State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1398

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Demont White, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-18-617

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Philip K. Miller, Benton County Attorney, Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Melissa Sheridan, Special Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
In his direct appeal from his convictions for second-degree intentional murder, first-
degree assault, and arson, appellant argues that (1) the district court improperly joined his
case for prosecution with his codefendant’s case, (2) the district court err ed by admitting

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the victim’s out-of-court identification, (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his
first-degree-assault conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) he is entitled to a new
trial because of his pro se claims. We affirm.
FACTS
This case arises out of a shooting that caused the death of J.D. and injury to N.P.
Trial testimony establishes the following. Appellant William White, Jr., went to a bar with
V.L. and N.J, and the two victims, J.D. and N.P . In the early morning hours of Fe bruary
16, the group returned to the neighborhood where J.D. stayed with his sister, K.D., and her
fiancé, P.H. After returning to the neighborhood, a confrontation broke out between
appellant and J.D. Both N.P and V.L. witnessed the confrontation. N.P. testified that a
“scuffle” broke out between J.D. and appellant, and N.P. approached the two men . N.P.
punched appellant and then turned to walk away. In response, appellant “pistol-whipped”
N.P. from behind. Next, N.P. was shot from behind.
V.L. also saw appellant and J.D. “fighting” and “wrestling” with a gun in the street.
V.L. heard gunshots and saw N.P. fall to the ground, screaming. V.L. did not see who shot
N.P. V.L. testified that, “[a]t that time, [J.D.] was on the ground too.” N.J. was also present
during the fight, and V.L. testified that N.J. removed something from the car, which he
believed was a cell phone or a charger. After the shooting, V.L., N.J., and appellant got
into J.D.’s car and drove away.
J.D.’s sister, K.D., heard the gunshots and woke up P.H. P.H. went outside and saw
N.P. “screaming” and “bleeding out” on the ground. P.H. ran back inside to call for an
ambulance. K.D. and P.H. then found J.D. lying on the porch, “[e]xhausted and hurt.”

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K.D. and P.H. dete rmined that they could not wait for an ambulance and placed the two
injured men into K.D.’s car. K.D. began driving to the hospital, but a police officer pulled
her car over before she reached the hospital. The officer testified that J.D. was bleeding
and moaning in the front passenger seat. N.P. was lying in the backseat with his pants
down and blood on his legs and on his head. The officer requested more help and several
police officers arrived on the scene and provided medical care to J.D. and N.P. Two
ambulances arrived and took J.D. and N.P. to the hospital. J.D. was pronounced dead at
the hospital as a result of blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds.
After driving away, appellant, V.L. and N.J. made arrangements to switch J.D.’s car
with another car. The three men left J.D.’s car on a side street. After switching cars, the
three men went to a gas station to purchase a gas can. The men filled the gas can with fuel
but left the station without paying . Later that morning, the fire d epartment received an
alarm for a vehicle fire involving J.D.’s car. J.D.’s car was located about one to two miles
away from the gas station. Firefighters arrived at the scene to find that the fire was “fully
involved . . . throughout the vehicle” and discovered a gas can near the car. An investigator
took samples from the car to determine whether there was a presence of an ignitable liquid
in the passenger compartment. One of these samples tested positive for the presence of an
ignitable liquid. Investigators confirmed that the car belonged to J.D.
A forensic scientist with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (the BCA),
examined the bullet fragments found outside K.D.’s house. The BCA analyst determined
that the fragment was from a .38 caliber bullet. The BCA analyst also examined a bullet

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extracted from J.D.’s body and determined that it was also a .38 caliber bullet and had been
fired from the same gun that produced the bullet fragment by K.D.’s house.
A grand jury issued an indictment , charging appellant with first -degree murder
(counts 1 and 2), second-degree murder (counts 3-6), first-degree assault (count 7), second-
degree arson (count 8), and crimes committed for the benefit of a gang (counts 9-15). The
district court held a jury trial. After respondent State of Minnesota rested, the district court
dismissed the counts for crimes committed for the benefit of a gang (counts 9-15). The
jury found appellant guilty of second-degree intentional murder (count 3), second -degree
felony murder (count 5), first-degree assault (count 7), and second-degree arson (count 8),
and the district court imposed sentence . The jury did not return a verdict for attempted
second-degree murder (count 6) , and the district court declared a mistrial on that charge.
The jury acquitted appellant of the remaining charges.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appellant did not suffer substantial prejudice as a result of the joinder of his
trial with his codefendant’s trial.
Appellant argues that the district court improperly granted the state’s pretrial motion
to join his case with that of his codefendant, N.J. Defendants may be tried jointly “if they
are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts
or transactions constituting an offense.” Minn. Stat. § 631.035, subd. 1 (2018). There is
no presumption for or against joinder. State v. Johnson, 811 N.W.2d 136, 142 (Minn. App.
2012), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012) . The district court must consider: “(1) the

5
nature of the offense charged; (2) the impact on the victim; (3) the potential prejudice to
the defendant; and (4) the interests of justice. ” Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 2. In
reviewing a joinder issue, this court conducts “an independent inquiry into any substantial
prejudice to defendants that may have resulted from their being joined for trial.” State v.
Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 370 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). We consider each
joinder factor in turn.
a. Nature of the Offense Charged
The first factor favors joinder when “the overwhelming majority of the evidence
presented [is] admissible against both [defendants], and substantial evidence [is] presented
that [codefendants] worked in close concert with one another.” Johnson, 811 N.W.2d at
142 (citation omitted). The state charged appellant and N.J. with aiding and abetting
murder, assault, and arson , stemming from the shooting that killed J.D. and injured N.P.
The vast majority of the evidence and the witness testimony , including test imony from
V.L., N.P., K.D., P.H., the police officers, J.D.’s neighbor, the gas station attendant, and
the BCA analyst, was admissible against both defendants. The defendants were alleged to
have acted in concert with each other during each part of the criminal activity, during the
initial assault and shooting, when they fled the scene together in J.D.’s car after the
shooting, and when they set J.D.’s car on fire. Given these circumstances, we agree with
the district court that the nature of the offense favors joinder.
Impact on the Victims
The second factor considers “the impact on both the victim of the crime as well as
the trauma to the eyewitnesses who would be compelled to testify at multiple trials.” Id.

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at 143 (quotation omitted). The district court determined that this factor favored joinder
and we agree . The state charged appellant and N.J. with murder and attempted murder.
We agree with the district court’s determination that the victim, N.P., would have to “relive
the trauma of the alleged crime multiple times in multiple trials.” And that J.D.’s sister,
K.D., and her fiancé, P.H., would face the trauma of testifying about J.D.’s death at multiple
trials. See State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Minn. 2009) (recognizing that this factor
favors joinder when “potential trauma” is “significant”).
b. Potential Prejudice to Defendant
“Joinder is not appropriate when there would be substantial prejudice to the
defendant, which can be shown by demonstrating that codefendants presented ‘antagonistic
defenses.’” State v. Martin , 773 N.W.2d 89, 100 (Minn. 2009). “Antagonistic defenses
occur when the defenses are inconsistent, and the jury is forced to choose between the
defense theories advocated by the defendants.” Id. (quotations omitted). Antagonistic
defenses do not exist when the jury must “choose between the state’s theory of the case
and each defendant’s theory of the case.” Johnson, 811 N.W.2d at 143 (citations omitted).
Moreover, a “[g]eneral concern on the behalf of defense counsel” that antagonistic defenses
exist is insufficient to show substantial prejudice. State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 675
(Minn. 2003) . “A bsent an offer of proof or the identification of any inconsistent or
antagonistic defenses by the appellant, there [is] no indication that joinder would
substantially prejudice [a defendant’s] trial.” Id.
Appellant argues that the defenses were antagonist ic because the state ’s theory of
the case was that appellant was the shooter and N.J. was merely an accomplice. Appellant

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asserts in his brief that N.J.’s counsel repeatedly “pointed the finger” at appellant during
trial, but he does not back up that assertion with citations to the record. And N.J.’s defense
at trial was that he was not the shooter.
Here, the jury was not in the position of having to choose between contradictory
defense theories offered by the defendants. Instead, the jury had to decide between the
state’s theory of the case and each defendant’s own theory of the case. N.J.’s theory of the
case was that the state failed to prove that he was the shooter. And appellant did not claim
that N.J. was the shooter or try to place the blame squarely on N.J. See, e.g., State v.
Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Minn. 1985) (noting that substantial prejudice is not
evident where, for example, codefendants “did not even attempt to place the blame on each
other”). In fact, during closing argument, appellant’s counsel argued that another person,
V.L., was the shooter. While appellant makes a conclusory statement that antagonistic
defenses existed, he failed to present an offer of proof in support of his argument. Nor did
he support his claim of pervasive antagonistic defenses by citing to evidence in the record.
We conclude that appellant did not suffer prejudice when his trial was joined with his
codefendant’s trial.
c. Interests of Justice
“[T]he length of separate trials is a legitimate factor in deciding to join cases.”
Johnson, 811 N.W.2d at 143 (citation omitted). Here, the evidence would have been nearly
identical in both cases, and would have relied on the testimony of the same witnesses and
exhibits. Joining the trials was much more efficient and eliminated the risk that extensive

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media coverage of the first trial would impact the second trial. The interests of justice
favor joinder of the cases.
After our independent inquiry of the four factors set forth in rule 17.03, we conclude
that appellant did not suffer substantial prejudice as a result of being joined for trial with
his codefendant, and we affirm the district court’s decision.
II. The district court did not err by admitting the victim’s out-of-court
identification of appellant as the shooter.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by allow ing N.P.’s out-of-court
statement identifying appellant as the person who shot him. Evidentiary rulings rest within
the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Amos , 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 ( Minn.
2003). Even if the district court abused its discretion, an appellant is not entitled to a new
trial if the error was harmless. State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006).
N.P. was sedated and unconscious in the hospital for three days after the shooting.
Once he regained consciousness, an investigating detective visited N.P. at the hospital and
“carried on [a] conversation for quite a while” with him. The detective brought
photographs from the security cameras at the bar to see if N.P. “could remember who was
with him that evening.” The detective went through the photographs one at a time. When
he reached appellant’s photograph N.P. stated, “That is the motherf----r that shot me.”
At trial, the state sought to introduce N.P.’s out-of-court statement . Appellant
objected on hearsay grounds . Hearsay is an out -of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). While hearsay is generally not
admissible at trial under Minn. R. Evid. 802, an out-of-court statement offered to prove the

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truth of the matter asserted may be admissible if it falls within an exception to the hearsay
rule or is exempted from the definition of hearsay. See Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 408. The
district court admitted the statement over appellant’s objection, deter mining that the
statement was admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(C) . Under that rule, a statement “of
identification of a person made after perceiving the person” does not constitute hearsay if
the declarant testifies and is available for cross-examination. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C).
N.P. testified at trial and thus was available for cross-examination.
The parties disagree about the appropriate standard of review. Appellant argues that
we should review for harmless error, while the state urges this court to conduct a plain -
error analysis because appellant did not object to the detective’s testimony on the same
basis he asserts now. Compare State v. Yang , 774 N.W.2d 539, 554 ( Minn. 2009)
(reviewing objected-to evidence for harmless error) with State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,
297-98 (Minn. 2006) (reviewing for plain error when defendant fails to object at trial). We
determine that, even assuming admission of N.P.’s statement was erroneous, any error did
not affect appellant’s substantial rights under either standard. See State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d
646, 658 (Minn. 2011) (noting that parties disagreed about standard of review and applying
“less onerous” harmless-error analysis); see also State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583-84
(Minn. 2007) (explaining that both harmless-error and plain-error review require that, for
an error to be reversible, it must affect a defendant’s substantial rights).
The evidence, even if improperly admitted—which we do not think it was—was not
prejudicial to appellant . Prejudice occurs when an erroneously-admitted statement
substantially influences the jury to convict the appellant. State v. Expose, 872 N.W.2d 252,

10
260 (Minn. 2015). Furthermore, admitting an out -of-court statement that is “cumulative,
and merely corroborate[s] other [evidence]” is harmless. State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d
35, 42 ( Minn. 1994). Here, the state presented strong evidence of appellant’s guilt. In
addition to N.P.’s out-of-court identification, the state also presented direct evidence from
N.P. that he saw appellant struggling with J.D., and that appellant “pistol-whipped” N.P.
when he approached appellant. N.P. turned away from appellant to walk away, and was
shot in the back. V.L. testified that he saw appellant struggling with J.D. in the street over
a gun. Even under harmless -error review , the less -onerous standard for a criminal
defendant seeking rev ersal of his conviction, appellant cannot show “a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State
v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 84 ( Minn. 2005). We therefore determine that the district
court did not err by admitting N.P.’s out-of-court identification.
III. Sufficient evidence supports appellant’s first-degree-assault conviction.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for
first-degree assault.1
To evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts “carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the [factfinder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d
895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review the evidence “in the

1 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for his other convictions.

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light most favorable to the conviction” and “assume the jury believed the State’s witnesses
and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting
with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged
offense.” Id. We review de novo whether the defendant’s conduct satisf ies the statutory
definition of an offense. State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013).
The jury convicted appellant of first -degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.221,
subd. 1 (2018) , for shooting N.P. Under the statute, “[w]hoever assaults anoth er and
inflicts great bodily harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or
to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.” Id. Assault is defined as “(1) an
act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or (2) the
intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily h arm upon another.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 10 (2018); see also State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 305 ( Minn. 2012)
(recognizing two types of assault identified as assault-fear and assault-harm).
Appellant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that N.P.
suffered great bodily harm. Appellant concedes that N.P. suffered a gunshot wound , but
claims that the state failed to present evidence that the wound was life-threatening or caused
serious bodily harm or pain. We are not persuaded. The statute defines great bodily harm
as “bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious
permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of

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the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 8 (2018).
Sufficient evidence supports the first-degree-assault conviction. N.P. testified that
appellant “pistol-whipped” him. N.P. turned to walk away from appellant and was shot
from behind. P.H. ran out of the house and found N.P. “screaming” and “bleeding out” on
the ground, and feared N.P. would die. The officer who stopped K.D.’s car on the way to
the hospital saw N.P. in the backseat bleeding from his legs and his head. Officers provided
emergency medical care at the scene to stop N.P.’s bleeding and called for an ambulance.
N.P. was sedated and unconscious in the hospital for three days after the shooting and had
surgery on his stomach. The evidence amply supports the jury’s verdict that N.P. suffered
great bodily harm. See, e.g. , State v. Barner , 510 N.W.2d 202, 202 ( Minn. 1993)
(determining that victim suffered great bodily harm for purpose of assault statute where he
sustained a head injury, multiple stab wounds, and injuries to his hands); State v. Peters,
143 N.W.2d 832, 833 ( Minn. 1966) (affirming aggravated -assault conviction and fin ding
great bodily harm where victim was pistol-whipped and shot in shoulder).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury reasonably
concluded that appellant was guilty of first -degree assault. See Bernhardt v. State , 684
N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (noting that court will not disturb verdict “if the jury,
acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of
overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [a]
defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged”).

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IV. Appellant is not entitled to relief based on his pro se claims.
a. Venire
Appellant argues that he was denied the right to a jury made up of a fair cross section
of the community. When, as here, the defendant does not raise this challenge to the district
court, we review for plain error and consider whether (1) an error occurre d, (2) the error
was plain, and (3) appellant’s substantial rights were affected. State v. Brown, 937 N.W.2d
146, 158 (Minn. App. 2019) (citation omitted). To prevail, appellant mu st show that the
“the group allegedly excluded . . . was not fairly repres ented in the venire.” Id. (citations
omitted). Appellant contends that there was a “systematic exclusion of African-Americans
from jury panels,” but fails to support this claim with citation to evidence in the record .
Because appellant has not established that an error occurred, we do not address the
remaining factors . See id . ( determining that appellant failed to demonstrate error and
declining to consider remaining plain-error factors).
b. Mistrial
Appellant argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury on partial verdicts
and should have declared a mistrial on certain counts.2 Minnesota law provides that “[t]he
court may accept a partial verdict if the jury has reached a verdict on fewer than all of the
charges and is unable to reach a verdict on the rest.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(7).

2 Appellant also argues that the district court failed to sequester the jury and failed to give
the jurors adequate breaks. Appellant provided no factual support for these arguments and
we therefore consider them forfeited. See State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Minn.
2003) (considering arguments forfeited when they are unsupported by facts in the record
and contain “no citation to any relevant legal authority”).

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Here, the district court excused the jury to begin its deliberations on March 8, at 1:02 p.m.
At 9:48 p.m., the jury submitted a note to the district court revealing that it was having
trouble agreeing on certain counts. Less than half an hour later, however, the jury sent
another note asking for another hour to deliberate. At 11:26 p.m., the jury shared that it
was still unable to reach a verdict on certain counts . At 12:03 a.m. —and after
approximately 11 hours of deliberation —the district court accepted the jury’s partial
verdict. Because Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(7), explicitly permits a jury to return
a partial verdict, the district court did not act improperly by accepting the jury’s partial
verdict after 11 hours of deliberation.
Affirmed.