a weapon are not c onclusive” and concluding that sufficient
circumstantial evidence supported the conviction).

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Here, circumstantial evidence supported the inference that Krier used a knife to stab
S.K. twice in the back, near her left shoulder. Regardless of the injuries S.K. actually
suffered, indiscriminately stabbing another person in the back is using a knife in a manner
that is calculated or likely to produce great bodily harm. See generally State v. Patton ,
414 N.W.2d 572, 572 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that the way defendant brandished a
knife was sufficient to classify it as a dangerous weapon). Therefore, we conclude that the
state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Krier used a dangerous weapon to assault S.K.
As a result, sufficient evidence supports his conviction.4
Affirmed.

4 Krier also argues that the kn ife is not “designed as a we apon and capable of producing
death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. But because we conclude that
the knife is a dangerous weapon under a different prong of the definition, we do not address
this argument.