Christopher Lee Holloway, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-1410

Christopher Lee Holloway, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 30, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-14-8517

Christopher L. Holloway, Robbinsdale, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After having sexual contact two nights in a row with a fourteen-year-old boy he had
just met on “Grindr,” appellant Christopher Lee Holloway was convicted of two counts of
criminal sexual conduct. In his postconviction petition, Holl oway challenges the district

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court’s denial of his request to assert a mist ake-of-age defense, arguing that the statutory
age restriction of the defense is unconstitutional. And, according to Holloway, a Hennepin
County District Court order from 2014 (in a different case) concluding the age restriction
on the defense unconstitutional is binding statewide. Becaus e Holloway advanced this
argument in his direct appeal to the Mi nnesota Supreme Court, which upheld the
constitutionality of the mistake-of-age defens e, he is barred from raising it now.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Christopher Lee Holloway exchanged messages with a fourteen-year-old
boy on the location-based social media application, “Grindr.” After messaging for a short
time, Holloway went to the victim’s home, and the two had sexual contact. The next night,
Holloway returned to the vic tim’s home and engaged in sexua l contact again, including
sexual penetration. During the second encounter, the victim’s mother discovered Holloway
naked in bed with her son and called the police. Holloway fled but was quickly arrested.
The state charged Holloway with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
In response to the charges, Hollowa y expressed his intent to present a
mistake-of-age defense at trial. But, under the statutory provisions, 44-year-old Holloway
was too old to do so. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.344, subd. 1(a), .345, subd. 1(b) (2014)
(limiting the assertion of the mistake-of-age defense only to defendants who are no more
than 120 months older than the victim). For this reason, Holl oway challenged the
constitutionality of the statutes. Specifically , he asserted that th e restriction of the

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mistake-of-age defense based on age was unco nstitutional. The district court found the
statutes constitutional and denied Holloway’s request to assert a mistake-of-age defense.
Holloway’s counsel withdrew from representa tion ahead of trial, claiming that he
and Holloway disagreed on trial strategy and that Holloway failed to make payments.
Accordingly, Holloway represented himself at his jury trial. The jury found him guilty of
third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
At his sentencing hearing, Holloway was represented by counsel. On the
third-degree conviction, the district cour t sentenced Holloway to 60 months in prison
(stayed for 15 years), 240 days in county jail, supervised probation for 15 years, and
lifetime conditional release. On the fourth -degree conviction, he was sentenced to
15 months in prison (stayed for 15 years), 240 days in county jail, and supervised probation
for 10 years. These sentences are concurrent.
After sentencing, Holloway filed a direct appeal, challenging the constitutionality
of the age limitation on the mistake-of-age defense. We upheld its constitutionality,
holding the following:
Minnesota Statutes sections 609.344, subdivision 1(b) (2014),
and 609.345, subdivision 1(b) (2014), do not violate a
criminal-sexual-conduct defendant’s substantive due process
or equal protection rights by limiting the mistake-of-age
defense only to defendants who are less than 120 months older
than their child-victims.

State v. Holloway, 905 N.W.2d 20, 20 (Minn. App. 2017). And the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed. State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 2018).

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Following the resolution of his direct a ppeal, Holloway filed a pro se petition for
postconviction relief. The postconviction court summarily denied his petition. Holloway
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Holloway asks this court, through a postconviction petition, to vacate his
convictions and grant him a new trial, with permission to assert a mistake-of-age defense.
Generally, Holloway argues that this relief is warranted because the district court lacked
jurisdiction over his criminal case due to the statute’s unconstitutionality.
The postconviction court denied Holloway’s petition, concluding that his claim was
procedurally barred. It reasoned that his petition was based solely on claims already raised
on direct appeal to the supreme court.
We review the denial of postconvictio n relief for an abuse of discretion.
Reed v. State, 925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). But we review the postconviction court’s
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Brown v. State ,
895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017).
When an individual files a petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal is
resolved, like here, “[c]laims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should
have been known but were not raised on di rect appeal, are procedurally barred.”
Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013) (citing State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d
737, 741 (Minn. 1976)); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018) (“A petition for
postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds
that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.”).

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According to Holloway, his convictions must be vacated because the district court
did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the statutes under which he was prosecuted
unconstitutionally limit the mist ake-of-age defense. Holl oway argues that this age
restriction on the mistake-of-age defense was found unconstitutional in an unrelated
Hennepin County District Court order from 2014, and that the postconviction court erred
in not following that order. But this is an argument he already advanced in his direct appeal
to the Minnesota Supreme Court.1 See Holloway, 916 N.W.2d at 344 n.4 (“Holloway also
raised a novel legal argument that a 2014 order from Hennepin County became ‘binding
state law when Hennepin County failed to appeal,’ and that it was thus error for the Olmsted
County district court not to follow that ‘binding’ law. Because Holloway’s attorney
withdrew this issue at oral argument, we do not consider it here.”). There, the supreme
court held that the age restriction on the mistake-of-age defense was constitutional. Id. at
347, 350. And decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court, including its opinion from
Holloway’s direct appeal, are binding preced ent statewide—on the postconviction court
and on this court. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
In sum, Holloway’s postconviction petition is based on grounds that he raised in his
direct appeal and that he knew about at the time of his direct appeal. His petition is

1 We acknowledge that Holloway voluntarily withdrew this argument at oral argument
before the supreme court decided its merits, but this shows that he knew about the argument
at the time of the direct a ppeal. It is barred from being considered in a postconviction
matter. See King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2002) (“Once a defendant directly
appeals a conviction, all matters raised in that appeal or kn own at the time of appeal will
not be considered by a postconviction court in a subsequent petition for relief.”).

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therefore procedurally barred.2 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Holloway’s postconviction petition.
Affirmed.

2 Because this argument is procedurally barred, we decline to address its merits. See King,
649 N.W.2d at 157 (“[E]ven if appellant’s cl aims are procedurally barred, this court may
in the interest of justice address the claims on their merits.”).